THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

THE CREST-WAVE 

OF 

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 



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THE BATTLE 
OF GETTYSBURG 

THE CREST-WAVE OF 
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 



BY 

FRANCIS MARSHAL 




NEW YORK 

THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY 

1914 



t 4-76 



Copyright, 1914, by 
The Neale Pubushing Company 



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DEDICATED 

TO THE 

AMERICAN SPIRIT 

That its largeness shall dissipate all 
remaining sectional and hostile feel- 
ings that have been engendered by 
our Civil War, and bring to the fore 
its common nobilities, heroisms, and 
truths, rendering these into a heri- 
tage common to the American people. 






Through lurid racks of cloud the sun outpours its surge. 
So war enshrouds the birth when nations strong emerge. 

This is the way of heaven — till Selflessness shall reign — 
The soul of man untombed to light his wide domain. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

A Word to Americans 13 

Foreword 17 

CHAPTER 

I Causes of the Civil War. Near and Remote 21 

II Field of the Civil War: Elxtent and Character; Natural 
Divisions; Salient Points of Attack and Defense; Its 

Terrain; Strategic Features; the Virginia Salient . . 30 

III Material Resources; Federal and Confederate .... 35 

IV Systems of Army Recruitment; Federal and Confederate 50 
V Conditions Precedent to the Gettysburg Campaign ... 56 

Vr Strength and Organization of Respective Armies ... 60 

VII On Campaign 70 

VIII Cause of Hooker's Failure. Position of Armies Preced- 
ing Battle 85 

IX The Field of Gettysburg 104 

X Battle of July First; Comments in 

XI Conditions Preceding the Second Day's Battle .... 133 

XII The Second Day's Battle 152 

XIII Critical Thoughts on Second Day's Battle 183 

XIV The Crest Wave, the Battle of July Third 194 

XV After Battle: Deductions and Criticisms 236 

XVI Lee's Retreat 247 

XVII The Reflex 252 

XVIII The Final Campaigns : Battles of the Wilderness, Spottsyl- 
vania. North Anna ; Cavalry Operations ; Cooperative 
Movement of the Army of the James ; Movement to 

Cold Harbor ; Battle of Cold Harbor ; Comments . . 259 

XIX Grant's Flank Movement to the James and Petersburg; 

Siege of Petersburg; Appomattox 299 

XX Peace and Unity: Generalship of Lee. Grant, and Sher- 
man; Treatment of Private Property and Prisoners of 
War; Why Secession Failed; Lincoln and Lee . , .314 

Index 329 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

PORTRAITS 

President Abraham Lincoln .... Frontispiece to Half-Title Page ^ 
Gen. Robert E. Lee Frontispiece to Title Page ^' 

TACINa 
PAGB 

Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade i.l-^ 

President Jefferson Davis 17^ 

Sec. of War Edwin M. Stanton 35 ^^ 

Maj.-Gen. George B. McClellan 40 : '^ 

Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck 46^ 

Lieut.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart 581^ 

Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker 68 

Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson 7.3'. 

Maj.-Gen. W. S. Hancock 85 '^^ 

Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds m v/ 

Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday 114!/ 

Lieut.-Gen. A. P. Hill 1181^ 

Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles 1.33 i^^ 

Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet I43 (/^ 

Lieut.-Gen. R. S. Ewell 148 v/ 

Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood 152 i/' 

Maj.-Gen. George Sykes 156 

Brig.-Gen. William Barksdale 166 l 

Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick 183 i' 

Maj.-Gen. George E. Pickett ^94 |/ 

Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum 196 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING 
PAGE 

Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander 200 

Brig.-Gen. George A. Custer 231 

Gen. U. S. Grant 2.'^2 

Lieut.-Gen. William T. Sherman 2.S7 

Lieut.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan 270 

Lieut.-Gen. Joseph E. Johnston 316 

Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas 318 

MAPS 

Virginia between Richmond and Washington 70 

The Country from the Potomac to Harrisburg 75 

First day's battle, north of Fairfield Road, the last Confederate at- 
tack, and second day's battle, south of Fairfield Road, the last 
Confederate attack 135 

Pickett's charge, July 3, 1863 202 




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A WORD TO AMERICANS 

Surely the time has come when we of the United States 
as one people can, without sectional feeling or sensitiveness, 
consider together events and their results, the arriving 
at which has been worked out by the people of sections of 
our common country while engaged in fierce strife embit- 
tered by misunderstandings grown into temporary hatred. 
It is ignoble longer to harbor such fosterings of our past 
while we study causes and effects. 

Influenced not so much by personal considerations as by 
the desire to do something toward eliminating from our 
common American life the least vestige of that sectional ani- 
mosity which was naturally engendered by our great family 
dispute of 1861-65, ^"d believing that truth, faithfully and 
lovingly narrated, is as interesting, to those who read to gain 
knowledge, as glossily woven fiction,^ the writer has at- 
tempted to narrate the most decisive event of war that has 
transpired in the history of the building of our nation. Not 
that numerous histories of the Battle of Gettysburg have not 
been, and will not be, written, but because every history so 
far, in character and treatment, has been purely military, and 
therefore of interest only to the military student. This ap- 
pears hardly fair toward the average reader, who supplies 
the bone, sinew, blood, treasure and suffering in time of war, 
and who is entitled, therefore, to full knowledge of the events 
of war in detail, scope, and results. Particularly is this 
knowledge due the American citizen in order that he may 
have a comprehension of the highest duty which he can be 
called upon to perform as a citizen defender of our republic. 

13 



14 A WORD TO AMERICANS 

For the reasons enumerated it is the endeavor in this writ- 
ing to present a great military event in terms and language 
that, if not entertaining, will at least be easily understood, 
be the reader, citizen or soldier, woman or youth, constitu- 
ting our unique and unparalleled American life. Especially 
addressed are the now aged of our war time, that they shall 
banish all lingering animosities of those beleaguered years, 
retaining the laudable impress of that time of stress only 
as sacred memories to be transmitted as ennobling heirlooms 
of our common Americanism. A special appeal is made to 
all citizens, young and old, who reside on either side of our 
almost obliterated sectional line ; that all shall, rising to the 
lofty spiritual altitude of the Fraternal Spirit, forever over- 
look all vapory lines of partition in recalling those deeds of 
noble endeavor to establish American life on an enduring 
basis. Let us, through the bringing together of the North 
and South on the field of our common glory, become better 
acquainted with what we did on that blood sanctified field, 
learn the lessons which our brave sires and grandsires 
there wrote out in heroic blood, and, in truth and love, study 
together and assimilate the facts and deeds of our common 
inheritance of glory which were left to us Americans, and to 
the world, by our great ancestors on the field of Gettysburg 
half a century ago. 

Shall we not emulate the example of the two soldiers 
who had been arrayed against each other in that War, and 
who, later, speeding on a train through a valley which their 
war had made a desolation but which was now smiling 
with rich farms, pointed out in good humor the positions 
of the victors and of the vanquished while they were 
building the new nation, — the Union? Like them, shall 
not we as a united people with glowing hearts study the 
culminating event of our family dispute in the light of the 
spirit of these two warriors, and proudly tell of its Crest 



A WORD TO AMERICANS 15 

Wave, as it surged on the ocean of Life? its every unit an 
American Valor rushing to spume red on the rock-reef of 
Cemetery Hill on July 3, 1863, then to level the storm-waves 
of war in shining ripples, and as a united Energy breast the 
great Deep of life, its mightiest swimmer. 

Let us Americans grow truer and larger of heart as we 
contemplate those mighty waves of war as they crashed 
together and receded to level in unity and oneness. Surely 
the time has come when Americans shall cease to trail 
enmities of the past as skeletons, and assimilate its experi- 
ences to be the bone and sinew of the present and their guide 
to right action in the future. Then the hard and bitter ex- 
periences of war will become ennobling memories. 

— The Author. 











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FOREWORD 

So completely have the statistics of the campaign and 
battle of Gettysburg been dealt with by numerous able 
writers and historians — especially by men of marked mili- 
tary attainment and fame, and versed in the art and practice 
of war — that it would be both hazardous and foolishly 
presumptuous for me to attempt to improve or add to 
their voluminous records and discussions. c.The statistical 
facts and data herein are not meant as a compilation,, 
so nearly agreed are the most competent authorities who 
have exhausted vast tomes of official reports and documents. 
These, however, are supplemented and enlivened by much 
material gleaned from organization histories and personal 
reminiscences, detailing the action of corps, divisions, bri- 
gades, regiments, companies, batteries, and collective and in- 
dividual incidents. As Confederate records are lamentably 
rare and incomplete, the writer who deals with our Civil 
War, or any phase of it, comprehensively, must bear the 
odium of apparent favor to the Federal aspect because the 
data of the Federals comes nearer being complete. 

Notwithstanding what may have been written before on 
this subject, the fact remains that there are as many view- 
points of any subject as there are human beings to consider 
it. And some of these hold elements of newness, and, per- 
haps, of information. Especially is this true of so momen- 
tous and many phased an event as the sixteenth decisive 
battle of the world — the Battle of Gettysburg. It is not 
the purpose here to present Gettysburg as a battle only, or 
mainly, nor simply as a contest of armed hosts. This is, in 

17 



i8 FOREWORD 

fact, incidental to what may well be considered a large, per- 
haps deeper, view of the subject ; a view which, in reality, is 
essential to an occult understanding of the battle itself; for 
greater forces than armies must have been engaged, acting 
through our fathers, on that field fateful to mankind! 

The two dominant Federal and Confederate armies ar- 
rayed against each other at Gettysburg were, in personnel, 
unlike any other armies which had ever met in battle outside 
of the United States of America ; for both were composed 
of citizens of a new nation, unlike any other that had ex- 
isted; independent, highly intelligent men, mustered from 
every pursuit of a free and progressive life. The men of 
which these armies were composed were of warrior races 
and ancestry, and they had become good citizens. The 
noble daring and indomitable courage of their sires 
had found free and constructive scope in the ex- 
ploiting and development of an imperial domain in the New 
World, as their more distant progenitors had in the Old. 
For such superb human material to submit itself to become 
disciplined into mere fighting mechanisms — automatons, 
like most armies — was an impossibility. Disciplined, yes ; 
but not out of individual intelligence and initiative action 
subordinated to advance a common enterprise or purpose. 
Rather was the individual intelligence heightened by disci- 
pline, that it should work more intelligently and congenially, 
and act with coordination in close or dispersed mass. 

This New Man on earth was regenerate of his regal an- 
cestry in bone, fiber and blood, and also in mind. He was 
fed of a virgin soil, breathed an untainted atmosphere, and 
was further vitalized by the presence of imposing and won- 
derful forests primeval, and vast plains of reverential si- 
lence lifted, at spaces, into majestic ranges towering into the 
infinite blue. What wonder that a new and extraordinary 
war was inaugurated by such men over a country so formid- 



FOREWORD 19 

able that it alone would have served to engulf the armies 
of Napoleon and those that opposed his adept genius? 
What wonder that the ranks of these American armies were 
studded brilliant with contented privates who competently 
judged, and freely voiced their judgment of epauleted gen- 
eralship, while loyally serving and dying under it often be- 
cause of lack of it? Is it a matter of surprise that these 
men represented not only themselves in person, but the spirit 
of an equally superb American womanhood — mothers, 
wives, sisters and sweethearts — which had bid them go 
forth to battle ! Is it not a matter to be wondrously spoken 
cf, — the campaigns and battles of unparalleled duration and 
fierceness to which these armies rollickingly submitted them- 
selves ? 

The facts pertaining to these heroic incidents, though 
feebly woven, cannot but be of interest as our com- 
mon heirlooms of glory, if nothing more. But, peradven- 
ture, they will help in finally misting away the lingering 
gauze of bitter memories of those torrential years of our 
family storm, and in bringing to view a clear sky that will 
long bless our country and mankind. 

In this age of commercialism with its intense selfishness, 
it is well to study the great events in our rearing of a na- 
tion. It is good to know that, on occasion, men will rise 
above self; that hearts will thrill and send the red blood 
coursing in heroic deeds, leaping into action for a cause be- 
lieved to be just. A warrior sleeps or stirs in the breasts of 
most men — and women ; and they love war, not for its car- 
nage and devastation, but because it speaks to the heroic life 
they feel within themselves; and to read of it lets them out 
to breathe its robust atmosphere and live in its splendid 
action. It is good that Americans shall read of and thus 
feel the vital events of their history in order that the fire of 
patriotism shall not die in their hearts. 



20 FOREWORD 

The ceaseless war between Good and Evil, the Spir- 
itual and the Material, Progress and Retrogression, is the 
universal cause of disturbance and revolution. In this 
revolution a local insurrection is like a volcanic obstruction 
heaved up in the boundless ocean of Being. Against such 
the infinite waves of the Great War dash and hurl until the 
obstacle is torn and washed below the level and disappears. 
The American Civil War was an incident or phase of the 
universal War. 

Thus viewed, and in the light of its beneficent results, its 
regretable phases become ameliorated to fade and mist away. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

THE CREST WAVE OF THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 

CHAPTER I 

CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 

THUS far in human history true national life has 
eventuated only after war. War for a principle, 
sometimes — generally for something less noble and endur- 
ing — but war; and then national life has emerged into 
greater or less permanency of being. So, likewise, on the 
free soil of the New World. From a war for principle, the 
great principle of Human Freedom, the unjoined British 
subject Colonies emerged, an assemblage of States joined in 
a Confederation bound together by the neutral hostility of 
self-interest. Finding in this tentative step toward union 
that these same self-interests were best served, the next ad- 
vance ensued and was enacted into a Constitution .meant 
to bind the existing States into one indissoluble Confedera- 
tion or Union, and also all territorial sections that should 
thereafter enter the Union and become an integral part 
of the nation. And in establishing this great principle, 
the American fathers accomplished far more than was af- 
fected in their rearing of a republic. 

The Document of the Union of States against tyranny, 
and the American Revolution resulting therefrom, marked, 
and, for the first time in human history, established a fact 

21 



22 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

greater by far than the union of States — the fact thai 
" All men are free and equal, in the inalienable right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Yet, in this proud 
Declaration, the fathers immediately stultified themselves 
before the world, and undermined the structure of freedom 
which they proceeded to rear thereon, by permitting the 
greatest of all tyrannies, human slavery, to nest therein. 
But, withal, they wrought nobly ! For did they not, for the 
first time in human history, compel tyranny to recognize 
the great principle of the freedom of man? And so firmly 
did they establish this principle of life, that when, in 1861, 
the same contest had grown to the dimensions of war, 
tyranny assumed the subservient role of rebellion, also for 
the first time in human history. 

Civil wars have, without exception, been class wars — the 
Commonalty against Sovereigns, or against arrogant over- 
lording by an Aristocracy. The civil wars of the European 
ancestry of Americans followed this general course, even 
those numerously incited by the religious class for its own 
base or questionable ends. But, being near of kin to 
the English people, Americans are their direct inheritors. 
Hence, in England's wars between mass and class, the near 
predecessors of our Civil War are found. English history 
is so familiar to Americans, however, that it is needless to 
present the progressive phases of the conquest of the powers 
of the Crown by the people, until the latter finally gained 
virtual supremacy over the aristocratic class, as well as over 
the Sovereign. What concerns Americans most is that, as 
the result of these wars of England, parts of the persecuted 
mass, that is of the great common people, and a less number 
of the aristocratic class — the latter with royal favor or 
disfavor — migrated and made homes in America; the for- 
mer settling the northern, the latter the southern Atlantic 
seaboard. 



CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 23 

The dominant settlement of the United States from the 
past of humanity through its European descendants was 
effected by the best, the most energetic and fearless repre- 
sentative elements of two distinct classes of humanity, the 
great common people and the aristocrat. And with them 
they unconsciously brought their old feud — the feud of 
humanity — the never-ending contest between freedom and 
tyranny. They were " Pilgrims " in fact! Bearers of the 
Ark, and chosen guardians of the Covenant of Human 
Freedom, primevally made by the Father with His children 
universal. Bearing this Ark, and blood-pledged for man 
to this holiest of covenants, the meager remnants of Puri- 
tans and Huguenots escaped annihilation at the hands of 
Aristocracy impelled by the agents of Retrogression, reli- 
gious persecution and hate. These hardy, self-reliant rep- 
resentatives of the great commonalty of freedom, not 
seeking nor accepting favors, but simply a place on earth 
where they might plant and grow Freedom for themselves 
and their posterity, naturally, if unconsciously, sought the 
more rugged zone of the New World as being most con- 
genial ground on which to bring to fruition the seed of their 
desire; clearing way for it through wildernesses, and com- 
pelling the penurious soil to give to it sustenance. With 
equal naturalness the adventurous representatives of Aris- 
tocracy — of tyranny — sought and obtained from the 
home government grants of landed estates in the warmer, 
more genial zone of physical ease and comfort. 

Here, then, at the very outstart of what was to become 
the United States are found transplanted two of England's 
long hostile classes, continued under their old conditions of 
royal favor, or more or less of persecution. And, to give 
virgin fuel to their ancient flame, African slavery found 
congenial home with the aristocrats of the South. Here, 
erected in America, and naturally hostile from old, and spe- 



24 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

cially under their new eonditions, were soulliern barons 
against northern yeomen. Snrely a less apparent and needy 
cause than that of slavery would serve to touch the match 
and blaze this smoldering camp-fire! So England's history 
of its civil conllict between classes repeated itself in our 
American Civil War. 

Our conflict between freedom and slavery, tyranny, was 
inevitable; and slavery had to disappear if either the nation 
or its free representative government were to live. Enlight- 
ened Democracy must win over the old proud Aristocracy, 
risen in rebellion — in tacit inferiority — against the threat 
at its domineering supremacy. A conflict adequate to the 
death of slavery was inevitable, but not necessarily a war. 
And when the good time comes around when the " hidden 
shall be revealed," the pages of history, then luminous with 
the truth, will display the fact that our family jar w^as 
fomented to war by the same lurking power which has 
been responsible for most armed conflicts of magnitude 
from the Dark Ages down to the present. Why should 
we, the flower of human progress, escape this calamity 
which has beset lesser peoples — many to their destruction 
as power- factors among the nations? But, as yet, this may 
be onlv touched upon — due to blind incredulity. The 
fundamental basis of the American Civil War being thus de- 
fined, that contlict may be studied with greater accuracy 
and a deeper comprehension than is possible with Slavery 
assumed as having been its root. 

To say that war was inevitable to the settlement of the 
fostered natural conditions of conflagration is not enlarg- 
ing on the truth. Had not the natural belligerent condi- 
tions been fostered, however, but loft to their natural 
course of settlement, it would not have been true that war 
was inevitable to their adjustment. Hence, as a matter of 
truth, we must further touch upon a hidden feature of the 



CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 25 

Civil War which has to do with the controlHng under-cur- 
rents of life, to none of which are our people awake, es- 
pecially to the phase of this secret power which has ever 
conspired against our national life and free institutions, as 
being in their nature hostile to its purposes. Unfortunately 
we did not sufficiently suffer by our Civil War to awaken 
us to its secreted cause, and to the ever-increasing jeopardy 
impending from this Undiscovered. Nor has the time of 
awakening yet arrived. Nevertheless, if Americans will 
fully benefit by the lessons of our Civil War its deeper 
phases and under currents may not be overlooked, and a 
comprehension of these will save much future trouble. 
For, while in the newness of our unprecedented experience 
wc submit ourselves to many ridiculous and tyrannical in- 
iquities, our unalterable purpose of freedom holds us un- 
conquerably hostile to permanent submission, and sure to 
depose them. 

If, in any measure, it has been made to appear that our 
Civil War was an inheritance from the near or distant 
past, it is because those who recognize these facts have, in 
their study of history, penetrated somewhat beneath its 
mere superficial aspects, or masks of the truth. And it 
would be strange, indeed, if a mind, once turned in that 
direction, did not continue its penetration a bit, and there 
discover that few, if any. great wars have not been incited 
by a so-called religious force. That such was present in 
our Civil War is true. For who living doubts the insight, 
honesty, or knowledge of that event exercised and pos- 
sessed by President Lincoln? Upon sitch correct data de- 
pended his successful prosecution of the war. We find the 
following among his records made in the early days of his 
administration : 

" A few days ago I saw Mr. Morse, the learned inventor 
of the electric telegraph ; he told me that, when he was in 



26 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Rome, not long ago, he found out the proof of a most 
formidable conspiracy against this country and all its in- 
stitutions. It is evident that it is to the intrigues and 
emissaries of the Jesuit, that we owe, in great part, the 
horrible war which is threatening to cover our country 
with blood and ruin. The tme motive power (behind 
Secession) is secreted behind the thick walls of the col- 
leges and schools of the Jesuits. Sooner or later this na- 
tion will know the real origin of these rivers of blood and 
tears, which now spread death and desolation everywhere. 
And, then, those who have caused these desolations 
and disasters will be called to give an account of 
them. This war would have never been possible without 
the sinister influence of the Jesuits. We owe it to them 
that we now see our land reddened by the blood of her 
noblest sons. I do not pretend to be a prophet. But, 
though not a prophet. I see a very dark cloud over our 
horizon, and that dark cloud is coming from Rome. It 
is filled with tears of blood. It will rise and increase, till 
its flanks will be torn by a flash of lightning followed by 
a fearful peal of thunder. Then a cyclone such as tlie 
world has never seen will pass over this country, spreading 
ruin and desolation from north to south. After it is over, 
there will be long days of peace and prosperity; for the 
Jesuit and merciless Inquisition, will have been forever 
swept away from our country. Neither I nor you, but 
our children, will see these things." 

Lincoln further records that the working tool of this 
secreted power was Democracy, which, expressed as a 
political party, was opposed to, and interfered with, the 
successful prosecution of the Federal war and to that ex- 
tent acted as the ally of the Confederacy. 

Looking back into the conditions preceding the war, it 
appears evident that true students of that time can honestly 



CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 27 

igree with Lincoln that " This war would never have been 
)Ossible without the sinister influence "of some power that 
vas not then apparent to the general public. Left to its 
latural conditions, the sectional controversy over slavery 
:ould have been settled satisfactorily to both sections, had 
he Union slave States recognized the law suggested by 
vir. Lincoln and passed by Congress in March, 1862, urging 
hem to free their slaves by agreeing to pay the owners for 
hem. Surely, it required some extraordinary and subtle 
nfluence to carry an entire population into a devastating 
var to maintain slavery, when two-thirds of that population 
vas strongly opposed to war for that institution, and the 
najority of the other one-third would have been glad to 
)e rid of it in a way that would not subject them to pe- 
uniary loss. Under these cultivated conditions of ele- 
nents naturally combustible, war was inevitable between 
he North and South. 

Armed conflict having become inevitable, then, a con- 
ideration of War itself may be beneficial to those who 
hiiik of it only as a wholesale slaughter by men become 
)easts. War, even as a selfish enterprise, sometimes has 
he appearance of an ultimate saving device employed by 
he Wisdom that attends to the well being of humanity. 
\s famine and pestilence often relieve disorders of physical 
lumanity that the entire body shall not become chronic 
vith diseases, so does War; and when it is waged for the 
ight or a principle, it eliminates mental disorders grown 
nto fever and plague until there remains no other remedy. 

Our local insurrection in the ceaseless Revolutionary 
)rogress of humanity viewed in this light, the belief in its 
nevitableness is sustained by what it effected of cleansing, 
lational unity, strength and growth. Nevertheless, had 
)ur best wisdom met in a patriotic spirit personal and sec- 
ional ambitions would not have been victorious; and with- 



28 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

out doubt peaceful methods would have accomplished more 
than did our Civil War. Only was it inevitable when the 
people of the United States — the vanguard of humanity — 
permitted wisdom to yield to the inflammation of selfishness. 

Secession failed in its attempt to disrupt the Union, and 
in this the law was sustained by the bayonets of armed 
hosts. But the conflict did not fall short of giving to us, 
as individuals and as a people, a full measure of honest 
and ennobling examples, rare lessons, and sacred memories, 
with which to build more grandly and cement more firmly 
the new national life which it brought to us. We are no 
longer slaves to slavery, to its tyranny. A thousand free 
workmen earning prosperous homes in building our South 
are more cheering, more profitable, than a thousand slaves 
hopelessly dragging the depleted fields or trying to brighten 
their dingy quarters with a weird pathos of song. Are 
we not now masters of self-developed conditions of skill 
and craft of hand and brain, and not the bound subjects of 
raw, undeveloped conditions? Is cotton " King," or are we 
who manufacture it into profitable fabrics for the world 
and ourselves? Do our rich soils lie fallow of all but 
cotton and tobacco, or are they teeming with varied prod- 
ucts? Is not the earth yielding its billions of mineral 
w^ealth to our blazing furnaces and gleaming forges? Is 
our South longer dependent, or independent; debtor or 
creditor to the world? 

Are w^e not imbued with the real spirit, the true pride of 
life? Free Americans, every one! and proud of that price- 
less honor, bought and eternally sealed with great treasure 
and richer blood. Our Civil War was a sacrifice unto sal- 
vation ; a throe in the birth of Freedom. From its swirling 
flames emerged the celestial form and spirit of Liberty, 
calling her benediction of '' Freedom to all men." Her 
war-hammered diadem glitters with gleaming suns, the 



CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 29 

States ; each in rivalry only to outdo in generating and re- 
flecting light to render more luminous the common Shield. 
Union at last — in a common cause and glory. This was 
a result of our Litigation confirmed by the decision of the 
Judge. These are some of the tangible, visible reasons why 
our American valor swept the slope of Cemetery Hill at 
Gettysburg, in July, 1863, like an ocean's tidal wave, to 
crest, spume red, fret back and level in robust waves of 
prosperous peace on the great Mother Deep. Because 
Secession failed, these exist. 



CHAPTER II 

THE FIELD OF THE CIVIL WAR 

THE conditions were ripe for armed conflict in 1861, 
when Abraham Lincoln was elected President of 
the United States as the representative of the political party 
which had arrayed itself at the polls in opposition to the 
extension of slavery into the new territories of the West. 
Following the election Civil War broke out, the Confed- 
erate forces attacking Fort Sumter, in the harbor of 
Charleston, South Carolina. 

The field of conflict naturally embraced that section of 
the United States which had undertaken withdrawal from 
the Union, covered by the eleven States which had decided 
to erect themselves into an independent nation under the 
name of the Confederate States of America. The frontier 
or " border " States developed a difficult problem during 
the early war, as these, neither slave nor free, but both, 
essayed a neutrality which they were unable to effect, their 
position between the contending sections making them the 
great battlefields of the war. 

The nature and conditions of the Confederate war held 
the South to the defensive while often acting in offensive 
defense in endeavors to hold its terrain free from the of- 
fensive invasion which was forced upon the Federal Govern- 
ment, the North, in contesting to bring the seceded States 
back into the Union under the plea of holding Federal terri- 
tory and the Union intact. These facts of hostility, which, 
in ordinary war, give an advantage of three to one to the de- 

30 



THE FIELD OF THE CIVIL WAR 31 

fense, in this case were emphasized by the size and character 
of the territory over which this war operated. With a 
northern front of nine hundred miles, as the crow flies, six 
hundred miles on the west, and to the south and east a 
continuous ocean front of about fifteen hundred miles in a 
direct line, and some three thousand of irregular coast line, 
including the Mississippi River, this field of war embraced 
800,000 square miles of territory, or an area equal to con- 
tinental Europe. The surface of this field was so diversified 
and cut by formidable mountains, rivers, streams, the coun- 
try interspersed with great forests and meagerly threaded 
with indifferent roads, as to render it phenomenally de- 
fensible. The Federal forces, after forcing the Confed- 
erate frontier at any point along its thousands of miles, 
were instantly involved not only with valiant antagonists, 
but with the entire country and its population, which at 
every step of advance multiplied many fold, demanding 
ever increasing detachments of soldiers to guard flanks, 
rear, and attenuating lines of communication and sup- 
ply, while concentration of forces was difficult and often 
impossible. Of these adverse features of the war the 
Confederacy was almost wholly exempt while it was bene- 
fited by the Federal difficulties. Its extreme western or 
trans-Mississippi section could only with great difficulty be 
conquered and this supply source of the Confederacy cut 
ofif, by holding open the Mississippi River, the great water- 
way of the Confederates. The Alleghany Mountains, 
coursing north and south a little east of midw^ay between 
the Mississippi and the Atlantic ocean, in their initial rise 
in the Central South offered no obstacle to passage east and 
west around their southern terminus ; but, rising abruptly 
northward, they prevented the passage of armies except at 
the far north, and subordinate ranges curtained and de- 
fended the intervening valleys as foremade runways for 



32 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

invasive operations northward, while opening into supply 
sections to the south. 

This central mountain range furnished an impregnable 
flank protection to the defense, and its several great rivers, 
with their innumerable tributaries, served as lines of de- 
fense from behind wdiich armies were obliged to drive their 
opponents at every step. The Federal armies w-ere com- 
pelled either to reinforce east or west by passing one far 
northern defile over the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, or 
to maintain Eastern and Western armies so powerful as 
to do their separate parts of the common w'ork unaided by 
one another. They were also forced to operate on a double 
line in progressing their necessarily invasive war. And 
their main western line, east of the Mississippi, was sup- 
plemented by operations west of that river, but more or less 
dependent upon that stream as a base. For this reason, and 
the more important one, of cutting off and isolating the 
trans-Mississippi supply region of the eastern Confederacy, 
the Mississippi was opened and held by the Federals as a 
first necessity to the success of their arms in the West. To 
insure success to the Federal Government the coastline of 
the Confederacy was closed to foreign trade by an effective 
blockade along an irregular shore of some three thousand 
miles, following bays and navigable inlets such as blockade- 
runners might harbor in. The order given by Lincoln in 
April, 1 86 1, to blockade all ports from Virginia to Texas 
necessitated a great navy of deep-sea warships and a shal- 
low water flotilla, w^hile numerous strong detachments of 
land forces w-ere required in attempts to penetrate inward 
against the numerically inferior forces necessary to the de- 
fense of the Confederate territory. 

Multiplying these natural aids to the defense was, the 
State of Virginia, a huge salient one hundred and fifty by 
one hundred and fifty miles, exterior measurement, thrust 



THE FIELD OF THE CIVIL WAR 33 

northward at the northeast angle of the Confederacy; the 
Federal frontier, the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay- 
as its north and east wet ditch, with Washington, the Fed- 
eral capital, on the immediate opposite bank of the Potomac, 
in easy jeopardy unless strongly fortified. The west wall 
of this salient was built of the almost impregnable Alle- 
ghany Mountains, a subordinate eastward range of which, 
the Blue Ridge, curtained the fertile Shenandoah Valley 
for invasive movements of the Confederates across the 
Federal frontier into the rich Cumberland Valley 
stretching through Maryland and Pennsylvania to the Sus- 
quehanna River. This valley was covered to the south- 
eastward by the South Mountains, the continuation of the 
Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, the impassable Alle- 
ghany Range guarding to the northwestward. This great 
salient, destined to be the vital battlefield of the war, fur- 
nished natural advantages to the defense so numerous and 
formidable that, in league with an alert and able army, 
they compelled successful attack to be delivered from its 
wet ditch, the Chesapeake Bay with its tributary rivers, 
which numerously cut the defensive terrain of the salient 
from its eastern coast to its western mountain rampart. 

Seldom in the history of war have topographical and 
strategic advantages so urged to flank and rear operations 
against an enemy occupying the Virginia salient. For 
here a spacious inland waterway opened from Washing- 
ton, the Federal capital, to Richmond, the capital of the 
Confederacy, and to its rear, along the course of the Poto- 
mac River, the Chesapeake Bay and up the James River, 
the Virginia shore frequently indented by bays into 
which considerable rivers empty. These afforded every 
advantage for the supply of armies operating from the 
shore inward, either against the flank of armies operating 
toward Washington, or for attack on the Confederate cap- 



34 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

ital, itself, always threatening in flank and rear from these 
water-base positions, and hence holding the Confederates 
to its protection and away from Washington and invasion, 
in the presence of a competent antagonist. 

From any side available for Federal penetration, except 
the water-front, this salient of the Confederacy was im- 
pregnable ; so proving itself through four years of ceaseless 
and desperate assault made by an army of mettle and un- 
conquerable valor such as the world has seldom seen save 
in its equally superb defending opponent; the first steady, 
stern, patient and invincible; its brother army of defense, 
fiery, impetuous, with spirit indomitable. These two 
armies contested four years, converting the center of Vir- 
ginia into the fiercest vortex of war the world has ever 
seen in a like area. Within the lines of twelve miles 
square, having Fredericksburg for its eastern boundary, 
were fought four great battles and scores of lesser engage- 
ments, in which 129,000 men laid down their lives. 




SKC. Ol- WAR I.DWIX M. STAN" TON 



Facing Page 35 



CHAPTER III 

MATERIAL RESOURCES 

THE South quickly became a solid unit in support of 
war; for the North, not content with placing itself 
as a barrier against the persistent and indefinite expansion 
of slavery, denied to sovereign States within the Union 
compact the right to secede and withdraw from that Union, 
and, with the proceeds of people, territory, and Union prop- 
erty, to set up and erect a new government, a new nation, 
necessarily hostile, and ever bent on the extension of slavery 
into the very territory from which it had been excluded by 
the North. To the South, then, the war necessarily be- 
came a war of presumptuous, degrading invasion, a war 
of tyrannical subjugation with the purpose of establishing 
negro equality. At the time the Act of Secession was 
passed by most of the Southern States, about two-thirds 
of the white population owned no slaves. This great com- 
mon class of the poor white people was bitterly against 
slavery because the negro robbed the white man of his 
legitimate work, such as that of tilling the soil. Having, 
strong color prejudices, they at the same time opposed the 
abolishing of slavery, because of their fear that the free- 
dom of the slaves would raise him to their level. For this 
reason the negro-hater constituted the main portion of the 
Soldiery in the Southern army. 

With this urgent oneness of purpose and will dominant, 
and so maintained by the idea and the stern fact of in- 
vasion, the Confederate Government was, in practice, a 

35 



36 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

dictatorship thinly gnised. Nor ch'd it delay in operating 
as such ; for at an early stage in the war it established a 
universal conscription, first, of all white men between the 
ages of eighteen and forty-five, and, finally, of all from 
fifteen to sixty years of age who were not physically dis- 
abled for army service. So intensely patriotic did the 
South become, that it was l)etter for the would-be stay-at- 
homes to face the guns of the enemy than those of a niore 
certain kind which would surely pelt him, fired from every 
woman and lisper, should he skulk the front of war. Thus 
the depletions of war were promptly and continuously re- 
plenislied so long as men and material resources existed in 
sufiiciency to maintain armies possessing any considerable 
efficiency. For this reason, out of a population of four- 
teen millions, every able-bodied white man from the age 
of fifteen to sixty was available, and was, in some manner, 
effective in, or to, the Confederate armies in the field. Out 
of this fourteen millions there were four millions of slaves 
who were engaged in the raising of food supplies for the 
armies and for home consumption, and in erecting fortifi- 
cations. In this manner all slave men, women, boys and 
girls of five years of age and upward, were employed, the 
vast majority in the fields raising provisions, some in the 
building of fortifications and field-works. This left every 
white man absolutely free to the military service — truly, 
a condition of aid to the Confederates unprecedented ! 
These four millions of slaves were of vast importance to 
the war, not only in supplying the armies with food, but in 
releasing their equivalent of able-bodied white men to the 
actual fighting ranks, otherwise held home for producing 
supplies. 

As a total of war efficiency, then, the Confederacy had 
a one-minded, war-urgent population, and every able- 
bodied man, white and black, effective in and for the war, 



MATERIAL RESOURCES 37 

The armies organized and engaged in campaign found 
themselves operating in an intensely friendly country, 
where every inhabitant, knowing every stream and road 
over which they moved, was a self-constituted scout, spy, 
and guide to every open and blind road and path, mislead- 
ing to the compelled invader. The defense moyed on in- 
terior or short lines against the enemy on exterior or long 
lines, the invader with ever-lengthening lines of communi- 
cation and supply to guard by increased detachment every 
mile advanced. This last-mentioned fact saved the Con- 
federates the usual detachment of men, of from twenty to 
fifty per-cent of the total army enrollment. 

The combined material features favorable to the de- 
fense fully offset and equalized any preponderance of men 
the attack brought against it. And, in addition, as a 
mighty power in the Confederate war, was the spirit of 
the South, which permeated practically every unit of its 
population after the war was actually begun, not alone 
the soldiery, but quite as important, those left at home — 
wives, mothers, sisters, sweethearts, children — who smoth- 
ered their aching hearts in the breast of the common cause 
while they called, " Go! Good-by," to the objects of their 
love. The great masters of war count this spirit equivalent 
to the trebling of the numerical strength of the troops. 
What measure, then, shall define its power when actuating 
an entire people — proud and imperious — of which the 
soldiery was a part? 

Another weighty advantage to the defense was, that op- 
erating on interior or short lines, it was able quickly and 
heavily to concentrate its forces at any endangered or ad- 
vantageous point against the offensive ; while the latter was 
forced to dispersion and exterior lines of operation. Illus- 
trative of this feature of our Civil War is the fact that 
" In fifty of the great battles fought, the forces were 



38 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

within two per-cent of being equal at the point of contact 
or fighting." Many of these potent factors of war strength 
are generally omitted, or are so seldom arrayed en masse 
by winters on the war, that the average reader is left to 
the illusion that war strength is almost wholly a matter of 
numbers of men and cannon arrayed and available. True, 
lacking men and guns, the other factors of war strength 
would be valueless and not to be counted; but, having the 
men and guns, these otherwise silent factors array and arm 
themselves to the aid of war with a potency far greater 
than the mere physical force of the same armies without 
them. 

As the comparative fighting quality of the soldiery of 
the North and South during the Civil War is sometimes a 
matter of discussion, the following facts are given with a 
view^ to settling that point. As already stated, in fifty 
important battles the respective forces actually engaged 
on the firing line were within two per-cent of being equal. 
This was due to the heavy Federal detachments for rear 
and frontier guards holding against an active, bold reg- 
ular and irregular cavalry, and often large bodies of infan- 
try, and sometimes it was due to generalship. Thus, with 
forces practically even at the point of battle, the results dem- 
onstrated the relative merits of the troops engaged. The 
facts are that "Of the sixty severe battles of the war, ten 
show drawn battles and twenty victories for each side. In 
thirty-four battles the Federal forces remained in posses- 
sion of the field, while the Confederates did the same in 
twenty-nine. In eleven assaults by large masses the Fed- 
erals won, in eleven, the Confederates." 

Man to man, then, the northern and southern soldiers 
proved themselves equals as fighters; and as armies, in be- 
ing able to bear greater slaughter than any others in modern 
time up to the Civil War, excepting only those of Napoleon. 



MATERIAL RESOURCES 39 

The losses sustained by individual regiments largely ex- 
ceeded anything of record in modem war previous to ours ; 
these in a single battle often standing decimation up to 
seventy to ninety per-cent of their number, entire divisions 
frequently suffering losses of forty to fifty per-cent in one 
action, Federals and Confederates alike. Longstreet's 
Confederate division at Gaines' Mill lost fifty per-cent of 
its men, and the Army of the Potomac, under Grant, in 
1864, from May 5th to June loth, nearly one-half its total 
of one hundred and twenty thousand men. 

These facts are here detailed not only for the sake of 
truth, but because of the general misunderstanding exist- 
ing, even yet, throughout our country, that the greater 
population of the North gave the Federal war a great ad- 
vantage over the Confederacy by enabling the Federal 
Government to place on the battle line a superior force. 
The truth is far from this, all things considered, as has 
been shown and will appear later. Frequently, due to 
forced detachments, and, sometimes, to lack of general- 
ship, there was not even numerical equality at the point of 
battle, and rarely did Federal superiority of numbers more 
than offset the physical and higher advantages possessed 
by the Confederates. 

The main factors of Federal war strength, when ar- 
rayed, were limitless men and material resources, of which, 
however, but a moiety was available for the reason that the 
North did not make a common cause of the war, its terri- 
tory being scarcely invaded. The war was almost foreign, 
even to its frontier. Hence, the farther its invasion of the 
South penetrated, the farther it left home behind and atten- 
uated interest of close contact; while from the piling 
demands of the invasion, irritation took the place of 
friendly and close personal interest. 

The general feeling toward the war was radically dif- 



40 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

ferent in the two sections arrayed against each other. In 
the South, at the outstart, it was a class war, as already- 
stated, instigated and inspired by ambitious politicians and 
deeper schemers, w^ho appealed to the affiliated affluent 
slave ow^ners, and w-ere either abetted or sustained by them ; 
while a large majority of the people of that section, the 
mass from which armies are draw^n, w^ere, in large measure, 
opposed to secession, this disposition affecting many of the 
dominant class also, including no less a personage than 
Robert E. Lee. It was not until hostilities were actually 
begun by the Confederates, and invasion was thereby made 
necessary to the Federal Government, and the cry of In- 
vasion w^as raised, that the war became popular in the 
South. Then its aspect quickly changed from a class to a 
popular war, and thus remained till the echo of the last 
hopeless shot. 

On the other hand, Mr. Lincoln foresaw from the first 
that if war ensued it must be a popular conflict, a w^ar of 
the masses of the North, if it was to succeed and the Union 
be preserved. And while laboring to his utmost to avert 
an armed conflict, to this end offering to sacrifice every- 
thing but the Union to save the Union, he never lost sight 
of the fact that w^ar was possible, and that if it eventuated, 
it must be popular to succeed. Seldom has a ruler faced 
a larger crisis, or one beset with so many and such perplex- 
ing difficulties, not only of domestic threatenings, but of 
jeopardies from abroad. And never has there been one 
who, either by experience or attainments, was apparently 
less fitted to meet and master such a crisis. 

The inter-hostile main units of power in the North were 
further divided by radicals, the abolitionists, who would 
sacrifice everything else to the destruction of slavery, and 
the peace party, which was for peace at any price. At this 
time many Northerners sympathized with tlie South and 




MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN 



icing Page 40 



MATERIAL RESOURCES 41 

strongly denounced the war. These so-called " Copper- 
heads " formed secret organizations to oppose Lincoln's 
plans, poisoning the popular mind, even from the halls of 
Congress and the Senate. Meanwhile the Democratic 
Party stood squarely arrayed against its new political 
antagonist, the Republican Party, in the purpose of the 
latter to restore and preserve the Union at the sacrifice of 
all else, if need be. 

Among the leaders of these heterogeneous and conflict- 
ing interests, sentiments, and radical determinations, there 
were but comparatively few who forgot themselves and 
rose to the magnitude of the crisis. And the self-seeking 
ambitions of these patriotic few weakened their efficiency 
and denied to them the clear and lofty vision requisite to 
safe leadership in such a crisis. And further, narrow 
self-interests, jealousies, and fear for their future commer- 
cial supremacy, so powerfully operated on some European 
minds, especially in England, that any semblance of a fair 
opportunity for meddling in the difficulties of the United 
States to the detriment of Federal interests was eagerly 
sought. England hopefully watched for any precipitate 
act of war on the part of the Federal Government enacted 
against the Confederacy, or of peaceful surrender of Fed- 
eral property — forts and arsenals — into the possession of 
the Confederates, and for any act which could be con- 
strued into a recognition of the Confederacy by the Federal 
Government as cause or pretext for its recognition by for- 
eign powers. 

At the vortex of this momentous turmoil, solitary and 
alone, stood Abraham Lincoln, a man practically inexperi- 
enced in public affairs, and judged incapable of exercising 
the knowledge imperative to their administration by most, 
if not all, of his new associates at the capital. In fact, he 
was looked upon by them as being a ludicrous accident 



42 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

tossed into the presidential chair, and as having no definite 
plan or fixed purpose to lead and guide him in the adminis- 
tration of the great trust imposed upon him in the exalted 
position to which he unexpectedly found himself elevated. 
The question asked by those who thought themselves best 
able to judge — and to administer! — was: "How will 
it be possible for this incapable to bring order out of this 
chaos, or to unite its hostile elements and lead them to vic- 
tory over the most formidable insurrection which it has 
been the fate of Government to face during man's his- 
tory?" 

But Abraham Lincoln, before taking up the ponderous 
burden of the presidential office, had made a deep and pro- 
found study of the public affairs and of the government 
of the United States, especially in relation to the subject 
of slavery, over which his country had become so fatally 
involved and embroiled ; nor had he failed to foresee and 
prophesy such disaster. He entered upon the momentous 
duties of his high office with a full understanding of the 
one dominant matter on hand, the slavery question, and 
the ruling conditions and forces centered upon it, and com- 
prehending these more profoundly than did any other man 
of his time. While the leaders, his legitimate helpers, were 
busy in misjudging him, and scheming to make up for his 
deficiencies, with eyes narrowed to their personal interests 
of ambition, Lincoln sat quietly in observation, holding 
steadfastly to his oath to the main issue, " To preserve the 
Union," remaining calm, unobtrusive, and apparently 
quiescent while making himself familiar with his new po- 
sition and its duties, and gathering the reins of power and 
direction into his large hands. Nor did the great common- 
alty, standing more remotely alert, fail to suspect its own 
kind of crisis-ability as lying in wait in the great commoner 
who was winning its heart, to enjoy its implicit trust, and 



MATERIAL RESOURCES 43 

lead it through the wild rage of great war, and save the 
Union — a loving trust, such as no other ruler has ever 
won from a people. For Abraham Lincoln ruled with the 
almighty power of love. 

During the initial period of inaction, Abraham Lincoln 
made himself master of the situation by holding the north- 
ern turbulence from either weak or aggressive action; for 
authoritative movement could be made with his approval 
only. Meantime, the insurrectionists were, by the nature 
of their enterprise, compelled to ceaseless forward action, 
and in so doing they were obliged to proceed on aggressive 
lines, and of a nature which would force them either to 
abandon their undertaking utterly, or else to break the peace 
by armed hostility. The North was restrained from overt 
acts, while every reasonable inducement was being held out 
to the South to withhold its secession element from break- 
ing the peace and rupturing the Union. 

Thus, at the beginning of his first administration, Abra- 
ham Lincoln dominated men and forces by masterful in- 
action; utilizing these and conditions to maintain public 
peace, if possible, while consolidating his forces for war, 
should that eventuate. He so united parties, factions, and 
men in the free States, that these forgot their differences 
and arrayed themselves almost unitedly in the determination 
to preserve the Union at any cost, his Democratic opponent 
for the Presidency, Stephen A. Douglass, publicly declar- 
ing himself as a staunch supporter of the Union cause. 
When Fort Sumter was bombarded by the Confederate 
forces the North was ready to spring to arms in defense 
of the Union in overwhelming mass, and to pour its blood 
and treasure to sustain the Union cause under the accepted 
leadership of this calm, patient and modest man. At 
this trying time Lincoln proved himself not only a " mas- 
ter of men," but, greater than this, the master of a great 



44 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURCx 

crisis involving the highest interests of the human race. 

But the untried experiment of creating vast disciphned 
armies out of the free and independent citizens of a free 
repubhc yet remained to be made a demonstrated success. 
It was indeed a herculean task, when undertaken without 
the aid of an adequate nucleus of regular troops and edu- 
cated, trained officers upon which to build by expansion, 
and from which to draw trained commanders to discipline 
a flood of raw material issued from a people utterly lack- 
ing experience or knowledge of war. These adverse con- 
ditions served to force upon the Administration, in the 
North, a swarm of influential politicians who sought scope 
for their personal ambitions in the new field of war. 
These men, though ignorant of the duties even of the pri- 
vate soldier, sought appointments as generals, in command 
of large field forces or of important military departments. 
This loaded down the Federal armies at the very outstart 
of the war with incompetent officers in high command, the 
little efficiency shown by most of them being due to regular 
officers, educated to war, serving under them as subordi- 
nates. Nor did this evil wholly disappear during the 
war. 

In the Confederate armies, on the contrary, Mr. Davis 
placed West Point men in high command so far as the 
supply of such permitted. Hence, these armies had that 
great advantage over those of the Federal Government 
during the two first years of the war when, more than 
frequently, the officers with a military education were 
compelled to serve and suffer defeat under " political gen- 
erals," even those who never acquired any ability in the 
art of war. In fact, until late in the war, a regular officer 
who sought command in the volunteer service — of which 
the armies were almost wholly composed — was, by the 
Federal Government, condemned to the extent of losing 



MATERIAL RESOURCES 45 

his rank in the Regular Army, to which he would return 
after the war closed. Fortunately this inane practice was 
abandoned at last ; but too late, however, to give the armies 
the benefit of large numbers of trained soldiers in high 
command. 

The South had still another advantage over the North 
in the early years of the war. From the first settlement 
of the South, its dominant spirit had led its preponderant 
or leading people to regard themselves as belonging to the 
aristocratic class of humanity, this feeling having been in- 
herited from their European ancestry, and brought with 
them in their migration to America. Aristocratic and 
chivalrous to a degree, they scorned labor and were the 
natural friends of slavery. Despising commercialism and 
mere wealth, for subsistence and comfort they confined 
themselves to owning large landed estates, and the raising 
of raw products, principally cotton and tobacco, selling 
these to the North and abroad, in exchange for manufac- 
tured products. These conditions of Southern life fos- 
tered the inherent spirit of its people, and with their sport- 
ing instinct and fiery natures rendered them natural soldiers 
ready for daring enterprise at the risk of life. It was only 
necessary that the South should make itself familiar with 
military tactics and evolutions to be ready for effective 
campaign and battle; for the discipline of orders and 
prompt obedience were natural to its everyday life at home. 

It was not excess of numbers so much as the slower 
coursing blood of the Northern rank and file which gave it 
that patient, stern determination that enabled it to with- 
stand the fierce onsets of its hot-blooded brothers of the 
South until the disparity in commanders was remedied by 
time and experience in war. One may wonder what might 
not be accomplished by combining these blood elements in 
disciplined hosts efiiciently commanded in an adequate 



46 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

cause. But this certain efficiency, dormant in the average 
American, surely must not be rehed on until trained and 
disciplined, to cope successfully with ready-trained armies. 
The experience of our Civil War fully demonstrating the 
well-known military fact that raw levies cannot be molded 
into an efficient soldiery in less than a year at least. In 
the early engagements of that war it was mob meeting mob, 
as compared with the later superb grapples of the same men 
as disciplined soldiers. Discipline only makes soldiers, and 
often good ones out of natural cowards. 

Viewing our Civil War in retrospect, it is not difficult 
to see that had it been possible for President Lincoln to 
pursue the same course as did Mr. Davis in selecting his 
leading generals, the conflict would have doubtless termi- 
nated years before it did. For, waged under such proper 
conditions of command, such as eventuated during the two 
last years of its continuance, the Executive would have 
been left free to give his attention to the broad political 
problems necessarily involved in the war, happily combin- 
ing these with its expansive military interests, the latter in 
the hands of competency. 

In the endeavor to remedy or mitigate the evils men- 
tioned, and to effect a fair degree of efficiency in the con- 
duct of the war, the harried President appointed and 
experimented with two commanders-in-chief of the Federal 
armies, McClellan and Halleck ; but until the war had de- 
veloped efficient generalship, and Grant was commissioned 
to that lofty responsibility, neither Mr. Lincoln nor the 
condition was in the least relieved. True, McQellan 
proved himself a masterful organizer of "raw" levies; 
and by the rare personal love and hero-worship which he 
was able to win from them, to transform these quickly into 
disciplined troops and a formidable army. Had he been a 
fighter as well as organizer and disciplinarian, what might 




M.\i.-(,i:x. II. w. [i.\i.Li:cK 



Facing Page 46 



MATERIAL RESOURCES 47 

he not have accompHshed with the superb volunteer Army 
of the Potomac in its first flush ! The fact should not be 
overlooked that McClellan was limited in his conception of 
the large requirements essential to the formation of a 
disciplined army into a mobile moving and effective fight- 
ing mechanism; for did he not resist every effort made to 
induce him to consolidate the multiplicity of divisions into 
which he had divided the Army of the Potomac, and form 
them into corps, though the history of war shows that these 
larger units are imperative to full efficiency? Yet so stub- 
bornly did he oppose corps formation that the President 
was finally compelled to make this change himself. Later, 
when McClellan was again given free hand, he overreached 
to the other extreme, and, by consolidating Mr. Lincoln's 
wieldy and efficient corps of moderate size into unwieldy 
grand divisions, not only condemned his original division 
formation, but proved his incompetency to apprehend large 
needs, or to profit by his own, or by general experience. 
If it be urged that at that time officers competent to com- 
mand corps had not developed, it may be said, on the other 
hand, that for this reason there was more need for lessen- 
ing the number of semi-independent commanders, in order 
that the commander-in-chief should be able more closely to 
supervise and direct operations through a few subordinates. 
While it is acknowledged that, in theory at least, McClellan 
was a competent strategist, it is true that he nullified this 
prime requisite of generalship by moral cowardice, dis- 
played in the presence of his antagonist and~in battle to 
such an extent that it apparently paralyzed his mental fac- 
ulties ; otherwise it is impossible to account for his action 
and inaction during the battles of his Peninsular Campaign 
against Richmond, and at Sharpsburg or Antietam. On 
these occasions he needlessly exposed fractions of his army 
to actual annihilation, while holding the major part idly 



48 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

inactive and out of supporting distance, in both instances 
the smaller portion of his army thrown across a river into 
the face of the massed enemy. 

That Halleck was a fatality superimposed on the war, 
and especially on the Army of the Potomac, will become 
apparent as we progress. His actions, supported by the 
Secretary of War, — stern, inflexible Stanton, — and enacted 
openly and surreptitiously against the superior knowledge 
and judgment of the President, and even the surpassing 
ability of General Grant, often jeopardized the Federal war 
at critical points during periods of extreme stress and peril. 
His frequent interference with higher orders is indicated 
in the following cipher dispatch from Mr. Lincoln to Gen- 
eral Grant, sent during the rage of the battle campaign of 
1864, against Lee's army: "I have seen your dispatch to 
the War Office, in which you say, * I want Sheridan put in 
command of all the troops in the field, on the Shenandoah, 
with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and 
follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let 
our troops go also.' This, I think, is exactly right as to 
how our forces should move: but please look over the dis- 
patches you may have received from here, ever since you 
made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any 
idea in the head of any one here of ' putting our army south 
of the enemy,' or of ' following him to the death,' in any 
direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor at- 
tempted, unless you watch every day and hour, and force 
it." 

How truly the condition was told by the President is 
evidenced by the fact that General Grant was compelled to 
leave the Army of the Potomac at a critical time, and in 
person transmit his orders to Sheridan, in the Shenandoah 
Valley ; for otherwise they would have been so changed 
by Halleck during transit through the. War Office at Wash- 



MATERIAL RESOURCES 49 

ington that Grant's purpose would have been either stulti- 
fied or defeated — and this when Grant was commander- 
in-chief of all the Federal armies, and Halleck acting as a 
sort of adjutant to him and Stanton, the latter under his 
military thumb. 

The President rarely considered it expedient or safe to 
interfere dominantly with this military " wisdom," knowing 
that such action on his part might be more disastrous to the 
war than would be the defeat of an army in the field. The 
fault-finding correspondence of Mr. Chase, Secretary of 
the Treasury, helps to make this fact evident : " Since 
Halleck has been here the conduct of the war has been 
abandoned to him by the President almost absolutely." 
What better evidence can be offered to elucidate the situa- 
tion than this, and the dispatch sent by Mr. Lincoln to 
Grant, already quoted? Truly, if ever a ruler was ham- 
pered, thwarted, and often bound helpless by military in- 
competency, and by cabals of personally ambitious patriots, 
President Lincoln was that man until the advent of Grant. 
It can scarcely be questioned that Mr. Lincoln spoke only 
the truth in saying : " Had I not been interfered with and 
thwarted I would have successively ended the War two 
years sooner." When these complex and interthreading 
conditions, ruling in the North, at Washington, and with 
the head of military affairs, are contrasted with the solidar- 
ity of the South whose military affairs and armies were in 
the hands of warlike competency, a clear conception of the 
status of matters may be gained. 



CHAPTER IV 

FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE SYSTEMS OF RECRUITMENT 

THE preceding chapter leads up to a consideration of 
the systems of recruitment, which, necessarily, were 
vital to raising and sustaining the armies. In this may be 
found the main cause of the well sustained strength of the 
Confederate forces, the course adopted by the Confederacy 
being far superior to the more or less haphazard one pur- 
sued by the Federal Government. At the beginning of the 
war neither the Confederate nor Federal Governments had 
what might be named a nucleus of an army capable of ex- 
pansion even to first needs. Hence, the quickest and best 
means for raising and putting troops into the field was to 
allot to each State its quota of men required by the general 
government, leaving the method of their raising to the 
States, as well as their organization into regiments and bat- 
teries, and the commissioning of the officers of these smaller 
units. These were then turned over for muster into Gov- 
ernment service, where they were brigaded and formed into 
divisions and corps of mixed State troops, as a rule, under 
commanders commissioned by, and, in the main, appointed 
by the Government. 

The first levies once in the field as disciplined troops, the 
former method or system was anything but proper or ef- 
fective as a means of maintaining or expanding the armies; 
and, in the main, the Confederates abandoned it for the 
efficient system of direct recruitment or conscription of 
the individual man into Government service to be assigned 

so 



SYSTEMS OF RECRUITMENT 51 

to depleted regiments of veterans, whereby he quickly be- 
came an effective soldier under command of veteran com- 
pany, line, and general officers. In this v^ay the old 
regiments were maintained in strength, and were not, as 
weak units, compelled to fight beside strong units of raw 
men commanded by inexperienced officers. The Federal 
Government, meanwhile, persisted with the original method 
of recruiting its armies with raw levies organized and 
officered by the States. Hence, the veteran regiments 
became skeletons under veteran officers, while beside them 
were full units of raw troops commanded by officers as 
unqualified as their men. And it is a compliment to the 
soldierly qualities of the average American citizen that 
these undisciplined levies under command of ignorance sel- 
dom disgraced the Federal armies by unsoldierly conduct 
in battle, often winning where veterans would have with- 
held in hopelessness. But had the recruits been used to 
maintain the strength of veteran organizations, far more 
decisive results would have been obtained in numerous 
campaigns and battles, which would have tended to bring 
the war to an earlier close. 

During the later years of the conflict when conscription 
became necessary, great riots ensued, requiring troops from 
the field to quell these and enforce the conscription in New 
York City. Nor did the Government ever dare to enforce 
full, legitimate conscription in any of the States, but per- 
mitted substitution, whereunder large money " bounties," 
paid to substitutes, enabled many thousands of the most 
desirable citizens for the armies to escape'military service, 
sending in their stead an almost worthless class of mer- 
cenaries known as " bounty jumpers." These bounty men 
were an almost wholly unreliable element in the fighting 
ranks, mainly serving as blocks to honest and worthy con- 
scription, which would have replenished the armies with 



52 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

fitting material to be molded into brave and reliable troops. 
Nor did public opinion in the North look down upon the 
citizen who thus escaped his highest duty of citizenship, 
while the general government took no steps against this 
openly perpetrated fraud. It was one of the crying defects 
of the Federal system of recruitment, while giving just 
cause for much dissatisfaction on the part of the great mass 
who could not buy substitutes. 

This truckling policy of the Government, which resulted 
in discrimination in favor of the man of means, robbed 
the trained veteran officers of ambitious incentive and 
spirit, and did more to destroy patriotism and create ill 
feeling among the very class from which the armies were 
composed than any other single thing in connection with 
the war. 

Serious as were these faults in Federal recruitment, its 
armies suffered a greater evil through not promoting 
trained veteran officers to earned rank and positions of 
command. They were thus unjustly left with ambitions 
unsatisfied. 

True, the somewhat pernicious right was reserved 
to the rank and file of the Confederate armies, of 
choosing new company officers. And while the veteran 
was yet in abeyance in raw levies, the good fellow, rather 
than the fit soldier, was often the wearer of insignia of 
rank. But once the veteran had evolved, who may ques- 
tion that he was more competent than any other to select 
the officer who would utilize his life to the best advantage 
of all concerned? Certainly he, rather than political fa- 
voritism and ignorance, was the competent judge and com- 
missioning agent. And it may be questioned if his 
judgment was not superior, all things considered, to that 
of regimental commanders and their superiors, in the selec- 
tion of line officers, when it is realized that the private 



SYSTEMS OF RECRUITMENT 53 

soldier was in immediate contact with, and his Hfe largely 
at the disposal of, his company officers. These points of 
vantage would serve to subject other influences to that of 
soldierly efficiency in command. And further, this annual 
practice acted more to eliminate than it did to augment 
inefficiency of line officers, while serving as a spur to them. 
If an army was semi-disorganized for a short time by this 
election of line officers, it appears that this temporary weak- 
ening would be more than offset by the advantages noted. 
In the main ability for command was well utilized and re- 
warded in the Confederate armies; and had the Federal 
armies enjoyed this relief from incompetency in command, 
court-martials, cashierings, dishonorable discharges, and 
many deaths from other than the enemy's bullets would 
have been less numerous. 

As this republic of ours must look to its citizens for its 
material for armies in time of war, we should in the fu- 
ture act on knowledge arrayed by our Civil War. And 
it left no more important lesson than in that relating to 
the false system of recruitment of the Federal armies. If 
this must be done through the agencies of the States — as 
appears best — then let the work be done under regula- 
tions established by, and the direct supervision of, the Gov- 
ernment in manner that will insure equitable treatment of 
the citizen, while bringing to the ranks of the armies only 
fit material of individuals, to be disposed through the forces 
to their best advantage as fighting units. And, by all 
means, let these forces be officered as far as possible from 
the Regular Army — even to the taking of the many 
worthy and capable non-commissioned officers and privates 
from its ranks. Nothing can be much worse than the 
Civil War system, though it largely persisted in our Span- 
ish-American War. 

Having a war college, West Point, equaled by no other, 



54 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

it is unjust to ourselves as a nation that its graduates shall 
not be called to high command when war requires the in- 
crease of our army ; when small politics should be relegated 
to utter subordination to war's larger and then vital in- 
terests. 

This much, then, as to mass ability in men: on the part 
of the North, limitless, theoretically; but, practically, se- 
riously limited ; and this availability greatly weakened and 
rendered less than effective by false methods which de- 
creased effectiveness as needs rapidly increased through 
the demands of progressive invasion. And of finance, vast 
credits such as the world had never seen or been asked to 
give, even to old and firmly established nations, were open 
to the Federal Government. Its loans, though largely 
made from the people of the North, were readily obtained 
in Europe, the money world, though its leading money 
powers w^ere in no manner anxious for the success of the 
Federal cause, so much did Europe fear the rise of this 
New and Prospering among mercantile nations. Nor 
w^ere they friendly to the Federal war for reason that man- 
ufacturers yearned for the Southern cotton in most profit- 
able exchange for Confederate war supplies. This trade 
w^as almost entirely shut off by the Federal blockade of 
the Southern coast. Europe's attitude was expressed in its 
demand that the Federal blockade of the South must be 
made effective or the Confederacy would be recognized. 
In this " schemed " emergency, the great commonalty of 
the North, together with the private cupidity of Europe, 
came to the rescue. The Federal blockade was made ef- 
fective with the result that Europe went hungry for cotton, 
and its secret friend, the Confederacy, of needed munitions 
of war, which it had not the facilities or developed skill to 
manufacture. Blockade " running " thereafter became an 
important, if secret, item of European and Southern ma- 



SYSTEMS OF RECRUITMENT 55 

rine news. But the Federal credit had become firmly es- 
tablished. 

A foreign emergency was passed; also one at home. 
For such a situation, pregnant with disaster, was not left 
unaided by the home opposition to the war, which surely 
never offered its aid to the Government, but continued to 
shout Failure! to the world from under the safe shelter 
of the very Government and people which were heavily 
taxed in order to replenish a sea of treasure, threatening 
to be drained by the ever-increasing expense of the war. 
As a result of these conditions, while a great majority of 
the people of the North were loyal and patriotic, the in- 
spiration which characterized the spirit of the South was 
non-existent both in the Federal armies and in their rear. 
The Southern war was war, pure and simple, while in the 
North the seriousness of the war was not fully realized, 
and was effectively hampered by politics. It was often 
debatable which was uppermost. 



CHAPTER V 

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 

WHEN the campaign season of 1863 opened, war had 
already raged for two years over the entire field 
of 800,000 square miles. Great armies had become disci- 
plined and fought into veteran hosts, unique in many 
respects. They had not only proved themselves competent 
to any enterprise ever undertaken by soldiery, but the 
extent and character of the terrain had engendered a mo- 
bility and independence of movement and action on the 
part of the individual soldier, small groups of them, and 
of all units of organization up to army corps, and these 
combined in great armies. And of these armies, composed 
almost wholly of American citizens, those of the Confed- 
eracy had distinguished themselves for fiery dash and 
persistency, while the Federal soldiery, with its cooler 
Northern blood, had become famed for its patient stead- 
fastness, which never knew discouragement or " let go " 
under two years of almost uniform defeat or but partial 
success. 

During these years the Confederate cavalry had become 
a formidable arm of the service. The young men of the 
South had ever been sportsmen on horseback, and were, 
therefore, superb horsemen ready to mount as daring riders 
eager for dashing enterprise in war. Nor were able and 
unique cavalry leaders lacking to command these ranked 
horsemen. General J. E. B. Stuart, a young and dashing 
cavalry officer from the old army, in command of General 
Lee's cavalry, had from the first made the Army of the 

56 



PRIOR TO GETTYSBURG 57 

Potomac feel the deft thrust and weight of his arm; 
while, in the West, Forrest and Wheeler had performed 
wonders. The Federal troopers, on the contrary, had 
from the first to be trained into firm-seated, confident 
horsemen, and under the disadvantage of not being con- 
sidered an important arm of the service, or used as such 
by the Federal commanding generals. Further than this, 
no cavalry commander of marked ability had yet emerged 
from the Federal hosts to bring the cavalry to its own, or 
to consolidate its scattered regiments and brigades from 
mere outpost duty into regular divisions and corps of the 
armies, operating with them in close unison, or cooperating 
at a distance as formidable and self-dependent units. As 
a natural consequence, the Federal cavalry displayed a 
marked inferiority to that of the Confederacy wherever 
they met in conflict previous to 1863, at the very outstart 
of the Gettysburg campaign. The first cavalry battle of 
magnitude fought in the war occurred at Brandy Station, 
Virginia, With Stuart and his superb horse, the Federal 
cavalry proved itself worthy of its foe by gaining the ad- 
vantage in that engagement. And from thence on, these 
prime equals, the Confederate and Federal cavalry, devel- 
oped a cavalry war unique in history, restoring to that arm 
much of its past importance and glory, acting with success 
offensively and in defense against infantry and artillery 
as frequently as in conflict with its own arm. 

The cavalry feature of our war should not be passed 
without calling attention to the group of a dozen or more 
of young men, from twenty-two to thirty years of age, 
who had developed into the most capable cavalry gen- 
erals that the world has ever seen. And while the Con- 
federate cavalry in the East declined after the death of 
Stuart in the campaign of 1864, the cavalry of the Federal 
armies was at its best at the close of the war, when 



58 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

under Phil Sheridan, then promoted to chief command of 
the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac. It fought battles 
of magnitude against infantry and artillery often when 
covered by field works, and blocked the way to Lee's re- 
treating army at Appomattox. The cavalry had acquired 
the skill as well as the surpassing confidence to dismount 
and fight its equal of the other arms, while one- fourth of 
its number stood idle as horse-holders nearby, with mounts 
ready for all to leap into saddle and pursue whatever they 
had set moving rearward, fighting on foot with their in- 
ferior range carbines and horse artillery. The American 
cavalry not only restored that arm of the service from 
subordination to a parity with infantry and artillery, but 
advanced it into a field never before exploited nor thought 
of as possible to cavalry. 

Returning to the general condition of the war in 1863, 
when the Gettysburg campaign opened : As its first step, 
the Federal cavalry was to win its first victory over that 
of the Confederates, showing that the two had finally ar- 
rived on a parity. Not so, however, in relation to the 
opposing armies as a whole, in the two years' conflict be- 
tween which the Federals had gained scarcely one impor- 
tant victory. And but one month before the Gettysburg 
campaign opened, the Army of the Potomac had met with 
defeat at Chancellorsville. At the same time a part of 
the Army of the West, under Rosecrans, was blockaded 
at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Grant with the balance 
was isolated down the Mississippi River, gripping Vicks- 
burg. Nor was the more or less cursory war in the trans- 
Mississippi region more encouraging to the Federal cause. 

In the mean time, voluntary enlistment into the Federal 
armies had almost ceased, and conscription was the only 
resort for recruiting them. This system, unpopular at any 
time, at this period caused dangerous draft riots at some 




LIEUT.GEN. T. E. B. STUART 



Facing Page 58 



PRIOR TO GETTYSBURG 59 

points, at so low an ebb was patriotism and support of the 
war. A crucial time had evidently arrived, and one to be 
taken advantage of by the Confederates. For at such a 
juncture a decisive victory, especially by the Army of 
Northern Virginia, would bring foreign recognition of the 
Southern Confederacy, and, with little question, the close 
of the war, with the Confederacy permanently established. 
And it may readily be seen that General Lee should not 
have ventured much if any distance beyond his own fron- 
tier, not only for fear of arousing the North, but from 
purely military and political reasons. A decisive battle 
fought in Virginia would have the same general effect and 
result as though waged in Pennsylvania, and with much 
more safety to his army and the Confederate cause. 

These weighty considerations doubtless had attention 
from the Confederate authorities, but that they were duly 
valued under the conditions of success which had attended 
the Confederate war up to that time may be questioned. 
It appears that the well-founded hope, if not the enthusiasm, 
of the time overcame safe prudence and was checked, if 
at all, by Longstreet's proposal that in the event of a 
battle being fought in the enemy's country, none but a de- 
fensive battle should be waged. To this General Lee 
agreed in the coolness of discussion before the heat of 
campaign. 

It was under these bright and prosperous, as well as pos- 
sibly ominous, conditions that the invasive campaign was 
inaugurated which resulted in the Battle of Gettysburg. 



CHAPTER VI 

STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 

IMMEDIATELY following the battle of Chancellors- 
ville, the victorious Confederate Army of Northern 
Virginia was powerfully augmented by the addition of 
three veteran divisions and by recruits. This increase of 
his force, together with the loss of General Jackson as 
commander of a corps, caused General Lee to reorganize 
his army from two into three corps, necessitating the 
appointment of two new commanders of corps. General 
Ewell to lead the Second — Jackson's old command — and 
General Hill, as chief of the Third, Longstreet retaining 
command of the First Corps. There were also several 
newly promoted commanders of divisions and brigades. 

In strength of numbers, the Army of Northern Virginia 
reached a point not before attained ; while in robust self- 
confidence and assurance of invincibility, in morale and 
esprit de corps, the veterans of Napoleon did not over- 
match its superbly dominant spirit. According to Army 
Reports and Official Records, the respective armies mus- 
tered, June 30, 1863, effectives present with colors, under 
command of General Robert E. Lee, as follows: 
Confederates, 80,000 men. 

Organized; Infantry, into three corps: 

The First Corps, Lieut. -Gen. James Longstreet. 

The Second Corps, Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell. 

The Third Corps, Lieut-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill. 

These three corps contained 9 divisions, or 2i7 brigades, 
or 155 regiments. 

60 



STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES 6i 

Cavalry: Commanded by Lieut.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart; 
consisting of 3 divisions, or 7 brigades, or 30 regiments. 

Artillery: Commanded by Maj.-Gen. W. N. Pendle- 
ton; made up of 15 battalions, or 69 batteries, or 287 guns. 

While the artillery remained under the super-command 
of General Pendleton, it was temporarily distributed as 
follows : 5 batteries to each corps, i to each division, 2 in 
reserve ; and i horse battery to each brigade of cavalry. 

The Confederate corps and divisions were powerful and 
well balanced, with veteran officers of proper rank in com- 
mand of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments, making 
a proper and superbly organized army. A chief com- 
mander for the artillery rendered that arm most effective 
in respect of massing and controlling its fire. 
Federal Army: Effectives present with the colors, June 

30, 1863, under command of Maj.-Gen. Joseph E. 

Hooker ; 

Total, 93^500 men. 

Organized; Infantry, into seven corps, commanded by: 

The First Corps, Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds. 

The Second Corps, Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock. 

The Third Corps, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles. 

The Fifth Corps, Maj.-Gen. George Sykes. 

The Sixth Corps, Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick. 

The Eleventh Corps, Maj.-Gen. O. O. Howard. 

The Twelfth Corps, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum. 

These seven Corps contained 19 divisions, or 51 bri- 
gades, or 206 regiments. 

Cavalry: Commanded by Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasanton, 
one corps of 3 divisions, or 8 brigades, or 33 regiments. 

Artillery: Commanded by Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt, 
ostensibly. 14 brigades, or 65 batteries, or 370 guns. 

The Federal artillery, under the command of General 
Hunt, was under the direct control of corps commanders 



62 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

among whom it was distributed: to each corps a brigade 
of from four to eight batteries; to the cavalry 49 bat- 
teries; in reserve 21 batteries. 

The Federal army was most defective in organization. 
The corps were too numerous and weak, while these and 
the divisions were wholly unbalanced, the units, even down 
to regiments being generally commanded by officers of 
rank inferior to their commands, in all arms of the service, 
especially in the infantry and artillery. The actual mixed 
command of the artillery, divided between the ostensible 
chief of artillery and the corps commanders, worked great 
mischief and detriment to the Federal artillery at the Bat- 
tle of Gettysburg. Fortunately for the Federal army, its 
cavalry was completely reorganized at Frederick, Md., on 
June 28, 1863, by drawing in its last small, isolated and 
largely useless detachment, and consolidating all in one 
powerful cavalry corps, after which the cavalry arm of the 
Army of the Potomac asked and took no odds of the be- 
fore unequaled Confederate Horse of Stuart. 

When units of the respective armies in question are men- 
tioned, it should be borne in mind that each Confederate 
corps represents a third, while each Federal corps stands 
for a seventh, of their respective armies. And the same 
ratio applies to divisions and brigades, barring the un- 
equalized strength of the Federal units. 

Perhaps no army of veterans ever took the field more 
superbly commanded throughout than the Army of North- 
ern Virginia. General Lee, revered and loved by his offi- 
cers and men, was ever competent to needs and opportuni- 
ties ; alert, wary and bold ; ever taking into due account the 
general character and traits of his opposing commander, 
and whatever bore upon the general or the fixed policy 
acting to control the hostile army, that is, the moral power 
as well as physical force. Too great for jealousies or ill 



STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES 63 

will toward any, he possessed the rare faculty of winning 
loyal love and obedience of his subordinates, to the extent 
that they were never afflicted with envy or jealousy of 
him, but always gave him their best. A more noble and 
lofty personality than that of Robert E. Lee has scarcely 
appeared on the human stage. " Tall, superbly propor- 
tioned and commanding, his calm dignity never perturbed, 
he mellowed soldierly rigidity into a winning nobility of 
pose and carriage; while his strong alertly reposeful features 
and gray-blue eyes faced true and level. Ruddy with 
health, adorned by a manly endowment of iron-gray hair 
and beard. Never in haste, nor ever slow, in movement or 
speech, his voice bespoke a big warm heart too true and 
simple to harbor evil or pettiness. Approachable by all 
without lawless familiarity, with a soul too large to classify 
men, in his like kindly treatment of all, Robert E. Lee was 
the idolized commander of his men and officers; while in 
their hearts they loved and revered him as a father." 

Longstreet, cool, capable and widely experienced in war 
and in command, was Lee's able second, and his loyal 
complement. Ewell and Hill were new to the command of 
corps, but superbly experienced in great war as generals 
of large command under inimitable Stonewall Jackson, 
whose invincible infantry had become famous as the 
" Foot Cavalry " because of its remarkable celerity of 
movement. True, this was Lee's first campaign lacking 
the aid of his right arm, Jackson : an officer whose unique 
ability and safe daring were not equaled by any commander 
in either the Confederate or Federal armies. His three 
corps commanders, however, were able generals, although 
this was their first experience in working together all as 
superior commanders. And Ewell's position proved try- 
ing, as he was at the head of Jackson's old command upon 
which Lee instinctively relied, as in the past; while the 



64 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

subordinate officers, with the men, did not regard Ewell 
with that absokite trust and confidence which they placed 
in Jackson. Then, in the reorganization of the army, 
many new subordinate commanders were scattered through 
the corps. In fact, the entire army felt the loss of this 
great general, whose presence in emergency more than once 
reinforced it with a might not measured by the strength 
of an army corps. From the first he had in large measure 
been the intuitive brain and forehanded arm of General 
Lee, to catch and execute his behest, his boldest strategic 
thoughts. Of his death Longstreet said: "The dark 
clouds of the future then began to lower above the Con- 
federacy." Jackson was the vital unit which could not 
be restored or replaced. 

Though somewhat foreign to this narrative, it is not 
inappropriate here to interject a loving if quaint monu- 
ment to Jackson. " Of medium height and firmly built, 
his jerky movements indicated action rather than nervous- 
ness. Nor did this characteristic detract from his general 
quaintness as he rode his raw-boned ambler with short 
stirrups, dressed in an old sun-browned and dusty coat, a 
little cadet cap cocked down over his nose, from under the 
visor of which his open gray eyes gazed in vision or flashed 
from his silence with quick, comprehensive order or com- 
mand. Prayerful and Bible-reading in camp and on 
march; a familiar with his troops, an infallible fate to 
the enemy, what soldier need be told that this unique com- 
mander became the object of adoration and supreme trust 
of his troops? Nor was Lee behind the soldiers in his 
trust in Jackson." 

Stuart, a born cavalry leader, would have won renown 
beyond Murat under the world's master of war. Napoleon. 
" At twenty-nine years of age a general of cavalry. Me- 
dium height, frame broad and powerful, heavy brown 



STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES 65 

beard flowing upon his breast; huge mustache, ends curled 
up; flashing blue eyes beneath a piled-up forehead, and of 
dazzling brilliancy like the eagles as he swung to saddle 
and charged into battle humming some merry song. War 
to him a splendid and exciting game in which his nature 
and genius found a congenial arena." A cavalier of 
whom an opposing general, Sedgwick, said : " Stuart is 
the best cavalry officer ever foaled in North America." 
And while Stuart was the most picturesque of the galaxy 
of young cavalry commanders staged by the war, there 
was an ample dozen in the opposing armies equally youth- 
ful, brilliant and daring, and his close equal in command 
of horse. These young riders made the American cavalry 
unique, fighting mounted or on foot, in battle with infantry 
and artillery, or alone on wide raids destroying railroads, 
storming fortifications, and even capturing water craft. 
Pendleton, by nature an artillerist, and as such largely 
experienced, selected none but his like as commanders of 
battalions and batteries. And this order of selection held 
good throughout Lee's army — experienced, specially fitted 
and capable men at every commanding post. Chivalrous 
men eager for chances. Soldierly worth won reward of 
adequate promotion. This last noted fact alone tends to 
render an army invincible; and General Lee was too great 
a commander and too just a man to overlook worth, or 
make it give way to personal or political favorites. For 
these reasons the Army of Northern Virginia was not dan- 
gerously infected by official jealousies and " discretionary " 
insubordinations which usually infest and often jeopardize 
armies. The Army of Northern Virginia was, as near as 
possible under its new conditions of reorganization, a 
homogeneous, inwardly and outwardly united, loyal fight- 
ing unit; and subject to one weakness, mainly, the habit 
formed by subordinate commanders of exercising large 



(^ THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

discretionary authority. However, it must not be over- 
looked that this spirit of perfect harmony and homogeneity 
had been somewhat disturbed by the death of Stonewall 
Jackson, and the large recruitment of the army, for these 
necessitated the formation of one new corps and the pro- 
motion of many officers. But the greatest weakness which 
the Army of Northern Virginia suffered was its depriva- 
tion of Jackson. So true is this, that it may be said that 
had Jackson been at Gettysburg, Lee would, in all human 
probability, have been victorious. 

In the largeness of his nature, and because of their abil- 
ity, Lee gave wide latitude to his immediate subordinate 
commanders, especially as they were often wholly or semi- 
detached, and required to decide and act on their own 
initiative and judgment. This, becoming a habit, led to 
lack of promptness and concert of action on the part of 
his lieutenants when brought together and required to act 
as one unit. The serious, perhaps fatal, effects of this 
were made evident in the battle of Gettysburg, as will be 
specially noted in the summary of that conflict. 

With the personnel of the Confederate Army of North- 
ern Virginia thus magnificently arrayed for invasive cam- 
paign, its equipment and impedimenta had not been 
neglected. Effectively armed and ammunitioned to the 
limit of difficult possibilities, the varying caliber of its 
arms and different kinds of ammunition gave some trouble. 
Stuart's cavalry, the ever-twinkling eye of the army, had 
been remounted; while the wagon trains had been replen- 
ished in vehicles and animals to needs requisite to the sup- 
ply of the army from its well-stocked base at Staunton, 
West Virginia, along its practically safe line of communi- 
cation behind the Blue Ridge Mountains. Further than 
this, any deficiency which might exist in transportation, 
live stock and subsistence would be readily made good 



STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES dj 

from the rich farming country through which the invasion 
was to be pushed. Nor was the campaign in plan left to 
the haphazard and excitement of active operations. Gen- 
eral Lee had fully discussed his proposed procedure with 
his corps commanders, especially Longstreet, and it had 
been fully determined and agreed that in strategy the cam- 
paign should be offensive, but that in battle it should be 
strictly defensive. This fore-decision was made chiefly 
to guard against any deviation therefrom amidst the 
temptations of active campaign which might arise to lure 
the commander or his generals temporarily from this safer, 
more stable and promising course. The veteran Army of 
Northern Virginia stood eager at Lee's command, master- 
fully self-confident, — in effective strength, organization, 
equipment, discipline, and morale an army such as had never 
before been arrayed by the Confederacy. 

While the perfecting of the Confederate army was in 
robust progress, the opposing host was suffering from 
fearful depletion. During the months of May and June 
it lost, through expiration of term of service, many thou- 
sands of its veteran troops. Sickness was excessive from 
hardship and exposure in the disastrous Chancellorsville 
campaign, and recruiting had almost ceased. In the main 
the cessation of voluntary enlistment was the result of the 
dispiriting effect upon the entire north of lack of marked 
success of the Federal armies. Like a strong but inexpe- 
rienced runner, it had waste fully expended its first enthu- 
siasm, and was pausing to get its second breath. With 
what force this general feeling acted and reacted between 
the armies and the people can scarcely be imagined. It 
was the most serious block to recruitment of the armies — 
even worse than a marked defeat in battle, as this would 
have acted to arouse rather than to have depressed the 
people in this period of quiescence. From these various 



68 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

causes, tlie Army of the Potomac at this time was reduced 
to a total strengtii of some 90.000 men, incUiding a worked- 
out cavahv corps of but 7.500 men. 

An(,l yet. at this most critical juncture, this crisis in the 
nation's destiny, Gen. Henry M. llalleck, commander-in- 
chief of the Federal armies, held one entire veteran corps 
at Port Royal, and one division at New Bern, North Caro- 
lina, two divisions at Suffolk. Virginia, one on the Virginia 
Peninsular, several in West Virginia and in the Shenan- 
doah Valley. — 86.000 men, in all, including the garrison 
about Washington. This formidable army was scattered 
about at points of little or no importance, where a small 
fraction of their number would serve the purpose better, 
excepting the Washington garrison. In the main they 
were held useless either for offense or defense, remote 
from the field of active operations, to which every possible 
Confederate soldier has been drawn from the very points 
llalleck strongly held. And these Federal detachments 
were composed of veteran troops of which the Army of 
the Potomac stood sorely in need. Meanwhile the Gov- 
ernment frantically called for raw levies. 

At this very time and later, when the Army of the 
Potomac was required to cover Washington, that city was 
garrisoned by one strong corps in the almost impregnable 
defenses about the capital, with one strong division some- 
where in the Shenandoah \^alley, its very isolation offering 
a tempting morsel to the enemy, and which was accepted 
when this division was destroyed by Lee's advance. Near 
]\Lanassas was still another division of six thousand cavalry 
defending \\'ashington from a few hundred of Mosby's 
transient partisans. Several thousand Federal troops were 
also held along the upper Potomac and in the West Vir- 
ginia mountains guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, 
where small posts would have done the work better holding 



I 




M.Vi.4;i:x. .kisi:pii iiookkk 



Facitig Paste (•> 



STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES 69 

against small and infrequent Confederate forays. Had 
the troops uselessly employed in these detached bodies been 
called to usefulness, the Army of the Potomac would have 
been amply strengthened, leaving a surplus for the defense 
of Washington if the Federal field army had disappeared 
and left the garrison force to cope with Lee's army alone. 
In any event, the Army of the Potomac, instead of being 
tied to the direct defense of the Federal capital, would 
have been, or should have been, left free to operate against 
Lee as opportunity should offer. 

Notwithstanding the availability of these scattered 
troops for reinforcing the Army of the Potomac, and for 
the defense of Washington, not a man of them was called 
in for either purpose, while Hooker was ordered to 
maneuver his army so that at all times it would interpose 
between Lee's army and the Capital. Thus facing cam- 
paign, the Army of the Potomac found itself sorely de- 
pleted of veteran troops, their places partially filled with 
" raw " levies, while it was tied to Washington, with 
Halleck in full swing of authority, suspicious of Hooker, 
its commander, and watching for some excuse to remove 
him from command. That it did not become dispirited 
and demoralized under such somber conditions, and in 
face of the certainty of having to engage promptly with 
its superb antagonist is the highest encomium that can go 
down to posterity affirming the splendid material of which 
that stern, patient and indomitable army was composed. 



CHAPTER VII 

ON CAMPAIGN 

THE great antagonists are prepared to move out in the 
greatest campaign the Southern Confederacy ever 
launched; Gen. Lee having the choice of either of two hues 
of operation, one to the east of the Blue Ridge directly 
threatening Washington, or the safer one down the Shen- 
andoah Valley behind and protected by those mountains to 
the Potomac, and beyond almost to Harrisburg, the capital 
of Pennsylvania, by their extension northward, the South 
Mountains. The protected line is adopted, rendering it 
practically certain that if a battle is fought it will be on 
northern soil. 

May we not re-embody those now shadowy hosts as in 
columns they wind from their camps, stretching out over 
every available road along valleys, and over mountains, like 
huge trailing leviathans ; here and there pushing and dart- 
ing out eyed tentacles in observation to peer or engage and 
spit fire, then draw in to the sinuous bodies of the monsters 
feeling ahead hunting advantage, to uncoil and strike in 
fierce grapple of death? for this pictures hostile moving 
armies. On June 3d Longstreet's First Corps was secretly 
withdrawn from the general line along the south bank of 
the Rappahannock River, set in march toward Culpeper, 
where it arrived on the 7th. Ewell's Second Corps fol- 
lowed Longstreet on the 4th and 5th ; while Hill's Third 
Corps, deployed to occupy its own and the vacated line, 
masked the withdrawal and then moved en route on the 
14th, to join Longstreet at Culpeper. 

70 




{Facing Page 70) 



Virginia between Washington and Richmond. 



ON CAMPAIGN 71 

On the 5th, the movement of Hill's camps in extension 
west from Fredericksburg aroused the suspicion of Hooker, 
encamped at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg. He im- 
mediately felt out across the Rappahannock, and, as the 
result, decided that Lee was engaged in a movement to- 
ward the west with purpose to turn his right flank and 
advance northward, either to the east or the west of the 
Blue Ridge. Hooker's able and brilliant strategic ability 
determined him to attack, rout, and destroy the exposed, 
isolated corps of Hill, thus placing the Army of the Poto- 
mac not only in rear of Lee, but between his army and 
Richmond, the Confederate capital. 

It may be readily seen that an attack in force made on 
Hill, thirty-five miles from Longstreet, as Hooker pro- 
posed, would compel Lee to abandon his invasion by re- 
calling Longstreet and Ewell, while subjecting them to the 
imminent jeopardy of being defeated in detail by Hooker's 
concentrated army, or of being crushed by superior num- 
bers should they succeed in effecting a concentration. 

For some time previous to the beginning of his move- 
ment, Lee's pickets had been so alert to duty that Hooker's 
spies found it impossible to pass the Confederate line and 
secure information. Because of this vigilance. Hooker's 
advisement of Lee's movement came through the suspicious 
activity of Hill's men. From these indications Hooker 
became satisfied that something was under way of which 
he must have knowledge. He, therefore, began his op- 
erations on June 6th. 

Hooker first ordered Pleasanton with his cavalry, on 
the right, to feel out toward Culpeper. On the 9th, his 
jaded seventy-five hundred cavalrymen, outdistancing his 
two brigades of supporting infantry, engaged Stuart's 
ninety-five hundred superb troopers, and, at Brandy Sta- 
tion, fought a cavalry battle such as America had never 



72 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

before witnessed. Pleasanton's reconnolssance was in the 
nature of a surprise. He caught Stuart with his regi- 
ments and brigades somewhat dispersed, and with this 
advantage to counterbalance the disparity in numbers and 
the physical condition of the opposing bodies of horse, the 
Federal cavalry here, for the first time, proved itself a 
worthy equal of Stuart's troopers, a position it never for- 
feited. In this battle it more than maintained itself against 
Stuart until infantry began to arrive to the aid of the latter 
from Culpeper. The presence of this infantry developed 
the information Pleasanton sought, that is, that Lee was 
in movement in force on Hooker's right ; and the Federal 
cavalry withdrew unmolested, from the field. This cavalry 
fight also had another important effect. It frustrated 
Stuart's planned raid past Hooker's right-rear against his 
line of communication with Washington with the double 
purpose of cutting this, and of masking Lee's movement 
into the Shenandoah and safety behind the Blue Ridge. 
Having obtained the desired information, on the nth, 
Hooker put the left w^ing of his army in motion past the 
rear of the right wing, thus facing the Army of the Poto- 
mac due west. At this point a glance at Lee's position 
and condition will be interesting. On the loth, the main 
body of E well's corps drew out from Culpeper, headed for 
the Shenandoah Valley. When it was demonstrated by 
Pleasanton's withdrawal, after the cavalry fight at Brandy 
Station, that he was not the advance of a movement in 
force by Hooker against the strung-out Confederate army, 
Lee knew it was safe to proceed with his well-initiated 
plan. This served as his notice from Washington that its 
officials had tied Hooker to the direct defense of that city, 
in continuance of their chronic scheme for its protection. 
Hence, holding Longstreet at Culpeper, Lee at once pushed 
Ewell out in the advance. Here the subtle generalship of 




icing I'aso 7;! f"^f"^'-':'^N. TIlOAiAS J. (STOXEWALT.) JACKS 



ON 



ON CAMPAIGN 73 

Lee displayed itself, his never-failing faculty of utilizing 
the mighty power of thought, actuating men and, espe- 
cially, armies. Ewell and most of his men had campaigned 
and fought through the length and breadth of the Shenan- 
doah Valley under Jackson, their now dead and immortal 
leader, hence they were familiar with every road and path, 
and advantageous position. 

What soldier does not love to recall past marches and 
battles? How much more, then, is he inspired when he 
lives them over again in actual campaign and conflict — 
and these avenging an idolized slain chieftain ! Such were 
Ewell and his splendid corps, Jackson's old troops. Nor 
was this all of this phase of Lee's generalship. The ad- 
vance of Ewell's command consisted of two cavalry 
brigades which, for some time past, had been operating 
throughout the Shenandoah region, until their presence 
there had become familiar to friend and foe. Halleck's 
little garrisons and posts, therefore, did not suspect that 
these everyday acquaintances were the advance of the Army 
of Northern Virginia; nor did they, until captured and 
destroyed by the oncoming flood. 

On the nth, then, we find Lee's army with Ewell, its 
advance in sight of the Maryland mountains, Longstreet 
at Culpeper, while Hill still held Fredericksburg. The 
Army of Northern Virginia was therefore stretched over 
a front of nearly one hundred miles, with a formidable 
adversary on its flank eager to take advantage of, but 
withheld from, such unusual opportunity. 

Not with truth, as yet, can Lee be charged with careless 
or reckless generalship; though to the unpenetrating ob- 
server his detaching of Jackson at Chancellorsville against 
Hooker's distant flank, against Pope's rear at Manassas, 
may invite criticism, and, most of all, this wide separation 
of the three corps of his army on the flank of a concen- 



74 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

■-*\ 
trated antagonist which offered magnificent opportunity 
to his opponent to interpose between Hill and Longstreet, 
holding the latter in check while destroying Hill, thus 
placing the Federal army in Lee's rear and between his 
army and the Confederate capital. On purely strategic 
grounds it is absurd to think that Lee would thus operate 
to invite disaster, both to his army and to the cause for 
which he fought. The basis for detaching Jackson against 
Pope's rear was his knowledge of the character of Pope's 
and Jackson's ability, and again, at Chancellorsville, he 
acted on Hooker's timidity displayed in his failure 
promptly to launch a bold attack from his most advanta- 
geous flank position. The fact that in this case Lee per- 
mitted himself, apparently, to jeopardize his army and 
cause, can be reasonably accounted for only on the ground 
that he was acting on his knowledge of the past policy of 
the Washington autliorities, to hold the Army of the 
Potomac directly to cover that city ; the perpetuation of 
that policy being confirmed when Hooker's cavalry attack 
turned out as being a reconnoissance, rather than the ad- 
vance of the Army of the Potomac moving to attack, as it 
should. Acting on this knowledge, the senseless fear of 
the Washington officials, the wide dispersion of his army 
displayed a high order of generalship on the part of Lee, 
for this dispersion, thereby made safe against attack by 
Hooker, in itself gave Lee weighty advantage by confusing 
Washington, thus rendering movement of the Federal 
army dilatory if not impossible at this otherwise dangerous 
stage in his operations. 

That this effect was produced at Washington is evident ; 
for while the generalship of Hooker informed him that 
Lee's advance was already in the Shenandoah, and he so 
notified Halleck, the commander-in-chief not only disre- 
garded Hooker's notification, but, without mention of the 



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The Country from the Potomac to Harrisburg. 



Facing page 75 



ON CAMPAIGN 75 

warning, sent orders to General Schenck, at Harper's 
Ferry, causing him in turn to give positive orders to Gen- 
eral Milroy, at Winchester, to remain at that point of ex- 
posure in the valley, in the direct path of Ewell, then almost 
ready to envelop Milroy. 

Commenting on the condition of the War Office at this 
time. President Lincoln said: "Our folks (Halleck and 
Stanton) appear to know but little how things are, and 
. show no evidence that they ever will avail themselves of 
any advantage." It was not until 1864, when Grant was 
placed in supreme command of the Federal armies, that 
the President had learned that the commander of an army 
is in superior position for using it as a fighting power, that 
the commander-in-chief must be a fighter as well as a 
strategist, and that his authority is exercised better any- 
where else than from the seat of political authority. 

Meanwhile, bis cavalry advance already in the valley, 
on the loth Ewell followed with his three divisions of 
infantry and eighty guns, passing the Blue Ridge at 
Chester's Gap and reaching Cedarville, on the Shenandoah 
River, on the 12th, having covered a distance of fifty miles 
in this rapid march. But, advised by his cavalry of Mil- 
roy's isolated garrison, held at Winchester, Ewell contin- 
ued the march of sufficient infantry to occupy Milroy's 
roads of escape. This veteran corps was toughened to 
campaign, sleeping without shelter, carrying only blankets, 
arms and ammunition, and, for rations, a little bread in 
haversacks, otherwise subsisting on the country, the rich 
and friendly Shenandoah Valley ; hence the men were light- 
footed for forage and march, one occupation inciting the 
other. 

On the 13th, Ewell began drawing in on caged Milroy, 
and finally destroyed his command, capturing ten thousand 
men, twenty-two guns, three hundred acceptable wagons, 



76 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

and an abundance of stores — all, save the men, most 
serviceable to the Confederates at this juncture. Ewell's 
loss was but two hundred and sixty men. 

In this encounter it cannot be truthfully charged that 
General Milroy did not bravely enact his hopeless part, 
though Halleck made of him a scapegoat to bear the bur- 
den of his own fatal blundering. In fact many competent 
commanders were made to suffer for the same reason by 
the military " wisdom " of Washington headquarters, 
which was mired in the absurd policy of holding large 
forces on the upper Potomac and outside of Washington's 
ample defense when small scouting parties would have per- 
formed the service better, giving these large units to the 
Army of the Potomac when the scale of battle often swung 
at balance. 

Having learned that Ewell had passed Sperryville, 
Hooker began the movement of his army northward on 
June 13th, moving reluctantly under his orders to " Fol- 
low Lee." The phenomenal exposure of the Army of 
Northern Virginia caused him to urge Halleck for per- 
mission to move against Hill holding on at Fredericksburg 
with but 20,000 men, while Hooker had 70,000 across the 
Rappahannock, opposite him, with Longstreet thirty-five 
and Ewell seventy-five, miles away. 

By the threat of Hooker's position, Lee was compelled 
to hold Longstreet thus dangerously exposed to the entire 
Federal army. But he safely trusted that his thrust of 
Ewell northward would so frighten Washington general- 
ship that it would compel Hooker to forego his desire and 
most promising chance, and move northward to cover the 
Capital. Hooker's movement to the north relieved the en- 
tire Confederate dilemma, and, on the 14th, Hill left 
Fredericksburg en route for Culpeper and the Shenandoah 
Valley. 



ON CAMPAIGN yy 

Hooker's army on the 15th was at and about Manassas 
and Fairfax, covering Washington. The course of the 
Federal army thus defined, Longstreet advanced from Cul- 
peper, hugging the eastern flank of the Blue Ridge in order 
to confuse Hooker as to Lee's purpose, and at the same 
time to mask Hill's corps following the track of Ewell. 
Having accomplished these purposes, on the 19th, Long- 
street passed the mountains through Ashby's and Snicker's 
Gaps, and was in the Shenandoah Valley within support- 
ing distance of Hill and Ewell. 

Lee now had his army safely concentrated behind the 
Blue Ridge Mountains, ready for his next move across his 
enemy's frontier. This initial movement had placed his 
army behind these mountains, which, stretching northward 
to the Potomac, continue beyond that river through Mary- 
land and into Pennsylvania, where they are known as the 
South Mountains. Seldom have topographical and polit- 
ical factors so propitiously combined to favor invasive 
war. These curtaining mountains were passable to 
armies only at wide intervals against an active foe, through 
passes easily defended, and extended far into the territory 
to be invaded; while the valleys behind them were wide and 
fertile, being occupied by a prosperous farming population 
with abundance for the needs of an army, including live 
stock. With base established at Staunton, in the southern 
•debouchment of the Shenandoah Valley, well within Con- 
federate territory, Lee's base and long line of communica- 
tion were practically safe with scanty guards until he 
crossed the Potomac River, which was the only natural 
obstacle throughout the course of his advance. 

The political factors were Washington, the Federal cap- 
ital, situated within the field of operations, the condition of 
the Federal war, and threatening foreign intervention — 
the last practically assured should Lee crown his invasion 



78 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

with victorious battle. True, Washington was strongly 
fortified and heavily garrisoned by a force independent of 
the Army of the Potomac, able to maintain the capital 
intact until the field army could relieve it, should the latter 
so operate as to uncover that city to the enemy. Free 
action, however, was not permitted to the Army of the 
Potomac, the commander-in-chief, Halleck, having refused 
the urgent request of General Hooker to attack Lee's dan- 
gerously exposed flank during his movement from the 
Rappahannock into safety behind the Blue Ridge. Un- 
questionably such an attack would have most effectually 
protected Washington, while offering unusual chances for 
the defeat of Lee's invasive campaign, if not of his army, 
thus stretched out and exposed over a hundred miles of 
front. This very timidity at Washington, preventing the 
Army of the Potomac from operating so as to directly un- 
cover the capital added another advantage to the invasion, 
both in its restrictive action on the field army and in Lee's 
assurance that this chronic policy would be held in opera- 
tion. 

Lee, then, on the 15th, was in the midst of a flank march 
on a front of thirty-five miles between Hill and Longstreet, 
past the concentrated Federal army, some 100,000 strong; 
and was wide open to the greatest jeopardy to a competent 
enemy free to act as it should. Hill was at Fredericksburg 
with 20,000 men against Hooker's 70,000 across the river. 
Longstreet was at Culpeper, thirty-five miles away, and 
Ewell forty miles beyond Longstreet. Lee's army, then, 
held a front of seventy-five miles, with the enemy 100,000 
strong nearer to either Hill or Longstreet than these two 
corps were to one another. Hooker had the choice of 
either breaking Lee's attenuated line by holding Hill in 
check while he smashed Longstreet, or of holding Long- 
street stationary at Culpeper while destroying Hill at 



ON CAMPAIGN 79 

Fredericksburg, and then march south and capture Rich- 
mond. This would effectually have drawn Lee after him 
away from his double threat and of invasion. This able 
strategist, tied hand and foot by his sleeping superior at 
Washington, quickly saw Lee's fatal position and pleaded 
for permission to take advantage of it. Halleck's timid- 
ity and utter incompetency, however, stood firm — like a 
mule in the road — and Hooker was ordered to hold his 
army from increasing the peril of his antagonist until Lee 
should recover his army to safety ; then to trail on after 
him — to keep the invasion going safely past Washington ! 

Though later in this campaign General Lee displayed a 
wondrous absence of his otherwise consummate general- 
ship, his apparent reckless disregard of fixed principles of 
war in this flank march must not be charged to any lapse 
in his strategy. Rather does it stand to the credit of his 
rare ability as a general. For in this he rose above com- 
manding regard of these principles and of mere physical 
force and acted almost wholly on the moral force which 
he knew from past experience would dominate the situa- 
tion. This was the chronic fright at Washington over 
any and every hostile threat toward the Federal capital, 
and the wholly inane strategy and tactics which were in- 
variably used in safeguarding that city. 

Lee, acting on the certainty of such procedure on the 
part of Hooker's superiors at Washington, who would 
compel him to do nothing else but to interpose his army 
between the Confederate army and Washington, made no 
mistake — not even taking a chance — in stretching his 
army out by the flank, as he did after Hooker had shown 
his hand. But under the conditions. General Lee, in every 
way, acted the part of the consummate general, disregard- 
ing the rules of war when the situation warranted these 
being made minor, or demanded that they should be utterly 



8o THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

disregarded. True, there have been few commanders who 
have possessed the abihty of judgment to discern when 
the moral force shall take precedence over the physical. 
General Lee possessed this genius preeminently among the 
commanders of our Civil War, specially while he was aided 
by Jackson, either to initiate or to execute such war. In 
the \^icksburg Campaign General Grant made this same 
quality evident, as also did General Sherman in his cam- 
paign from Atlanta to the sea. 

In the instance under consideration, General Lee op- 
erated to confuse, frighten, and hold his opponents to their 
fatality until his army was out of danger and again well 
gathered in hand across the Potomac. And in his disre- 
gard of the principles of war Lee relied with sublime 
certainty of the moral force, w^hich in war, as elsewhere, 
'* is three times more powerful than the physical." Lee dis- 
played the rare competency which enabled him to " seat 
himself in his opponent's camp-chair and view the situa- 
tion." 

Ewell. with Jackson's old corps of " foot cavalry," cov- 
ering twenty-five miles per day, had captured or dispersed 
Halleck's force at Winchester, disregarded Harper's Ferrv', 
and was in force opposite Williamsport, on the Potomac. 
His cavalry was advanced to Chambersburg. Pennsylvania, 
requisitioning from the ricli Cumberland Valley towns and 
farms great herds of beef-cattle, horses, subsistence for 
man and beast, together with shoes and clothing, for the bet- 
terment and comfort of the advancing jubilant host. Retir- 
ing with these tor deposit, and leaving general consternation 
behind, this cavalry joined Ewell on the 17th. at Williams- 
port, where he awaited the arrival of Hill and Longstreet. 
A Confederate cavalry brigade at Cumberland guarded 
against and rendered ineffective one of Halleck's divisions, 
thus isolated and useless in the upper Potomac region. 



ON CAMPAIGN 8i 

On June 22d, Ewell crossed the Potomac at Williams- 
port and Shepherdstown, concentrating his two columns at 
Hagerstown; thence moving on to Chambersbiirg. On the 
23d his advance opened all of the Cumberland Valley as 
far as the Susquehanna River to the Confederate supply 
gatherers, who gaily brushed aside the inoffensive militia 
hastily mustered to oppose these veterans. Thus unmo- 
lested and turned free in this richly burdened army pasture, 
the entire Confederate host was feasted, laid up stores, and 
filled its wagons now drawn by exchanged horses; while 
the army, reshod with the enemy's footgear, stood elate 
astride the hostile frontier ready for any enterprise upon 
wliich its idolized chieftain should launch his eager sol- 
diery. 

It will be noted that as yet only E well's corps had crossed 
the Potomac while Hill and Longstreet remained on its 
south bank. By this strategy, made possible by Hooker's 
orders to cover Washington, Lee compelled Hooker to hold 
his army to the south bank of the river; and Ewell was 
left free and unmolested in his temporary war on sub- 
sistence. June 24-25, Longstreet and Hill crossed the 
frontier at the same points where Ewell effected his pas- 
sage, thence following the course of that advanced corps. 

The Confederate army at this time was entirely across 
the river frontier, with its advance stretched out and scat- 
tered through the length and breadth of the Cumberland 
Valley, even to the bank of the Susquehanna River, threat- 
ening Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, and Phila- 
delphia. Hooker, now free to cross the Potomac, on the 
25th and 26th moved his army in concentration on Freder- 
ick, Md., where it threatened Lee's rear and his line of com- 
munication, near the Potomac. Here again opportunity 
beckoned the Army of the Potomac to advance northwest- 
ward against Lee's exposed rear and his line of communica- 



82 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

tion and retreat. Such a movement would hold Washing- 
ton covered, and its own line, while forcing Lee to give bat- 
tle with his two rear corps against the entire Federal army, 
before Ewell could possibly come to their aid. Fighting in 
this position. Hooker could be safely reinforced from the 
Washington garrison, by French with his 10,000 from Har- 
per's Ferry, and by thousands of otherwise useless troops, in 
fact, by at least 60,000 men from Halleck's army of de- 
tachments worthlessly scattered about in Lee's rear. 

General Hooker, appreciating this inviting opportunity, 
on the 27th, initiated movement by Harper's Ferry, in 
Lee's rear, the Army of Northern Virginia now covering 
from Chambersburg to the Susquehanna. Reynolds with 
three corps was stationed at Middletown and in the South 
Mountain passes. On the 28tli Hooker ordered Slocum's 
Twelfth Corps to Harper's Ferry, to be joined by the gar- 
rison of Maryland Heights, 10,000 strong. Slocum, thus 
strengthened, was to cut Lee's communications, while 
Reynolds with his three corps would operate in the Con- 
federate rear. This left three corps free to advantage or 
necessity, at Frederick. Halleck, however, denied Hooker 
this prime offering, for the reason that he would hold the 
useless position of Maryland Heights, swamped in Lee's 
wake, except, as proposed by Hooker, to be utilized by strip- 
ping it of its garrison and armament and leave it to itself. 
Of this operation proposed by Hooker, General Slocum, a 
most able officer, says : " Ordered by Hooker to move up 
the Potomac and place my corps, with the 10,000 men under 
French, I should have had ample time in which to intrench. 
With his way thus blocked, and the remainder of the army 
free to act on his flank, it is difficult to see how Lee could 
have escaped defeat." Of this Gen. Lee, himself, reported: 
" To deter Hooker from advancing farther west and inter- 
rupting our communication with Virginia, after he crossed 



ON CAMPAIGN 83 

the Potomac, it was determined to concentrate our army 
east of the mountains." Had Hooker been left to his pur- 
pose his army would have been on Lee's line before he 
would have known it, or could have concentrated his army 
to draw Hooker from placing his to cut him off from Vir- 
ginia. 

Thus hampered and foiled by Halleck, Hooker resigned 
from command of the Army of the Potomac, because " In 
presence of the enemy he is not allowed to maneuver his 
own army." Here it may be remarked, that if for any 
reason Hooker was considered unsafe with the Army of 
the Potomac after Chancellorsville, it was unpardonable to 
postpone his removal from its command until a critical 
point in campaign had been reached on the verge of almost 
certain battle. For if Hooker had had his army less com- 
pletely concentrated and in hand, the result from a change 
of commanders might easily become fatal to the Federal 
army, as well as to the cause and country for which it was 
fighting. In this affair, however, is mixed the political in- 
trigue of a leading cabinet official, Secretary of the Treas- 
ury, Chase, ambitious for the Presidency as an opponent of 
Mr. Lincoln, his present chief. For thus were millions 
of treasure and thousands of valorous lives sacrificed, al- 
most to the breaking of Lincoln's great heart, he having to 
submit to such shameful evils of personal and political 
ambitions, rather than that his country and countrymen 
should be subjected to worse by such aspirants holding 
places of great power in the Government. Patriots in gen- 
eral, traitors in particular! For did they not betray the 
President, whom they should have loyally supported, and 
the country which trusted them, because Mr. Lincoln placed 
and held them in position? 

Major General George G. Meade, the modest commander 
of the Fifth Corps, reluctantly assumed the onerous honor of 



84 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

chief command of the Army of the Potomac in place of 
Hooker. And the patient hardihood and patriotism of the 
superb old Army of the Potomac was thus tested for 
the fifth time within ten months by a change of command- 
ers. Not so much that it fought its way to final victory 
as that it simply held itself together under the treatment 
meted to it, is that army's loftiest renown. 




\IAI.(,1X. W . S. IIA\(.0(.K 



aiint; I'auc S."i 



CHAPTER VIII 

CAUSE OF hooker's FAILURE; POSITION OF THE ARMIES 
PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

SINCE his fiasco at Chancellorsville, General Hooker 
had not enjoyed the confidence of either the Washing- 
ton authorities or of his own army, for the veterans of the 
Army of the Potomac had, through long and bitter experi- 
ence, become as subtly sensitive to their leader as is the met- 
tled steed to the rein touch of its rider. While admiring his 
strategy, they were silent over his battle tactics, for its 
wasted smoke sullied their fair fame. Hooker's failure at 
Chancellorsville was not due, however, to physical cow- 
ardice, his splendid fighting qualities having already won 
him the title of " Fighting Joe " from the army. We ac- 
cordingly must seek further for the true causes of his dis- 
astrous defeat. 

In no phase of life is the adage " Familiarity breeds con- 
tempt " more apparent than in those callings which require 
men — the warrior most of all — to become familiars with 
death. Oddly enough at first glance, but quite natural on 
second thought, the soldier " eats, drinks and makes merry 
to-day, for to-morrow he may die." And, from the fact 
that he dies for duty, gives his life for something besides 
himself, we may hope that he finds a justice so just that it 
will hold him less guilty for his robust merriment than are 
the many who so fear death that they ceaselessly fail in 
duty, to themselves, their fellows, and to their country. 
This thought is in no manner meant as excuse for a 

85 



86 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

crime on the part of those in positions where the hves of 
thousands are in their hands. The fact remains that 
" drink " is the main factor in the soldier's merriment, as 
in his solace from fatigue. So true was this, at least in 
the Federal armies, that it was common knowledge among 
officers and men that many officers of high rank and of 
splendid abilities often permitted themselves to become so 
merry as to unfit them temporarily for command, and this 
knowledge has become widely spread through later years 
by the soldiers of those fading hosts. 

As an illustration of this official merriment in the armies, 
the quaint story of President Lincoln may be mentioned. 
Appealed to by a committee of sober ministers alarmed 
in behalf of General Grant and the nation, charging the 
general with bibulous indulgence, the President eagerly 
asked them to tell him the special brand of whisky con- 
sumed by Grant so that he might supply the same to his 
other generals. 

Among those knowing the conditions at Chancellorsville, 
the defeat of Hooker in that battle was mainly accounted 
for on the ground that he was under the influence of the 
*' soldier's favorite," and that this defeated his brilliant 
strategy and befuddled his marked fighting ability. This 
was also the private conviction of his superiors at Wash- 
ington, according to the diary of a cabinet officer. On any 
other grounds it is difficult to account for his act in with- 
drawing his advanced columns from their positions ready 
for aggressive battle, and placing his army huddled and 
congested in a defenseless forest blind, there to be practi- 
cally corraled and saved from capture only by the kindly in- 
terposition of dense darkness. 

Having accomplished his brilliant turning operation 
unknow'U to the most alert and able strategist of the War. 
placing his army in most advantageous position for bold 



POSITION OF THE ARMIES 87 

advance against Lee's flank and rear, and having issued his 
orders and placed his columns for such action in the morn- 
ing, it was the natural thing for a convivial man, his day's 
work accomplished so well, then to " treat " himself royally 
— a fatal error, but natural to habitual indulgence; and 
Hooker could hardly have done otherwise. In confirma- 
tion of this is the following extract from the diary of Gideon 
Welles, at the time Secretary of the Navy : " The Presi- 
dent first intimated to me that Hooker is intemperate. 
Senator Sumner laid ' Hooker's failure at Chancellorsville 
to whisky.' The President said of this failure: 'If 
Hooker had been killed by the shot which knocked over the 
pillar which stunned him (so reported) we should have 
been successful.' No explanation has ever been made of 
the sudden paralysis which befell the army at that time. It 
was then reported by those who should have known, that 
it was liquor. It was so intimated, but not distinctly as- 
serted, in cabinet. Hooker lost command of the Army of 
the Potomac because of his generally reported intemperance, 
whereby he lost the confidence of his superiors." 

The imminent peril and lurking terror which possessed 
Hooker's army on the night of its escape from Chancellors- 
ville, as it waited the restoration of its bridges across the 
Rappahannock, damaged by a storm-swollen river, are 
vividly illustrated by the following word picture, drawn 
by Colonel Wesley Brainerd, who commanded the 15th 
New York Engineer regiment : 

" Along the short section of the river to which the cross- 
ing in retreat was confined, each bridge head was lighted by 
big brush fires in order to show their position to the mass- 
ing troops. Looking rearward past these fires into the dark- 
ness, there were seen the densely massed columns, the 
glare fitfully lighting their front and magnifying the pale, 
stern faces of the men massing back and becoming lost in 



88 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

a boundless sea of blackness. Absolute silence dominated 
that great host, so that the noise of our construction work 
sounded magnified into signals to the enemy, whose guns 
we momentarily expected to boom and roar, hurling shot 
and shell into the mass, and to hear the wild Confederate 
yell as they charged into its rear. When we had the bridges 
lengthened and restored, they were thickly covered with 
brush. Artillery wheels, harness, and cavalry scabbards 
were all muftled. Then the almost whispered commands 
set that ghostly mass in motion, its front disgorging a few- 
thin columns which silently crept over the bridges to be swal- 
lowed into the darkness and to safety beyond; while from 
the black rearward these were interminably replenished. 

" Finally, after an age of time, it seemed, the last man 
was across: and, cutting loose the hostile shore ends of the 
bridges, the rushing current swung them and us engineers 
home and to safety. Looking up the abrupt home shore 
against a leaden sky, we could distinguish the blacker 
shadows outlined of sullen guns and their silent, immovable 
gunners ready to vomit fire and death into the black be- 
yond, giving us their lurid brooding sliould the blackness 
disgorge an enemy to molest our work of alert bridge re- 
moving. 

"If silent prayer for deliverance, and thanksgiving for 
safety, ever went heavenward from an army, such stole 
through the darkness with the bated breath of that ghostly 
waiting host of fearfully expectant, but orderly and un- 
dismayed soldiery, that black night in May, 1863." 

" Fighting Joe " Hooker, of capacity and ability above the 
average general, though conceitedly ambitious to the point 
of insubordination, was sent to reinforce the Western army 
as commander of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps. There 
he made himself a " thorn in the flesh," to his superiors, un- 
til Shei;man w^as glad to approve the endorsement of Thomas 



POSITION OF THE ARMIES 89 

that " Hooker's resignation be accepted." Then, dis- 
gruntled and soured, he attempted to right himself by rear 
assault on his past comrades in arms, and on the Federal 
war. Finally, he sank and disappeared, a self-ruined man 
— the ultimate fate of all such fighters for self to the sacri- 
fice of their duty in life. 

At the outbreak of the Civil War Gen. Scott, com- 
mander-in-chief of the army, was incapacitated by age to 
assume the new responsibility ; and when Colonel Robert 
E. Lee declined that proffered position, the Federal Gov- 
ernment appointed George B. McClellan as virtual com- 
mander-in-chief from among several men of mark who, 
having resigned from the old army to engage in civil pur- 
suits, re-entered again to engage in the civil conflict. Mc- 
Clellan took immediate command of the Army of the 
Potomac, the first Federal army organized, and of which 
he made a superb fighting mechanism. But failing as a 
fighter, McClellan was succeeded by Pope, an unknown 
bombast of Halleck's from the West, who was quickly su- 
perseded by Burnside, who was forced into command of the 
army against his own judgment and becoming modesty, 
which would have more fittingly placed him in command of 
a division. Then McClellan again, soon followed by 
Hooker — all self-demonstrated failures as army com- 
manders. And the Army of the Potomac was the instru- 
ment upon which this low-keyed gamut was run during the 
first two years of the war. Under this schooling the Presi- 
dent was not slow to learn that purely military matters in 
great war must be left to educated and trained soldiers, 
and that only such are safe to the command of armies. 
But, lacking this knowledge at the beginning of the war, 
and the military eye, he overlooked the more modest rising 
officers, who were to win great fame, and appointed Gen. 
Henry M. Halleck as commander-in-chief of the armies. 



90 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

The accounted worth of this officer rested on Works on 
Strategy and Military Law, which he had written and 
tried to practice, and on some capacity lie had shown as a 
departmental commander in the West ; where, among things 
of note done, he had nearly succeeded in driving U. S. 
Grant from the army for having won a signal victory with- 
out having first obtained his permission, — the pleading of 
W. T, Sherman with Grant saving him to the service. 
Halleck soon found himself bolstered by Stanton, the 
rugged Secretary of War; and they constituted the Wash- 
ington Military team. 

Of President Lincoln's so-called, " interference with the 
army," in the early war, it can be said with truth that his 
military advising was often most worthy of careful con- 
sideration. For Lincoln's rare common-sense abetted in- 
sight to an extent that gave him that higher rare quality, or 
faculty, intuitive perception, which enabled him to perceive 
the common line of Truth threading and keying every 
phase of outward expression, be it in government, state- 
craft, war, or ordinary politics. But, perhaps, the Presi- 
dent did not realize until later in the war, that while war 
must be held subservient to statecraft, to let it be made the 
tool of politicians and their political schemes of personal 
ambition, is as fatal to both statecraft and war as it is to 
the armies on which both depend during war. That the 
interference of Mr. Lincoln with the Army of the Potomac 
was detrimental, on the whole, is not apparent. But after 
his authority was delegated to Halleck it became nearly 
fatal. To mediocre generalship it was cause for shifting 
of responsibility and excuse for failure; while competency 
withheld itself from prostitution by declining command of 
the Army of the Potomac except under conditions of real 
command. In one way this super-authority was used until 
1864, in a manner almost as detrimental to the Federal 



POSITION OF THE ARMIES 91 

cause as would have been another hostile army. For it 
required the Army of the Potomac constantly to safeguard 
Washington by direct interposition between that city and 
Lee's army, when the strategic features of the field de- 
manded the opposite course; and these reinforced by two 
years of bloody failure attempting to force the overland 
direct covering line, by which the Federal war was blocked 
until Grant finally proved the latter impossible, in 1864. 
A fine illustration of the Direct Covering Policy, we have 
just seen in operation, preventing Hooker from taking ad- 
vantage of oppcjrtunitics such as are seldom offered in war. 

In considering President Lincoln's actions, the terrific 
public pressure to which he was subjected must be borne in 
mind, while that of a private political nature was equally 
strong and of a far more perplexing, if not mean and per- 
sonal, nature. As the armies were overstocked with po- 
litical generals, it is safe to say that politics, personal feuds, 
jealousies and ambitions had as much to do with the fatal 
selections of commanders of the Army of the Potomac 
and many of its subordinate officers, as these Inefficiencies 
in command had to do with the failure of that army until 
they were rooted out. But for these irregularities — inci- 
dent to the wars of republics — these vital positions would 
have been filled by officers of proven capacity, by such as 
had won their way in war, to such generals as Hancock, 
Sedgwick and Reynolds. Nor under legitimate conditions 
would such worthy officers have declined chief command, 
as did the two last named. And why Hancock was not 
solicited to the same duty, with his masterful ability, whicii 
" was never responsible for a military error," as Grant 
stated, is one of the wonders of the war. 

Not until 1864, when General Grant was given command 
of the Federal armies, and assumed general direction of the 
Army of the Potomac, was that army ever left free to 



92 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

show its competency, cutting loose from Washington, both 
in position and chief command. And this, only after most 
of its original superb volunteer material had gone into per- 
manent bivouac, and its place was occupied but not filled by 
drafted and bounty men. What would not its original 
stuff have accomplished under the same conditions? 

At the present juncture in Lee's invasion, with every- 
thing at tension, there had been made a change in com- 
manders of the Army of the Potomac. Seriously weakened 
of veteran troops, and having been somewhat recruited 
by raw levies, as we have seen, it was yet hardly a match 
for Lee's enthusiastic veterans in even battle ; and the Fed- 
eral Government was making frantic effort to obtain more 
recruits. Hence, with Halleck, we should look about to 
discover if there were the usual detachments of trained 
troops scattered about, and ascertain if some of these could 
not be spared to the field army, on which so much depends. 
For every possible man should be drawn to its strengthen- 
ing. 

First, as Hooker had already urgently pointed out, was 
the useless garrison of a useless point, Harper's Ferry, the 
division of French, 10,000 strong. And, strangely enough, 
this had already been turned over to Meade, dismantling 
that place, — though both were denied to Hooker but yes- 
terday. At other points, useful and useless, there were 
under Halleck's personal direction as follows : 

At Suffolk and Norfolk, Virginia — useless 30,000 men 
Stahl's division of cavalry — just swept in 

from Manassas , 6,000 men 

In the Harper's Ferry region — useless in the 

main 16,000 men 

Washington garrison — 5,000 sent to Meade 

later 45,000 men 



POSITION OF THE ARMIES 93 

In eastern West Virginia jind lower Mary- 
land — mainly useless ,. . . . 35,000 men 

At New Bern and Beaufort, N, C. — mainly 

useless .,. 20,000 men 



Grand total of Halleck's isolated detachments 152,000 men 

All of these troops, however, were not available for the 
Army of the Potomac. But there were enough to enable 
Halleck to place in the field of the present campaign, under 
Meade if he chose, an army of 80,000 men — well-disci- 
plined troops. In Washington alone were eleven regiments 
of artillery, 20,000 strong, which were perfectly available 
as field infantry, a division of which was thus utilized later 
by Grant, south of the Rappahannock, far distant from the 
capital. 

After deducting all troops needed in Washington and at 
other points mentioned, Halleck had at his immediate com- 
mand some 80,000 veteran troops which could, and, by all 
principles of war, should be with the Army of the Potomac, 
better as a part of it, but, at all events, operating with it. 
Instead of this, Halleck gave Meade the 

Division of French ,. 10,000 men 

Stahl's division of cavalry 6,000 men 

Lockwood's provisional brigade of infantry 

from Baltimore . .| , 2,700 men 

Total out of 80,000 men mainly useless 18,000 men 

A pity that Milroy's 10,000 inanely sacrificed to Ewell at 
Winchester, had not been saved to supplement this meager- 
ness to Meade! Who may question that if Halleck had 
assembled and placed at Meade's disposal these 80,000 use- 



94 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

less troops, Lee would never have recrossed the Potomac 
with his army? The Army of Northern Virginia would 
have found its tomb in Northern soil, and the Southern 
Confederacy — carried on its bayonets — would have col- 
lapsed. 

This much more must be noted in justice to Halleck and 
his strategy. Probably meant as a diversion to draw Lee 
back from Pennsylvania to the defense of Richmond, Hal- 
leck launched Key's Corps of 15,000 men on the Virginia 
Peninsular, in a ** demonstration " out a few miles into the 
wind, the result of which was the capture of one Confed- 
erate brigadier, at home an invalid, and a few miles of 
railroad track torn up. At this time Richmond was de- 
fended by 9,000 men, unassailable, it was thought, behind 
their defenses, as certainly were the 40,000 Federals held 
in like impregnable works about Washington. This con- 
stituted Halleck's aid to the sorely pressed army fighting for 
the nation's life at Gettysburg. Of his strategy, he, him- 
self, is quoted: "In 1862, I stated to McGlellan very 
frankly my views in regard to the impracticability of his 
plan." That is, operating against Richmond up the Penin- 
sular and James River. Yet at that very moment Lee was 
in fear that McGlellan would advance along that line, it 
being, in Lee's opinion, the true and best operation looking 
to the capture of that Capital. While, two years later. 
Grant and his colossal final test of the overland line, fav- 
ored by Halleck, confirmed the strategy of McGlellan and 
Lee. For Grant " hammered " along the overland line only 
to be forced to the line of the James. 

As stated in early pages, correct Federal strategy in Vir- 
ginia required operations to be conducted from the water- 
front, using its waterways as bases, lines of communica- 
tion and supply. The opinion of General Lee, and the 
stern logic of war, both of which decided against Halleck, 



POSITION OF THE ARMIES 95 

are sufficient condemnation of his strategy, without calling 
on the field itself, to decide. 

McClellan said of Halleck : " Of all men I have ever 
encountered in high position, Halleck was the most hope- 
lessly stupid. It was more difficult to get an idea through 
his head than can be conceived by anyone who never made 
the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military 
idea from beginning to end." Grant said of him: " Hal- 
leck will never take a chance in battle, and a general who 
will never take a chance of battle never fights one." A 
most drastic criticism most impersonally expressed, espe- 
cially unimpassioned in view of the fact that it was made 
by the man whom Halleck had almost driven from the 
army as a subordinate ; and after, when their positions had 
been reversed and Halleck was acting as adjutant for Grant, 
the former had the presumption to systematically change 
and nullify the orders of his superior, in transmitting them 
to Sheridan, ordering him to make persistent battle, as al- 
ready mentioned. 

Making proper allowance for possible acrimony, due to 
the stress of the time, and for personal characteristics, the 
diary sketches of Halleck by Gideon Welles, Secretary of 
the Navy under Lincoln, do not far miss the truth when 
compared with voluminous evidence which has come to 
light during the half century succeeding the war. The fol- 
lowing are extracts from the published diary of Mr. Welles : 
" I look upon Halleck as a pretty good scholarly critic of 
other men's deeds and acts ; but as incapable of originality 
and directing military operations." During the Gettys- 
burg campaign, Welles records : " I have seen nothing to 
admire in the military management of General Halleck, 
whose mind is heavy, and, if employed at all, is apparently 
engaged in something else than public matters on hand. 
At a time when activity should pervade military operations, 



96 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

he sits back in his chair doing (Comparatively nothing. 
With Lee's advance already at Hagerstown, and Milroy 
captured, at Headcpiarters and the War Department, all is 
vague, opaque, thick darkness. I really think Stanton is no 
better posted than myself. Halleck has no activity, never 
exhibits sagacity or foresight, though he can record and 
criticise the past. He scolds and swears about the stupidity 
and worthlessness of others. This seems his way to es- 
cape censure himself and cover his stupidity in high posi- 
tion. . . . Halleck's inaction and inattention to passing 
military affairs, worries the President, yet he relies on him, 
and, apparently, on no one else in the War Department : 
and will not act without the consent of the dull, stupid, in- 
efficient and incompetent commander-in-chief. . . . The 
President is kept in ignorance of military operations, and 
defers to the general-in-chief, though not pleased that he is 
not fully advised of matters as they occur. There is a 
modest distrust of himself, of which advantage is taken. 
. . . Halleck dropped an expression showing that he pro- 
poses to make Milroy a scapegoat for the stupid blunders, 
negligence and mistakes of those who should have warned 
and advised him. . . . The President was drawn into with- 
holding the Harper's Ferry garrison from Hooker, as he 
was into withholding McDowell from McClellan, by being 
made to believe it necessary to the safety of Washington. 
Stanton was the moving spirit in the McDowell case, as 
Halleck is now against Hooker — prompted, perhaps, by 
Stanton. . . . With Lee along the Susquehanna, Halleck 
sits and swears and scolds and scratches his arm, and hates 
it ; but exhibits little military capacity or intelligence ; is 
obfuscated, muddy, uncertain, stupid, as to what is doing 
or to be done. . . . Secretary Blair wrote the President 
urging that Dix's command (on the Peninsular) should be 
brought to the Army of the Potomac ; and says, * Halleck 



rosiTiON ou tmp: armies 97 

is good for nothing and knows nothing.' No suggestions 
to the Cabinet ever come from Halleck. . . . After the 
battle of Gettysburg Halleck is bent on driving Lee back, 
not on intercepting his retreat, is full of zeal to drive his 
army out of Pennsylvania instead of to intercept and anni- 
hilate the enemy. Extreme partisans fear that success to 
the army will mean success to the Administration." In 
this last sentence is given a glimpse of the extent to which 
political ambition in high place worked against Mr. Lin- 
coln, and against the war, waging to save the nation. Open 
insurrection against the Government on the part of such 
nefarious schemers would have been less dangerous to the 
country, as it would have been more honorable ! In time 
of crisis, the man who secretly betrays his country by be- 
traying its trust in him is to be wholly despised. The one 
who openly proclaims his disloyalty and dares the conse- 
quences is to be lauded for his honor, in comparison. 

On Meade's assuming command, Halleck at once ordered 
Harper's Ferry dismantled, and turned over to him its gar- 
rison, both of which Halleck had just denied to Hooker. 

Gen. Meade, an engineer officer, was a scholarly soldier 
thrust into command of an army in the midst of campaign 
from the command of a corps against his modest objections 
in favor of Reynolds, and was without knowledge of the 
position of his army or Hooker's plan of operations. But 
wisely retaining Gen. Butterfield as his chief-of-staff, who 
had acted in that capacity with Hooker, he was thus quickly 
informed, and promptly set the Army of the Potomac in 
motion northeastward along the outer flank of the South 
Mountains with purpose to find Lee's army, which he be- 
lieved was in main force along the Susquehanna River 
threatening Harrisburg and Philadelphia. 

In fact, the movements of the hostile armies were in the 
nature of a still hunt for each other; as Lee's bold if 



98 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

dangerous strategy had befuddled the Federal commander, 
while the Army of Northern Virginia was without cavalry 
— its eye of observation ; for through a misunderstanding 
on the part of Gen. Lee or his cavalry commander, Stuart, 
or both, the latter in an attempt to mislead or to circle 
round the Federal army found himself with all but three 
brigades of the Confederate horse on the outer flank of 
the Federals moving towards the Susquehanna, and he was 
forced to continue on almost to that river before he suc- 
ceeds in riding round the Federal front and reaching Ewell; 
his troopers more asleep than awake from several days and 
nights of almost continuous riding. Meantime Gen. Lee 
was ignorant of the position of Stuart and of his antagonist, 
but presumes the former was somewhere in the rear of 
the army, where, strangely, he left three detached brigades 
of horse. Therefore Lee was without a single cavalrj^man 
in contact with his main forces spread from Chambersburg 
to the Susquehanna. 

That a general of Lee's ability should have assumed such 
a jeopardy of position as that in which his army was now 
placed can be accounted for only on the supposition that he, 
with his army, was possessed by overconfidence, the out- 
come of that moral force which, surging through masses 
of men, especially armies, frequently carries them into im- 
prudence or recklessness. Had Lee first fought a success- 
ful battle on the south side of the Potomac, his purpose 
would have been better served and with far greater safety 
to his army and cause. Ignorant of the fact that Halleck 
had safeguarded his rear and line of communication, and 
being advised on the 28th, by a spy, that the Army of the 
Potomac was across the Potomac. Lee's soldiery judgment 
naturally determined that his antagonist would operate in 
his rear. His one course was to concentrate his army and 
operate to draw his enemy away from his line of communi- 



POSITION OF THE ARMIES 99 

cation by a threat directed toward points which the Federal 
army must protect. In furtherance of this purpose, on the 
28th Lee ordered his army to concentrate at Cashtown, near 
Gettysburg, south of the South ]\Iountains, and began the 
crossing of this barrier by his two corps at Chambersburg. 
at its northern base, while drawing Ewell in from the Sus- 
quehanna River. Heth's division of Hill's Corps reached 
Cashtown the next day, sending Pettigrew's brigade for- 
ward nine miles to Gettysburg for a supply of shoes, not 
expecting there the presence of Federal soldiery. 

Lee's reasons for selecting Cashtown rather than Gettys- 
burg as his point of concentration, is difficult to determine: 
for the most casual inquiry, if a map was not available, 
would have identified Gettysburg as the great road center of 
the region he was penetrating; while Cashtown, a hamlet 
on the Chambersburg pike some ten miles west of Gettys- 
burg, was in no manner important, and could be reached 
only over one pike. Then again, Gettysburg was about 
equidistant between Ewell, along the Susquehanna River, 
and Hill and Longstreet about Chambersburg. And had a 
speedy concentration been ordered on this central point, 
and diligently prosecuted, the bulk of the Confederate army 
would have encamped about Gettysburg on the night of 
the 30th. This accomplished, Lee, full master of the posi- 
tion, would be free to maneuver and compel Meade to at- 
tack him; or, after overpowering his left wing, to operate 
offensively against Meade's center and right with great 
promise of a successful battle. 

Confederate concentration on Gettysburg, then, appeared 
as being better than the one less decisive and more consum- 
ing of time which was being made. It was easily within 
the chances of war that these might prove fatal in the loom- 
ing battle. Thus viewed, Lee's concentration was not in 
keeping with the skill thus far shown in this campaign, nor 



loo THE BATTLE OE GETTYSBURG 

in harmony with the past generalship of the great confed- 
erate commander. 

For the first time in his campaigns Lee was without Jack- 
son to urge his infantry into " foot-cavalry," and snatch 
victory from the apparently impossible. However, Lee had 
his columns well in hand and in movement with the excep- 
tion of Longstreet, who could not move foot until Hill had 
pulled out and had his corps filing over the mountain road. 
Nor had he assurance that Hill's advance would head into 
Ewell, his divisions making way toward Cashtown over 
either circuitous or impeding crossroads. For Lee was yet 
without a single cavalryman scouting ahead of his infan- 
try columns, heading into a region which held his antago- 
nist hunting for these very columns. 

Meade, meantime, was operating with the view to pla- 
cing his army in defensive position behind Pipe Creek, from 
Middleburg to Manchester, covering Baltimore and Wash- 
ington, while tlireatening Lee's flank and rear and com- 
pelling him to withdraw from the Susquehanna and attack. 
Meade labored under the belief that the main body of the 
Confederate army was, at this moment, in the country to 
the east of Gettysburg toward Harrisburg. He made plans, 
therefore, and disposition of his army in accordance with 
this belief. Fortunately they were not adverse, and in 
some respects were favorable, to taking unexpected position 
at Gettysburg. With Lee already withdrawn from the Sus- 
quehanna and concentrating toward Gettysburg, in order 
to draw the Federal army from his rear near the Potomac, 
as he believed, a peculiar condition of affairs was in opera- 
tion, not only in respect to the hostile armies, but in tlie 
minds of their respective commanders — conditions which 
gave rise to display of alert, resourceful generalship, and 
of the fighting abilities of the troops. 

Battle imminent, the exact position of the respective 



POSITION OF THE ARMIES loi 

armies on June 30th will vitally influence that issue. Lee 
already has his forces moving in concentration on Cash- 
town. Longstreet is camped about Chambersburg, twenty- 
four miles from Gettysburg, Hill's Corps crossing and over 
the South Mountains to Cashtown, from twenty-four to 
nine miles distant. Ewell with two divisions, Rodes and 
Early, at Heidlcrsburg, eleven miles north from Gettys- 
burg, Johnson's division at Fayetteville, twenty-one miles 
west, Stuart with three brigades of cavalry near Carlisle, 
thirty miles north, three brigades of cavalry along the Po- 
tomac some forty miles to the rear, and one brigade of 
horse with Ewell. Lee's front from east to west covers 
a distance of twenty-eight miles in a direct line, not in- 
cluding the cavalry along the Potomac. 

With view, then, to taking position behind Pipe Creek, 
the Army of the Potomac, on June 30th, was feeling out 
to find the Army of Northern Virginia. Its left wing, 
consisting of the First and Eleventh Corps, under Reynolds, 
was stationed at Emmitsburg and Marsh Creek, from Get- 
tysburg ten and eight miles distant respectively, and the cen- 
ter, composed of the Third and Twelfth Corps, at Taney- 
town, eighteen miles from Gettysburg, the Third Corps 
thrown forward toward Emmitsburg in support of the left 
wing. The right wing, the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps, 
were at Frizzleburg, Union and New Windsor, respectively, 
some thirty miles away from Gettysburg, — one brigade of 
the Cavalry Corps at Mechanicsville, fifteen miles away, 
watching out over the mountain roads, Bu ford's two re- 
maining brigades with him in advance at Gettysburg. On 
the right, at Planover, twelve miles from Gettysburg, Kil- 
patrick was feeling out into the region where the bulk of 
the hostile army was thought to be, after a sharp encounter 
with Stuart. For some inexplicable reason Meade had 
left the division of French, 10,000 strong, at Frederick, 



I02 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Md., wliere its presence availed nothing, while if with the 
army it would have been of the utmost tise. 

The Army of the Potomac covered a front of thirty miles, 
with its flanks well covered by cavalry; and w^as placed for 
feeling out for the enemy by the left, and to not speedy 
support from the center should the advanced left have be- 
come seriously involved. The refused right, in rear of 
Pipe Creek, supported and held position for the center and 
left retiring upon that line. 

If, however, the left being so involved as to render its 
withdrawal dangerous, the center and right w^ere somewhat 
distant from Gettysburg compared with Lee's forces, and 
that strategic center of the entire region was where contact 
of the two armies would naturally occur as they were 
placed and moving. 

The position of the Army of Northern Virginia in 
progressed concentration will give Lee considerable ad- 
vantage over Meade in time requisite to bring his army 
together at Gettysburg; but the advantage w^ill be some- 
what offset by the delay he must suffer in passing some 
60,000 men w'ith their trains over a single mountain road, 
the Chambersburg and Gettysburg pike. Besides, Meade 
was operating to utilize the Pipe Creek line and not Gettys- 
burg, as his field for battle. 

Within the correctness of ©fiicial Reports — without go- 
ing into details and eliminating all men not with the colors 
— there were present July i, 1863: 

Army of the Potomac, 85,674 men, out of its total en- 
rollment of 117,930 men. 

Guns, 354, of which, due to lack of artillery positions, 
there were in action at Gettysburg, 124 guns. 

Army of Northern Virginia, present with colors, 71,675 
men.* 

♦ Figures of forces present are from those given by Comte de Paris, 



POSITION OF THE ARMIES 103 

Guns, with ample position for effective action, 265. 

Unelated and uninspired, but sternly ready and dutiful, 
the faithful old Army of the Potomac settles in restful 
bivouac on the night of June 30, 1863; while its valorous 
antagonist, the Army of Northern Virginia, rests elated 
and over confident in itself and relying absolutely on its 
revered commander, and this superb spirit interchanges 
between officers and men. The Confederate army is in- 
fected with the mighty force of invincibility to an extent 
that takes hold on calm, self-commanding Lee, and over- 
heats his usual cool judgment to the verge of recklessness, 
as it appears. 

Thus, waiting the morrow, these two valiant hosts of 
Americans encamped under their furled banners — in their 
keeping, the fate of man's great self-governing experiment, 
and, therewith, the well-being of humanity. 

corrected from official and regimental reports compiled by authoritative 
military writers. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE FIELD OF GETTYSBURG 

WHILE the armies yet sleep we will precede then to 
Gettysburg and in its rural peace and morning si- 
lence make ourselves acquainted with its field before the 
alarm of war, its smoke and carnage, shall change this 
peace of life into an inferno of Death. 

Standing upon Cemetery Hill, the town of Gettysburg at 
its northern base, we look southwest over the immediate 
slightly undulating valley of rich farms. Beyond, and 
three-quarters of a mile distant, rises a wood-fringed eleva- 
tion known as Seminary Ridge forming the slightly raised 
boundary of the near valley. , This ridge sweeps along a 
fronting distance of some three miles in direct course, its 
extension to the northeastward and east, in a three-mile 
curve, rising here and there into knolls and hills, quarter- 
circling around our point of view on Cemetery Hill and 
its ridge development. Somewhat to the right of our di- 
rect line of vision to the northwest, and on Seminary Ridge, 
stands the Lutheran Seminary overlooking the valley. Gen- 
eral Lee will utilize its cupola as his vantage outlook on 
July 2d, and 3d, the Seminary Ridge with its eastward 
development being the position of his army. 

Beyond Seminary Ridge, Willoughby Run flows south- 
east through its little drainage valley, beyond which a series 
of more or less defined ridges rise and base the South Moun- 
tains in the far distance. On July ist the advance of the 
hostile armies will unexpectedly encounter one another in 

104 



THE FIELD OF GETTYSBURG 105 

force, and desperately engage on the ridge beyond Wil- 
loughby Run; the battle extending during its growth to 
our right until it envelops the ground and hills to the north 
of our viewpoint. And in this battle, the Army of the 
Potomac will lose Reynolds, one of its four superb corps 
commanders. 

In covering this landscape, directly in the line of vision 
southwestward, the eye has naturally followed the Gettys- 
burg and Chambersburg pike. Along this highway, from 
Marsh Creek, eight miles distant to Chambersburg, the 
corps of Hill is stretched in bivouac, Longstreet behind it 
at Chambersburg. With this view of the more elevated 
terrain to the southwest, we face south and observe the 
Emmetsburg pike hugging the westward base of Cemetery 
Hill, and running off southwest. In its course this pike 
cuts diagonally through the valley, in the distance passing 
over a slight elevation, or groundswell, on the crest of 
which is a peach orchard, and on its eastern slope, a wheat 
field. Beyond the swell the pike drops out of sight on its 
course toward Emmetsburg, where the Federal left wing 
sleeps in bivouac under Reynolds, and its advance, Bu- 
ford's two brigades of cavalry, is beginning to stir on the 
emerging edge of the distant mist-fields along the Cham- 
bersburg pike where yesterday it encountered Pettigrew, 
Lee's advance. 

Now looking slightly to the left of the peach orchard and 
wheat field, there is seen in the far view an irregular line of 
rocky, wooded knolls, lining eastward and terminating in 
Plum Run gorge, marked by a depression strewn thick with 
great granite boulders. This is the Devil's Den, which 
holds nest at the immediate base of two abrupt rising cones 
of wooded rocks and bowlders. The nearest of these 
is named Little Round Top and its mate. Big Round Top. 
These formidable hills are one and one-half miles south 



io6 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

from our view-station on Cemetery Hill. The Round 
Tops, abrupt and formidable against ascent from the 
Devil's Den, will form the left of the Federal position, 
while their opposite or eastern slopes are more accessible. 

The Federal line is foremarked by nature from the Round 
Tops northeastward, by the slope of Little Round Top, 
which dies into low ground for a distance of one-third 
of a mile, this depression dominated by the peach orchard 
crest along the Emmitsburg pike. Coming in over this 
low, dominated ground, the beginning of Cemetery Ridge 
is met, rising gradually to terminate its direct course in 
Cemetery Hill, where we stand. This crowning eminence 
gains an elevation of possibly sixty feet above the val- 
ley to its southwest, presenting thereto a semi-abrupt 
slope which forms an admirable, though exposed, posi- 
tion for artillery, to fire over the heads of infantry cov- 
ered by an irregular stone wall at its base, some two hundred 
yards from the Emmitsburg pike, with its double post and 
insert-rail fence. To the north and east. Cemetery Hill con- 
tinues itself in a curve, abruptly terminating in Gulp's Hill, 
the eastern face of which is also abrupt, rocky and heavily 
wooded, with Rock Creek at its base. Across Rock Creek 
are seen Power's and McAllister's Hills, which will serve 
as detached posts beyond the Federal right on Gulp's Hill. 

This strong line of natural defense is in likeness to a 
shepherd's staff ; from the Round Tops to Cemetery Hill, the 
straight portion, one and one-half miles long, Gulp's Hill 
terminating the crook, one-half mile long and directly east 
of Cemetery Ridge. This curving line covers a running 
distance of three miles, while from flank to flank, in a di- 
rect line, it is but one and one-half miles. This is to be- 
come the Federal line, in itself exceedingly strong, and weak 
only in its openness to being turned on the left beyond 
Round Top. 



THE FIELD OF GETTYSBURG 107 

The narrow valley of Rock Creek, with its fordable 
stream, at the eastern base of Gulp's Hill, separates this ele- 
vation from the raised ground and detached hills which 
form the irregular extension of the Ridge around the north 
of Gettysburg, connecting with Seminary Ridge to the 
southwest. These hills to the east across Rock Creek form 
the Confederate left on July 2d and 3d. A series of bril- 
liant cavalry combats will be fought among the hills and 
valleys a little farther to the east, where Stuart's troopers, 
in an attempt to push' into the rear of the Federal army, 
will be defeated by Gregg, Custer, and other young Federal 
cavalry knights. 

Running southward from Gettysburg and passing the 
ridge between Cemetery and Gulp's Hills is a pike which 
dips behind Cemetery Ridge. There it forks into the Balti- 
more and Taneytown pikes, over which the Federal center 
and right will move into position up Cemetery Ridge, which 
covers these roads throughout its length. Roads from Han- 
over and York, southeast and east, also debouch behind 
Cemetery Ridge. Along these roads and their intersections, 
Kilpatrick with his Federal cavalry is now watching Con- 
federate Stuart. 

Such is the general field of coming battle, in the main an 
open country in which it is difficult to hide the movement of 
any considerable body of troops, especially over the Con- 
federate zone, and then, only at night, for a few Federal 
signalmen posted on the Round Tops will overlook the 
whole field. They will be seen withholding the Confed- 
erates from most dangerous movements against the Federal 
left, which, unobserved, would be easily possible and which, 
otherwise would doubtless be undertaken. The immediate 
Federal zone to the rear, however, is perfectly covered and 
masked from the Confederates by the elevated defense line 
of Cemetery Ridge, behind which are the Federal lines of 



io8 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

supply and communication, and for intercommunication for 
quick passage of reinforcements from flank to flank and to 
intermediate points of need along the entire battle line. 

The Army of the Potomac will find itself fighting in a 
natural fortress of unusual strength, compactness and ac- 
cessibility. Gulp's and Cemetery Hills form internal for- 
tresses on the right, as do the Round Tops on the left, each 
surmounting the extreme flanks; while the Cemetery Ridge 
forms a line of defense which completely covers the roads 
in its rear, and from which reinforcements, reserves, battle- 
line enginery and ammunition can pass to the firing line 
in comparative safety and with great rapidity. On its 
southwest, or battle declivity, the advantageous slope of 
Cemetery Ridge is based by a stone wall which will serve 
as a breastwork ; and within musket range of this wall the 
double post-and-rail fence along the Emmetsburg pike is 
sufficiently obstinate to hold its own against easy or quick 
removal, and should damage the formation and sap the im- 
petus of assailing lines. About midway in the Federal posi- 
tion a considerable woods projects, affording concealment 
for brigades lying in wait on the flank of passing columns 
of attack. While this compact position w^ll not permit of 
full array of the Federal artillery, the elevated positions for 
guns along the line are sufficient to permit the fire of every 
gun to be concentrated on any point in the open valley, 
three-quarters of a mile wide, over which attack must be 
made if the Federal center is assailed. 

The Cemetery Ridge, then, is a remarkably strong posi- 
tion for defense except at its weak point, around its left. 
Here it may be easily turned either in close attack, or by 
the enemy taking position beyond, threatening Washing- 
ton and Baltimore, and thus compelling its defenders not 
only to abandon their position, but to give offensive battle. 
Surely, attack at any other point along the entire Cemetery 



THE FIELD OF GETTYSBURG 109 

Ridge position will be a most desperate undertaking such as 
will demand all the superb inspiration of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia to attempt; and failing, all its daring valor to 
save itself from annihilation will be needed. 

The Confederate position offers advantage for a turning 
movement to the right, while it perfectly covers Lee's line 
of communication, or retreat. Its weakness is in its cir- 
cuitous enfoldment of the Federal position and its length 
incident thereto. To reinforce from one flank to the other 
would be impossible in emergency; while the center would 
be dangerously exposed by heavy detachments sent to aid 
either remote flank. The Seminary Ridge affords a fine 
position for artillery ranged for concentric fire. This 
should enable the Confederate guns to silence the Federal 
artillery with a dominance of convergent fire directed on 
any desired point. For the Federal gunners must reply 
with a divergent range if they will pay attention to the ar- 
tillery, or keep silent and wait, to pay their compliments to 
assaulting columns of infantry. Such columns, launched 
from either position along the direct or straight front, will 
be under the direct and crossfire of artillery every step of 
the three-quarters of a mile ahead. The Confederate posi- 
tion as a whole, or at any point, has no special feature of 
strength, while it is open to a turning movement against 
its right as already noted. Its occupants signally defeated 
in front of the Federal position, the victor may, with safe 
temerity, quickly gather every fighting unit available and 
hurl it after the defeated with promise of a crushing vic- 
tory. 

As an entirety, and in detail, this field of Gettysburg is 
picturesque and beautiful as it dreams in rural peace and 
summer sweetness. An unusually open field, and in this 
respect offering a new experience, to the Confederate army 
in particular. From Cemetery Ridge the entire field is un- 



no THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

der view, excepting behind the screen of woods which fringe 
Seminary Ridge, and along which the Army of Northern 
Virginia will find itself, on the 2d, stretching around the 
position of the Army of the Potomac, from opposite Gulp's 
Hill, the Confederate left, to its right, fighting in the Devil's 
Den at the western base of the Round Tops. 

We are now acquainted with the prospective battlefield 
of Gettysburg, and the naturally defined military positions 
thereon and their relative merits and defects. These are 
foreindicated because the present position and movements 
of the opposing armies should naturally bring them into the 
positions indicated ; and, from the more concentrated condi- 
tion of Lee's Army, Meade's battle will begin on the de- 
fensive, while Lee will be strongly tempted to take the of- 
fensive. 

The first to appear in movement on the field of Gettysburg 
in the early morning of July ist are the Confederate bri- 
gades of Davis and Archer. Buford, who has been sent 
by Reynolds to hold in check this advance guard of the Con- 
federate army, has passed the night of June 30th a mile 
west of Gettysburg and before dawn has skillfully disposed 
of his forty-two hundred troopers behind Willoughby Run. 




MA.i. (;i:.\, joiix I'. K^,^.\()|.|) 



lis Page m 



CHAPTER X 

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

July First 

AT 6 A. M. a little squad of Buford's scouts in conceal- 
ment make such a demonstration that their boldness 
leads the hostile advance to think itself in the presence of its 
enemy in force, which causes the head of column, Arch- 
er's brigade, to deploy, and precious time is gained to the dis- 
tant Federal infantry. Archer is followed by the remain- 
ing divisions of Hill and those of Longstreet. At nine 
o'clock Buford's horse artillery opens on the Confederate 
advance, which quickly deploys and fiercely attacks the 
valorous weakness across the Run, Devin's and Gamble's 
brigades of troopers. Buford, himself, is in the thick of 
the fight directing the fire of his artillery in the desperate 
attempt to hold his ground, and sends word to Reynolds at 
Marsh Creek, eight miles away, to hasten to his aid. As 
the arriving Confederate brigades extend their line, threat- 
ening to envelop the attenuated front of the fast-thinning 
cavalrymen, Buford's condition becomes desperate, and see- 
ing that it is but a waste of life to attempt more in his 
position, he decides to withdraw to Cemetery Hill, and de- 
fend that key to the entire field of Gettysburg. To Buford 
is given the credit of first recognizing the strategic impor- 
tance of Gettysburg and Cemetery Hill, 

At this critical moment Buford's signal men on the roof 
of the Seminary inform him that infantry is approaching 
over the Emmitsburg pike, and Reynolds comes spurring 

III 



112 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

ahead, riding to the soldier's call, the sound of battle. 
Reynolds — reported as sad- faced during the morning — 
becomes an inspiration to Buford and his men. Quickly 
surveying the ground Reynolds perceives its suitability as 
a battle-ground and orders his advance division under 
Wadsworth to occupy and hold it. He also dispatches 
hurry orders to Doubleday to let nothing delay the march 
of his two remaining divisions, under Rowley and Robin- 
son, and to Howard to hasten his march for Gettysburg 
with the Eleventh Corps. By lo a. m. Wads worth's two 
small brigades are in position with Buford's tenacious 
troopers, blocking the way to the outnumbering Confed- 
erates, who come up with ever-increasing strength. Can 
Wadsworth and Buford maintain themselves till help 
comes? Fortunate for them that Lee so concentrated his 
army that now, in being compelled to move over a single 
road, it arrives in a single column and slowly. General 
Doubleday, arriving in person, aids Reynolds in establishing 
the best defensive line possible along the slope just beyond 
Willoughby Run. While thus engaged under a heavy fire 
from the enemy, noble Reynolds is shot in the head and 
instantly expires. 

Of all men in the Army of the Potomac at the time his 
brave soul took flight, Major-General John F. Reynolds 
was the officer most endowed to command that army. A 
graduate of West Point he had performed his part in the 
war with Mexico ; hence, when the Civil War broke out, he 
at once took important command as a well-experienced offi- 
cer. Bringing with him the universal respect and warmest 
friendship of his past life contacts, in the Army of the Po- 
tomac he quickly won the same treasure from his new 
comrades ; and. had he lived, his developing competency 
as a general must have forced him to supreme command of 
an army against favoritism and undiscerning incompetency. 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 113 

Just now in command of the left wing of the Federal army, 
specially selected by Meade for fitness for that most dan- 
gerous and exacting command of the moment, he had won 
his way by solid worth and without acclaim. A warrior- 
soul of dauntless fire, but self-controlled; coolest where 
peril was thickest; quick, alert, never too fast or too slow 
— a man to be depended upon anywhere and under any con- 
ditions. Meade named him, among thousands of brave and 
devoted souls, " The noblest and bravest of men." 

Let those who look down upon the soldier — this chal- 
lenger of death — consider if he, himself, would array un- 
der this fearless challenge, even for duty's sake. Let him 
consider the fact that a simple fighter does not constitute 
a soldier. A true soldier is a true man, whatever be his 
rank. 

Let man thank heaven for the ennobling of such 
through the ages, for had it not been for the warrior hu- 
manity would have long since sunk in such a despair of 
fear that he would have lost all soul or spiritual sense and 
would have made life wholly a burden to himself. In the 
sense of having saved man from spiritual death through 
fear, the soldier has been man's savior. 

With saddened hearts, cleared visions, and deeper solici- 
tude because of this holy offering of a true, hence, a great 
life, on the altar of freedom for futurity, we withdraw 
from contemplation of the great mystery, and look over the 
field where Reynolds fell. The brigade his presence in- 
spired is so hot at its work that the men do not know of the 
death of their loved chief. But, as though quickly to 
avenge it, they rush forward, shatter the enemy's front and 
capture one thousand of his troops. But soon another por- 
tion of the Federal line, attempting to hold a bald position, 
is fiercely assailed and driven in, a part of its defenders 
fraying off almost into Gettysburg. The Confederates, 



114 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

rushing in pursuit, are caught in flank by the victorious bri- 
gade which Reynolds had led ; and some of the enemy suc- 
ceed in regaining their lines, but leave two regiments to the 
keeping of the Federal brigade. 

General Abner Doubleday, now left in command of the 
Federal First Corps at 1 1 a. m. finds his valiant little band 
victorious along the entire line, having utterly defeated the 
attack of Davis and Archer, and inflicted upon them a 
loss of more than one-half of their two strong brigades. 
This valor leads Heth to believe himself in the presence of 
a superior force, and he withholds further attack until he 
can restore his broken line with his two fresh brigades 
under Pettigrew and Brockenbo rough. The Confederates, 
accustomed to fighting in broken, w'ooded country where 
sudden attacks en masse are effective, have been taking their 
first lesson on an open, rolling terrain demanding deployed 
lines of defense and attack. Under these new conditions 
they find their massed assaults enveloped and subjected to 
an enfilading fire under which no troops can stand. This 
is what has happened to Heth's two brigades. Doubleday, 
utilizing Heth's respite interval, also rectifies his line while 
anxiously awaiting the divisions of Rowley and Robinson. 
At 1 1 130 A. M. the head of their column is seen in the dis- 
tance sweltering along the Emmitsburg pike — four bri- 
gades with a total of between five and six thousand men 
making the total of the First Corps present on July ist 8,200 
men, aided by Gamble's brigade of cavalry. Rowley 
quickly deploys into line of battle, while Robinson is held 
in reserve near the Seminary. None too soon have these 
fresh divisions arrived, for Heth now attacks w'ith his en- 
tire division of four strong brigades. Fortunately for the 
Federals, he delivers his heaviest blow against that portion 
of the line held by a regiment of Pennsylvania lumbermen, 
gigantic fellows proud of the name " Bucktails," from the 




MAT.-GKN. ABNIiR DOL'BLEDAY 



Facing Page 114 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 115 

tail of that nimbleness which they sport in their hats. 
These men are fighting on the invaded soil of their own 
State, and they announce to the oncoming foe that " They 
are there to stay ! " 

Thus far the Army of the Potomac is adding sprigs to 
its wreath of proud fame. The ranked waves of Confed- 
erates seemingly dash against stone and iron, until Hill, be- 
lieving he is in front of a largely superior force, contents 
himself with holding his eight strong brigades from further 
attack on the six small Federal brigades. He puts his 
eighty guns into action, however, with much noise and con- 
siderable effect among his tenacious antagonists. The 
prelude of the battle is thus announced as closed, and the 
curtain is raised on a w^ider scene of fierce grapple. For 
Howard, commanding the Eleventh Corps, leaves Emmits- 
burg on the direct pike to Gettysburg, Barlow's division 
following the First Corps, while the two remaining divi- 
sions under Schurz and Steinwehr move over the Taney- 
town road to give them free way for haste in reaching 
Gettysburg. 

The situation of Meade on the morning of July first is 
peculiar, and that of his army in relation to its antagonist 
about Gettysburg somewhat precarious ; for the Federal 
commander is still operating on the belief that the army of 
Lee is to the east of that town, and his right, at Hanover, 
can sustain an attack better than his left under Reynolds 
feeling out towards Gettysburg, thirty miles distant from 
his right, where, on June 30, Buford became convinced 
that Lee was assembling in force, and where Meade's left 
wing is becoming dangerously involved beyond quick sup- 
port. He has not yet received Reynolds' dispatch of his 
engagement with the enemy, and the Federal corps com- 
manders, — even Reynolds, — have no later orders than that 
of June 30th, governing their assembly behind Pipe Creek; 



ii6 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

hence the left wing is left practically isolated and in battle 
with the advance of Lee's concentrated army. It is not 
until some hours have passed that Meade receives the dis- 
patches of both Reynolds and Howard informing him of 
the situation, w^hen he at once issues orders for the con- 
centration of his center and left on Gettysburg. 

At 11:30 A.M. Howard is making examination of the 
field from a housetop in Gettysburg for the purpose of de- 
termining the best position for his coming troops. Here 
lie first hears of the death of Reynolds, and, by seniority 
of rank, finds himself in supreme command on the field. 
While making his observations, he sees the driven brigade 
of the First Corps fraying back toward Gettysburg, as 
noted; and in sending his report to Meade of the death of 
Reynolds and the condition of matters at Gettysburg, How- 
ard reports that " The First Corps had given way at the 
first fire and w^as running." He has surely begun his new 
task in a questionable manner, in condemning the First 
Corps without knowledge of its action, thereby misleading 
tlie army commander by giving him to understand that one 
of his corps is practically out of action and worthless; and 
this regarding the left wing the marked exposure of which 
was already a matter of serious concern to Meade. With- 
out knowledge of the field or of conditions, Howard knows 
that whatever is done at Gettysburg for several hours must 
be done by the First and Eleventh Corps ; and, doubtless, he 
has not as full confidence in the Eleventh as he could de- 
sire, while he has just deceived himself regarding the First 
Corps. This indicates a dangerous carelessness on the part 
of Howard, which is confirmed when taken in connection 
with a similar action at Chancellorsville, where, had he given 
heed to Hooker's warning that Jackson was moving across 
the Federal front toward his flank and made preparation 
to defend it, his troops would have been in place, and the 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 117 

reputation of the Eleventh Corps perhaps would not have be- 
come so sullied in that battle, nor the army so jeopardized. 

That there will be much to do this ist of July the heavy 
cannonade of Hill proclaims, for it tells of the enemy in 
force in front and engaged with the First Corps; while the 
numerous roads he sees converging at Gettysburg from the 
general direction of the now discovered enemy tell him that 
Lee's troops unquestionably should come pouring over these, 
aimed at the strategic point he now occupies. Howard 
must see that possession of this road center gives com- 
mand of all the region roundabout. It appears that the 
commanding general should now hasten to Doubleday, as- 
certain the state of his battle, and become familiar with his 
position in order to know what disposition to make of the 
Eleventh Corps as it arrives. But from his lookout on the 
Gettysburg housetop, he makes a distant observation of 
Doubleday, and sets about to support him by occupying the 
curved extension of Seminary Ridge north and northwest 
of Gettysburg. 

Like Buford and Reynolds, Howard sees and realizes the 
vital importance of the Cemetery heights, if the Army of 
the Potomac is to fight a battle in front of the proposed 
Pipe Creek line, as now appears probable, judging from the 
strength of the contest along Willoughby Run. The first 
thing, then, is to dispatch for all possible aid. Howard, 
therefore, sends couriers hotfooted to Sickles, with the 
Third Corps now probably at Emmitsburg, ten miles away, 
also orders to the marching divisions of the Eleventh Corps 
to hasten on. 

The signalmen all day posted in the Seminary cupola, 
now wigwag to Doubleday the coming of the Eleventh 
Corps, as the division of Schurz emerges into view entering 
Gettysburg at 12:45 p. m. Howard assigns Schurz to the 
command of the Eleventh Corps, with orders to move the 



ii8 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

division of Barlow and his own — now commanded by 
Schimmelpfennig — northward and to the west, over the 
Mummasburg pike, to take position in extension of the 
right of the First Corps; meanwhile holding Steinwehr's 
division and the reserve artillery on Cemetery Hill. But 
another new factor now appears on the extending field of 
battle. Rodes' division of Ewell's Corps, aiming for the 
very ground which Barlow and Schimmelpfennig are mov- 
ing to occupy, moves down from the northwest, pushing 
ahead against the ineffectual objection of Devin's cavalry 
brigade, in observation in that quarter. ]\Iarching on Cash- 
town in the morning, Rodes has been reversed by Hill, to 
move on Gettysburg over the Mummasburg pike and he 
is on the field before Schurz can advance his divisions over 
the same road into the designated position on Oak Hill, the 
natural extension of Doubleday's position and command- 
ing his right rear. 

Ewell, W'ho is with Rodes, sends an aid to expedite the 
arrival of Early with his division from Heidlersburg. 
Ewell is astonished to see Gettysburg occupied by the Fed- 
erals, and, becoming suspicious, permits Devin's small cav- 
alry command to check his further advance, while he makes 
himself acquainted wuth the state of affairs, and looks for 
advantageous position for his divisions. Discovering Oak 
Hill as being in command of all that section of the field, 
he directs Rodes to take position there, and by so doing 
greatly endangers the Federal battle. For, as said, Oak 
Hill is the natural extension to the right of Doubleday's 
line, and is the culminating height on Seminary Ridge at 
its eastward curvature. A Confederate force thereon is 
not only a direct threat against Doubleday's right flank, 
but it also commands all the roads in his rear coursing paral- 
lel with his position on Willoughby Run. 

At 2:15 p. M. Rodes has his division deployed in double 




LIKUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL 



l-acing Page 118 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 119 

line across Oak Ridge, his left on the Newville road, and 
advancing occupies its culminating height with four of his 
five strong brigades and twenty guns. This gives him 
command of the interval between Doubleday's right-rear 
and the Eleventh Corps which should be occupied by Schurz 
in force. Doubleday's line is now subjected to direct and 
enfilading fire from the hundred guns of Hill and Rodes 
until 2:30, when Hill renews his infantry attack with the 
divisions of Heth and Pender aided by Rodes. By the 
convergent movement of Hill's and Ewell's Corps Lee has 
united them on the field of battle at the very point where, 
like a wedge, Rodes forms a block to the welding of the 
two Federal corps. This movement, dangerous in pres- 
ence of a concentrated foe, has worked well in this in- 
stance. Should Ewell now establish himself in his coveted 
position for to-day, circling round Gettysburg, and the Fed- 
eral army take position on Cemetery Heights, Lee's line will 
be weak because of its shape and forced extension. 

Howard, now returning from confirming Doubleday's 
position, learns that the Confederates are already in the po- 
sition on Oak Hill which he had previously ordered occupied 
by Schimmelpfennig. In this initial emergency, probably 
judging the Confederate position too strong to attack, 
Howard simply sets two batteries in the interval between 
the First and Eleventh Corps, shooting at Rodes' four bri- 
gades and twenty guns, which proclaim themselves by their 
enfilading fire amongst the First Corps men. Here he 
might assemble his two, or, if necessary, his three divisions, 
and boldly attack Rodes in order to gain a subordinate 
position in protecting contact with Doubleday's jeopardized 
right. Instead, holding Schimmelpfennig inactive in ob- 
servation of Rodes, he still further divides his forces in 
the very presence of the enemy by diverging Barlow to the 
right and away from Schimmelpfennig; then, by a swing 



120 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

or wheel to the left, Barlow is placed perpendicular to what 
would have been the Federal line had not Rodes interposed 
and occupied Oak Hill Ridge. 

The ground over which Barlow has to advance is desti- 
tute of strong position either for offense or defense; while 
the numerous roads and open country stretch to the aid 
of the strongest battalions. Schurz is permitted, however, 
to move Barlow ahead until he is so advanced and isolated 
that both his flanks are exposed to turning on the left from 
Oak Hill, and on the right by the arrival of Confederates 
along the Heidlersburg pike. With these mustering condi- 
tions of disaster in full swing on the Federal right, inferno 
breaks loose against Doubleday. While Hill assails his 
front with Heth's roughly handled brigades, with Pender's 
division in support, Rodes, left free by the divided condi- 
tion of the Eleventh Corps, deploys to his right to connect 
with Hill's left. To cover this operation he feints with 
the brigades of Iverson, Ramseur and O'Neal, toward 
Doubleday's right-rear. This feint, made through the in- 
terval between the First Corp^ and Schimmelpfennig, 
threatens to separate completely the two Federal corps now 
engaged in fierce battle. Doubleday, seeing the danger, 
calls up his reserve and sends the brigade of Baxter against 
the threat of Rodes. Pushing over this debatable interval 
under a heavy artillery fire, Baxter disperses O'Neal's bri- 
gade and gains and holds a position on the Mummasburg 
road, though attacked from the west by Iverson and Ram- 
seur. But Rodes gains his main purpose of connecting with 
Hill. 

Lack of unison on the part of Rodes' three brigades in 
opposing the single brigade of Baxter alone prevents most 
serious trouble for Doubleday. This failure is due to the 
usual causes, the inefficient handling of O'Neal's brigade 
and the detached and isolated attacks made by Iverson. 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 121 

Such lack of harmony and combination between large fight- 
ing units is quite common in war, as may be seen before the 
great battle is finished. But this condition should not find 
place in small units well disciplined and commanded. 
Rodes, himself, is new to the command of a division, as 
are some of his brigadiers to their commands. And this is 
a part of Jackson's old corps, itself under a new chief. 
Personal ill feelings and jealousies may be at work, also, 
exaggerating the natural differences in character and dis- 
position of commanders; for so are these weaknesses of 
men permitted by men to interpose, even when the lives of 
thousands, and the cause for which they are all fighting 
are the stakes. 

Baxter is reinforced by the brigade of Paul — both of 
Robinson's division — and the two are attacked by Iver- 
son with his single brigade, which is almost annihilated. 
Daniels now undertakes the same task alone, and, after a 
desperate combat, the Federals are still in position, exchang- 
ing fire with the retiring Confederates. Judging from what 
has been done, had these three Confederate brigades at- 
tacked simultaneously, Baxter and Paul would have been 
wiped out. Meanwhile Heth has been unsuccessful in an 
attack on Doubleday's front. 

Now, at 3 :45 p. m., there is a lull in the battle between 
the First Corps and its persistent antagonists. But, like the 
pause of wrestlers for breath, it must presage still harder 
work, for fresh Confederate troops are constantly becom- 
ing available. Hill is preparing to attack with the full 
power of Heth's tired division reinforced by a fresh bri- 
gade of Pender's and assisted by two brigades of Rodes 
under Daniels and Ramseur. With this large preponder- 
ance of force Confederate success seems to be assured, and 
apparently, it is now made certain by unexpected Federal 
aid. For at this juncture the remote Eleventh Corps be- 



122 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

gins work, that is, wliat has been made a detached and iso- 
lated part of the general battle. Two of Schimmclpfen- 
nig's brigades, advancing in oblique echelon between the 
Oak Hill slope and the Carlisle road, present double flanks 
to the artillery of Rodes on that hill, and are so demoralized 
by its tire that Doles, witli his single brigade, easily pushes 
the two back to the intersection of the Mummasburg and 
Carlisle roads where some fences aid in the temporary re- 
formation of this division. This divergent movement of 
Schimmelpfennig has still further separated the left from 
the right wing, and the Confederates have interposed there 
in force, occupying a formidable pt^sition, while fresh troops 
are constantly reinforcing them on both flanks against the 
ceaselessly decreasing Federals, lacking reinforcement. 
Not only is this condition of affairs true, but tiie Federals 
are alarmingly out of position, or, rather, in false position. 
Surely a crisis has arrived, a disaster to the Federals if 
the Confederates accept the alluring Federal invitation. 

The battle has run in detachments: first, from Double- 
day's west front, assailed by Hill ; then to the north against 
his right flank by Rodes and Hill. It is now due to the 
northeast against Schurz, just now given a foretaste, and 
is arriving in the shape of Early's fresh division of Ewell's 
Corps, pushing along the Heidlersburg pike to deploy along 
the hills across Rock Creek, where he arrays three brigades 
front. Hoke on the extreme left. Hayes in the center along 
the road, and Gordon on the right, with Smith's brigade 
in reserve. Ewell. overlooking the entire field, while 
watching Rodes' detached attacks on Baxter, directs Early 
into position to envelop practically the Federal right wing. 
Barlow's division of which is busy against Doles to relieve 
Schimmelpfennig. Early's artillery at once opens on Bar- 
low, while Gordon crosses Rock Creek in magnificent ar- 
ray, " Swinging lines of bright muskets gleaming among the 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 123 

trembling wheat," as he moves against Barlow, now caught 
between Gordon and Doles. Fighting desperately, this di- 
vision of the Eleventh Corps, commanded by a line, rising 
young oflicer. General Barlow, is linally withdrawn, leav- 
ing behind a penalty of many dead and wounded, its brave 
commander anuMig the latter, desperately disabled. Bar- 
low's men fall back some live hundred yards and there re- 
form, their left on the Carlisle road, their right across the 
Heidiersburg pike resting on the masonry buildings of the 
Almshouse. .After a short but stubborn resistance under 
this powerful front ruid Hank attack, everything lets 
go. Doles at once turns against Schimmelpfetuiig, and with 
his single brigade completely routs this entire division, which 
now engaged in a wild race rearward, run with Barlow's 
men against time. They confirm Napoleon's statement that 
" There are no poor regiments, there are some bad officers." 

When, at 3:30, Howanl bethought himself to order 
the withdrawal of the already base-running divisions of the 
Iilleventh Corps, he also thought it advisable to repeat the 
same order to Doubleday ; though that brave and wide- 
awake commander had already and repeatedly sent aids to 
Howard asking for instructions. Finally, when the order 
for the First Corps to withdraw was dispatched, it was not 
written, but was entrusted verbally to a staff officer. As 
the quite probable result, in an unknown country, and 
amidst the confusion of the surrounding rout, this officer 
either became lost, or forgot the kernel of the order, and 
it never intelligibly reached Doubleday. 

Finding himself without occupation to his left, the Elev- 
enth Corps gone. Rodes now orders a general attack of his 
division on Doubleday's right-rear, while Mill, in his front, 
hurls Pender's entire division at the decimated Federal 
brigades of Stone, Meredith and Biddle, numbering less 
than five hundred men each. Robinson's two depleted 



124 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

brigades, Baxter's and Paul's, facing Rodes, are subjected 
to simultaneous assault by the lately repulsed brigades of 
O'Neal, Iverson, and Ramseur, aided by the fire of thirty 
guns. From behind a stone wall these two heroic Federal 
brigades defend their position under a rain of musketry and 
cannon fire during which brigadier Paul falls wounded. 
By the rout of the Eleventh Corps, the flank and rear of 
Robinson's command is now left completely open, without 
even a remote threat opposing the occupancy of this ground. 
Robinson is quickly enveloped on three sides, and, to save 
his gallant command, is compelled to fall back on Cutler's 
brigade, posted in a woods in his rear. 

The position which the superb First Corps has held all 
day is lost. Left to themselves, isolated, abandoned, and 
finally chained to death and annihilation by their command- 
ing general-in-chief, they fight on, slaughtered and uncon- 
querable! Mangled and hurled in a vortex of cannonry, 
enveloped by thronging battalions, until even their one re- 
maining door of escape is fairly closed. This corps has 
defended itself and its fellows of the Army of the Potomac, 
and made victory for it most probable. Now decimated, 
abandoned, and about to be swallowed up, it withdraws to 
the Cemetery Heights with the coolness and order of parad- 
ing troops, and gains for itself safety from further attack. 

In his report to General Meade, Howard held the First 
Corps responsible for the wild rout of the Eleventh, charg- 
ing that " By the First permitting its flank to be turned, 
this made necessary the abandonment of its position, and 
thus exposed the left of the Eleventh, making necessary the 
withdrawal of the latter." This written and legibly signed 
by the commanding general who forgot to order the with- 
drawal of the Eleventh Corps until after it was in wild 
panic rushing its own withdrawal! By the general who 
had deliberately ordered the First Corps to stand its ground 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 125 

and be executed to death, and denying it hope of relief 
from him. The general, who in later years said of this 
event, " I commanded from my outlook on Cemetery 
Hill : " while from that commanding elevation the field on 
which Doubleday was left to command so ably was entirely 
shut off from Howard's view by woods and a ridge. Gen- 
eral Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery, relates years 
after that many of the Confederate survivors of the war 
who fought the First Corps during July ist, 1863, had 
told him that the fighting of the Federal First Corps that 
day equaled, if, indeed, it did not surpass anything they had 
seen from first to last. A brave foe is in better position to 
see the truth than a friend seeking excuse for his own fail- 
ures. 

As already stated, the brigades of Paul and Baxter have 
been forced back on Cutler, and in consequence of this the 
position held by the First Corps along Willoughby Run 
must be abandoned. In executing this most difficult and 
hazardous operation of withdrawing a line of battle in the 
presence of an attacking enemy, such troops as are not 
actually fighting are withdrawn to the advantageous woods, 
now held by the remnants of the three brigades of Paul, 
Baxter and Cutler. This force serves as a nucleus and 
sustainment to the engaged troops as they gradually yield 
ground or are forced to the rear. Realizing the Federal 
situation. Confederate Hill now makes a fresh assault with 
Pender's division on Doubleday's entire front and against 
his left flank. For the inexhaustible First Corps has worn 
out its original assailant, Heth's division, which Hill has 
sent to a less active position for temporary rest. 

At 4 p. M. Pender takes and holds the Federal line, while 
Heth's troops deploy south of the Chambersburg pike, Lane 
on the right, Perrin in the center, with Scales on the left 
near the pike. Scales, relieving Brockenborough in passing, 



126 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

sweeps down the slope facing a wood near Willoughby Run. 
Meredith's httlc brigade is hidden there, and at eighty paces 
distant dchvers a fire which checks Pender's advance and 
sends Scales' brigade flying, discouraged past the power of 
its commander to bring it back to combat. Lane, on the 
right, is held by the fire of a .small detachment of Gamble's 
cavalry dismounted. Perrin is thus left alone in his tardy 
advance. Opposed by Biddle's brigade, fighting in the 
open and without reserve, the opposing lines riddle one an- 
other. lUit Perrin, temporarily checked, re-forms his line 
and drives Biddle from Willoughby Run, the latter finding 
safety on the western slope of Seminary Ridge. Scales 
now gives his attention to Meredith and Stone who hold 
the woods to his left. Maneuvering to cut these two Fed- 
eral brigades off from retreat, they .sustain a terrible loss, 
caught between a front and flank fire. 

At this minor crisis — which the Federals must dominate 
somehow — Doubleday, having received no orders from 
Howard, now quite properly takes upon himself the re- 
sponsibility his superior has .shirked, and gives his valiant 
men a chance to live and fight another day. But the re- 
treat of the First Corps of the Army of the Poto- 
mac mu.st be made with order and dignity. Quickly 
withdrawing Meredith and Stone to Seminary Ridge, which 
affords good defen.se for covering retreat, Doubleday orders 
Robinson to occupy the Seminary and intrench it, and there 
gather the live remains of the brigades of Meredith, Stone 
and Biddle, two-thirds of whose original number are left 
on the honored field. With this orderly wreckage of the 
First Corps, he checks the creeping advance of the Confed- 
erates, for they have learned through the day to approach 
these little assemblages with circumspection. On the right, 
the .stubborn resistance of the brigades of Robin.son with 
Cutler's, has made possible the withdrawal from that ex- 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 127 

posed part of the Federal line, leaving behind but one gun, 
dismounted. On the extreme left, south of the Hagers- 
town road. Gamble's cavalry still holds Lane in check, who, 
proposing to turn the Federal line by the south, is foiled. 
All of the First Corps now safely withdrawn and gathered 
about the Seminary, it will be useless waste of life and 
precious time to tempt the enemy further and delay march 
down the slope and across the valley to Cemetery Hill. 

At 4 p. M. the decimated battalions of the First Corps are 
seen descending the eastern slope of Seminary Ridge, leav- 
ing it to their tired and satisfied antagonists as a vantage- 
point from which to view their march across the mile of 
exposed valley and up to nobly earned rest on Cemetery 
Hill. Its left flank is exposed to Ewell's troops along the 
near ridge. But Ewell, not satisfied with whipping an op- 
ponent and leaving him to peaceful rest, is dogging along 
the left of the First Corps' retreat from Seminary Ridge, 
with Ramseur and Doles watching a chance to nag and 
bite. Nor has he been so blinded by laughter at the 
Eleventh Corps' race that he forgets to send Hayes's and 
Hoke's fresh brigades after the flying divisions of hiding 
Schimmelpfennig, and of brave, wounded Barlow. These 
Confederate brigades are now on the outskirts of Gettys- 
burg brushing aside the gallant troopers of Devin, which 
alone interpose to cover the flying rout now swarming the 
streets, back alleys and hiding-places of the town. This is 
what the weary and mangled First Corps has escaped into ! 
But it fortunately meets Howard, at last awake to the im- 
mediate conditions. He has called one of Steinwehr's 
brigades from Cemetery Hill and posted it in front of the 
town in support of Devin, who, reinforced by the First 
Corps, check the Confederates for sufficient time only to per- 
mit of withdrawing the troops to Cemetery Hill. Stein- 
wehr's brigade, Devin's and Gamble's troopers, and all of 



128 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

the First Corps arrive there. But the little mighty brigade 
of Stone, the rear guard of the First Corps in its retreat, is 
now caught in the stern-tow riot of the Eleventh and is cap- 
tured with the rest. This brave brigade leaves on the banks 
of Willoughby Run two commanders, most of its field and 
line officers, there sleeping or moaning with a large majority 
of its men. 

From 9 a. m. until 4 p. m. the First Federal Corps was 
left under the command of Major-General Abner Double- 
day without one superior order. With this attenuated and 
flanked line of battle covering one and one-quarter miles of 
hills and valleys of open and woods, with a considerable 
stream threading, General Doubleday fought and main- 
tained his position intact for seven hours, this entire time 
fighting off a superior and constantly increasing enemy, 
with his own force rapidly dwindling. The rate may be 
correctly judged from the fact that the First Corps brought 
on the field in the morning 8,200 men, and at 4 p. m. nearly 
four thousand of them lay dead and wounded on the field, 
most of the remainder prisoners in the keeping of the Con- 
federates, with an unusually small proportion of missing. 
The battle made by the Federal First Corps on July ist 
was as notable a feat of arms as its commander's action was 
of generalship. Doubleday was steady, alert and resource- 
ful to a marked degree under most difficult and unnecessary 
conditions, forced upon him by the faulty handling and 
placing of the Eleventh Corps. These facts, in no manner 
chargeable to Doubleday, but to Schurz and Howard, 
forced Doubleday ceaselessly to shift the positions and 
formations of his fighting units — a feat of generalship ! 

To resume the battle narrative: The exhausted hulk of 
the First Corps, with Steinwehr's division of the Eleventh, 
lies prone on Cemetery Hill, a natural stronghold and 
somewhat fortified by Steinwehr, but physically in a con- 



I 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 129 

dition of defenselessness; so that a vigorous assault, if 
immediately made by two Confederate divisions of average 
strength, should surely clear these heights to their free 
occupancy. The immediate defensive ground on the 
Cemetery Heights is too extensive for proper occupancy 
and defense by the Federal force present. Hence it is 
weak and indefensible against any considerable assault, 
such as the Confederates are amply able to make at any 
time after 4 p. m. The Federals are posted on the round 
and return bend of the Shepherd's Crook, before described; 
and with its present defense, can be taken in flank and 
reverse by any division which will take the trouble to march 
down Rock Creek valley a short distance and ascend Culp's 
Hill; another division, meantime, engaging the Federal 
northwest front on Cemetery Hill. Howard disposes his 
force the best he knows how, while anxiously observing 
Ewell's brigades feeling about as though disposed to make 
an attack. In fact. Early strongly urges his chief to con- 
sent to this; whereupon Ewell, equally aggressive in dis- 
position, dispatches to General Lee, requesting permission 
and the support of Hill. In conversation with General 
Meade on this point, in after years, General Ewell said, 
" I, at 4 p. M., July 1st, had my corps, 20,000 strong, in 
column of attack, and on the point of moving on Culp's 
Hill, when I received orders from Lee directing me to 
assume the defensive and not advance. I then sent, urging 
Lee for permission to advance ; but his reply was a reitera- 
tion of the previous order." To this General Meade made 
reply: "Had you occupied Culp's Hill on the afternoon 
of July ist it would have produced the evacuation of the 
Cemetery Ridge position, and the Federal withdrawal by 
the Baltimore, Taneytown and Einmitsburg pikes." And 
most fortunate would have been the five thousand Federals 
to have been permitted to withdraw. 



130 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

General Lee, in his report of the battle of July ist, 
says: "The attack (on Cemetery Hill) was not pressed 
that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it 
being considered advisable to wait the arrival of the rest 
of our troops." 

While the relative strength of the opposing forces could 
not be known to the opponents on July ist, the predominant 
strength of the Confederates is plainly visible. The facts 
are that the total Federal force on the field after the ar- 
rival of the Eleventh Corps was 18,000 men; and unrein- 
forced, this number is reduced at 4 p. M. to 5,000; while 
the Confederates now have at least 25,000 men present, as 
their losses have been made more than good by fresh troops 
constantly debouching onto the field. 

A marked disposition is displayed on the part of some of 
Ewell's subordinate commanders to act on their own ini- 
tiative; and even without orders from, or knowledge of, 
their superiors. This is Ewell's first campaign as the com- 
mander of Stonewall Jackson's old corps ; hence, in this 
new relationship, full acquaintance has not been reached. 
Nor would Ewell, himself, be disposed to use his discre- 
tionary authority to attack without the orders of General 
Lee. It is scarcely questionable, however, that had Jackson 
lived to command the Confederate Second Corps, now 
immediately about the Federal position, it would be 
promptly assailed and captured. Two Confederate officers 
scout over Gulp's Hill finding it vacant. 

At 3 :30 p. M. a powerful reinforcement arrives to the 
relief of the anxious Federals. Superb, magnetic Hancock 
comes riding up, in hot haste, bearing orders from General 
Meade to take command at Gettysburg, although the junior 
in rank of Howard. Hancock is empowered to exercise 
his own judgment as to whether Gettysburg or some other 
position he may discover en route shall be occupied by the 



BATTLE OF JULY FIRST 131 

Army of the Potomac, instead of the contemplated Pipe 
Creek Line. In passing, it is well to notice that General 
Meade, the new commander, possesses the rare quality of 
being able to select men competent to necessities, and also 
the moral courage to place such in command of them, 
subordinating personality and personal pride to the more 
important and worthy interests of his army as a whole. 
These fine qualities he has displayed in thus commissioning 
Hancock to command over his seniors, and in so arranging 
his army that Reynolds should command the left wing. 

Hancock, of whom General Grant says later, " He never 
made a military mistake or blunder for which he was re- 
sponsible," possesses the " topographical eye," so rarely 
found, and recognizes at a glance the remarkable advan- 
tages for defense offered by the Cemetery Ridge position, 
as he rides along its rear length from the Round Tops 
finally to rise on Cemetery Hill and view its general charac- 
teristics and frontal command. Immediately dispatching to 
Meade and advising rapid concentration here, Hancock 
now gives himself to the immediate situation. His superb 
bearing, distinguished by its fiery energy, restores confi- 
dence and courage, even to the extent that the Eleventh 
Corps fugitives cease to run, are re-formed into order, and, 
with the steady division of Steinwehr, the First Corps, 
and the artillery and cavalry, are advantageously posted in 
such manner that a formidable show of defense begins to 
appear to the observant Confederates. Had General Lee 
been earlier on the ground, an attack would perhaps have 
been successfully accomplished before the appearance of 
the one-man reinforcement; for he, with that ability which 
grasps and masters a crisis, had in one and one-half hours 
organized from the meager wreckage a defense so formid- 
able in appearance that a swarming foe dare not attack it. 
By holding the Cemetery Ridge position Hancock boldly 



132 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

thrust the Army of the Potomac at Lee and tempted him 
into offensive battle. In any case, the usually alert, 
persistent dash of the Confederates has been absent from 
the field this day. 

A pertinent criticism of the first day's battle of the Con- 
federates is made by Col. Henderson, the able English mili- 
tary critic, who writes: "The absence of Lee's cavalry 
after crossing the Potomac, held him from having both Hill 
and Ewell in Gettysburg July ist in full force; both only 
nine miles away, while Reynolds was fifteen miles distant.. 
Had cavalry been in place Lee should have occupied Gettys- 
burg the morning of July ist, or if not this, then after the 
battle he would have occupied the Cemetery Heights, know- 
ing that other Federal corps were not up." Howard's per- 
formance will suffice for his criticism, while the doings of 
Doubleday raise him above it. 

It has become history, through Howard's official report, 
that he was responsible for selecting the Cemetery Ridge 
position for the Federal battle; but the facts are as herein 
related. For Buford was first to appreciate the importance 
of Cemetery Hill, so reported to Reynolds, and the latter 
ordered Howard to Gettysburg to occupy that position, as 
one of the staff of Reynolds affirmed. But it was Hancock 
who first saw and appreciated the full development of the 
Cemetery Ridge position, and on his recommendation 
Meade occupied it with his army. Nor did Howard ever 
correct his report reflecting on the First Corps, and as a 
consequence Doubleday was placed under a shadow and 
withheld from promotion. 




fa 



M.\J.-(.1-.N. DAMKl. I'- SUK1.I".S 



rase i:« 



CHAPTER XI 

BEFORE SECOND DAy's BATTLE 

BOTH Lee and Meade have now decided to make this 
site the battle-ground for a decisive battle. Meade 
orders his entire army to hasten to the field of Gettysburg, 
and the seasoned veterans of the Army of the Potomac 
swing out on a forced march, day and night, while the few 
distant and belated divisions and brigades of the Army of 
Northern Virginia keep step with them, all rushing to a 
Feast of Death. 

After the battle of July ist it become evident to both com- 
manders that the contest would be continued at Gettys- 
burg on the morrow. Forced marches, then, are in order 
for the main portion of the Federal army and a portion of 
Lee's. 

From the respective headquarters swarms of aids and 
couriers speed over strange roads where a wrong one taken 
may prove fatal to the army, bearing orders for putting the 
scattered corps in motion. Columns in movement compact 
themselves, turning heads toward Gettysburg with quick- 
ened step. Lazy bivouacs spring into chaotic life as the 
men hustle on equipments, fill canteens and haversacks — 
provided the Quartermaster's Department, with its thou- 
sands of gathering arms reaching for supplies throughout 
the country, has done its duty and delivered these to the 
Army Depot, and the thousands of corps, division, brigade, 
regimental, and company wagons have worked out of the 
depot chaos to find ways to their proper commands con- 

133 



134 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

stantly shifting and moving over strange roads. All this 
supply machinery of war having worked perfectly, then the 
plodding troops will have bacon, hardtack and coffee to put 
into their haversacks. The bivouac chaos falls into serried 
columns which pull out into dusty roads and swelter. Tired 
legs and galled feet do not count now. " Close up ! close up, 
men! no straggling!" are the orders of the day and night 
ahead heard along miles of these racing columns of some 
200,000 men. The usual five-minute halts for rest are cut 
down to the limit of human endurance; while the water de- 
tails, loaded down with canteens in temporary exchange for 
equipment-burdens, are kept busy, for thirst must be 
quenched. 

On forge these great columns in the waning sunlight to 
become ghostly creeping monsters in the moonlight, glinting 
through the dust-clouds which envelop them like a smoke 
from which strange sounds emerge. The dull thud of innu- 
merable feet, the cluck of thousands of train wagons, pon- 
derous artillery, and nimble ambulances ; the clank of harness 
and the jingle of cavalry; sullen commands and teamster's 
cursing and savage lashing; a great breathing of toil, and a 
stench from sweating men and beasts such as reveal through 
their swirling envelopments that the moving life within is 
wear's enginery of flesh and iron ! 

These leviathans stretch out interminable toward the 
coming vortex of war, twisting and undulating along every 
road pointing to the fateful circle ; while far out on their 
flanks and in advance as tentacles are small bodies, groups, 
and strung files of horsemen and infantry feeling out and 
fending. These monstrosities alarming the rural peace cast 
off a strange wreckage, — of exhausted men, beasts, and dis- 
abled wagons, which straggle and trail on after the main 
bodies like dragged tails. As these strange things head out 
of the night into the waking smother of heat, the fragrance 




First day's battle, ncrtl, of l-airfield Koad. tlio last Co.i federate attack and 
day's battle, south of Fairhcld Road, the last Confederate attack. 

(Facing Page 135) 



second 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 135 

from the open windows of houses where people are pre- 
paring breakfast steals to dusty nostrils as the halted 
columns drop to pieces, and little fires gleam and grow 
ambitious boiling precious coffee and frizzling bits of bacon 
for the provident veterans if the commissary machinery 
has done its work ; water and hardtack are tempting enough 
to improvidence and greenness, while many tighten their 
belts for breakfast, and trust to their last meal to carry 
them through the unknown ahead. 

General Lee is more closely examining the Federal posi- 
tion through the moonlight. And at i a. m. General Meade 
arrives to find the soldiery, weary from the battle of yester- 
day, sleeping among the tombstones of the Cemetery and 
beneath its cresting trees. The moon is sinking toward the 
west. The hours for rest and silence are fast speeding to 
make way for glorious dawn. Let us trace with Meade the 
Federal line, past its sleeping guardians and their pacing 
sentinels. 

On the crest of Cemetery Hill we find the arrested racers 
of Schurz's division posted across the Baltimore pike, faced 
north toward Gettysburg ; on their right and rear is Barlow's 
division, now under Ames, while Steinwehr's steady com- 
mand sleeps on the left of Schurz. In extension of the 
line to the left, next to the Eleventh Corps, Robinson's 
division of the famed First Corps is posted along Cemetery 
Ridge, Wadsworth's division being on Gulp's Hill, to the 
right of the Eleventh Corps. Doubleday is in rear of 
Schurz; for General Newton has been given command of 
the noble First Corps with which Doubleday fought so 
splendidly all day along Willoughby Run. Surely 
Meade may trust him to hold the ground to-day should 
Schurz's men again break into a mad foot-race to the rear. 
Robinson carries the line south to Ziegler's Grove, to be- 
come famous on the 3d as the point of direction for the 



136 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

most desperate charge made in modern warfare up to that 
time. The artillery of these two corps is well posted along 
their front, and a portion of it is protected by light earth- 
w'orks thrown up by Steinwehr while acting as reserve on 
the I St. Directly south, or on the left of Robinson, are 
the brigades of Graham and Ward — Birney's division — 
of the Third Corps. These range along the depression of 
Cemetery Ridge, reaching to the low ground w'hich is 
dominated by the Peach Orchard swell along the Emmits- 
burg pike. Next is Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, 
extending the line over the low ground toward the Round 
Tops, and on which heights he has posted two regiments. 
Williams' division of the same corps is a mile or more in 
rear of Cemetery Hill on Rock Creek, near the crossing 
of the Baltimore pike, mistaking that for the Federal right 
flank. And, finally, two brigades of Humphreys' division, 
Third Corps, are massed in the left-rear of Birney. 

The remainder of the Army of the Potomac is approach- 
ing. Hancock's Second Corps arrives at 7 a. m., on the 
2d, and is used to strengthen a weak point in the Federal 
line to the south of Ziegler's Grove, between the First and 
Third Corps. Hancock's divisions are in order from right 
to left, first Hayes, Gibbon next, and Caldwell, joining 
Graham of the Third Corps. Tw-o brigades of the Third 
Corps, De Trobriand's and Burling's, and the corps artil- 
lery, are in march from Emmetsburg. The Fifth Corps, 
under Sykes, is some ten miles aw^ay on the Hanover pike. 
The United States Regulars are a part of this fine com- 
mand, which has marched sixty miles during the last three 
days. It arrives at i p. m., and is held in reserve on the 
right till 3 p. M., when it is relieved by the Sixth Corps, and 
moved to the left in reserve. At 3 p. m., the Sixth Corps 
begins to arrive from Manchester, having marched thirty- 
five miles since 7 p. m. of the ist. 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 137 

Meade's cavalry is scattered and somewhat out of posi- 
tion in its disposition for the proposed Pipe Creek position. 
Gamble's brigade of Buford's division is on the Emmits- 
burg pike somewhere on the Confederate right; while 
Devin's brigade, on the Federal right, has been driven off 
by Ewell, and is now on the Taneytown road. Merritt's 
brigade is pushing in from Mechanicsville, off to the left; 
Kilpatrick is at Two Taverns, and Gregg has left Huey's 
brigade at Westminster to protect the railway terminal 
and supply depot of the army, while with his two remain- 
ing brigades he is hastening to take position to cover the 
right of the army to the northeast of Gulp's Hill. The 
reserve artillery, put in march by Meade July ist, will 
arrive shortly. Night marches, excessively fatiguing to 
troops, leave a heavy trail of stragglers that seriously weak- 
ens the fighting force present for battle. But by 9 a. m. 
all of the Army of the Potomac will be on the field except- 
ing the Fifth and Sixth Corps and two brigades of the 
Third. This is a quick concentration, most creditable to 
Meade on so sudden a change of plan. 

At 7 A. M., July 2d, the position and condition of the 
Army of the Potomac is as follows : Two of its strongest 
corps, two brigades of infantry, and all its cavalry, are 
from two to nine hours' march from the field on which 
battle should open at any moment. And had the Confed- 
erates attacked at daylight, they would have found the 
attenuated Federal line lacking the presence of the Second 
Corps, and unsupported by a single reserve; while the Fed- 
eral left — the weak point — was held by but two semi- 
isolated regiments. At 9 a. m., still unmolested by a shot 
from the Confederates, additional troops have arrived, 
enabling Meade to rectify and strengthen his line. He 
shifts Geary's division from the extreme left near and on 
Round Top, and places it on the southeastern slope of 



138 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Gulp's Hill; at the same time ordering Sickles to extend 
the Third Corps to the left to occupy the ground vacated 
by Geary. Hancock is placed between the First and Third 
Corps, in the space vacated by Sickles. 

Meade, wrestling with the belief that the Confederates 
will attack his right on Gulp's Hill, and himself think- 
ing to move Slocum against Ewell, entrusts the oversight 
of his left to a staff officer, Colonel Meade, his son. And, 
more unaccountable, he permits Buford with his cavalry 
division to quit its guard of the extreme left, south of the 
Round Tops, and move off to Manchester, leaving this flank 
bare of a single guard. This on the verge of battle, when 
nothing requires the presence of Buford at Manchester 
further than to relieve the depot guard, which can as well 
remain there for a time as elsewhere. Nor does the com- 
manding general do more than promise immediately to re- 
place Buford with a force ample to occupy and guard the 
Round Tops, in answer to repeated and urgent requests 
made by Sickles. 

Thus, left to himself, and doing his best to cover his 
long line, the brigades of De Trobriand, Burling and his 
artillery having arrived. Sickles deploys his corps on the im- 
mediate left of the Second, holding Burling in reserve. In 
this position he finds his small corps along Plum Run, in the 
low ground to its east overlooked by the peach orchard crest 
along the Emmitsburg pike, the Round Tops beyond his 
left neither occupied nor even guarded. Humphreys, 
meantime, throws detachments up the peach orchard rise 
as far as the Emmitsburg pike, where they can observe 
the approach of the enemy. Sickles's corps, then, is under 
a commanding rise in its front, the crest of which is per- 
fectly open to occupancy by the enemy, while his left, and 
that of the Federal army, is open to being turned. H he 
is attacked, he is helpless, apparently, to defend himself on 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 139 

his position or the Round Tops beyond his left. In this 
trying situation he decides to advance to the Emmetsburg 
pike rise with a part of his corps, and refuse the balance to 
the left along a line of strong, rocky and wooded knolls, 
running from near Little Round Top to the peach orchard 
on the 'Emmitsburg pike crest ; and to do this before the 
enemy has chance to occupy this dominating ground. This 
move would seem commendable were it not that his ap- 
pointed ground in the depression is a portion of a general 
line which must be maintained in its entirety, or the whole 
is deranged and weakened. By taking the stronger ad- 
vanced position, he necessarily refuses his left toward but 
not covering Round Top. His position, then, constitutes 
a great exposed salient thrust out to the enemy on the 
extreme left of the Federal position, and nearly a mile in 
advance of its general line. Nothing better than this could 
be invented to invite assault in front and flank with direct 
and enfilading fire along both sides of the angle ; while on its 
unprotected left flank loom the unmanned key of his and 
the entire Federal position. And Sickles, thus advanced, 
is in less advantageous condition to defend these heights 
than he would have been in the low ground. This salient 
may easily demand the utmost effort of the Federal army 
to its defense, unless Meade sees the error, withdraws the 
Third Corps in time, and gives much needed attention to 
the exposed left of his general line and its key. At this 
hour no one but Sickles appears to appreciate the vital im- 
portance of these abrupt hills, the Round Tops, or to fear 
what is concerning Sickles, — that Lee is preparing to attack 
by his right, as indicated by the movement of heavy columns 
toward that flank, which is evidently his most promising 
point of attack. Detailed examination of this new 
position taken by Sickles develops the facts that the 
Millerstown road leaves the Emmitsburg pike near 



140 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

the peach orchard and runs in rear of his Hne along 
the rugged knolls and bouldered ravine, crossing Plum 
Run just north of the Devil's Den, and on past Little 
Round Top to the Taney town road running in rear of the 
Federal position. Sickles then has this road in the rear of 
the rough, irregular wooded knolls wiiich afford a natural 
defense for a portion of his refused left, and overlook a 
perfectly open country to the south, from whence attack 
will naturally come. 

As time drags on without demonstration from Lee, 
Sickles, becoming convinced that an attack is preparing 
against him, sends Berdan with three hundred of his sharp- 
shooters to feel out from the peach orchard across the 
Emmitsburg pike. Here Berdan quickly becomes engaged 
in sharp fire with Confederate skirmishers. Pushing these 
back, with persistent daring, he soon discovers heavy 
columns massing behind the Warfield w'oods. Apprecia- 
ting the value of moments now, he boldly engages with 
these while dispatching to Sickles this information, con- 
firming the general's belief that he is to be attacked. Upon 
this discovery Sickles makes his final dispositions. He 
wheels Birney's division to its left to occupy the wooded 
knolls beyond the Millerstow-n road, while he sends 
Humphreys' division forward into position on the high 
ground along the Emmitsburg pike, connecting with 
Birney near the peach orchard. This position taken by the 
Third Corps leaves the Round Tops without direct de- 
fense, and a gap between the right of Humphreys and 
Hancock's left, which the latter quickly fills with two of 
his regiments and a few guns. While Sickles has thrust his 
corps out into the very face of the enemy in a semi-isolated 
position, he has done the best possibly that could be done, 
under the conditions. For if attacked in the position which 
Meade has assigned to him, and his left open, — the Round 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 141 

Tops unoccupied as they are, — he could, by no manner of 
means defend himself. And, with his left crumpled up, 
the Round Tops in possession of the enemy, Meade could 
not maintain the remainder of his line, nor do much else 
than to retreat away from his depot of supplies, as also, 
from Washington and Baltimore. 

At I p. M. the Fifth Corps, assigned to Slocum, com- 
manding the Federal right wing, is held in general reserve 
on the Baltimore pike near its crossing of Rock Creek, 
from which point this corps can reinforce any part of the 
line with quickness and facility. This ease of reinforcing 
is one of the admirable features of the Federal position. 
The reserve artillery is advantageously placed between the 
Baltimore and Taneytown pikes. At i p. m., July 2d, then, 
Meade has his entire army up and in position except the 
Sixth Corps. 

A survey of the Confederate position at break of day, 
July 2d, finds Ewell's entire corps in position ready to 
assault. Johnson's fresh division has arrived and is on the 
extreme left of the Confederate line, across Rock Creek, 
on Benner's Hill, opposite Culp's Hill, after attempting to 
wrest it from Wadsworth in the night. The victor finds 
tlie position virtually won occupied by the foe, the Federal 
right. Early's division is on Johnson's right over against 
the sharp declivity connecting Culp's with Cemetery Hill. 
Rodes comes next, extending northwest of Cemetery Hill 
through the town of Gettysburg. Hill's Third Corps con- 
nects with the right of Rodes, Pender's division continuing 
along the flattening circle to Seminary Ridge proper, where 
he connects with Heth along the Ridge. Heth's division 
is held somewhat retired in semi-reserve between Pender 
and Anderson, whose division extends Hill's line to connect 
with McLaws' division of Longstreet's First Corps, Flood's 
division holding the extreme Confederate right, terminating 



142 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

somewhat south of and overlapping the Federal left; so that 
if Lee attacks with his right, Sickles' salient will become en- 
veloped, and place the Round Tops at the pleasure of the 
Confederates. Pickett's division of the First Corps is still 
at Chambersburg. This most hazardous situation on 
Meade's left, taken in connection with Berdan's discovery, 
the massing of Confederates behind the Warfield woods in 
front of the Federal exposure, is significant enough to attract 
Meade's prompt and special attention. But he does not 
see his danger. 

The First Corps — Longstreet's — has marched all 
night, and has been given two hours' rest and refreshment 
on the bank of Marsh Creek, then resumed its march while 
waiting orders for assignment to position. The brigade 
of Law, Hood's division, is leaving New Guilford, to march 
twenty-nine miles in nine hours, then swing into fierce bat- 
tle on the Confederate extreme right, without rest or break- 
fast, and fight till darkness. Stuart is hastening to hot 
conflict with the Federal cavalry to the east of Gettysburg. 
At 9 A. M. the entire Confederate army is in position on 
the field of Gettysburg, with the exception of the six thou- 
sand infantry of Pickett and Law. At this hour Lee is 
Meade's equal in troops present and two-thirds of Lee's 
infantry are well rested and fed, while Longstreet's two 
divisions have now had some four hours of rest and easy 
marching since they arrived at Marsh Creek in the early 
morning. On the contrary, the major part of the Federal 
army is just in from forced marches, tired and hungry, 
while two of its strong corps are four or more hours away. 

It may be claimed that the condition of affairs cannot 
be determined from what can be seen of the field. But 
the entire field of Gettysburg between the arrayed armies 
is practically open terrain, and is overlooked from the 
cupola of the Lutheran Seminary — Lee's headquarters — 




i.iKL'T. ci'.x. iAMi:s i.().\i;stri-:i-:t 



'aciiig I'agt 14o 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 143 

excepting the reVerse side of the Federal position and the 
low ground along its left toward the Round Tops. There 
is no possibility of concealing movement of any consid- 
erable body of troops except in the Federal rear. So open 
is the field that a few signalmen on Round Top are worth 
battalions to Meade in preventing, during the day, a heavy 
movement of Confederate troops to their right, as related 
by a Confederate general, who writes: "That wretched 
little signal station upon Round Top that day caused one 
of our divisions to lose over two hours, and probably de- 
layed our assault nearly that long. During that time a 
Federal corps arrived near Round Top and became an im- 
portant factor in the action which followed." This fact 
General Warren, Meade's engineer officer, appreciated. 
For he, climbing the Round Top at the time Hood was 
about to attack, and finding the signalmen about to quit, 
set them to wig-wagging vigorously as though to hasten the 
approach of coming troops, and thus caused a Confederate 
delay which gave time for a part of the Fifth Corps to man 
Little Round Top and save it to the Federals. So do ap- 
parent trifles often turn the tides of battle. 

The most important fact known, however, is that at no 
time during July 2d will Lee's force on the field be more 
numerous, Pickett's division and Law's brigade excepted, 
than at the hour of daylight. Under these conditions, and 
an attack having been determined upon and prepared dur- 
ing the night of the ist, every moment of delay cannot 
but render it more difficult and less promising in results. 
A fractional part of the splendid initiative and daring 
exhibited by the Confederates in the second Manassas cam- 
paign, and again at Chancellorsville, if displayed at Gettys- 
burg at any time within three hours after daylight of the 
2d, offers far greater results with far less risk. The two 



144 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

cases referred to were phenomenally unusual in war, and 
forbidden by its rules under the physical conditions in face 
of which Lee violated them and won. In this case the 
attack, actually demanded by all the principles of war, as 
well as by the conditions, is deferred, though it can be seen 
that Meade is constantly strengthening to meet it. 

Lee's line of battle is five and one-half miles long while 
the direct distance across from flank to flank is three miles. 
Within this partial enfoldment the Federal army holds a 
position four miles in extent, its flanks one and one-half 
miles apart. The Confederate line would be greatly im- 
proved by withdrawing from the east of the town of Gettys- 
burg and make that defensible point its left flank. This 
also would free the divisions of Johnson and Early to oper- 
ate with Longstreet on the right with a strong column either 
in an attack against the Federal left or to turn Meade out of 
liis position. 

Three courses of action are open to Lee: (i) to fight 
it out where he is; (2) to retire and take position in the 
passes of the South Mountains and there compel Meade to 
attack, his present position being weak for defense, and (3) 
to move to his right and take a chosen position between 
Meade and Washington, where a Federal attack would be 
imperative on account of jeopardy to the Federal Capital. 
So preeminently does the position of Lee's anny lend itself 
to a movement to its right to place it between Meade and 
Washington that Longstreet remarks to Lee in the morning 
of July 2d : "If we could have chosen a point to meet our 
plan of operations, I do not think we could have found a 
better one than that upon which we are now concentrated. 
All we have to do is to throw our army around their left 
and we shall interpose between the Federal army and Wash- 
ington. Finding our object is Washington or that army, 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 145 

the Federals will be sure to attack us in our chosen position." 
In such position Lee's lines to his rear would be well cov- 
ered by his army, and the supplies therefor, requisitioned 
from the rich country about and in the Cumberland Valley, 
would be amply maintained. It is over this third alternative 
that controversy has arisen; not, however, between the 
principals in the case, Generals Lee and Longstreet, but 
among military critics. Did General Longstreet advise Lee 
in favor of this flank movement; and should Lee have made 
this movement, instead of fighting the battle at Gettysburg? 
The following letter was written by General Longstreet 
on July 24, 1863, to his uncle, who had requested the facts 
regarding his action in the Battle of Gettysburg: 

" My dear Uncle : My idea was to throw ourselves be- 
tween the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, 
and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to 
man the ability to judge, we may say with confidence that 
we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into 
Washington and dictated our terms, or at least held Wash- 
ington and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we 
cared to had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our 
carefully chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose 
the plan adopted, and he is the person to choose and order. 
I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the 
commanding general. If he approves and adopts them, it 
is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views 
and to execute his orders as faithfully and as zealously as 
if they had been my own. I cannot help but think that 
great results would have been obtained had my views been 
thought better of ; yet I am inclined to accept the present 
condition as for the best. ... As General Lee is our com- 
mander, he should have all the support and influence that 
we can give him. If the blame — if there is any — can be 



146 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by 
taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility 
that can be put upon me shall go there and remain there. 
" Most affectionately yours, 

" J, Longstreet." 

General Lee, in a letter written to General Longstreet, 
in January, 1864, says: "Had I taken your advice (at 
Gettysburg) instead of pursuing the course I did, how dif- 
ferent all might have been." Captain T. J. Grove, of 
Houston, Texas, then aid to General Longstreet, bearing a 
letter from that general in East Tennessee to General Lee, 
in Virginia, says: " In the winter of 1864, when you sent 
me with some dispatches. General Lee asked me into his tent, 
and in the conversation remarked that he had just been 
reading the Northern official reports of the battle of Get- 
tysburg; that he had become satisfied from reading these 
reports, that if he had permitted you to carry out your plan 
on the third day, instead of making the attack on Cemetery 
Hill, we would have been successful." The facts are thus 
established that General Longstreet did advise the flank 
operation, that General Lee rejected it, and that in doing 
so he made a grievous error. It remains to ascertain, if 
possible, what influences led General Lee to commit this 
error. 

A reckless overconfidence prevailed among the troops 
at this time, which infected the Confederate army to such 
an extent that it fired even the calm, self-poised commander. 
An astute observer, and ever ready to utilize the feelings 
and opinions which rule men, Lee also doubtless realized 
that the least appearance of timidity would anger his troops, 
even against him, and render them sulky and less effective. 
He was morally unable to withhold from attack after the 
victory of the ist. 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 147 

The following statement of General Longstreet is suffi- 
cient evidence that General Lee was carried away by over- 
confidence. On the 1st of July, Longstreet was urging 
upon Lee the advantage of the flank movement to the Con- 
federate right, when Lee said, " No, the enemy is there, and 
I am going to attack him there." And again, in reply to 
further argument of Longstreet, General Lee said, and 
most decidedly for him, " No, they are there in position, 
and I am going to whip them or they are going to whip 
me." And this decision is the complete reversal of Lee's 
deliberate determination before the campaign not to fight 
other than a defensive battle. 

After considering whether he should not withdraw en- 
tirely from the east of Gettysburg from along the heights 
across Rock Creek, concentrate heavily on his right and 
deliver a massive attack against Meade's left near the Round 
Tops, on the evening of July ist in conference with Ewell, 
General Lee decides that Ewell's corps shall deliver the main 
attack at daylight on the 2d, the center and left demon- 
strating in support ; but during the night he changes his plan 
of battle to the extent of directing the attack to be made 
with both wings of his army at 9 a. m., Longstreet on the 
right to lead out, Ewell to advance as soon as he shall hear 
the booming of Longstreet's guns. It is claimed, however, 
that General Lee did not name a positive hour when Long- 
street should advance to attack ; that he did not give the 
point of attack, nor state the number of troops that were to 
engage, that is, the strength of attack; though by implication 
it is to be made by Longstreet's two divisions, supported on 
their left by Hill. Seeking reason for these apparent over- 
sights in matters vital to the Confederate battle, we find it 
was the practice of General Lee to give great freedom to his 
lieutenants, whereby, after having acquainted them with his 
general plans and given them general instructions, they 



148 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

were left to carry these into detailed execution in manner 
which seemed best to each commander, and most advanta- 
geous to the common purpose. 

After giving Longstreet his general directions as to posi- 
tion and point of attack, Lee rides to his left to examine 
the Federal position, while Ewell makes preparations for 
his attack on its right. Rejoining Longstreet at 9 a. m., 
Lee finds the First Corps still in its line position, either 
because Longstreet does not understand that he is expected 
to make a prompt attack, or because he is unfamiliar with 
the ground within his radius, and the position he is des- 
ignated to assail. In any case, the interval between 9 and 
II A. M. is spent in reconnoitering the ground. Lee then 
gives Longstreet definite orders to envelop Meade's left 
by moving north along the Emmitsburg pike, aiming at 
the peach orchard as the commanding point on that road. 
The Round Tops are in sight, and it is not thought to 
question that Meade has strongly occupied these formidable 
heights as the left key to his entire position. But Lee be- 
lieves that the peach orchard marks the left termination 
of the actual Federal line of battle, which, if taken some- 
what in fiank and crumpled up, will isolate any force on 
the Round Tops and cause their evacuation. This some- 
w^hat surprising conclusion is confirmed by his order of 
battle on his right, which he has made so positive that his 
subordinates do not feel at liberty to change after the battle 
develops that the Round Tops should be the point of attack. 

Lee's general order of battle is simultaneous attack by 
both wings, Hill to act in concert with Longstreet. In 
detail, it is the oblique order of battle: On the right to 
begin with Longstreet's divisions successively, taking the 
Federal left at the peach orchard somewhat in flank, it is 
supposed, and to be continued by Hill's divisions in echelon 
of brigades on Longstreet, a rapid succession of sledge 




r.ii:rT.-GKx. r. s. i:\vkll 



Facing Page 148 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 149 

strokes delivered somewhat obliquely against the Federal 
front, to progressively shatter and crumple it up, be- 
ginning on its left with Sickles' salient. In the mean- 
time Ewell is to engage the Federal right and hold it from 
reinforcing its left, while Hill's constantly increasing 
threat against its center will effect the same purpose. 
This is a most effective order of battle, once success- 
fully under way on a flank and then follow^ed up with 
prompt and vigorous strokes in quick succession. But 
lacking these requisites, the brunt of the battle must inevi- 
tably fall upon the flank assailing force fighting a heavy 
concentration against it. The shape of Lee's position 
makes this order most favorable on his right, as it prac- 
tically involves both Longstreet and Hill as the column of 
attack; and the ground is such that there is no reason why 
these two corps shall not work in perfect harmony and 
close cooperation. But Ewell will be compelled to fight 
his own battle ; and it will be most unusual if he so times 
his attack that it will support the Confederate right and 
center, — especially as he is to depend, not on definite time 
orders, but on hearing the guns of Longstreet, miles away 
behind hills and woods. 

Stuart's ill-judged excursion is bearing much evil fruit, 
for had he, as usual, been available during the preceding 
days, Lee would know that the Round Tops are now 
occupied by only a few Federal signalmen. Possessed of 
this knowledge, it is scarcely doubtful that General Lee 
would desist from his questionable convergent attack, and, 
reinforcing Longstreet from Ewell's Corps, would swing 
his right around these heights and capture this keypoint of 
the Federal position. Such an operation, supported by Hill 
on its left, would envelop Sickles' salient in front, flank 
and left-rear, smash it in, and give Lee the Round Tops 



150 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

from which to enfilade the entire Federal line with gun- 
fire ; also the Taneytown and Baltimore pikes. This would 
give the Confederates command of Meade's line of supply, 
communication and retreat, and force him eastward away 
from his supply depot, Baltimore and Washington; for his 
position on Cemetery Ridge would then become untenable. 
To make his attack on the T'ederal left Longstrcet has 
available but two strong divisions and his corps artillery, 
a force much too weak, surely, for the probable needs. 
And unless Hill does his part promptly and with vigor, the 
First Corps divisions will find themselves hard pressed. 
For this reason Longstreet persuades Lee to delay the as- 
sault, hoping that Law's brigade, if not Pickett's division, 
will arrive to his reinforcement. For, at this moment, 
when he should be engaged with the enemy, it is not fairly 
permissible for him to attack until his force is augmented. 
Lee is opposing a rule of war, " A smaller army shall not 
approach its antagonist with its two wings," and is pre- 
paring in exactly this manner to attack Meade, when the 
relative positions of the armies further prohibit it. Under 
these conditions strong concentration for attack is impossi- 
ble anywhere ; but, instead, comparatively weak and scat- 
tered assaults are to be made at widely separated points 
circuitous from his center, against a superior force on a 
strong position unusually favorable for reinforcing at any 
point. Lee's oblique order of battle on his right somewhat 
offsets the disadvantages of his position, enabling him to use 
his center cooi)erating with his right to break in Meade's 
left and crumple his line back upon Ewell. Nevertheless it 
will be strange if Meade docs not find opportunity to inter- 
pose between Longstreet and Ewell when Hill becomes 
weakened in their support, or to crush one of these flanks. 
At Chancellorsville Lee interposed between Hooker and 



BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 151 

Sedgwick with one-third of his army while the remainder 
under Jackson made a wide circuit across the front of the 
Army of the Potomac and hurled itself against Hooker's 
right flank with crushing effect. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE SECOND DAY's BATTLE 

LAW'S brigade has arrived to complete Hood's divi- 
sion, which, with that of McLaws', has moved from 
\\ illonghby Run along a wooded road debouching into the 
Emmetsburg pike to the south of the peach orchard, in 
front of which Alexander has placed his artillery. Ten 
hours have been wasted and the Confederate opportunity is 
past. Lee's orders as to the direction and point of attack 
being positive, Longstreet confines his assault to Sickles' im- 
mediate front, and orders Hood to make his immediate ob- 
jective the hills overlooking the Devil's Den, held by Ward, 
of Birney's division. McLaws is to attack and envelop the 
peach orchard angle, which, in Lee's mind, is the Federal 
flank. Hill is promptly to join in to support and extend 
the attack of Longstreet, while Ewell is to assault the Fed- 
eral right and hold it from reinforcing against Longstreet. 
Ewell, ready to attack at daylight and again at 9 a. m., 
becomes impatient, and, receiving no instructions, under 
cover of a weak artillery fire from his batteries on Brenner's 
Hill, feels of the enemy preparatory to delivering attack 
when the expected signal from Longstreet is heard. At 
3:30 p. M. Longstreet has 17,000 infantry and 57 guns 
arrayed against Sickles' 9,8cxd with 34 guns, when Hood 
moves forward into position for attack in double line for- 
mation, his right, Law's brigade, extended toward Plum 
Run, his left somewhat to the east of the Emmitsburg pike 
and south of the peach orchard. McLaws is ready to 

152 





MAJ.-CKN. JOllX 1'.. HO"" 



Facing Page 152 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 153 

strike that angle as soon as Hood is engaged. The move- 
ment of Longstreet's divisions has not been wholly con- 
cealed from the Federals by the Warfield woods and the 
slight ridge upon which they rise. And now, when Hood's 
lines move to attack, the Federal artillery opens fire from 
the peach orchard, to which Longstreet's batteries reply 
from their position near the Warfield farm house. Wilcox's 
skirmishers. Hill's right brigade, engage with those of 
Graham in a rapid fire in the fields west of the Emmitsburg 
pike. At this juncture Meade arrives with Sickles from a 
council of war called to consider *' whether the Army of the 
Potomac shall remain waiting attack or withdraw south- 
w^ard into a defensive position," the orders for such a move- 
ment having been prepared in readiness for an expected 
flank operation by Lee. Longstreet's guns announce the 
decision. Seeing that the Third Corps is deployed in a tlnn 
line over strong ground which it is too weak to hold un- 
aided, Meade sends Warren, his chief engineer, to ascer- 
tain what point most needs strengthening by the reinforce- 
ments which he has called. Sickles, learning that Meade 
does not approve of the position in which he has placed the 
Third Corps, suggests its withdrawal, but is informed that 
it is too late, for Hood's infantry fire, off to the southward 
against Birney, adds its rattle to the rapidly increasing boom 
of artillery. 

Hood's division advancing across the open fields to the 
east of the Emmitsburg pike, Law, commanding the right 
brigade, gains a clear view of that portion of the field and 
of the Round Tops to his right- front. He realized their 
dominance of his field and of the Federal left flank. Law 
records : " Observing the formidable position of the Fed- 
eral front, and not knowing where their left rested, I sent a 
few scouts out instructed to scale Big Round Top, if pos- 
sible, and send back a runner to tell me what they discov- 



154 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

ered. Meantime I captured a few Federals who came up a 
road skirting the eastern base of Big Round Top, who said 
they were on their way to hospital at Emmitsburg. Being 
(juestioned, they reported that there was a road leading 
around Round Top to where the Federal trains were parked 
about a mile distant; and that there was no Federal force 
there except the train guards, and none on Round Top. 
Soon my scouts returned and confirmed what the Federal 
prisoners had said. This important information I at once 
sent to General Hood with the urgent request that we 
should turn the Round Tops. My aide quickly returned 
with orders from Hood to attack at once as originally 
ordered. From the short absence of my aid I was led to 
believe that the information I had sent to General Hood 
was not referred to either General Longstreet or General 
Lee. I immediately proceeded to attack, at the same time 
sending a strong protest against this direct attack to Gen- 
eral Hood." 

Hood, an impetuous fighter, thus assumes a responsibility 
that is not his. Law makes his point of direction somewhat 
toward Little Round Top, Robertson holding contact with 
his left. This brings Robertson in front of the Devil's Den, 
across Plum Run, opposite the western base of Little Round 
Top, at 4 p. M., when he attacks at this point, encountering 
Ward, posted on the wooded knoll overlooking the Den. 
A fierce struggle ensues, in which Robertson is gaining 
ground until his advance exposes his left flank to De Tro- 
briand's men, who drive it to the rear and force the remain- 
der of the brigade to come from the right to its assistance. 
This relieves Ward, who retakes his original position. An- 
derson, in support of Robertson, did not follow his move- 
ment, as he should have done, and, in consequence, finds 
his brigade in front of the storm center of De Trobriand's 
position, where he is disastrously repulsed. Fortunately 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 155 

for both Robertson and Anderson, Benning, who also failed 
to follow Law, now comes up in rear of Robertson, and 
these three brigades renew the attack upon De Trobriand 
and Ward. The combat at this point quickly becomes des- 
perate, and Sickles's artillery joins with the infantry in hotly 
contesting the ground. Ward and De Trobriand, outnum- 
bered, are slowly driven, both the attack and the defense 
suffering heavy losses. Law's brigade, left free and un- 
molested on its course toward the Round Tops, now crosses 
Plum Run at the western base of this eminence. His fine 
brigade of fiery Texans and Alabamians is reinforced by 
two of Robertson's regiments, which, by mistake, followed 
Law. To resist the fierce assault on this key position, there 
is but one battery — Smith's — and a small mixed force of 
four regiments quickly detached from the four brigades of 
Birney. These troops are quickly scattered among the 
rocks and boulders littering the slope. But they are routed, 
and Ward is compelled to unman his right in sending 
them aid. This forces De Trobriand to thin his front by 
extending to his left to fill the gap left by Ward's detach- 
ment, utilizing one regiment for this purpose. This at- 
tenuated line is posted in the wheat field behind a stone 
fence, with a woods in its front where Ward had held posi- 
tion. De Trobriand has left but three small regiments 
with which to defend his line, but so sturdily tenacious are 
his men that they repulse Anderson's second assault, wound- 
ing that brigadier. Benning's fresh troops, however, drive 
Ward from his position and capture three guns. 

At this critical stage in Federal affairs, McLaws's division 
enters upon the scene. Ordered to form in double line of 
brigades, west of the Emmitsburg pike, facing northeast, 
and to strike the west front and point of Sickles' salient 
obliquely, McLaws, observing the change in direction Hood 
has made in his attack, throws a portion of his division 



156 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

to the east of the Emmitsburg pike. Kershaw, command- 
ing his right brigade, supported by Semmes's brigade, 
crosses to the east of the Pike and moves in support of 
Hood's left. Thus advancing, at 5.30 p. m. Kershaw 
strikes the center of De Trobriand's command now con- 
sisting of two small regiments, which hold a strong posi- 
tion on a wooded knoll. Extending to his left, Kershaw 
assails this weak line between the knoll and Graham's left, 
held by one regiment and the batteries of Clark and Bige- 
low. 

Thus far the Confederate infantry attack has fallen en- 
tirely on the south front of Sickles's salient. With this 
line crushed, the Federal left broken in and taken in reverse, 
the Round Tops captured, Meade's position and army 
would be placed in great jeopardy. Meanwhile the Confed- 
erate artillery hammers Sickles' west front; first concentra- 
ting heavily on Humphreys and Graham, until, finally. Hill's 
guns open and concentrate their fire north against the Sec- 
ond Corps and the Federal batteries reply with equal vigor. 
The Confederate gun fire together with the threat of Hill's 
ready brigades serve to hold Meade from detaching rein- 
forcements to Birney from contiguous parts of his line. 
But as Ewell does not attack his right, Meade is able to 
draw from there to his left. Sykes deploys on the left of 
Birney, across Plum Run valley and up Little Round Top, 
as Meade is now especially solicitous that this ground shall 
be held. Sykes does not, therefore, feel at liberty to de- 
tach reinforcements directly to Birney 's urgent call. He 
crosses Plum Run, however, with Barnes and his division 
at 4.30 p. M., and reconnoiters the ground himself. Plum 
Run valley, and, with it. Smith's battery, are dangerously 
exposed. Sykes offers Birney the support of Barnes if he 
will extend his line to fully occupy this ground. Quickly 
accepting, Birney dispatches Burling's two remaining regi- 




MAT.-GEN. GEORGE SVKES 



'aeing Tage 156 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 157 

ments in reserve to join the one of De Trobriand now there. 
Sykes then puts Sweitzer's brigade into Hne on the right of 
De Trobriand, with Tilton's brigade on the right of Sweit- 
zer extending up the slope to the peach orchard. It is these 
fresh troops that meet Kershaw's attack, first successfully 
resisted by Tilton. But Sweitzer's flank becomes exposed, 
and both of these brigades are driven back, leaving the 
three regiments of De Trobriand, toward Plum Run on the 
left, dangerously exposed in flank and front. These suc- 
cesses along Birney's front free the Confederates to swarm 
to their right toward Round Top in such force as to engage 
all of the Fifth Corps there in wait. 

Warren reaches Little Round Top at 3.45 p. m. where 
the signal officer expresses to him his surmise that the Con- 
federates arc concealed in force across Plum Run, not re- 
mote from the base of the eminence on which they stand. 
Warren thereupon orders Smith to send a shot in that direc- 
tion through the treetops, which causes a movement among 
the men of Law's brigade, and the glint of their muskets 
confirms the suspicion of the signal officer. Warren at 
once grasps the situation — the importance of the Round 
Tops and the imminent danger of their capture. He has- 
tens to find Sykes, who gives him Vincent's brigade of 
Barnes's division with Hazlett's battery, which Warren di- 
rects to take position along the base of Little Round Top. 
Hastening back to its summit, Warren is just in time to see 
De Trobriand's little force driven from the gorge by Law, 
and falling back toward the peach orchard. This leaves 
the Round Tops entirely exposed, with Law's men ready 
to ascend and take possession. The signalmen are about 
to decamp for safety; but Warren sets them at active sig- 
nalling with the hope that this will serve to deceive and 
delay Law for a few moments, during which many things 
may occur. Looking down the northeastern slope of 



158 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Little Round Top Warren sees Weed's brigade of Ayers's 
division, of the Fifth Corps, moving past in the direction 
taken by Barnes. Hastening to this column, Warren en- 
counters a personal friend in Colonel O'Rourke, command- 
ing one of the regiments; and that gallant youth, without 
waiting for permission, quickly swings his command out 
of the column and follows Warren up and over the crest. 
In the meantime Vincent has arrived and taken position on 
the southwestern slope of Little Round Top just in time to 
check Law's men, already beginning its ascent. But they 
immediately gather themselves and assail Vincent's center 
in its citadel of great boulders, from which they are un- 
able to drive the Federals. The Confederates take cover 
(among the rocks and the hostile lines pelt each other 
at almost touching distance. Finding effort against the 
center of Vincent's position unavailing. Law extends his 
left, which overlaps and overcomes his opponent's right, 
thus completely isolating Vincent's brigade. This leaves 
the crest of Little Round Top, commanding Meade's entire 
position, open to Hood, and Law's men now begin to climb 
for it. 

It is at this crisis that O'Rourke's strong regiment pours 
over the crest from the opposite side and meets the Con- 
federates face to face. Not a moment is to be lost by either 
party to the contest for the crest, the possession of which 
gives to the victor the keypoint of the Federal position. 
Here occurs a marked example of reversion. O'Rourke, 
though met by a wasting fire, neither stops to form his regi- 
ment into line, nor to fix bayonets ; but shouting to his men 
to '* Club muskets and at them ! " this fighting Irishman 
hurls his regiment in solid column amongst the astonished 
Confederates; trusting the " shellaly " and strong arms to 
do the necessary — and he wins. Checking Law's advance, 
O'Rourke now has time to deploy into line and deliver a 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 159 

hot fire, which not only saves the crest but reHeves Vin- 
cent, enabHng his men to come to the aid of this lonely 
regiment facing many times its own number. Following 
O'Rourke, Hazlett's battery has climbed Little Round Top, 
and takes position on the crest under a shower of lead. But 
the declivity is so abrupt that he cannot depress his guns 
sufficiently to rake the slope. He therefore directs his fire 
at the Confederate reserve in the valley at its base. The 
boldness of this brave artilleryman gives the infantry in- 
creased confidence to maintain a stern front against Hood's 
fierce Texans. Little Round Top and the Federal left, for 
the present, are safeguarded ; but O'Rourke's gallant regi- 
ment, the One Hundred and Fiftieth New York, has lost 
one hundred men in a few minutes, among them its young 
commander, of bright promise, who died at his post of duty. 
The irrepressible Confederates are checked for the mo- 
ment. But the importance of the Round Tops having now 
become evident to the men as well as to their commanders, 
they desperately engage again, even in personal combat, 
along Law's entire front. Men hunt each other from be- 
hind boulders, trees and ledges. Many climb trees to secure 
more effective positions; others pile up little heaps of loose 
stones as head-fortresses, behind which they lie and fire. 
This inaugurated a new practice in war which was de- 
veloped by the troops in quickly covering themselves behind 
impregnable breast works. The two uncaptured guns of 
Smith's battery along Plum Run catch the Confederate line 
obliquely and pour shells into its midst. Law, seeing that 
this man-hunting fight will continue indecisive, again hurls 
his men at O'Rourke's regiment: but Vincent, now in com- 
mand of all the Federals fighting for the Round Tops, comes 
to its aid, and Law is again checked. Gallant Vincent and 
hundreds of his brave men pay the price with their lives. 
Nor have the Confederates escaped with equal loss, among 



i6o THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

these, brave Hood, seriously wounded in the effort to cap- 
lure the heights which, earlier, would have been his without 
a shot liad he heeded Law's report and urge to assail and 
turn the Round Tops which his scouts had found un- 
occupied. 

At this time, to the west of Plum Run, Kershaw has 
driven two of Barnes's brigades, and De Trobriand and 
Ward are thus endangered. Ward, weakened by his re- 
pulse of Robertson, cannot resist Benning, assaulting him 
both on his right and left. Smith succeeds in saving the 
remainder of his guns; but the Devil's Den hill is com- 
pletely abandoned to the Confederates, who fill its woods 
and drive a Maine regiment from behind a stone wall, 
charge forward into the wheat field to the east of the peach 
orchard, and force Winslow to retire his guns, while 
threatening De Trobriand's flank. This brave and able 
Frenchman is at the same time assailed by Anderson, and 
is compelled to give ground on his right; for no troops 
can be spared to his assistance from his right near the 
peach orchard. At this point the Federal artillery, ex- 
posed to the fire of Longstreet's guns, is now in serious 
danger from Kershaw. In fact, one of his regiments, the 
Eighth South Carolina, is advancing against the batteries 
of Clark and Bigelow, when, fortunately for the latter, a 
Pennsylvania regiment, posted near in a sunken road, rises 
to the situation and stops the Carolinians with a scorching 
fire. But, uncertain of their position, the batteries retire 
behind the sunken road, and in doing this they still further 
expose the right of De Trobriand. 

Caldwell's division of the Second Corps now arrives to the 
aid of Birney and Barnes. Cross goes to the support of 
]^e Trobriand's brigade, now reduced to a handful of men, 
while Kelly supports Ward, on De Trobriand's left, near 
Plum Run. This is Meager's old Irish brigade, following 



THE SECOND DAY'S 15ATTL1-. i6l 

its green flag with the golden harp, from beneath which 
strange music has hurtled, flaunting over many a battlefield. 
These fighting Irishmen charge into the thick of the fight 
and stop the victorious advance of Anderson's brigade. 
Birney, meanwhile rallying De Trobriand's men and Bur- 
ling's two driven regiments about Cross, leads these troops 
against Kershaw, whose line has become so extended that 
it cannot resist this attack, and is driven back upon the 
brigade of Semmes, following close at hand in support. 
Semmes's untired troops advance against this first line, 
formed principally of Caldwell's division, which is quickly 
aided by Birney's second line, composed of the brigades of 
Zook and Brooke, of the Second Corps. The weight of 
these divisions overcomes both Semmes and Kershaw. The 
latter, however, refuses to order his men to retire, and they 
stand broken up into squads fruitlessly fighting on isolated 
bits of advantageous ground, with the exception of his left 
wing, which holds its position. Here Brigadier Semmes 
lays down his life. 

Across Plum Run, on Little Round Top, Federal rein- 
forcements have also arrived; for Sykes, on hearing of the 
necessity there, has ordered Weed's brigade to return and 
join that command on Little Round Top, where he arrives 
just as the hostiles are ready to reengage after their rest 
from exhaustion. Taking position on the right of Vin- 
cent's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Rice, the latter 
is able to extend and reinforce his left, under Chamberlain. 
Law, persistently bent on the capture of the Round Tops, 
now fiercely assails his antagonist before Weed has time to 
deploy his command ; and during this interval Law's men 
attempt to pass Chamberlain's left and gain the crest from 
the southern slope of Little Round Top by forcing their 
way through the tangled gorge between the two eminences. 
They are met by the Twentieth Maine — tough, burly lum- 



i62 THE BATTLE OE GETTYSBURG 

bermen, who, in war, as in their native forests, are accus- 
tomed to clearing ground in their front, rather than being 
driven from that they temporarily occupy. Here is waged 
a hand to hand contest over ground and among obstacles 
that would delight Indian warriors, the Confederates per- 
sistently attempting to work around the Federal flank as the 
Maine choppers extend their line and fight them back. 

The battle thus far has been confined to the ground drain- 
ing into Plum Run, just north of the Devil's Den, extending 
along the western slope of Little Round Top, on the Con- 
federate right, and on the right bank of that stream, up the 
peach orchard slope. The attack has been made by Hood's 
four brigades and two brigades of McLaws' division, aided 
by Longstreet's artillery from beyond the Emmitsburg pike. 
The Federal force meeting this assault is Birney's of the 
Third Corps, aided by Barnes's division of the Fifth Corps 
and Caldwell's division of the Second. It is seen that the 
faulty position of the Third Corps has already involved one 
division of the Second and a division of the Fifth Corps. 
Nevertheless, the six Confederate brigades are by no means 
defeated; but still hold grimly to the base slope of the 
Round Tops, and are defiantly observing the remainder of 
the Federal line which they have so seriously shaken. 
As already seen, the Fifth Corps is in movement toward 
the left, the division of Barnes having arrived and engaged. 
The Sixth Corps, wearied by its long forced march from 
Westminster, goes into reserve, relieving the Fifth. At 
5 p. M., Meade withdraws Williams's division of the 
Twelfth Corps from his extreme right and at 5.30 Geary, 
of the same corps, is ordered to detail the brigades of Kane 
and Candy. These troops are all sent to the left, leaving 
only Greene's brigade of 1,350 men to occupy the entire 
position held by the Twelfth Corps on the right. 

Meade's utter neglect of his left in the earlier day in face 



i 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 163 

of Sickles' urgency, is now bearing fruit, for in his frantic 
effort to save his left he is denuding his right in the presence 
of Ewell from whom he should expect attack in aid of Long- 
street. But Ewell is waiting to hear the guns from the 
right ! 

Longstreet's artillery is hammering at the peach orchard, 
with the skirmishers of Barksdale's brigade, McLaws's di- 
vision, hotly peppering it. McLaws has been in position 
to attack since four o'clock, the brigades of Barksdale and 
Wofford wholly unengaged, while those of Semmes and 
Kershaw have been in action but a short time in support of 
Hood. In fact, the brunt of the battle thus far has fallen 
upon Hood's single division, which is now well exhausted. 

At 6 p. M. Hill is waiting for McLaws, on his right, to 
move against the Federal west front in order that his right 
shall be protected in moving across his greater distance 
of open. In accordance with Lee's oblique order of battle, 
the movement of Hill's brigades must be determined by that 
of McLaws, while that of the latter is, to an extent, depend- 
ent upon Hood's. When McLaws sees Caldwell forcing 
back his two brigades under Kershaw and Semmes, he 
moves out to attack the peach orchard ; Barksdale on the 
left against the west front of the angle, Wofford to his 
right-rear to assail its south front, aided by portions 
of Kershaw's brigade, which still remains near the Fed- 
eral line. Sickles has given Graham, defending the 
orchard, a second brigade for the defense of this key to his 
exposed position, now completely enveloped and open to 
both a frontal and enfilading fire along its two fronts. 
Thus, completely enveloped in a hail of infantry fire, Gra- 
ham's infantry is almost instantly wasted, nor does the 
canister belched from his guns retard the Confederate 
charge. The orchard is captured; Graham is a wounded 
captive; while such of his command as are not dead, dis- 



i64 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

abled, or captured are flying down the slope. Sickles 
hastens thitherward, has his leg broken by a bullet, and the 
command of the Third Corps devolves upon Birney. The 
batteries along the Emmitsburg pike abandon their un- 
tenable positions, while those in the left field, just outside 
of the sweep of the Confederate charge, fire into their 
column at close range, but without avail. Birney's com- 
mand loses tw^o thousand of its five thousand men in the 
space of a few minutes. 

Into the gap made at the angle by crushing Graham, that 
is, at the center of the Third Corps, Barksdale leads his 
brigade and pushes straight ahead, closely followed by sup- 
porting batteries charging at a gallop, while Wofford, 
swinging in on his right-rear, takes in flank the Federals 
who are holding Kershaw. The Federal batteries and 
broken infantry now deluge Barksdale at close range. At 
this moment Colonel Alexander, commanding Longstreet's 
artillery, observes the victorious sweep of Barksdale's in- 
fantry, and, quickly limbering up his batteries, makes a 
dashing charge across the fields and onto the peach orchard 
crest, where his guns do murderous work — such a charge 
of numerous batteries of artillery is unusual. 

The apex of Sickles's angle broken in and demolished, 
and Meade's left thereby placed in extreme jeopardy, the 
Confederates now extend their battle to involve a part of 
Hill's Corps and one of Ew^ell's divisions on the extreme 
left. It is now^ early twilight. For three mortal hours 
Longstreet's tw^o divisions have done desperate battle alone. 
Not a man has stirred to aid or cooperate from either Hill's 
or Ewell's Corps, so that Meade has been left perfectly 
free to call troops and mass heavily against Longstreet from 
his center and right. Hill now pushes out in quick succes- 
sion from his right three brigades only of Anderson's 
division, Wilcox, Perry and Wright, in their order from 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 165 

right to left. Wilcox, personally instructed by Lee as to 
his point of direction, inclines to his left to clear the front 
of McLaws along the peach orchard crest, and in order to 
strike Humphreys to its right, in connection with Perry 
and Wright in echelon on his left. The remaining di- 
visions and brigades of Hill are left stationary, the com- 
manders impatiently pacing about the right flank of their 
commands eager to catch the expected order to advance. 
Ewell does not hear the signal until 7 p. m., when he immedi- 
ately proceeds to attack Gulp's Hill with Johnson's division, 
supported by six batteries on Brenner's Hill. After an 
artillery duel* lasting an hour, Ewell's unprotected guns are 
silenced by those covered in the works Steinwehr threw up 
on July first while in reserve on Cemetery Hill. These are 
the only intrenchments thrown up by either army during 
the three days of naked battle. With these Federal guns 
active above the slope of Culp's Hill — in itself formidable 
— the position is deemed too strong to carry by frontal as- 
sault, and Ewell moves Johnson to the left into the gorge of 
Rock Creek, there to flank and attack the Hill from the 
southeast. It is 8 p. m. when Johnson finally finds himself 
in position to begin his assault. At this late hour the battle 
has extended to cover the front of both armies: For while 
the infantry between Johnson on the extreme left and 
Anderson, the right of Hill's Corps, is not engaged, the 
artillery is belching along the entire line, and in like man- 
ner is reciprocated by the Federal guns. 

Returning now to the Confederate right: Barksdale is 
on Humphreys' left flank threatening his rear; Wilcgx, 
Perry and Wright, are moving against his front. Hum- 
phreys' position is desperate, for he has loaned all but 
two brigades to previous emergency, and his right is weakly 
connected with the Second Corps by two of Gibbon's regi- 
ments. Humphreys is thus almost isolated; and, like the 



i66 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

mettled soldier that he is, he proposes to move forward and 
attack his oncoming antagonists, and at least check them 
long enough to permit him less endangered withdrawal. 
Birney, however, fearing that such a move will still further 
disconnect and expose his division, orders Humphreys to 
retire his right to connect with the Second Corps, holding 
his left in position to protect his retiring right and at the 
same time hold connection with his, Birney's, flank. 
Humphreys performs this most difficult feat amidst the din 
and excitement of battle, and under a galling fire. Form- 
ing double columns of battalions, his veterans move steadily 
to the rear, then swing into line and open a checking fire 
on the pressing Confederates, losing half of his men. 

The condition of affairs in and about Sickles' salient are 
peculiar and dangerous in the extreme, unless powerful aid 
quickly arrives. By the capture of the peach orchard apex, 
the Confederates have impinged a powerful column of 
infantry and artillery between Humphreys to their left, 
and Barnes to their right along the south front of the 
salient. Barksdale concerns his brigade with Humphreys' 
affairs, in conjunction with Wilcox, to his left; while Wof- 
ford, supporting Barksdale's right-rear, finds himself also 
in not distant conjunction on his right with Hood. In 
fact, at the peach orchard, Wofford finds his victorious 
brigade — with Humphreys dislodged — free to charge 
down its eastern slope against the right flank of Barnes, 
held by Tilton without support. Kershaw^ and Semmes 
at once resume the offensive against Zook and Sweitzer, 
to the left of Tilton. These three Federal brigades, as- 
sailed in flank and front, are driven until, finally. Cakhvell 
finds his left flank uncovered. 

The entire Federal line from the slope of the peach 
orchard to Plum Run is now^ broken and sent reeling back- 
ward through the wheat field. The strewn ground bears 



I 




i:ri(;.-(;k\. wii.i.ia.m i!.\kksi)ALi-: 



Facing Page I (I'i 



I 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 167 

evidence of the murderous character of the contest, Gen- 
eral Zook being among the killed. The Confederate ar- 
tillery descends the slope, and at close range pours a 
devastating fire against the flank of Barnes's retiring, dis- 
ordered line. Brooke bravely charges these guns, is re- 
pulsed, and himself wounded; but this splendid officer does 
not relinquish his command in this emergency. At this 
moment the position of the Confederates in order toward 
their left is: Law at the base of the Round Tops across 
Plum Run, with the remainder of Hood's division more or 
less in his support and making connection across the Run 
with Kershaw and Semmes, posted practically along the 
captured Federal line toward the peach orchard. Here the 
Confederate line deflects northward, cutting off the apex 
of the captured salient. Semmes is across this cut-off, con- 
necting with Wofford and Barksdale, farther to the left in 
contact with Hill's brigades in front of Humphreys. 

Sickles' salient, after costing thousands of lives, is 
crushed in and no longer exists ; while the more or less 
disintegrated remnants of the battalions and batteries which 
have so gallantly defended it are sullenly retiring across 
Plum Run into the position to which Sickles was first 
assigned on the low ground. But now the Round Tops 
are held by the Fifth Corps. Lee's oblique order of battle 
has been established in so far as Sickles' salient is con- 
cerned. From this position of vantage on their right the 
Confederates push forward, McLaws with purpose to inter- 
pose in the practically undefended ground between the 
routed Third Corps and the Round Tops, thus isolating 
these heights for capture by Hood, while together these two 
divisions envelop the Federal flank. But the victors now 
have to account with Hancock, who, when Sickles was 
wounded, was placed in general command of the Third 
Corps over Birney. Hancock's energy is bent to fill the 



i68 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

gap between his left and Little Round Top. Humphreys 
has just effected his retirement in extension of the Second 
Corps. All of his artillery horses being killed, the guns 
of his division were necessarily abandoned — a sore 
temptation to the enemy, though they are under Hum- 
phreys' fire. Bigelow, without support, places his bat- 
teries close in and pelts the advancing Confederate line 
with canister. This bold officer and most of his gunners 
are disabled, compelling the abandonment of his guns. But 
the determined bravery of these men has temporarily 
checked the hostile advance into the gap. This check is 
now made permanent by the appearance of Day and Bur- 
bank, with their two brigades of regulars, of Ayers's di- 
vision of the Fifth Corps. They are seen in the direction 
of the Round Tops, crossing Plum Run, and swing into 
position on the near crest of the Devil's Den where the 
remnant of Ward's brave brigade still clings, opposing Law. 
The forced retirement of Barnes and Caldwell leaves 
Ayers's right flank exposed, and McLaw^s furiously charges 
him from this direction, while Law assails his front. But 
his regulars are equal to the fearful demand made upon 
their famed steadiness and courage. Losing eleven hun- 
dred out of an effective of two thousand men in a few 
minutes, Ayers slowly retires the remainder across Plum 
Run and takes position on the right of Weed's brigade of 
his division, ranged along the northern base of Little 
Round Top. 

During the past hour the contest waged by Law against 
Chamberlain's Maine lumbermen in the Round Top gorge 
has slackened, but now the battle springs up with renewed 
life along the whole front about these heights. Weed is 
fatally wounded, with Hazlett's dead body by his side, shot 
w'hile bending to catch his comrade's last words. Law has 
so attenuated his line in attempting to pass the Federal 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 169 

flank in the gorge, that Chamberlain now charges and drives 
him at the moment that Ayers engages across Plum Run, 
as already described. Though Ayers is compelled to re- 
tire his two decimated brigades, his action, with that of 
Chamberlain, is sufficient to prevent Law from resuming 
attack upon the Round Tops. At the time that Ayers takes 
his retired position with Weed at the base of Little Round 
Top, General Crawford arrives with the brigade of 
McCandless and establishes it on the raised ground where 
Vincent and Weed lost their lives. Thus reinforced, the 
Federals advance and drive the Confederates from the base 
of the Round Tops and across Plum Run, and this strong- 
hold on Meade's left is finally freed from direct attack. 
The Round Tops have been secured at a fearful cost, which 
would not have been exacted had Meade examined this 
portion of his position in person in the early day, as Sickles 
urged. Barksdale and Wofford, however, continue their 
advance down the peach orchard slope against the weak 
resistance of shattered groups of the Third Corps, and 
clear the ground to the northwest of the Round Tops down 
to Plum Run, giving free play to Alexander's batteries, 
and completely isolating the defenders of these heights. 
Some of Hill's batteries now join with Longstreet's guns 
in an artillery duel with the Federal artillery, while Alex- 
ander with his batteries closely follows the advancing in- 
fantry and bombards the weakened division of Humphreys. 
With such energy do the Confederates press forward 
that the weakened Federals soon find themselves occupying 
the very ground which Sickles quitted to take up his ad- 
vanced salient. Although this low ground is dominated 
from the rise along the Emmitsburg pike, now held by the 
Confederates, it offers some local advantages, the narrow 
valley of Plum Run being covered by brush and trees, 
among which McLaws' men have found cover from the 



170 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

fire of the Federal guns. On the eastern txtrder of this 
valley rises an abrupt bench, of some thirty feet elevation, 
up and over which the Confederates will have to climb in 
their advance, exposing them to an effective fire. At all 
hazards the Federals must defend this last possible line, 
covering the Baltimore pike, Meade's line of communica- 
tion and retreat. Hancock, therefore, places every avail- 
able man and gun to its defense. From his own corps — 
the Second, already depleted by the rough handling Cald- 
well's division has received — he detaches still further to 
the defense of the left two regiments from the division of 
Hayes, and, taking with him Willard's brigade, also of 
Hayes's command, he deploys it beyond Humphreys in 
the very center of the gap in the low ground where McLaws 
is attempting to push through. Hunt also places some 
forty guns from the reserve along the east bank of Plum 
Run, under the command of Major McGilvery. This 
formidable battery dominates along six hundred yards of 
front, while crossing fire with the guns of Hancock, at the 
same time covering the remnants of Caldwell's, Barnes's and 
Birney's divisions, which Longstreet has driven back in 
breaking in the salient. 

This semi-fortress of guns and fresh infantry standing 
in grim readiness in the center of the breach, with the 
Federal general line on its right and the considerable force 
of defense on Little Round Top to the left, does not form 
a specially inviting object of attack to McLaws' victorious 
but heavily depleted brigades. In truth, due consideration 
of the fact that Meade's line must now be stripped of 
troops in march to his left demands vigorous attack from 
Lee's center and left, as well as by McLaws on the filling 
gap in his front before it can be stopped. But, instead, at 
this vital juncture, with the exception of Johnson's division, 
busy against Gulp's Hill, there is a decided lull in the Con- 



i 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 171 

federate attack, although the brigades of Posey and 
Mahone just to the left of Wilcox, Perry and Wright, and 
Pender's division on their left, since four o'clock have 
been ready and impatient, waiting the order which should 
have been given them to advance in rapid succession against 
the Federal line, their assault to culminate on the section 
marked by Ziegler's Grove, the center of the F'ederal posi- 
tion. But this plainly evident Confederate opportunity is 
left unattempted until it is too late. Meanwhile the Fed- 
eral weak point is becoming its strength. First, Lockwood 
arrives with his two regiments — from guard of Baltimore 
from insurrection, and are in support of the guns of 
McGilvery. Williams's division, of the Twelfth Corps, 
from the right, closely follows on a crossroad connecting 
the Baltimore and Taneytown pikes, just in rear of the 
filling gap. On the heels of Williams is Candy's brigade 
of Geary's division, from the right, the other two brigades 
of this division unwarrantably gone astray off beyond Rock 
Creek, where they are useless to any of Meade's pressing 
needs. To the south of these hastening columns marches 
Bartlett's brigade of the Sixth Corps, in reserve, following 
Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps; a bit later two 
more brigades of the Sixth Corps are set in motion. 
Finally, Newton, holding the west front of Cemetery Hill, 
is ordered to hold in readiness such portion of the First 
Corps as he can spare, and sends Doubleday with his di- 
vision. Meade has, therefore, in position on his left, or 
in march, the live remains of the Third Corps, the Fifth, 
the Twelfth all but one brigade, a division of the Sixth, 
more than one-third of the First and Second Corps, and 
nearly one-half of his artillery; that is, nearly four out of 
his seven corps of infantry, and, approximately, one-half 
of his artillery. 

General Longstreet, in recounting his battle thus far, 



172 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

says : " This was an unequal battle. General Lee's orders 
had been that when my advance was made, the Second 
Corps, on my left, should move and make a simultaneous 
attack; that the Third Corps should watch closely and en- 
gage so as to prevent heavy massing in front of me. Ewell 
made no move at all until about eight o'clock at night, 
after the heat of the battle was over, his line having been 
broken by a call for one of his brigades somewhere else. 
Hill made no movement whatever, save of the brigades of 
his right division which were covering our left." 

It is now 7.30 p. M., when Meade leaves his headquarters 
staff almost in a panic over his sudden departure for his 
left, so fearful is he that he will be attacked before his 
reinforcements can arrive to its succor, and that they will 
be defeated in detail as they successively appear on that 
part of the field. At this very time, on the Confederate 
side. Mahone and Posey, of Anderson's division, are won- 
dering why they are not definitely ordered to advance on 
Wright's flank. But they do not feel w-arranted in moving 
out under their discretionary instructions from Hill, which 
hold them fast unless they, themselves, conclude that the 
initial assault by Longstreet is an entire success. Why, 
this delegating to brigadiers the corps commander's duty, 
if, indeed, not that of the commander-in-chief? For were 
either in immediate contact with the main attack, subordi- 
nates would not be left in doubt as to what they should do 
in the many contingencies which are sure to arise for 
prompt and authoritative decision amidst the changing 
hazards of such enterprises. 

To the left of Anderson's waiting brigades, Pender goes 
to the right of his eager division in order more quickly to 
have the expected order for the advance of his command to 
the assault of Ziegler's Grove, the Federal center, where 
success would be fatal to Meade. While waiting, Pender 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 173 

is fatally wounded by a stray missile, and his command 
devolves upon General Lane, At the left of Hill is Ewell's 
corps which has waited all day long for orders to attack 
Gulp's and Gemetery Hills. This general assault, last 
ordered to be delivered at 4 p. m., is not enforced, the Con- 
federates confining their serious efforts to Longstreet's two 
divisions, a little aided later in the day by three of Ander- 
son's brigades, Wilcox, Perry and Wright. These three 
brigades we left moving against Humphreys, when he 
effected his withdrawal. They are led by Anderson, their 
division commander, over the ground abandoned by 
Humphreys, strewn with dead, wounded, ruined cannon 
and stragglers. This wreckage deceives Anderson into 
thinking that victory is already assured, and he advances 
with careless boldness, during which his line becomes 
broken and confused as the men follow Humphreys. 

Under the orders of Hill, Anderson should guide his 
movement by Barksdale, on his right, whose objective is 
the gap in the Federal line to Humphreys' left. But this 
Anderson has not done in his careless progress, and as a 
consequence finds himself isolated and disorganized as his 
troops straggle through the woods and unexpectedly con- 
front Humphreys, firmly arrayed. Here Perry's Florid- 
ians lose their nerve and leave Wilcox and Wright to assail 
Humphreys unaided. Anderson now sees his error and 
unwisely thins his line by extending to his right at the 
very moment when his concentrated strength is required 
in his immediate front against Humphreys. In the smoke 
and confusion of battle the hostile lines become entangled. 
One of the regiments oKWilcox steals around Humphreys' 
left, but is checked by the First Minnesota regiment after 
severe loss to both. Willard's Federal brigade, without 
support and with both flanks exposed, stands its ground, 
though it is almost obliterated, after losing its brave com- 



174 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

mander. Hancock endeavors to maintain the partially 
formed Federal line at this point; while on his left Gen- 
eral Meade leads Lockwood's command across Plum Run 
and attacks Anderson's brigade of Hood's division. 
McCandlcss supports and connects Lockwood with the 
Fifth Corps on the slope of Little Round Top. At this 
juncture three brigades of the Sixth Corps, Bartlett, Nevins 
and Eustis. reinforce the Fifth Corps line, extending from 
Little Round Top to McGilvery's batteries, and join with 
the extreme left in repelling stubborn Law's last attack on 
the Round Tops. The sun is low in the w^est when McLaws 
and iVnderson make a simultaneous and resolute assault in 
a last attempt to break the new Federal line before it be- 
comes fully established and firm. But McLaws is so 
detached from Law, on his right, that the latter is obliged 
to remain stationary, while Anderson is separated from 
McLaws's left, and in advancing widens the breach. Their 
line thus broken, and the flanks of each three units of the 
attack exposed, the Confederate advance is seriously weak- 
ened. 

The Federals are rapidly re-forming and reinforcing 
their line in preparation for the Confederate final attack. 
Chamberlain, on the extreme left, with a few men, has 
driven Law's skirmishers from Big Round Top and estab- 
lished himself on its summit, where Fisher's brigade joins 
him and finally secures this commanding height. Sedg- 
wick has three brigades around the southern base toward 
Plum Run, to guard against any stealthy force of the 
enemy. The division of Williams moves into position in 
support of McGilvery's guns; and Newton completes the 
new line with the division of Doubleday and a part of 
Robinson's, together with scattered troops and guns from 
the battle. Newton thus extends the new line of battle 
over the low ground, reaching to the Second Corps on the 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 175 

initial slope of Cemetery Ridge, and covering the right of 
Willard's brigade. Thus the Federal line is fully restored 
on the very ground abandoned by Sickles in the morning 
when he advanced and occupied the fatal peach orchard 
salient. But it is no sooner formed than fiery Barksdale, 
on horseback, leads his brigade into a shot-storm, where 
he is killed by the fire of Burling's men, whereby the Army 
of Northern Virginia loses one of its most gallant and 
competent brigadiers. His maddened troops rush forward, 
but are outnumbered and driven back in such haste that 
they leave tlie body of their loved commander in the hands 
of the Federals. Wofford, in support of Barksdale's right, 
is checked on the flats of Plum Run by the opposing fire, 
and Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, is not within 
supporting distance. Kershaw and Semmes have been too 
roughly treated to engage again, though Longstreet, present 
and directing the attack, is anxiously expecting them. 
Farther to the Confederate left, Anderson's division, of 
Hill's Corps, ascends the southern slope of Cemetery Ridge 
against Humphreys and Gibbon. Wilcox is on the right 
leading the attack, distantly followed by Perry. To their 
left Wright, caught by the oblique fire of some guns, in 
position in front of Gibbon, makes a dash and captures 
eighteen of them. Webb's Federal brigade then assails 
him, and a desperate combat is fought for their final pos- 
session. Lee, Hill and Anderson are watching Wright's 
desperate effort, together with the remainder of Hill's 
eagerly ready corps ; but for some unaccountable reason, 
neither Posey, Mahone, nor Lane is ordered to his as- 
sistance. 

Gallant Wright meanwhile fights his way to the crest of 
Cemetery Ridge, where he sees the Baltimore pike filled 
with an excited crowd of soldiery; and, believing himself 
master of the position, for a quarter of an hour he fights 



176 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

off all comers with such fury that he leaves three-quarters 
of his i^allant brigade on this ground, — in the very center 
of the hederal position, — when he is compelled to fall 
back before Gibbon's division advancing against him. 
Here again Lee refuses a most hopeful opportunity, for 
had Mahone, Posey and Lane promptly advanced to his 
aid, this powerful column would doubtless have been able 
to have made permanent lodgment on the position gained 
by Wright single-handed. There planted, Meade's army 
would have been cut in the center, and the way opened for 
its defeat in detail, its right and center so seriously weak- 
ened by Meade's heavy massing on his left, leaving the 
weakened portion of his line to contest against the unim- 
paired columns of Hill and Ewell's Corps. 

Wilcox, taken in flank by McGilvery's guns, also en- 
counters Humphreys on one flank and Hancock's reserves 
on the other. In this vortex he leaves five hundred of his 
sixteen hundred men when he retreats, — like Wright, with- 
out aid to assist him out of his extreme jeopardy. Thus 
abandoned, both Wright and Wilcox find their way back 
to the Emmetsburg pike as darkness falls, and the boom 
and rattle of war dwindles and ceases. Longstreet has de- 
stroyed Sickles' salient and virtually strengthened Meade's 
line. 

As the Confederate attack is delivered in sections widely 
detached in space and time intervals, and even at the points 
of assault without harmony in simultaneous action by the 
local units, we, with the shifting Federal reinforcements, 
are enabled to pass from point to point and witness these 
several actions or successive detached battles the sum of 
which constitute the battle of July 2d. 

We now return to the extreme Confederate left where 
Ewell, at 8 p. m., is attacking Gulp's Hill across Rock 
Creek, with the division of Johnson. On Johnson's right 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 177 

is Early's division extending to the town of Gettysburg, 
opposite the Federal line on the abrupt rise which connects 
Gulp's and Cemetery Hills. On the right of Early is 
Rodcs, connecting with Lane of Hill's Corps bending 
around the slope of Cemetery Hill and running off onto 
Seminary Ridge. As the Federal right has been stripped 
to reinforce the left, it is now essential to ascertain what 
defense the right can oppose to the formidable assault to 
be launched by Johnson at the very time when the brigade 
of Greene alone is left to extend itself in the futile attempt 
to man the line occupied by the entire Twelfth Corps before 
it was sent to the Federal left. Greene was left to occupy 
Gulp's Hill only on the protestation of Slocum against 
utterly stripping this key to the Federal right and rear. 
To this wisdom of Slocum's. to the marked ability of 
brigadier Greene, and to the phenomenal activity and per- 
sistent valor of his thirteen hundred and fifty men, aided 
by eight hundred and twenty-five loaned by Howard from 
his Eleventh Corps, is Meade indebted for the salvation 
of his right. 

Greene has placed a small detachment, well intrenched, 
extending out from the southern base of Gulp's Hill, be- 
ginning at Spangler's Spring and running to Rock Creek. 
The remainder of his brigade is intrenched from the south- 
ern base up the hill, then along its crest connecting with 
Wadsworth's division of the First Corps. His position 
on the hill is exceptionally strong, having intrcnchments on 
the crest of a steep declivity covered with rocks and a 
forest tangle. A long traverse has also been thrown up 
jicrpendicular to the main line, running westward along 
the southern slope. But his position is weak on the ex- 
treme right, where the works in which his detachment is 
lodged have been thrown up to aid in covering the Balti- 
more pike, a short distance in their rear. Nor can Greene 



178 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

occupy that portion of the works vacated by Rnger's 
division on his right, though he stretches his brigade until 
it stands but one rank deep with wide intervals between the 
men. Wadsworth is well intrenched along the abrupt rise 
connecting Gulp's and Cemetery Hills, his left meeting a 
part of Robinson's division of the same corps, which joins 
onto Howard's Eleventh Corps, both stretched across 
Cemetery Hill. This eminence is also defended by a 
numerous artillery covered by earthworks. This combined 
force constitutes the defense available on the Federal right 
to meet the assault of Ewell's Corps, strong and fresh for 
battle. 

Johnson forms his division in double line of brigades; 
Jones on the right supported by Nichols, with Steuart on 
the left following Walker. His artillery is silenced on 
Brenner's Hill, as before noted. Ewell's advance is against 
Gulp's Hill with the division of Johnson, his left extended 
to strike the low ground along its southern base. Greene's 
detachment is brushed out of the intrenchments between 
Rock Greek and Spangler's Spring, and the Confederates 
occupy the vacant Twelfth Corps works approaching 
Greene's right. But this carries the left of Steuart's bri- 
gade so far to the front that it is caught by an enfilading 
fire from Greene's troops in the traverse, and he is tem- 
porarily checked. Greene now extends his traverse-line 
westward in a strong position having a southern slope, and 
commanding the ground in its front over which Steuart 
must advance if seeking the Baltimore pike, near at hand, 
and giving access to the Federal rear. This is prevented 
by darkness and by Greene, who is heard giving orders 
to imaginary battalions. His right thus safeguarded 
by his antagonist's quiescence, Greene's efforts are con- 
centrated on his left against Jones and Walker, who 
now push forward upon that flank. Vastly outnumbered, 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE 179 

Greene's men are behind works crowning a rocky faced 
hill, where they calmly await the approaching lines. Each 
moment these become more deranged and confused by the 
tangle of trees, brush and rocks, through which the men are 
picking their way in the darkness. When they are within 
sure range, Greene's troops open a steady fire which stag- 
gers the Confederate advance. Persistent, however, in 
their purpose, they suffer terribly. Jones is wounded, when 
Nichols comes up to his support out of the night. Greene, 
meanwhile, has been reinforced. A brigade of eight hun- 
dred and twenty-five men, from Schurz, is with him in 
position, while Wadsworth has extended his right to aid. 
Now Kane arrives with his brigade — lost while in march 
to the aid of Sickles — and he drives Steuart's skirmishers, 
on the extreme right. Nichols is repulsed, and Johnson's 
attack on the Federal right has failed — only because it 
was made too late. This and darkness alone save Meade's 
stripper right from being successfully turned, and its posi- 
tion in the right-rear of the Federal line taken and occupied 
by the enemy. And, as it is, Johnson holds lodgment in 
some of the Twelfth Corps works. 

During Johnson's attack the two other divisions do not 
engage, even by a thrust in support. Ewell's attack upon 
the stronghold of the Federal right has failed also. Early 
and Rodes were ordered to attack when Johnson should be 
seen advancing. And though these divisions have been in 
position for hours, they have not proved themselves com- 
petent to combined attack ; which, had they done, promptly 
seconding Johnson, the Second Confederate Corps would 
doubtless now be in possession of the heights on which the 
Federal right and center are thankfully resting as surprised 
occupants. Early had his division deployed and ready for 
the' advance when he received the order for himself and 
Rodes to attack. In pursuance thereof he promptly put 



i8o THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

his troops in movement, acting on the assumption that 
Rodes was doing likewise, and that they would thus give 
each other and Johnson support. In this preparedness, and 
prompt, soldierly action, there appears nothing but high 
commendation due Early. Rodes, however, delayed his 
attack long after Ewell ordered him to assault, continuing 
this disobedience for more than an hour after Early's hard- 
pressed brigades had been desperately engaged within his 
distinct hearing and knowledge. And further, a part of 
this delay was due to the fact that Rodes was engaged in a 
futile attempt to induce General Lane, adjoining him in 
Hill's Corps, to cooperate with him in his proposed attack. 
Lane, however, determined to act with his own corps unless 
otherwise ordered. Rodes claims that he had discretionary 
orders. 

At 7 p. M. the brigades of Hays and Avery, of Early's 
division, climb the eastern front of Cemetery Hill against 
a fearful artillery and musketry fire. But, undaunted, 
these superb troops leap the trenches and break through the 
two small brigades of Ames, of the Eleventh Corps, phys- 
ically and morally weakened by the experience of yesterday. 
They are speedily driven and followed by the Confederates 
among the intrenched cannon which form the Federal sec- 
ond line, which they capture. Here the Confederates find 
themselves in rear of the three remaining brigades of the 
Eleventh Corps, under Schurz and Steinwehr. These face 
about and act to the assistance of Ames, from their position 
along the western front of Cemetery Hill. Hays and 
Avery are in possession of the north front of the Hill, and 
are contesting possession of the captured Federal guns on 
this keypoint of Meade's right. For one mortal hour these 
two superb brigades of Louisianians and North Carolinians 
firmly hold their won ground against constantly increasing 
and superior numbers, while not a man comes to their aid 



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE i8i 

from the idle waiting division of Rodes or the brigade of 
Gordon, held in reserve by Ev^^ell. Hancock hears the fire 
of Early's attack, and appreciating the depletion of the 
Federal right, immediately sends Howard two of his regi- 
ments and Carroll's brigade of splendid fighters. These 
troops arrive at the moment when the contest about the 
Federal guns is hanging in the balance. 

About nine o'clock Rodes deploys his division, Lane decid- 
ing to cooperate with him, and his* skirmishers push up the 
western slope of Cemetery Hill, and open fire from the po- 
sition vacated by Steinwehr and Schurz when they faced 
about to fight to their rear. But suddenly Ramseur, com- 
manding the brigade on the right, halts, not finding Lane 
in his right-rear in support of his exposed flank ; for Lane, 
also, has stopped the advance of his command. This un- 
warranted action of Ramseur deranges the movement of 
the other brigades, and while fresh instructions are awaited, 
Carroll gains possession of the ground won by Hays and 
Avery, and they are driven back, the life blood of the latter 
consecrating the ground he so valiantly helped to win and 
defend. Rodes is now finally ready to deliver his part of 
the assault, aimed at the heart of Meade's position. But 
he is so out of time that he finds himself with his left, as 
well as his right, unsupported, since Early's two unaided 
brigades have been routed. This caused a further delay 
until night kindly shrouds withdrawal into his original po- 
sition, none save the skirmishers of this fine division having 
fired a shot. 

Ewell's three disjointed attacks against the Federal right 
and right-center, constituting the assault of the Confederate 
Second Corps, have failed, in spite of the superb fighting 
done by the troops when they were given opportunity. 
They have failed for the reasons (i) that Ewell's attack 
was made in the darkness; (2) that Rodes failed to make 



i82 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

prompt and simultaneous assault with Early in support of 
Johnson, also attacking only with a skirmish line ; and 
(3) that but two of the seven brigades of Early and Rodes 
engaged — a responsibility lying more with tlie corps com- 
mander than with his by no means guiltless subordinates. 
Nor may the general-in-chief escape blameless, for in 
neither of his attacks, by his right and his left, has Hill's 
Third Corps been utilized to do little more than to stand 
a passive observer of the battles being fought to its right 
and left. 

In the late night of July 2d and the early morning of 
the 3d, the hostiles find themselves located in their re- 
spective lines awaiting the portentous day, while the weary 
troops find rest in sleep, that sweet oblivion which hushes 
their ears to the last cry of departing souls, and the moans 
of the wounded. 

The great battle of July 2d has ended. Its thundrous 
crash, rattle and din, its lurid glory and mangled horror, 
have died away and are buried in the silent night. The 
battle rage and shout of elemental men are hushed alike 
with the sleeping hosts of the living and of the dead. Save 
for the dotting lines of pickets — like ghosts in the moon- 
light — and the measured pace of the sentinels nearer in, 
the birds of night may hoot and flit their accustomed 
haunts, unconscious of the presence of armed hosts of liv- 
ing manhood. But there, between the ghostly picket lines, 
they fly, shrilling their night alarms; for a smothered In- 
ferno finds voice in wailing moans, in groans and shrieks ; 
in agonized curses and murmured prayers ; delirious dreams 
of battle shouts and cheers, of home and love's messages 
voiced. 




\i \.i. liiN jdiix si:iu;wicK 



ciiig I'asc 18."? 



CHAPTER XIII 

CRITICAL THOUGHTS ON THE SECOND DAy's BATTLE 

THE cool, tlionghtful and alert, decisive generalship 
which Meade has thus far displayed during his five 
days of unexpected and eventful command, is somewhat 
shadowed hy his neglect of his left, which was responsible 
for Sickles' salient. Nor was Meade warranted in leav- 
ing to Sickles such wide judgment and discretion as might 
have been safely done had the commander of the Third 
Corps possessed a military education whereby he would 
know the principles and rules of war and its safe govern- 
ance. For Sickles, while a most brave and loyal soldier, 
and an officer possessed of marked ability, was of the num- 
ber — all too common in the Federal Armies — who began 
his service as a general, and therefore lacked the practical 
knowledge of war which is acquired by experience in win- 
ning promotion tlirough the subordinate grades to final 
large command. Gallantly giving his services to his coun- 
try in the early war, he, a lawyer by profession, entered the 
army as a general mainly through the influence of his 
political position, which enabled him to raise a brigade and 
go forth as its commander on his aided course to the early 
command of a corps with the rank of major-general. But 
no braver, more gallant or devoted soldier ever fought for 
country or cause. And let it be understood to his honor, 
that Sickles devoted himself wholly to his duties as a sol- 
dier, without political ambitions. 

Evidently General Sickles appreciated these disadvan- 
tages, to judge from his persistent solicitation of his su- 

183 



i84 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

perior's judgment and direction as to his assigned position 
and his action in relation thereto. Sickles loyally asked 
from General Meade only that which the commander-in- 
chief should have given of his own volition through fore- 
sight for the safety of his position and army. Had he done 
this, it is improbable that he would not have strongly occu- 
pied the Round Tops, — " The key of my whole position," 
he says, — with a portion of the Fifth Corps, instead 
of massing its entirety as his reserve near to his 
right. With a division on Round Top, Hood's attack on 
Sickles would have been greatly weakened by such con- 
siderable force on his flank even had he then dared to 
attack Sickles' left. Had the Round Tops been properly 
occupied, then, Sickles would doubtless have formed on 
the ground to which he was ordered. But as Sickles was 
left to do his best with a force wholly inadequate to the 
weak position to which he was assigned, is it questionable 
that he did not do the right thing in strengthening his 
numerical weakness by occupying strong defensive ground? 
Again, is it reasonably to be questioned that, had he not 
done this, he could have held the weak position until rein- 
forced? Scarcely. Then his change of position saved the 
Federal left from being broken in, and the Round Tops 
from being captured, if no more. And to Sickles alone 
belongs the credit, and to the splendid fighting of his 9,800 
men who held his line until aid arrived. 

In view of these facts, it scarcely became necessary for 
General Sickles, in later years, to defend himself against 
criticism for having taken up the salient position — criti- 
cism unfortunately based largely on Meade's report of 
the battle, hence being considered as being finally authori- 
tative. Sickles' record and that of the Third Corps stand 
nobly monumental and firmly based on the fact that both 
fully performed their legitimate duty and responsibilities 



CRITICAL THOUGHTS 185 

with such heroism that criticisms cannot detract from, nor 
praise add to, their won meed of glory. Neither is it 
necessary that either shall claim the doing of more than 
was really accomplished. Forming a thin line without 
support on an extended and exposed position, these 9,800 
infantrymen and artillerists successfully performed the ap- 
parently impossible for many hours, not one flinching or 
disheartened under the terrific punishment in which they 
lost nearly one-half of their number. Thus fighting alone, 
they withstood the continuous desperate assaults of a most 
formidable and competent enemy for hours, and until four 
times their number of fresh troops arrived to break the 
final victorious advance of the same foe they had so long 
withstood and seriously depleted. 

Had Meade given due attention to his left during the 
long hours of his prepared waiting for Lee's attack, he 
might have seen the opportunity then urgently inviting him 
to heavily concentrate on that flank, swing on the Round 
Tops as his pivot, and throw his army in a turning move- 
ment to the right to envelop the Confederate right, which, 
during the 2d, was the least formidable division of Lee's 
army. The terrain on the Confederate right and center 
was most favorable to such a turning operation, affording 
no natural defensive ground looking southward; while the 
Round Tops as the pivot of a turning movement provided 
a fortress of defense dominating all the country thereabout, 
covering Meade's lines of communication and serving as 
a rallying point in event of defeat. And further, as Meade 
feared that Lee, himself, would engage in such an operation 
around his left, thereby placing his army between the Army 
of the Potomac and Washington, such a movement would 
have placed the Federal Army in its true position, from 
which Lee had drawn it by his operations along the Sus- 
quehanna River. 



i86 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

So just, eminent, and worthy is the renown won by 
General Robert E. Lee, that were it not that our single 
purpose is to discover and record the whole truth, in so far 
as lies within our power, we should hesitate to scribe even 
much which appears as being plainly apparent even to a 
casual student of our War. But would aught short of the 
evident truth be just, even to General Lee, himself; to his 
revered name, his fame, and his blessed memory? Did he 
ever evince a desire to obscure the truth relating to him- 
self? He did not, because he was frankly honest as well 
as human, and knew that he was subject to influences and 
judgments of error, which he voluntarily acknowledged in 
simple justice to all, that they should stand as warning 
guides to others about him, and to those who should fol- 
low. We shall endeavor, then, to do only as Lee himself 
would, could he act as the unimpassioned but reverently 
loving student and recorder of his own doings. Unfortu- 
nate for our time and for posterity that his modesty and 
his consideration for others held General Lee from this 
duty to mankind. 

In our consideration of the first day's battle we have 
searched out what appeared as being the only fair and 
reasonable explanation of Lee's failure to improve the 
urging opportunity of that day. And, as though in con- 
firmation of that opinion, the conduct of the battle of July 
2d is but the logical growth of the erroneous influences 
which apparently actuated his mind on the afternoon of 
the I St; that is, overconfidence developed into a species 
of carelessness, if not mental blindness. Nor did the 
general plan finally adopted conform to a well-proven 
principle of war, which prohibits a convergent attack un- 
less made by a force greatly superior to that assailed. 
Such an operation is open to chances of delay and misun- 
derstood orders and the practical impossibility of close co- 



CRITICAL THOUGHTS 187 

operation between the widely separated forces; of passing 
reinforcements from one unit to another, and of personal 
supervision by the commanding general. From each and 
all of these causes the Army of Northern Virginia suf- 
fered irreparably, as evidenced by its disjointed attacks, 
and in the brunt of battle left to fall on two divisions only, 
while six stood ready without moving a man in time for 
effective aid to the two desperately engaged, from four 
o'clock until half-past seven p. m. These errors, however, 
do not account for the reasonless delay — from daylight 
until four o'clock p. m. — in making the attack, nor for the 
lack of definite orders to Longstreet after he was ready, 
as well as to the other corps commanders. This gave free 
rein to the usual tendency in such actions, to deliver iso- 
lated, successive blows, as opposed to properly timed com- 
bination. 

Again, if any superior attention was given to the 
strength of the various columns of assault, it is not appar- 
ent, for each corps commander seemed to have determined 
these most important matters for himself ; and in each 
case the attacking columns were too weak, nor were they 
supplemented by reinforcements ready at hand where most 
likely to be needed. For instance, Longstreet, delivering 
the main attack, was weakened by the absence of one strong 
division, yet no detachment was made from Hill's Corps to 
Longstreet's immediate and personal command. Had such 
been at hand to the aid of Hood, he would doubtless have 
quickly crushed his opposition and secured the Round Tops 
before Meade could have brought aid from his right to his 
left. To an extent the same remarks apply to the Con- 
federate action on the left. 

It cannot be reasonably questioned that, had Ewell's at- 
tack followed that of Longstreet in proper sequence and 
been made with weight and vigor, Meade would have been 



i88 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

prevented from detaching the Twelfth Corps and most of 
the First from his right, when they were apparently abso- 
lutely essential to the preservation of his left. Then 
Meade's right would have been driven from Gulp's and 
Gemetery Hills for a certainty; also by Ewell's belated 
assault, had his three strong divisions attacked simultane- 
ously. Had Anderson's division of Hill's Gorps been 
promptly and vigorously advanced in continuation and sup- 
port of Longstreet's battle, it is hardly doubtful that the 
Federal left would have been utterly crushed before ade- 
quate reinforcements could have arrived. Or later, had 
Wright's desperate grip-hold on Meade's center been rein- 
forced — as it might easily have been by the major weight 
of Hill's ready troops — who may question that they would 
have made and held lodgment in the very center of Meade's 
position? Had any one of these plainly demanded actions 
been put into execution, it would have resulted in perma- 
nently breaking the Federal line of defense. 

Some of these failures may be charged directly to sub- 
ordinate commanders ; but not so the general errors which 
either permitted or gave them birth. These larger facts 
in evidence show a weakness or shortcoming on the part 
of the commander-in-chief; as a dominant command, alert, 
centered, firm and continuous, is ever and everywhere abso- 
lutely requisite to success in any large undertaking, and 
especially in battle, where its ever shifting and unforeseen 
exigencies demand the active presence of the commander 
to meet them. In this great battle, after giving his lieu- 
tenants general instructions, Lee practically held himself 
aloof from his commanders, retiring to his headquarters 
at the Lutheran Seminary, distant from both of his attacking 
wings some two miles. When he descended to his battle 
line — as he did when witnessing Wright's lonely as- 
sault on Gibbon — Lee apparently made no effort to over- 



CRITICAL THOUGHTS 189 

come the inaction of Hill in failing to support Wright's 
won vantage. When, finally, he did enter into details, his 
orders served to hamper his lieutenants when they advanced 
and encountered conditions which demanded a departure 
from his positive instructions — the definite direction of 
Hood's attack, for instance, which presumably held him 
from swinging around the Round Tops and capturing them, 
as Law urged. The wholly improper, but apparently triv- 
ial, matter of trusting to the fickle wind as messenger to 
carry the signal of attack from Longstreet to Ewell quite 
probably lost the battle to Lee, while it made evident the 
fact that on so vital a matter as the simultaneous assault 
of his widely separated wings there was an absence of 
orders fixing a definite time to all the corps commanders 
as to when the general attack should be made. Lee's ab- 
sence from his right during Longstreet's attack, and his 
failure to require from each corps commander frequent re- 
ports of his affairs, prevented the issuing of corrective or 
new orders to meet contingencies as the battle progressed. 
So true was this that Longstreet, fighting the main contest, 
was compelled frequently to absent himself from his des- 
perate and constantly shifting battle, and repair to Lee's 
headquarters for instructions. None better than Lee knew 
the extreme difficulty of bringing about close cooperation 
between the different units of an army, even under the most 
favorable conditions. Hence, none of the usual, or of the 
unusual, precautions to effect this harmony should have 
been neglected. 

These foregoing errors had their root in Lee's reversed 
decision to fight an offensive battle. For, if before launch- 
ing on campaign, there were reasons which caused him to 
decide upon a defensive battle only, such reasons had 
surely been reinforced since. Again, it was a basic error 
in strategy that Lee decided upon a battle at Gettysburg 



I90 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

rather than the far more promising, effective and brilHant 
plan, urged by Longstreet, of operating to his right, taking 
up a chosen position between his antagonist and Washing- 
ton, and there to await Meade, who would be compelled to 
attack. In fact, it was an error for Lee, with an inferior 
force, to fight offensively unless he should find his op- 
ponent's army widely scattered, as he did on July ist but 
failed to improve that unexpected opportunity. Having 
abandoned great offensive chances then, and not improv- 
ing them in the early morning of the 2d, Lee should have 
resumed his original defensive purpose. 

Much discussion has arisen over Longstreet's proposed 
flank operation. Having failed to move General Lee to 
his plan of a flank movement to the Confederate right after 
fighting the battle of July 2d, General Longstreet on the 
night of that day sent out a reconnoissance to his right to 
discover more fully the terrain and general conditions 
there, thinking that Lee might conclude to move around 
the Federal left on the 3d rather than to reattack Meade in 
his position, as he was then planning to do, and which to 
Longstreet appeared almost hopeless of success. But Lee 
still adhered to his determination to fight Meade where he 
was. Of this General Longstreet records: "I was dis- 
appointed when General Lee ordered me to attack Ceme- 
tery Hill, probably the strongest position in the Federal 
line. I stated to Lee that I had examined the ground on 
our right, and was much inclined to think the best thing 
was to move to the Federal left. To this the General re- 
plied, ' I am going to take them where they are on Ceme- 
tery Hill ; you to take Pickett's division and make the at- 
tack. I will reinforce you by two divisions of the Third 
Corps.' " Lee later thus acknowledged his error in not 
adopting and undertaking this flank movement: "H I 
had only taken your counsel even on the 3d of July, how 



CRITICAL THOUGHTS 191 

different might have been all." General Meade has also 
recorded : " I expected Lee to make this flank movement, 
and scarcely expected him to attack at Gettysburg." And 
again, " This was sound military sense. It was the step I 
feared Lee would take." 

Longstreet may be charged with slowness in his prepa- 
ration for attack; also both he and Hood with a serious 
shortcoming in duty in not reporting to General Lee the 
most important discovery of Law's scouts as to the de- 
fenseless condition of the Round Tops before his attack on 
the 2d. For had this fact been pressed to the cool con- 
sideration of the commander, it scarcely may be doubted 
that he, realizing its vital nature, would have availed him- 
self of this advantage, dominating the field. There would 
have remained no ground upon which to rest the shadow 
of a criticism of Longstreet over his work of July 2d had 
he done every duty with full energy and promptness during 
that eventful day. 

The certain result which would have eventuated at this 
time had Law's urgency been heeded is shown in this 
statement, made by General Meade: " The arrival of the 
Fifth Corps saved Round Top, where the enemy's artillery 
planted would have enfiladed the whole Federal line, and 
with results no one needs to guess." Yet this refers to 
conditions at one o'clock, after a considerable Federal de- 
fense was available for these previously naked heights. 

Deeply considering these errors, enacted in the decisive 
battle of the war by one who theretofore and thereafter 
displayed only the commanding skill and deftness of a 
master craftsman; is it presumption for us to agree with 
the suggestive after-thought of General Lee, himself, when 
he uttered these prophetic words in regard to the final out- 
come of the battle of Gettysburg: "Perhaps it was all 
for the best?" 



192 I! IE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

In fighting the battle of the 2d, the Confederates engaged 
but fifty regiments on their right, while Meade found it 
necessary to employ one hundred and ninety-seven of his 
infantry regiments in order to resume and hold his true 
position intact on his left alone. And during the entire 
day out of his total of two hundred and thirty-one regi- 
ments of infantry, Meade had two hundred and ten en- 
gaged, against eighty-six of Lee's total of one hundred 
and seventy-one. The Confederates had a preponderance 
of artillery, due to their more extended position, accom- 
modating more guns, and because of their encircling loca- 
tion they had the advantage of a convergent fire. It thus 
appears that while Lee engaged but one-half of his regi- 
ments, Meade was forced, by the early neglect of his left, 
to put into action nearly seven-eighths of his, many of 
which were fearfully decimated. Concisely, seven-eighths 
of Meade's total of infantry regiments, at the close of bat- 
tle, were physically exhausted by rapid marches or fight- 
ing or both; while one-third of all his regiments was nu- 
merically fearfully depleted by battle. The Confederates 
must have suffered equally from battle, as they were the 
attacking force ; though their less complete reports reduce 
their loss below that of the Federals. But their troops 
were not wearied by reinforcing and counter-marches, 
while one-half of Lee's army had not moved a foot. 

During the rage of battle at Gettysburg, to the east of 
that place a cavalry combat is going on between Stuart, who 
is finally appearing from his useless ride, and Kilpatrick, 
which results in little more than permission to each to take 
their respective places on the flanks of their armies. 

The crest wave of the battle of Gettysburg had yet to 
come and fling its horrible ultimate of death and misery 
out of its manhood glory, to writhe and rot on some shore 
of the field to be more sacredly consecrated by the blood 



CRITICAL THOUGHTS 193 

of brave American brothers. But of the battle's fearful 
loss of 45,166 human beings, full three-quarters of this 
number — 5,664 dead, and 27,206 wounded — was suf- 
fered in the battle of July 2d. As a fighting unit, then, the 
Confederate army was in far better physical condition than 
its antagonist at the close of the 2d. But after a night's 
rest Meade's army was restored to a physical parity with 
its opponent. All things considered, Confederate attack 
should cease with the battle of the 2d. It is not too late 
for Longstreet's flank movement. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE CREST WAVE: THE BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 

THE battle of the 2d has resuhed, if not in defeat, as- 
suredly not in Confederate success. The Federals 
with slight exceptions, occupy their original position, 
driven, it is true, on the left, but only to gain a far stronger 
position on the ground Meade first intended to occupy. 
Nor is his army so crippled that it cannot more stoutly 
maintain its rectified line against further attack, for the 
left, with the impregnable Round Tops, is now adequately 
manned. Lee has made a lodgment on his right at the 
base of Round Top in the Devil's Den and its woods. He 
has also gained the peach orchard crest as an advantageous 
position for artillery, perfectly open, however, to the fire 
of the Federal guns; also some intrenchments on his left 
at the southern base of Gulp's Hill. But these Confeder- 
ate gains are well offset by the Federal withdrawal from 
Sickles' salient, the manning of the Round Tops, and the 
rectified line. The battle has defined the impregnable hills 
on the extreme left as being the key to the entire Federal 
position, as the heights on the right form its salient strong- 
hold on that flank. With the latter captured and the 
former held, Meade's line of retreat, at least, is safe, 
whereas, with the Round Tops in possession of the Con- 
federates, his lines would be closed and his entire position 
rendered untenable. If the battle of the 2d has demon- 
strated one thing more than another, it is that the front of 

Meade's line is nowhere vulnerable except with the utmost 

194 




MAJ.-GEN. GEORGK E. I'KKICTT 



l^'aciiii; I'a.no 1 !M 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 195 

difficulty and hazard. For has Lee not signally failed 
against the weakest section of the Federal position where it 
was almost fatally thrown out of true relationship with 
itself by Sickles' salient, and this but half manned? Now 
these weaknesses have been corrected and changed into for- 
midable strength. 

Only the minor portion of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia was brought into action on the 2d, while all but a 
small fraction of the Army of the Potomac was either 
desperately engaged or greatly fatigued by marches. 
Hence, Lee has in hand on the 2d the greater proportion of 
fresh troops. But the Army of the Potomac is now united 
and refreshed, and has suffered a loss no greater than has 
its antagonist. It now has a weighty advantage on the 
left in having a preponderance of comparatively fresh 
troops along the front of Longstreet's two exhausted divi- 
sions, seriously depleted by their losses of the 2d. In any 
event, if an attack is to be made by the Confederates to de- 
liver the blow anywhere along the Federal front appears 
well-nigh hopeless. But General Lee not only decides to 
make such, but proposes to repeat the program of the 
2d in its entirety except as to the point of the main at- 
tack. This is to be delivered against the strongest point 
of the Federal position, its center, with purpose to pierce 
it and thus cut the Army of the Potomac in twain, then to 
fight and defeat it in detail. Acting to this end, the one 
forlorn chance of success in a direct attack consists in 
heavily massing against the Federal center a carefully or- 
ganized column of attack, and so ordered that its various 
units shall act as one in delivering and following up a 
stunning blow, the balance of the army to support with a 
thrust sufficiently imminent to hold reinforcements from 
the point of attack. But to form such a column of suffi- 
cient weight is difficult to Lee unless he abandons his line 



196 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

beyond the town of Gettysburg and details two of Ewell's 
divisions with Pickett's to that sole purpose, supporting it 
strongly with Hill's Corps. General Lee is proposing to 
make a frontal attack, though he must know that of such 
nine out of ten have failed in warfare. 

Ewell is ready at the fair signal of daybreak, but he is 
forestalled ; for it is not the purpose of Meade to leave the 
Confederates in undisputed possession of such of his v^'orks 
as Johnson's troops were found in on the night of the 
2d by the returned Twelfth Corps. They must be driven 
out at all hazards before the day shall fully reveal to them 
the vital nature of the captured ground, in rear of Cemetery 
Ridge and in full view of the Baltimore pike, with the in- 
evitable battle chaos of wagons, ambulances, and of strag- 
glers, all rushing rearward in spite of cordons of cavalry 
attempting to stop and turn them back. During the night 
and early morning Meade has remanned his right with the 
troc^ps taken from it to save his left, and without Ewell's 
knowledge. While Slocum directs the right wing of 
the army, Williams, commanding the Twelfth Corps, hur- 
ries his artillery into commanding positions on Power's and 
]\IcAllister's Hills, where it sweeps the ground occu- 
pied by Johnson's troops, while the division of Ruger 
threatens their left flank from the south, posted along 
the Spangler stream. Geary, meanwhile, advances to 
strike the intrenchments occupied by the Confederate 
advanced line. The Federal artillery, now ceases its 
fire on this point, quitting it to the infantry. Johnson 
has been strengthened by three brigades from Early and 
Rodes, and at once hurls his battalions, in three lines in close 
order, to overrun this ground, sweep Geary away, and gain 
the Baltimore pike. All the unengaged guns of the Fed- 
eral reserv^e artillery are run into position and sweep the 
slope up which the Confederates are pressing. Sedgwick, 




MAI.CI.X. Ill■..\k^■ \\. SI.OC I'M 



•iiiK r.ii;.' I!ii; 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 197 

soutli of the pike, stands ready to engage should they gain 
the ground on Geary's right, while Lockwood goes to his as- 
sistance. Under a storm of shot and shell from the Fed- 
eral guns, and a rain of musketry, the Confederate in- 
fantry is without the aid of artillery, both on account of 
the ground and because the Federal batteries on Cemetery 
Hill and the various eminences about are able to hold 
Ewell's guns silent. The contest, indescribably fierce, is 
waged under a broiling sun, which compels short intervals 
of rest. 

Johnson, listening in vain for the sound of Longstreet's 
guns; is left alone to withstand the entire Federal brunt 
of battle from daylight until eleven o'clock, when his heroic 
troops are finally driven back completely repulsed. This 
able and intrepid commander, with his ecpially competent 
soldiery, has performed wonders of heroic battle, as though 
under the expectant eye of their old loved chief. The com- 
bat is often waged hand to hand, like ancient war, in which 
individual strength and prowess replaced the more dis- 
tant and orderly methods of modern warfare. On John- 
son's right, the brigades of Jones and Nichols stand stub- 
bornly to their work, neither gaining nor losing ground. 
Walker is on the extreme left along Rock Creek, opposed 
by R.uger. Steuart with Johnson's reinforcements, occupies 
particularly dangerous ground, where they are shattered 
under the crossfire of artillery and infantry. There is, 
nevertheless, a point of endurance beyond which even 
Jackson's old veterans cannot pass, although they refuse to 
abandon the attempt without a final desperate effort. After 
seven hours of almost incessant and fierce battle, Johnson, 
determining to put an end to what is becoming a useless 
waste of life, rushes at Geary's right with purpose to break 
through and gain the Baltimore pike. Kane's brigade, re- 
inforced by Shaler, meets the Confederate onset. Steuart 



198 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

leads his men in an attempt to pass Kane's right, where it 
is doubtful that even his veterans would go unless to follow 
their commander; but, thus led, they rush into a vortex 
of fire from the hemming Federals. Ruger's murderous 
musketry enfilades their left while they rush through 
Geary's fire in front. But this extreme Confederate valor 
is in vain, and they are repulsed by a combined forward 
movement of the Twelfth Corps, which drives them from 
the slope of Gulp's Hill and across Rock Creek. 

Years later a forest of dead trees, shot-wounded to their 
death this day, bear naked, ghostlike evidence of the hail 
of driving shot and lead hurled and withstood for hours 
by human beings. Geary's division alone — 3.702 men — 
have fired into this superb valor 277,000 rounds of ammu- 
nition, snatching intervals during the seven hours of battle 
to clean their foul and dangerously hot muskets. 

Thus, at eleven o'clock, the Confederate battle against 
Meade's right has completely failed, and with fearful loss 
to brave Johnson's superb division. Not a Confederate 
soldier has been advanced against the enemy at any other 
point along the entire front. Johnson has lost 2,015 
heroes; while Slocum, somehow, escapes with a loss of 
1,156 men, though his troops have attacked intrench- 
ments. 

The midday heat is almost unbearable ; and silence holds 
sway as the exhausted combatants rest, the Federals won- 
dering when the expected general attack upon their position 
will come. But General Lee has not, for some reason, 
realized the hope expressed in his report, " To harmonize 
the action of his three corps, from which he expected suc- 
cess." It is difficult, however, to imagine how he can ex- 
pect this harmony of action between his corps, in view of 
the fact that he, himself, gave Ewell orders last night to 
attack at daylight, with the assurance that Longstreet would 



i 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 199 

assault at the same time, and that the latter received his 
orders to attack at 7 a. m. on the 3d — long after day- 
break; and further, that Lee, himself, is engaged in mak- 
ing disposition of his troops that are to assault at Ziegler's 
Grove, between seven and eight o'clock, though Johnson 
has been desperately engaged on his left for some hours. 
In fact, it appears that even at this hour General Lee has 
not arrived at a positive decision regarding his main at- 
tack, for he is yet engaged in a discussion with Longstreet 
who urges a flank movement, which he has tentatively en- 
tered upon, deeming any other course utterly hopeless of 
success. In regard to Pickett's proposed assault on the 
Federal center, it is Longstreet's opinion that "The 15,000 
men who could make such an assault with success on that 
field have never been arrayed in battle." Meanwhile, Pick- 
ett's division arrived in the evening of the 2d, has been 
designated to lead the attack wherever made, and awaits 
orders under the broiling sun in the field west of the Em- 
mitsburg pike, near the peach orchard. 

Conditions along the Confederate right on the ground 
captured on the 2d, that is. Sickles' salient, are favorable 
to a flank movement around the Round Tops. Lee now oc- 
cupies practically the same line as that assumed by Sickles 
in forming the salient, except that to the right it extends 
southward along Plum Run, skirting the base of the Round 
Tops, where the brigades of Robertson and Law bivouacked 
during the night of the 2d. This line is now sufficiently 
manned or could be reinforced to mask and protect the 
flank of a turning column until it should debouch into the 
open to the south of Big Round Top, provided Lee's left 
had been drawn in during the night of the 2d, and proper 
disposition of the army made for such a flank attack. If 
now impracticable to do this in the daylight, Meade has not 
displayed disposition to interfere with Lee should he choose 



200 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

to hold battle in abeyance until the night of the 3d shall 
pass. 

After weighing all considerations, Lee finally decides 
against this operation to his right, and adopts the seem- 
ingly hopeless plan of assaulting the Federal center at 
Ziegler's Grove at the western base of Cemetery Hill. At- 
tacking at this point, his column must move for a distance 
of more than three-quarters of a mile over ground swept 
by the direct and oblique fire bf the Federal artillery 
from the entire west front of Meade's line. It is essential 
to the success of the attacking column that the Federal 
artillery shall be first crippled and silenced, and the Con- 
federate guns are disposed to this end. At daylight 
Colonel Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery, has 
placed the six reserve batteries of the First Corps along 
the Emmitsburg pike in the vicinity of the peach orchard. 
Here he is later joined by Colonel Walton with the re- 
mainder of the First Corps guns, which are placed along 
the same road northward to occupy the high ground yes- 
terday held by Federal Humphreys. All told these number 
seventy-five guns, batteried at a distance of from nine to 
twelve hundred yards from Meade's line. This formid- 
able array of artillery, forming a slight semicircle, is placed 
in front of the forming infantry column for the purpose 
of helping to clear the way for the infantry attack. Hill's 
sixty-five guns, crowning Seminary Ridge, are ready to 
engage, while Ewell's batteries are ordered to occupy the 
attention of the Federal artillery on Cemetery Hill. Lee 
thus has in position against Meade's west front one hun- 
dred and thirty guns prepared to open fire. 

With his artillery ready, Lee has not yet fully formed 
and placed his column of attack. At his request, Long- 
street accompanies him to examine the ground over which 
the attacking column must charge. At this time Lee has 




BRIG.-GEX. E. P. ALEXANDER 



Facing Page 200 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 201 

in mind to employ the depleted divisions of Hood and Mc- 
Laws to support Pickett by attacking along their front. 
This is made quite evident by the fact that none of Hill's 
command has been designated as a part of the column of 
attack, and that, while making his reexamination of the 
ground, Lee asks Brigadier Wofford, of McLaws' division, 
if he could successfully assail the Federal position where 
he had failed on the 2d. Wofford declaring it impossible, 
Longstreet then states that his two divisions. Hood and 
McLaws, suffered too severely in the battle of the 2d 
to enable them now to effectively support Pickett. Lee ac- 
cordingly orders to the immediate support of Pickett's 
right Wilcox's brigade of Anderson's division, since morn- 
ing some one hundred and fifty yards at the west of the 
Emmitsburg pike in front of the Warfield Ridge. This 
one brigade forms the right support and guard of Pickett's 
column. The latter takes temporary position in the right- 
rear of Wilcox, between the Warfield and Seminary Ridges, 
in order of Kemper's brigade on the right behind the War- 
field rise, Garnett and Armistead extending the front to 
the left. One of Hill's light batteries is ordered to ac- 
company Pickett. The remaining brigades of Anderson's 
division are formed from right to left; first, Perry, then 
Wright, Posey, and Mahone on the left along the southern 
extension of Seminary Ridge, occupying the same ground 
they did on the 2d. This disposition places Anderson's 
division, excepting Wilcox, in the rear of Pickett. On 
Pickett's left is Heth's division of Hill's Corps, now under 
Pettigrew, which forms the left of the column of assault, 
and, with Pickett, the first line. The brigades of Lane 
and Scales, of Pender's division, under Trimble, support 
Pettigrew, and with Wilcox form the second line. Hill's 
six remaining brigades with artillery are to stretch out and 
cover his entire line. 



202 TiiK r.A'riM.K oi' ci<:rrvsr^URG 

The coliiinii of assault, tlicn, is tlie division of I'ickett 
on the rii;ht of the lirst hnc, with IVltigrcvv's on his left, 
whik' till- sicoiKJ lini' consists of the brigades of i^ane and 
Scales supportinj;: I'ettij^^rew, and Wilcox in the right- 
rear of IMckett. in the event that Longstreet thinks neces- 
sary, he may call on the brigades t)f IVrry and Wright. 
Without tliesi' two last-named brigades the C(»hnnn has a 
strength t)f 14, (xx) men. With what an advantage could 
two of JCwell's divisions be now used in support of this 
desperate venture! Or, even as it is, what prevents the 
fresh and' intact division of Kodes, assisted jjy ICarly, 
lioni being ordered rea<ly to assault the north and west 
front of Cemetery Mill in conneclion with I'icketl? Such 
a convergent assault would coni|)lelely enveloj) the north 
and west fronts of that stronghold, prevent reinforcements 
from the righl from massing ;igainst either, and compel 
Meade to call on his left, thus weakening its strength 
against Mood and McLaws, the real danger point in Lee's 
hue. b'hnson, with I'^weH's ailillery, is still strong 
enough to hold most of the Twelfth Corps on ("nip's Mill. 
This ap|)arent wisdom, however, is evidently not con- 
sidered, and I ickett is to be left to be.ir .done the brunt 
of the attack .ig.iinst the bederal army, otherwise left 
wholly free to mass .against him, as not a Confederate 
soldier is prepared to move either against the h'ederal 
position in relief of Tickett or in his rear to support him! 

Me.ide. after the repidse of Johnson .•mlicip.ates fiuther 
atlacl<, .ind im|)ro\es the respite given bin) until one o'clock 
in rectifying the position of his troops. The Twelfth Corps 
is in its old position on Culp's Mill with Lockwocul's brigade 
added to the division of Williams. Shaler's and Neill's 
brigades of the Si.xth CorjjS are in position along the cast 
bank of Uock Creek, forming the extreme right of the 
I'Vderal line, and covering the Baltimore pike. Wads- 



Gcttyshurfj 








_; (jiiiiioN 

~ ^m Wf (111 

yf '_^| 2nl) Corps 



6TAN- 
NAHO 






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HALL 
f)OUtlLl.0Ay 

1st. Cones 




II 



lljl ^ril|3HDCORP8 



18T. Corps '^^ gulp's 

HILL 

12th uorp 



|,|m|m|„1m1„M RL6rrivc 

|,,„|„||,l,.lM|.AHTILLL(tY 
HL8ERVE 



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J:2!^08T^n■.E^ 



KILPATRICK 



II 



LITTLE 
ROUND TOP 



ROUND TOP 



I /ii. iiir. I'lifj- '.'Ml) 



I'lckcH's ( li.iriM'. July it, IHC.:!. 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 203 

worth's division, First Corps, is to Slocum's left on Gulp's 
Hill. Continuing the line to the left is Carroll's brigade 
of the Second Corps, then the Eleventh Corps, Robinson's 
division of the First, on Cemetery Hill; then the Second 
Corps reinforced by Doubleday's division of the First in 
line between Caldwell and Gibbon somewhat to the left of 
Ziegler's Grove. Doubleday has the strong brigade of 
Stannard just arrived from the Washington defenses, which 
is posted a little in advance of the general line in a woods 
near the point where Wright and Webb contested so fiercely 
on the 2d. Behind Doubleday is Birney with remnants of 
the Third Corps. Joining Caldwell's division of the 
Second Corps on the left are McGilvery's batteries with 
Brewster of the Third Corps and two brigades of the Sixth 
in support; while Humphreys', massed in the second line, 
supports the guns and the Second Corps. To the immedi- 
ate left of these Meade has his troops in position and in such 
formation as to render them a formidable column of attack, 
with practically no change ready to move against the de- 
pleted divisions of Hood and McLaws, — Lee's right, — and 
do execution to the Confederate army. Immediately to the 
left of McGilvery this column is arrayed; the brigade of 
McCandless, Fifth Corps, is its head across Plum Run on 
the flank of Confederate Semmes and in front of the inter- 
val between Benning and Wofiford. Supporting McCand- 
less is the brigade of Nevin, Sixth Corps, which is in the 
near front of Sweitzer of the Fifth; to the left of Sweitzer 
is Bartlett's brigade, Sixth Corps. At the western base of 
Little Round Top and to the immediate left of Bartlett are 
the brigades of Rice, Fisher, Tilton and Girrard, supported 
by Day and Burbank on its crest, all of the Fifth Corps, 
opposed to the Confederate brigades of Law, Robertson 
and Semmes. The brigades of Grant and Russell, Sixth 
Corps, are at the southeast base of Big Round Top; Kil- 



204 'nil-: llATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

l);ilriik will) (lie cavalry brigades of I'aniswortli and Mer- 
ritt is on the extreme left from Round Top to the limmits- 
hurg pike, facing the strung-out brigade of Anderson guard- 
ing the pike for the passage of Lee's trains, Law connect- 
ing willi liiin w itii little more than a skirmish line. 

Thns Meade has ready for attack by his left fifteen bri- 
gades of infantry and two of cavalry with ample artillery, 
most of this force not heavily engaged on the 2d; while 
opposed in its iinniediale front are eight de|)lete(l Confeder- 
ate brigades, with Alexander's batteries almost out of am- 
ninnilion. 

The I'Vderal artillery suffers under the disadvantage of 
being under the orders of corps commanders, as originally 
mentioned; and (General llnnl, chief of artillery, is obliged 
to bear this fact in mind when readjusting the batteries, 
being unable to move and mass them as he desires. The 
scattered reserve guns, however, are brought together, and 
from these the shortages of corps batteries are made good, 
the supply trains of the latter having been left behind. 
This serious oversight would not have occurred had the care 
and handling (>f the entire artillery been in the hands of 
the chief of artillery, instead in the hands of those whose 
chief concern is infantry. Two batteries of rifle guns un- 
der ]\ittenhouse crown the crest of Little Round Top. Mc- 
(lilvery's eight reserve batteries are in their position of 
yesterday on the high ground north of the Round Tops. 
Major Llazzard, with four batteries of the Second Corps, is 
in position from the southern extension of Cemetery Ridge 
up to and along its crest. These are commanded by Ivorty, 
Arnold, Cushing and Perrin. Woodruff, with his regular 
battery, is in front of Ziegler's Grove. More to the right, 
and out of the direct line of fire of the Confederate guns 
on Seminary Ridge, Major Osborne has eight batteries 
from the First and Eleventh Corps and one regular bat- 



RATTLl'j Ol' JU1.^■ IIIIKI) 205 

tery. Osborne's guns arc placed in an irregular line lo 
give a north and northwest fire, and are not ranged for ac- 
tion on the west front. 

Meade's arlillory is tlu'reft)re placed in tliicc j^roiips: 
Osborne on llic liglil on Cemetery Mill, widi lifly guns 
ranged away from the ground over which the attack is 
expected; llazzard at the center about ZiegK'r's (irove, 
with twenty-six pieces and i)aniels' foui- light gnus. Mc- 
Gilvery and kittenhouse man the left with forty-four guns 
near and on Little Uound To]). I'ivc batteries are held in 
reserve. These une hiuuhed and twenty- four guns aic 
exposed t)n crests, and are so offset by Confederate artilleiy 
on the (lanks that but seventy-foiu" ai"e in position along a 
mile of tlu' central front to cover the ground over uliicli 
the assault is to be delivered, and to contest the heavy pre- 
ponderance of the cutMuy's artillery stretching in continu- 
ous batteries fidin ( ii-ttysburg, semicircling to the |)eacli 
orchard. The Confederate artillery, therefore, has the 
double adv.'Uitage of convergent lire and a heavy ])repon- 
derance of guns over the I'ederal batteries, held to diver- 
gent range shoidd they attempt to exchange dirc-ct <-ouii)li- 
meuts with their opponents. 

The resi)ective cavalry forces are in position: Kilpat- 
rick near Round Top, as already shown, while Cregg is 
in the triangle formed by the York and Baltimore pikes 
u itii (icttysburg as its apex, the Salem Church road its base. 
This road intersects the triangle live miles distant fioni 
Gettysburg, while the llanover pike divides it. Within this 
figure is lireuncr's Mill ridge, McAllister's and Wolf's Hills, 
over against and to the southeast of ( ■ul|)'s Hill, among 
which Rock Creek meanders in a gorge like valley. To the 
east along the llanover pike tlu-se hills and ridges rise into 
Ihinkerhorf's l\idge, from which (lettysbiu"g and C'euu'tery 
Hill are overlooked by one standing on its abrupt, wooded 



2o6 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

summit. Spreading eastward is an undulating, open farm- 
ing country. 

The cavalry in this section guard the flanks of its re- 
spective armies; and the ridges and numerous roads afford 
fine cover and passage ways for cavalry operating against 
flanks — Stuart especially, advanced from Carlisle, to steal 
through Gregg's guard onto the Baltimore pike and raise 
commotion in the Federal rear in aid of an attack against 
its front. Gregg, appreciating this fact — and Stuart, has 
posted his division on the commanding eminence of Cress's 
Ridge, where he overlooks the surrounding country while 
he connects with Slocum near Rock Creek, Stuart being 
some distance to the northwest of Gregg. Four brigades of 
Lee's cavalry, Jenkins, Imboden, Jones and Robertson, are 
coming in from near the Potomac River, and arrive after 
the battle has ceased. Federal Buford is at Westminster 
with his division acting as depot guard. From his crossing 
of the Potomac to July 3d Lee's strangely absent cavalry 
has been of little if any service to him, 

Longstreet's column of attack is ready, and only waits 
for the artillery to clear way for it by pounding the Federal 
guns to wreck and shattering the infantry lines. At i p. m. 
Alexander's guns boom signal, which lets loose the mur- 
derous thunder of one hundred and thirty-eight Confed- 
erate cannon. War-wise Hunt has ordered his gun cap- 
tains to reserve their reply for fifteen minutes while 
watching the Confederate fire, in order to determine on 
what points to direct their fire most advantageously. This 
decided, one hundred and twenty-four Federal guns let 
fly; and the mighty voice of two hundred and sixty-two 
cannon make such crash of thunder as never before 
trembled the New World, or from its fair fields of peaceful 
industry essayed proud competition with the elemental 
powers in aerial war. The simultaneous volleys from all 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 207 

the Confederate batteries, seemingly directed on various 
points, produce greater havoc than would a successive fire, 
while they are more terrifying to the inactive infantry. 
Profiting by their faulty practice of the 2d, their range 
to-day is corrected, enabling them to deliver an unusually 
effective fire, not only among the Federal guns in action 
but also among the reserves, trains and ambulances in the 
rear. Buildings are destroyed, Meade's headquarters be- 
ing shot to pieces, and his chief-of-staff. General Butter- 
field, is wounded therein. Everywhere men are hunting 
ground shelter, while stragglers, the wounded, and citizen 
spectators are crowding the roads to the rear. 

A Confederate officer riding under this iron storm tells : 
" At first nothing existed but a horrible noise, until pres- 
ently out of it came the howl and screech of every passing 
bolt hunting for me ! Then reason quit work and one mad- 
dening thought possessed me — to find a hole and bury my- 
self from them and sound." 

The real bone and sinew of the old steady veteran fight- 
ers of the Army of the Potomac, however, remain at their 
posts. The infantry lies quietly in position, undismayed 
by the terrific cannonade tearing over and among them, 
for they have lain under artillery fire too often not to 
know that its damage is not commensurate with its roar 
and fiendish disturbance. But the exposed gunners suffer 
most seriously, as the Confederate fire is mainly to disable 
and silence their batteries. Casualties in men, horses and 
guns are replaced from the reserve. These conditions hold 
true in both armies, until the Confederates, overarduous to 
silence Hazzard's guns, advance their batteries so far that 
many of their guns are silenced. The hostile guns are 
placed about two-thirds of a mile apart; yet the fire from 
such a mass of cannon is so continuous, and their range so 
accurate on both sides, that a greater damage is effected 



2o8 THE BATll.E OF GETTYSBURG 

than is usual for artillery fire. A slight wind floats the 
smoke over the Confederate line, which serves to conceal 
their batteries from the Federal gunners. Due to their 
preponderance of guns the Confederate loss is less severe 
tlian that suffered by the Federals. Yet they have gained 
no great advantage in this respect. Longstreet's batter- 
ies, most advanced, are badly crippled. Kemper loses two 
hundred men from his brigade in the space of a few min- 
utes while waiting for the order to charge, and severe loss 
is sustained along the whole line of Hill's and Longstreet's 
Corps. During the cannonade Hunt, concentrating his 
gun-fire, stands critical of the work of his old pupil the 
Confederate general of artillery, while the latter is wonder- 
ing what his old instructor is thinking of it. 

Two o'clock is near at hand. The Confederate caissons 
are nearly empty, with but one hundred and sixty rounds 
of ammunition in reserve. By Hunt's orders the Federal 
fire has gradually slackened, as though his guns were dis- 
abled. All battery commanders, except Hazzard, have 
obeyed Hunt's instructions to reserve sufficient ammunition 
for long-range work against the expected attacking column. 
With his guns in position to crossfire its ranks, Hunt ex- 
pects to shatter and destroy it while at a distance from the 
Federal line. But Hazzard, in command of the guns at 
the center, from which direct fire is to issue, has been com- 
pelled by his corps commander to disregard Hunt's order: 
hence, his caissons are almost empty of long-range supply 
when Pickett appears, and the powerful center batteries 
are not operative until the column's near approach. Finally 
the Federal guns cease their fire, and Hunt withdraws the 
batteries from the Cemetery Hill front, only to replace 
them with the fresh batteries of Fitzhugh, Cowan and 
Parsons. This action, together with the silence of all their 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 209 

guns, deceives Alexander into believing that Meade's ar- 
tillery is disabled, and at 1 140 p. m, he notifies Pickett that 
his opportunity has arrived, but does not assume the re- 
sponsibility of ordering Pickett to advance. The reluct- 
ance of Longstreet to order his men to death has caused him 
to attempt to shift the responsibility to Alexander. There- 
upon Pickett sends successive aids to Longstreet for orders 
to advance; but, receiving no reply by their hands, he rides 
ofif in hot haste, reports his long waiting readiness to Long- 
street, and demands orders to move out. Longstreet, be- 
lieving this assault hopeless, and that Pickett and his gallant 
column are to be uselessly sacrificed, with a sad smile for 
Pickett, turns his horse and moves away without giving the 
order ; whereupon Pickett curtly says : " I am going to 
move forward, sir ! " salutes, dashes back, and orders the 
advance.* 

Pickett's division, called to attention, is re-formed. The 
broiling sun, as well as the hostile cannonry, having made 
sad havoc in its ranks, held all day in line waiting orders. 
His four thousand nine hundred veterans, inured to great 
battle, align under their riddled colors. Kemper's brigade 
holds the right, Armistead the left, with Garnett in the 
center — the latter sick and just out of an ambulance for 
the occasion. On Pickett's left is Pettigrew's division of 
Hill's Corps, composed of the brigades of Archer, Marshall, 
Davis and Brockenborough. Pickett and Pettigrew form 
tlie first line with double division front stretching away 
a mile or more. The second line has Wilcox in Pickett's 
right-rear, then Lane and Scales behind Pettigrew, under 
command of Trimble. Strangely, the brigades of Perry 

* The facts of this episode as related to the writer by an eye and ear 
witness, General E. P. Alexander, Longstreet's Chief of Artillery. 



2IO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

and Wright are neither formed as a part of this cohimn 
nor in quick readiness to follow as support. 

Covered hy a swarm of skirmishers, this column sweei)S 
out through the artillery, seven brigades front, just as 
the smoke of the guns is blown rearward, revealing to 
these doomed men the distant line which they must reach, 
there to fight and die. Pickett advances but a short dis- 
tance when he is compelled to make a half-wheel to his 
left in order to place his line squarely in front of the 
])oint in the Federal position he is to assail ; for it is one 
thousand yards to his left front. This maneuver throws 
his division in echelon across the Emmitsburg pike, thus 
presenting the three flanks of the echeloned brigades to 
the enfilading fire of McGilvery's forty-four guns and the 
six rifle pieces of Rittenhouse, all of which now open 
on Pickett with a most destructive concentrated fire. Stag- 
gered by this fire, suddenly belched from the Federal guns, 
Pickett's braves nerve themselves and swing on. wonder- 
ingly encouraged by the lack of a similar reception from 
in front. But Hazzard, as noted, has expended all of 
his long range ammunition ; hence this isolated lone divi- 
sion escapes McGilvery's fire as it moves on to meet 
more bloody work from Hazzard's close range fire and the 
hail of musketry. 

Having gained his distance to the left, in front of Han- 
cock's position, Pickett is again compelled to make a half- 
wheel to his right, then halt and rectify his alignment 
when five hundred yards from the Federal line and while 
under Hazzard's canister fire. Meanwhile Pettigrew and 
the supporting brigades are trying to get into position, as 
will be seen later. 

The section of Meade's line about to be assailed by this 
wave of war must now have our attention. Ziegler's 
Grove is a small wood on the western base of Cemetery 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 211 

Ridge, near its final rise into the main Hill. While the 
crest of the Ridge is level, its western base is rocky and 
scattered with bowlders, and lined off by stone fences which 
form a general line affording the Federal infantry good 
defensive cover. Woodruff's guns are in position on the 
edge of the grove. At the right-rear of the grove is the 
division of Hayes, Willard's brigade on the right, with 
Smith's on the left. The line is continued to the left by 
the brigades of Webb and Hall, of Gibl)on's division. These 
troops are behind the stone fences. Up the slope behind 
these brigades are Hazzard's guns with Harrow's infantry 
brigade in their left-rear. At Hall's left the wall turns 
westward, or to the front, and runs onto a slight ridge 
where there is a small wood. Doubleday has concealed 
Stannard's Vermont brigade in these woods, Rowley and 
Stone in double line in rear of the general position. On 
Doubleday's left is Birney's division of the Third Corps, 
composed of the brigades of Graham, Ward and De Tro- 
briand. The brigades of Shaler and Eustis, of the Twelfth 
Corps, are in their rear near the Taneytown pike, in reserve. 
Next in line on the left is Caldwell's division of the Second 
Corps in the first line, Humphreys' division of the Third 
Corps forming the second, both in rear of McGilvery's bat- 
teries. As the troops farther to the left do not move to en- 
gage against the attack, it is unnecessary to define their 
position at present. The position and work confronting 
Pickett's I4,cx)0 in defective formation is similar to that 
disastrously undertaken by 40,000 Federals in six massive 
assaults on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, in 1862. 

Pettigrew, putting his division in motion at the same 
time that Pickett started, but being somewhat in his rear, 
has had a greater distance to cover, and finds himself dis- 
tanced. Besides, several of Pettigrew's brigades were con- 
siderably shaken in the battle of the ist, and advance with 



212 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

less al.urily aiul ardor than do Pickett's fresh battalions. 
As already shown, I 'c-llijj^rcw's fonr l)ri^^•l(les, Archer, Mar- 
shall, Davis and iJrockcnhorouj^h, were deployed in this or- 
<\vi- Ironi lij^ht lo k-ll, in one line. Sucli a lcn!L,^(h of front 
is (h'nicull to maintain nnder the most favorable condi- 
tions. In this ca.se the left of the line moves slowly, while 
its ri^Iit, with the brip^ades of Lane and Scales, pnsh ahead 
to overtake Micketl. The latter, meanwhile, makes his 
wheel to the left and approaches the ^ronnd diaj^fonally in 
ri-tti,L;rew's front, toward which the latter is movinj^^ .some- 
what ()l)li(|nely. In this somewhat irrepnlar order to I'ick- 
ill's leltrear, IVttif^rew's brijj^ades come into view of the 
l'\-deral L;nnners and receive such attention as to cansc them 
t«> liall ;it a distance of two lumdred and lifty yards and 
optn a nsi'less musketry lire. They thus lose their momen-' 
IniM ;ni(I become lost to the dose aid of Tickett, who con- 
tinues his coiu'se unobservant (tf his rear. 

Wilcox, who was detailed to the sui)port of Pickett's 
rij^ht, and nnder the command of Ponj^street, is held by a 
dispute, in which Hill detains this brijj^ade *' Until it is de- 
cided that rickett's attack is successful," — an indecision 
most dangerously exercised at this vital juncture by Hill. 
I'inally rickett, observin,t,f his rij.!;ht uncovered, sends an 
ni,i;c'nt recpiest to Wilcox, who thereupon moves out in col- 
umn of battalions in order to m.ake speed in j^ainiu}^ posi- 
tion and to attract a portion of the iH'deral lire from Pick- 
ett a noble example to his cor])s conunander. So lonj^ 
lias Wilcox been detained that l^icketl is out of sipht in a 
di-pression, and envel(»ped in smoke. Wilcox, therefore, 
pursues a direct course and never reaches the flank of the 
ad\ance which he seeks to protect. 

While alij^ninp his division for the final charge, Pickett 
obserxes that Pettij:][rew is still in his distant left-rear, and 
that Wilcox is not yet up on his right. Already under a 



I 



BATTLE O I' JULY 11 1 1 Is' I) 213 

heavy lire, he docs not delay lor Wilcox, alter seiuliiij^ liiiii 
the request already noted, but moves ahead practically alone, 
his superb batlalioiis elosiii}^ the j^a[)s of death which bef^^iii 
to tear throuj^h tlu'ir ranks from llie hCderal Hank and fi(jnt 
fire, " Steady, and with an alifj^nnienl as on paradi-, they 
sweep forwai'd wilh unbroken front milil icachiu}; (he post- 
and-rail fences lining the JLnnnitsburg pike, within two hun- 
dred yards of the belching' bederal line." So says an ad- 
miring h'ederal who was behind the stcjue wall awaiting 
them. (Observing i'ickett's advance Lee may well rei)eat 
his admiration expressed of (he hederal masses charging his 
line at i^'redericksbnrg: " It is well thai war is so horrible 
or we should learn to love it too well." 

During this last stage of their advance, tliesi- niorlal 
men have moved against a terrific fire of canist<T from 
Ilazzard's and Woodrnff's guns, and a storm of lead from 
the heavy lines of infantry in front, while shol and shell 
from MeCiilvery's batteries, off to their riglit-fionl, take 
them in Hank, "()ften destroying wImjU; sections of men 
with a single shot." ("limbing the i)ike fences, they are nut 
by the musketry fire from Gibbon's entire division behind 
the stone breastworks, and men drop as though struck by 
a hail of death. Noble (iarnett is shot dead in lead of his 
advanced brigade, within one hundred yards of the stone 
wall. His men, staggered for a moment by his death, are 
immediately steadied by Kemper, whose brigade comes up 
on their right, and together they open lire for the first 
time. This, iK^wever, is (|uite ineffective against the stone; 
1)reastworks, and it cpiickly becomes evident that they must 
either charge them or lly. 'fhese indepid warriois have 
permitted themselves to halt but for a few minutes while 
Armistead comes into line. Officers now spring into lead; 
and, with the herce Confederate yell, tiiese dauntless Virgin- 
ians rush ahead through blast-storms of lead, the smoke 



214 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

of battle engulfing the combatants. Breaking into a run- 
ning charge under a hail of musketry, grape and canister, 
the brigades merge into one crowded, rushing line many 
ranks deep, through which tlie Federal cannon plow deadly 
furrows, while its front melts like snow before a belching 
volcano. Gibbon's voice, commanding a countercharge, is 
lost in the fearful din ; but his men stand their ground, 
maintaining a rapid fire. 

But an added danger now assails the heroic division. Its 
right flank, unprotected by Wilcox, is opposite the project- 
ing woods in which Stannard forms line perpendicular to 
Pickett's right flank, and practically destroys the two regi- 
ments on Armistead's right. What remains of this bri- 
gade saves itself from a like fate by moving to the left 
in rear of the brigade of Kemper and dead Garnett. This 
side-drift of Armistead's men, and Stannard's hot fire, tend 
to deflect Pickett's column to the left against Hayes, who 
is also within close reach. Armistead thrusts his men into 
line between Kemper and Garnett, which compacts the 
whole of Pickett's front. The grapple, waged at such close 
quarters, is terrific. Webb is wounded among hundreds 
of his prone and dead troops. The Confederates quickly 
break through the first line of Federals, which at once 
lodges itself behind the second line up the slope near the 
guns. Hancock and Gibbon hasten all reserves toward 
the breach. Hall, at the left of the break through Webb's 
front, makes a half- wheel to the rear with his brigade, thus 
saving his exposed flank while forming line on Pickett's 
right, into which he pours a point-blank fire. Harrow, 
swinging round on his right, takes the crowding Confed- 
erates practically in rear with his left. Humphreys sends 
Carr's brigade to help check and destroy the fierce driving 
wedge. The Federal soldiery on the right and left rush 
in, forming massed lines four ranks deep, until muskets will 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 215 

not reach past the front Hne to deliver their fire into the 
doomed column of massed men now warding to their right 
and left while fiercely fighting their way up onto the crest 
commanding the entire plateau of Cemetery and Gulp's 
Hills. This is the point reached by Wright on the evening 
of the 2d. Gallant Armistead, at the head of one hundred 
and fifty unyielding survivors, with hat on sword as guidon, 
rushes up to attack Gushing's battery. This little mass of 
mightiness breaks through the swarming lines of Federals, 
leaps their intrenchments and reaches the guns on the 
crest! Young Gushing and dauntless Armistead are 
killed at the same moment, their brave souls taking flight 
together, even as they leave their bodies side by side in 
the shade of the trees. This spot becomes historic in 
marking the extreme point reached by Pickett's charge, the 
Grest Wave of the American Givil War. 

Gallant Wilcox was last seen hastening to the aid of 
Pickett, in spite of the retarding jealousy of his corps com- 
mander. But he was thereby held to become so out- 
distanced that, not finding Pickett, he drives straight ahead, 
to become wholly lost later in the scrub growth on the low 
ground about the source of Plum Run. Still advancing, 
he finds himself in front of the Third Gorps far to the 
right of Pickett, and after his assault has failed. Noth- 
ing daunted in his determination to aid Pickett, as he be- 
lieves, Wilcox advances in full view of the amazed Federals 
who overlook and command the field. He is within two 
hundred yards of Stannard's victorious brigade, which, 
from the advanced woods so effectually helped to annihilate 
Pickett. 

Stannard at once faces his command to the rear and 
advances to the cover of a fence, from behind which 
his men pour a withering fire into the flank of the bold 
enemy, while the hostile guns riddle his front. Halting 



2i6 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

to return the fire of Stannard, Wilcox discovers his isolation 
and immediately retires, leaving two hundred of his men 
on the field. 

In the meantime, to the left of Pickett, Pettigrew and 
Trimble follow so close tliat all but two brigades strike 
the Federal line while Pickett is still engaged on the slope. 
Marshall's and Archer's brigades assail Hayes, but fail to 
break his front. Trimble resolutely supports these bri- 
gades. Lane breaches the first line and advances up the 
slope to attack the second, behind a stone wall. Archer 
and Scales have also succeeded in sweeping back the first 
Federal line beyond Lane and Pickett, and, with Lane, are 
advancing against the second. But Pettigrew's two left 
brigades, Davis and Brockenborough, which have not ad- 
vanced with alacrity, are still loitering beyond supporting 
distance, and do not arrive in position until Pettigrew's 
and Trimble's advanced brigades are repulsed after a short 
but murderous contest at close quarters in which impetuous 
Trimble is wounded. 

The steadily maintained fire of Hayes sends the four 
brigades, Marshall, Lane, Archer and Scales, in disordered 
retreat, leaving behind them two thousand prisoners, fifteen 
stands of colors, besides many killed and wounded. A few 
of Archer's and Scales' regiments, which overlap the right 
of Hayes, join Pickett, who is still fiercely engaged with 
Gibbon. These stray regiments are, in fact, the only direct 
reinforcements which reach Pickett, and are of slight aid, 
as he now finds himself completely isolated in the very 
midst of the strength of the swarming Federals. Whelmed 
in the vortex of these hopeless conditions, the superhuman 
valor of Pickett's Virginians, exemplified by Armistead and 
his one hundred and fifty, is all unavailing. Kemper is 
wounded; and, out of four generals, with eighteen field offi- 
cers, Pickett and one lieutenant-colonel alone remain un- 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 217 

scathed, though they act their heroic parts in that storm 
of lead lonely and exposed. 

Pickett's matchless division has ceased to exist as an or- 
ganized unit. Individually and in pitiful little groups, 
many of the survivors surrender, seeing the fate of those 
who attempt to re-pass the ground they have conquered 
through the raking fire sent searching for them by the 
Federals. But fourteen hundred of that immortal four 
thousand nine hundred reach safety behind Alexander's 
guns, or, with Pettigrew's and Trimble's men, take the short 
cut back to the Confederate line near the spot where Lee has 
watched the struggle. Twelve of their riddled flags are left 
behind, dyed with the life blood of the many who have 
fallen, in groups or single combat, attempting to wrench 
and bear these loved symbols from the victorious enemy. 

So quickly was Pickett's battle fought that there was 
insufficient time for advancing the batteries designated to 
aid him, or to cover his possible retreat. Colonel Alexan- 
der, watching from his guns in Pickett's support, gives a 
vivid picture of the final clash of this desperate enterprise : 
" From the position of our guns the sight of this conflict 
was grand and thrilling, and we watched it as men with a 
life and death interest in the result. If it were favorable 
to us, the war was nearly over; if against us, we each had 
the risk of many battles yet to go through. And the event 
was culminating with fearful rapidity ; for it seemed hardly 
five minutes before the fierce struggle was over. Listening 
to the rolling crash of musketry, it was hard to realize 
that they were made up of single reports, and that each 
musket-shot represented nearly a minute of a man's life in 
that storm of lead and iron. It seemed as if a hundred 
thousand men were engaged, and that human life was be- 
ing poured out like water. No soldier could have looked 
on Pickett's charge and not burned to be in it." 



2i8 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

None so well as participants can tell war's incidents and 
events, or so simply as the private soldier who bears the 
brnnt of conflict. One of these infantrymen who was on 
Cemetery Hill under the cannonade and against Pick- 
ett's charge relates the general experience in telling of his 
own. 

" In our rear the guns of Tettil's jjattery were llamiiig 
luTicly. just to our right and rear the brass pieces of 
llrown were bellowing, while on the far side of the clump of 
trees (Ziegler's Grove) C'ushing's three-inch rilled guns 
wc'ic added to the tumult with their sharp detonations. 
Along the ridge behind the infantry was the wildest and 
most terrible scene that ever marked a battle-field. 
Through the drifting smoke could be seen the batteries, 
where the toiling gunners, bareheaded and coatless, were 
working their heated guns. ICvery where, overhead and 
along the ground, the enemy's shells were bursting with 
deadly effect and adding to the dire confusion. Behind the 
guns the battery horses were rearing and plunging frantic- 
ally under the lash of whips and the i)ain of wounds. The 
shouting, swearing drivers were fast at work unhitching 
wounded horses and replacing them with spare teams. 
] lere and there a thick cloud of soil would .shoot high in 
the air with a loud roar, showing where a well aimed shot 
of the enemy had exploded a cais.son. in places cannon 
were ui)-ende(l or hurled over as a solid .shot struck a wheel 
or axle, while on every side men were tf)ssiiig their arms 
wildly and reeling to the ground as the jagged pieces of 
exploded shell tore through their (|uivering bodies. Dur- 
ing all this tumultuous storm of missiles the infantry lay 
prone upon the ground for safely, 'fhese veterans had lain 
under artillery fire too often to become demoralized by the 
demonstration, terrible as it was. They left it to their 
comrades of the artillery to fight it out, while they clutched 



BATTLE Ol' JULY 1 IlIRD 219 

Ihcir trusty rilles and waited for the deadlier strife of in- 
fantry, which their experience told them must follow. 

" And yet, when the artillery fire was at its heij^ht, when 
the storm of bursting shells was sweeping over the crest of 
Cemetery Ridge, when, except artillerymen, every man was 
lying flat on the ground for safety, General Hancock rode 
slowly along the crest in rear of the infantry, accompanied 
by his staff, and an orderly carrying the corps Hag. Jt was 
no piece of bravado. It encouraged and strengthened the 
men to see their general, to know that he was i)ersonally 
attending to affairs. The sight of him thus riding slowly 
amid the dire storm of death quickened the pulse of every 
soldier, and loud cheers greeted him as he rcjde along. In 
their enthusiasm men sprang to their feet forgetful of the 
deadly exposure, and some gallant fellows, with caps in air 
and cheer on their lips, were struck dead while thus paying 
tribute to the noble bearing of their commander. 

"After an hour or more of this terrible cannonade the 
C'onfederale batteries ceased their lire. The h'ederal bat- 
teries had stopped their fire some time before in order to 
save their ammunition for the infantry assault, wiiich all 
knew must soon come. The roar of the artillery had 
scarcely died away when long lines of Confederate infantry 
emerged from the woods on the opposite ridge. They pre- 
sented a front over a mile in length. It was a grand sight! 
With waving ilags and glittering bayonets glinting in the 
sunlight, with well aligned ranks and steady step, the vet- 
erans of I'ickett and I'ettigrew moved forward to the as- 
sault as if they were on parade. The skirmishers which 
preceded their advance exclianged fitful, scattering shots 
with the Federal pickets, but the main line moved forward 
with their guns at a right-shoulder. 

" When they were half way across the interval the I'Y'd- 
eral batteries opened on them with shell and shrapnel, and 



220 THE RATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

then with canister, but without retarding their advance. 
With a steadiness that challenged the admiration of their 
enemies, the Confederate veterans closed up the gaps in 
their ranks, and pressed on in good alignment. It was evi- 
dent to each soldier on Cemetery Hill that artillery fire 
could not check them. Everything must depend on the 
rifles of the infantry, and a cool, deliberate aim. The in- 
fantry held its fire. The Confederates had reached the 
Emmitsburg pike, and were so near that the buttons on 
their coats could be easily counted. When, with a crashing 
sound, the rifles of the Second Corps blazed forth, and the 
hapless foemen went down like wheat in a hail-storm. 

" Like a wounded bull, staggered for an instant, and 
goaded to determined madness, Pickett's sui)erl) division 
closes up as it rushes forward at our lines without stopping 
to fire. They break through our first line; and a little 
wedge of those remaining alive follow one of their generals 
and surge uj) against Cushing's guns, ])elching into their 
faces; while we infantry hem them in on both sides, four 
ranks deep, with our murderous fire. 

" The superb charge of the Confederates is broken ; and 
our dauntless foes, mangled and dead, strew the ground like 
leaves in autumn. Of those left alive many surrender, 
while others trickle back in pitiful little streams, like a 
broken ocean wave, to find safety from the still pelting 
storm behind the distant line of their watching comrades. 

" Nor have we escaped a slaughter almost equal to that 
of our dauntless assailants: for of the three hundred men of 
my regiment who answered to roll-call that morning, one 
hundred and ninety-two have fallen." 

The Crest Wave of our American Civil War has run, 
crested, and broken. Had it overrun the Stars and Stripes 
of our love we would have been rended into two hostile 
peoples, and our doom as a nation would have been sealed. 



BATTLE Ol< JULY THIRD 221 

Pickett's Charge! Its fame will live so long as dauntless 
courage and splendid heroism shall ennohlo human life and 
enrich the heart-blood of men. The si)irit of that acme of 
human valor was horn immortal from mortal failure assay- 
ing the impossible. Pickett's Charge has becomr the mar- 
tial [)ride of the American before the world. /Vmong the 
great deeds of war performed by masses of men, that of 
Pickett's grand division of Virginians at Cetlysburg is 
apexed. 

Armistead and Cushing, fighting and dying together 
amidst the guns of the young Federal's cresting battery at 
Cemetery Hill, were representatives not only of the Amer- 
ican, but of the causes for which they contested. Mature, 
intrepid, fierce Armistead recklessly giving his life after 
hope of success had vanished. Cushing, young, hopeful, 
cool and determined, standing to his guns almost alone in 
the face of a mad rush of splendid valor. In these two the 
Great Conflict became reduced for the moment almost to a 
personal duel between these host Champions. Glories of 
manhood, both ! Superb representatives of Aristocracy 
and Democracy. 

The ])lace of their death would be fittingly crowned by a 
monumental symbol embodying to futurity the material 
death and spiritual rising there wrought for humanity by 
American brothers, — the place of burial and resurrection. 

l^^xpecting a counter-attack from Meade, following in the 
wake of Pickett's wreckage, the meagre ability of the shat- 
tered front of the Confederate is immediately utilized to 
make a brave show, 'fhat porti(;n of the line vacated by 
Pickett is held alone by the decimated brigade of Wilcox 
aided by artillery. To his right, the only available force 
are the brigades of Wofford aind ]>arksdale, wo fully weak- 
ened from the battle of the 2d. These, commanded by 
Colonel Humphreys, arc slightly advanced and a portion 



222 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

deployed to his left as skirmishers to cover the guns occu- 
pying the line between his position and that of Wilcox. 
Perry and Wright are still waiting orders to advance 
in attack. It will be remembered that these two brigades 
were placed under Longstreet's orders should he deem 
them necessary to Pickett's success. They have not, how- 
ever, been utilized, and Pickett's division is already an- 
nihilated. 

For the late overconfident Confederates, the valiant hope 
of successfully storming the Federal position is swallowed 
in the present emergency of utmost exertion on the part 
of their officers to rally the remnants of the shattered and 
decimated brigades and divisions of the column of assault, 
and offer such resistance as they may to the momen- 
tarily expected counter-assault. Longstreet says: "They 
then drove the fragments back upon our lines. As they 
came back I fully expected to see Meade ride to the front 
and lead his forces to a tremendous counter-charge. I rode 
to my line of batteries, knowing they were all I. had in 
front of the impending attack." Amidst the confusion of 
such a disaster, and the apparently endless stream of 
wounded, they succeeded in rallying but a few. The un- 
supported artillery, almost exhausted of ammunition, is left 
to make such noise and show of ready resistance as will, 
it is hoped, save the shattered center and weak right from 
a determined assault in force by the Federals. Colonel 
Alexander runs every available gun into advanced position 
along the Emmitsburg pike about the peach orchard, and 
pounds the Federal line with the utmost fury. General Lee 
himself rides through the returning drift of Pickett's di- 
vision towards Meade's expected counter attack calling to 
the men : " Rally men, now is the time to stand fast. It 
is all my fault." He also finds time and the disposition to 
take interest in a horse that an aid is roughly treating in 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 223 

its fright and also to request his staff to " turn back " out of 
the hostile fire. A noble man, for a certainty, — draining 
the bitter cup. 

After Pickett's repulses, the Confederate center is held 
by the heavily weakened Third Corps, its major part now 
spreading its dismay through the more fortunate brigades, 
which are strung out beyond the making of a strong defense 
in covering the whole extent of Hill's line and that portion 
of Longstreet's left where Pickett's wreck is straggling 
through. In so far as infantry is concerned, the Confed- 
erate center is in no manner or sense prepared to resist a 
determined assault, even if delivered by a comparatively 
small column, its available defense being practically de- 
pendent upon its more or less disabled artillery. Long- 
street, holding the right, the present most vulnerable point 
in the Confederate line, is dependent upon Alexander's 
guns and the seriously weakened and outstretched divisions 
of McLaws and Hood. Alexander's guns are fearfully ex- 
posed, having been run far to the front to hammer the ex- 
pected Federal attack at all hazards, as the Confederates' 
strongest defense. Nor is Alexander in condition to work 
his guns for more than an hour, for lack of ammunition. 
Pickett is shattered and his ground is occupied by a thin 
line of skirmishers. Longstreet's seven remaining bri- 
gades, fearfully depleted from bearing the brunt of yester- 
day's battle, are over against more than two-thirds of the 
Federal army. These brigades occupy the extreme right, 
semicircling in a wide sweep of line beginning on the Em- 
mitsburg pike, near the peach orchard, arching along Plum 
Run at the base of the Round Tops, then bending back to 
the Emmitsburg pike, where Anderson's brigade is guard- 
ing the passage for Confederate trains. To call this line 
of Longstreet's a line of defense, would be a gross mis- 
nomer ; for it is little more than a dangerously exposed line 



224 THE BATTLE OE GETTYSBURG 

of picket-posts connected by skirmishers, and semi-isolated 
from the Confederate center. 

At this time of practical defenselessness of the Confed- 
erates trouble breaks in on their extreme right in the sliape 
of Kilpatrick's cavalry attacking Law's strung out infantry, 
guarding from the base of Round Top the Emmitsburg 
pike, over which are passing Lee's supply trains. The small 
brigade of Earnsworth is put at a task impossible to cavalry, 
routing infantry from ground thickly interspersed with 
stone fences, and this brigade is practically destroyed and 
its daring leader is killed. Merritt with his troopers goes 
at Anderson's men guarding the pike, and after a sharp 
contest is driven off. 

Of Kilpatrick's chance Longstreet says: " LLad Kilpat- 
rick hekl his brigades together and swept through the open 
fields past our right and onto the roads in our rear no body 
of cavalry ever had chance to do more damage." Had Kil- 
patrick done this, first calling on the infantry brigades of 
Grant and Russell lying useless at the eastern base of Big 
l\oii;i(l Top, there should have been left no Confederates to 
the south of the peach orchard, nor would he have failed to 
drive Lee's decimated right pell-mell onto his wrecked cen- 
ter, Meade's massed column in front of Little Round Top 
swinging in, as they would have done with Kilpatrick's 
drive. General Alexander says: "If our right had been 
attacked after Pickett's repulse, the war would have been 
ended within an hour." 

Of Kilpatrick's abortive attack Col. Henderson remarks: 
" Had Kilpatrick's been supported by infantry and his at- 
tack pushed against Law's weakened and scattered bri- 
gades, they would have been driven in, clearing the way 
for the Sixth Corps advancing from the north of Round 
Top, and Lee's right should have been smashed and 
turned." 



BATTLEi OV JUI.Y THIRD 225 

Opposed to this Confederate line of weakness and con- 
fusion, Meade has promptly reformed the disintegration 
that had gathered about Pickett, and has his batteries well 
in hand, largely massed at his center from both wings. 
For Meade, for some unaccountable reason, is expecting 
Lee to renew his assault with his entire army. The Fed- 
eral commander, who was on the left of his line at the 
time of Pickett's attack, hastens to the threatened point, 
taking with him the considerable remnant of the Third 
Corps. Humphreys has massed his division behind the 
Second Corps; Birney has come into position on the left 
of the Second in readiness to strike the expected attack in 
flank; Doubleday has joined Stannard with his remaining 
brigades; Robinson's division of the First Corps, has 
moved from Cemetery Ilill, and is in position to reinforce 
the right of the Second Corps; while two brigades of the 
Twelfth, Shaler and Eustis, arrive from the extreme right. 
This powerful massing at the center is placed under com- 
mand of Newton — Hancock wounded — and is quickly 
restored to order by the time Pickett's wreckage has reached 
the Confederate line, this realignment being made in read- 
iness for Lee's expected renewal of attack. The troops 
stationed toward the left beyond Birney with the Third 
Corps and McGilvery's batteries were not drawn into the 
resistance against Pickett, and their positions have been 
but little disturbed. The offensive or defensive force, — the 
" ready Column " for attack, composed of the h^ifth and 
Sixth Corps, — remains in position to the left of McGilvery, 
as before shown, as does Kilpatrick's cavalry. This ready 
force holding Meade's left is some 25,000 men strong, and 
is in close proximity to the depleted division of McLaws 
and Hood's, now commanded by Law. The batteries of 
McGilvery and Rittenhouse more than offset the guns of 
Alexander. 



226 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

To oppose the formidable massing on the Federal left, 
Lee has Law's and McLaws' divisions and Alexander's 
batteries disposed as follows: On his extreme right An- 
derson's brigade is refused and semi-isolated on tlie Em- 
metsburg pike, guarding it for the passage of supply trains. 
Law's remaining brigades are strung along Plum Run 
facing an overmatching force of the Fifth Federal Corps 
at the base of the Round Tops; and the line is continued 
by Semmes and Robertson, with Benning in close sup- 
port of the latter, whose position is on the knoll overlook- 
ing the Devil's Den from the west. Wofford is in Ben- 
ning's left-rear in the wheat-field, with a considerable in- 
terval between, as there is, also between Wofford and Ker- 
shaw in position on the peach orchard crest to the right 
of Alexander's guns. Barksdale's reduced brigade is com- 
pelled to deploy as a skirmish line to cover the space. The 
weakness of this line is evident. Far too extended for its 
holding force, the brigades are scattered, with dangerous 
intervals, and are connected with Pickett's disintegration 
and Hill's confused weakness by a skirmish line only; while 
they are beyond the hope of reinforcement, and on ground 
that offers no defensive position if assailed by a swinging 
movement from the Federal left. 

This with practical accuracy defines the conditions and 
positions of the contending armies, after the repulse of 
Pickett. While both armies have suffered terrible losses 
and are wo fully exhausted from the three days of battle, it 
can scarcely be claimed that the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia is not in a decidedly worse condition than the Army 
of the Potomac for a prompt renewal of the contest. The 
latter, still formidable, has been quickly reformed and 
stands ready to repel the expected renewal of assault by 
Lee. Should Meade execute his present purpose and at- 
tack Lee's exposed right, such an operation will, if carried 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 227 

to its legitimate conclusion, decide the fate of one or other 
of the armies, with every probability in favor of victory for 
his own. 

Napoleon's decision exactly applies to this case, and 
as an educated soldier Meade must know it. " No mat- 
ter what the condition of the force which has success- 
fully attacked, or which has successfully repelled an at- 
tack, that of the defeated foe is worse, and demands hurled 
continuance, or hurled counter-attack." Wounded Han- 
cock, who " never made a military error " sends a note to 
Meade, saying : " I have never seen a more formidable at- 
tack, and if the Fifth and Sixth Corps are now pushed up 
the enemy will be destroyed." Lee expects a counter-at- 
tack, and rides towards its source through Pickett's drift 
endeavoring to rally the men to resist it. The best inter^ 
ests of all the States, North and South, demand of Meade 
this imperatively plain course of action, — as do the prin- 
ciples and practices of war ; while preeminent fame beckons 
the Federal commander. The magnitude of the responsi- 
bility and of the opportunity cannot escape the clear, pene- 
trating mind of the Federal commander; and, with this 
realization, it is but natural that he also considers the fact 
that he may already have repelled Lee's invasion. 

With thought to act with his massed left Meade passes 
Sedgwick without giving him any instructions, and gives 
Sykes, commanding the Fifth Corps, orders to recon- 
noiter the ground of his left-front, instead of directing 
that it be occupied in force; nor does he indicate to Sykes 
that this reconnoissance is a matter of any particular 
moment. The single brigade of McCandless is, there- 
fore, advanced from its position on the upper stretch of 
Plum Run, and after a brief encounter with Benning's 
extended flank, compels the latter to retreat. Still ad- 
vancing, McCandless is deceived by a simple expedient of 



228 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Kershaw's to conceal the Confederate weakness; and, be- 
ing without support or special orders, McCandless halts, 
satisfied with having retaken nearly all of the battlefield of 
the 2d with his single brigade. 

Law, in command of the Confederate brigades along the 
Devil's Den and Lower Plum Run, has meanwhile with- 
drawn them to the Emmitsburg pike, realizing their 
jeopardy. McCandless busies his men until dark in the 
humane work of collecting the wounded and burying the 
dead of the battle of tlie 2d, until now uncared for. When 
too late, the brigades of Wheaton, Nevin and Bartlett are 
advanced to his support, and these troops advance to within 
a considerable distance of the peach orchard and bivouac 
for the night. 

This forward move of one brigade demonstrates the 
fact that had Meade promptly supported McCandless with 
the ready brigades of Sedgwick and Sykes, thus form- 
ing a powerful column of attack, it would have met only 
the two brigades sighted by McCandless, until it had 
reached the Emmitsburg pike. In fact, such a massive, 
column as Meade could have promptly hurled and sup- 
ported — more than 25,000 men — could have encountered 
no appreciable resistance other than such as Alexander could 
have made with his unsupported batteries, taken mainly 
in reverse and while perfectly open to the Federal artillery. 
Such a column advanced from the north of Round Top in 
combination with Kilpatrick supported by Grant and Rus- 
sell swinging round the extreme right of Law, would have 
completely cut him off from the Confederate center, as its 
progress would have been along the cord of the bow which 
his circling scattered brigades formed. Under such con- 
ditions, Kilpatrick would certainly have more than realized 
what Longstreet feared from him. 

The complete success which such an operation would 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 229 

have won is not a matter of doubt; and, once established 
on the Emmitsburg pike, with Law isolated or driven and 
left to the care of the ample force yet disposable on the left 
for that and contingent purposes, the main turning column 
would have advanced against Hill's uncovered flank while 
his line was held by a confused conglomeration of weak and 
decimated battalions, and artillery, largely out of reach 
of aid from Ewell. The turning column, meanwhile, 
would be constantly augmented from the main line, swing- 
ing out to its right-front as uncovered by the column, 
and to support it, as previously outlined. Such an opera- 
tion should have destroyed Lee's army. But Meade does 
not obey any of these plain commands of war, and the 
Army of Northern Virginia is thus left unmolested after 
the disastrous collapse of its final effort at Gettysburg. 
As soon as night shrouds the light Longstreet and Ewell 
are drawn in on the center, and the defeated army in- 
trenches a strong, compact line along Seminary Ridge 
reaching from the Seminary to the peach orchard, and 
bristling with cannon. Behind this formidable front Lee 
reforms his effectives, while his impedimenta, sick and 
wounded take up their forlorn march for the frontier and 
home. 

We must now give attention to a cavalry combat which, 
during the battle of the 3d, was fought off to the east of 
Gettysburg in the triangle formed by the York and Balti- 
more pikes. Lee had instructed Stuart to find his way 
around the Federal right in order to fall upon Meade's 
retreating columns on the Baltimore pike, should he be 
driven from Cemetery Ridge. But Meade, also, has 
posted his cavalry to provide for this contingency and to 
improve any advantage which might be offered by the 
Confederates. 

Stuart's six thousand troopers, in four brigades, under 



230 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Jenkins, Clianibliss, 1 lampion and Mt/Jiugli J.cc, arc in 
movement at 3 a. m., on July 30!, toward Brinkerlioff's 
Ridge. While in march Stuart covers the left of Evvell as 
well as of the Confederate army. 11 is purpose is to lo- 
cate Gregg's brigades, then to conceal his column from his 
antagonist behind Cress's Ridge, and, under its cover, move 
by stealth and adventure to his purpose on the Federal 
right-rear at a point about opposite where Pickett will 
charge its ironi. Advancing, he jjeers over the crest of 
the iirinkerlioff Ridge and, half a mile distant on an op- 
posite slope, observes Custer's brigade — left in observa- 
tion by Kilpatrick — posted near the junction of the Han- 
over and Salem Church roads. If he can conceal his 
march southward behind Cress's l^idge, his cavalry may 
reach the Baltimore pike between Kock ("reek and White 
Run, and at the same time isolate his opposing cavalry 
from the right of the Federal army. This position once 
gained in rear of Meade's line of battle, many things may 
be made to transpire by Jeb Stuart in aid of tlve Con- 
federate main battle against its opposite front. 

Riding to this end, the brigades of Jenkins and Chambliss 
are put in concealed march along the west base of Cress's 
Ridge, while Hampton and Lee, some distance in the 
rear, are ordered to follow in the tracks of the advanced 
brigades. J^ut Hampton and Lee carelessly make them- 
selves visible to Custer, and Stuart's concealed movement 
is frustrated. Meanwhile Gregg's cavalry, the brigades of 
Mcintosh and Irvin Gregg, is in motion up from the Balti- 
more pike over the Hanover road, with the eastern slope 
of Wolf's Hill in view over which Stuart must move if 
he passes beyond Brinkerhoff's Ridge. Kilpatrick, on 
march to the left of the army, left Custer in observation on 
the same road until Gregg should appear. Coming un- 
expectedly upon Custer, Hampton and Lee immediately open 




r.ivK.. (;i-:.\. ckokci-: a. crsri-.R 



icing Page 2:'.l 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 231 

fire on him with a battery. This Custer's guns quickly 
silence, and the Confederate cavalry retires behind the 
woods, hoping to draw Custer into this ambush. At this 
juncture Custer receives orders from Kilpatrick to join 
him on the left of the army. Mcintosh, therefore, re- 
lieves him, and shortly after engages with Hampton and 
Lee, but is quickly driven back by their superior numbers. 
Stuart, hearing the sound of guns in his rear, halts Jenkins 
and Chambliss until Hampton arrives in person, and in- 
forms his chief of what is transpiring with his two rear 
brigades. Gregg, answering the urgent call of Mcintosh, 
meets Custer marching toward the left, and requests him 
to delay and join his advance to the reinforcement of Mc- 
intosh. Custer has four magnificent Michigan regiments 
with which he is not anxious to escape battle exercise, and 
he delays his march to Kilpatrick to join adventure with 
Gregg. This gives Gregg four thousand troopers. 

Stuart observes Custer's advance and sends Jenkins 
against him, withholding Chambliss to continue his original 
movement toward the Baltimore pike, with the purpose 
of turning Gregg's flank, thinking thus to insure defeat 
of the Federal cavalry ; which accomplished, he will have 
free swing in Meade's rear. Stuart's troops are in a most 
advantageous position along the slope of Cress's Ridge, 
with stronghold among the buildings of the Rummel farm. 
However, Gregg determines to attack; and to this end two 
of Custer's regiments, the Fifth and Sixth Michigan, are 
sent to reinforce Mcintosh, who is posted along the Salem 
Church road north of the Hanover pike. Gregg's guns, 
in position at the junction of these roads, open fire on the 
Rummel buildings, occupied by Lee's skirmishers. 

In the endeavor to turn the flank of Mcintosh, Lee has 
engaged the main portion of his own and Hampton's bri- 
gades, when Jenkins comes up on his right, extending the 



232 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Confederate line to the Hanover pike. The Federal gun- 
fire clears the Rumniel buildings, while Custer dismounts 
his troopers and deploys a skirmish line which advances 
against the Confederate skirmishers, consisting of Jenkins's 
men, dismounted and deployed in like manner. But Jen- 
kins finds his men out of ammunition, and the Sixth Michi- 
gan sets the Confederates flying. Gregg, meanwhile, has 
advanced his left near to Cress's Ridge; and when Jen- 
kins is discovered, Gregg brings forward his center, a part 
of the brigade of Mcintosh, and both Lee and Jenkins are 
driven. In falling back, the two Confederate brigades be- 
come separated, and Jenkins is put in such jeopardy that 
Stuart is forced to recall Chambliss to his succor. Gregg 
is checked; but he has wholly defeated Stuart's original 
purpose. His entire force and energy are now required 
in the developing field at hand. 

The regiment Chambliss has dismounted and sent ahead 
is met by the Fifth Michigan with a repulsing fire from its 
repeating carbines. Lee has mounted the First Virginia 
regiment, and, watching the combat to his right-front, now 
charges the right of Mcintosh, which is held by the First 
New Jersey regiment. Its ammunition boxes empty, it is 
quickly driven back. Alert Custer, however, is at hand 
with the Seventh Michigan, mounted. But a fence inter- 
venes, across which the hostile troopers exchange a hot 
fire, during which some of Lee's men dismount, rush for- 
ward and tear away the obstruction. The Virginians now 
charge, drive the Federal center, and compel the left of Mc- 
intosh to change front into position behind a fence, to 
escape being taken in flank. But the gallant Virginians 
have exhausted themselves, and now, caught in a hot fire, 
are forced to retire. 

Hampton now returns, and, seeing the repulse of Lee on 
his left and Chambliss on his right, orders the First North 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 233 

Carolina regiment and the Jeff Davis Legion to mount 
and charge. The Legion rushes at the Federal battery, 
disregarding its murderous fire, which continues until Cus- 
ter's line is abreast the mouth of the guns. Hampton's 
brave regiments are repulsed; but Lee now charges, fol- 
lowed by the remainder of Hampton's brigade, and joins 
Hampton struggling against Custer in the midfield. Their 
advance has exposed them to the fire of skirmishers on 
their right behind a fence, and to Gregg's guns. The 
Federal reserves, joined by the mounted skirmishers, now 
charge the Confederates on both flanks, the First New 
Jersey engaging with sabres only. The combat quickly 
becomes general and desperate when, carbines empty, sabres 
flash and cut as the columns sway and clash. Hampton 
and many of the Confederate officers are disabled among 
their fallen men. Finally the Federals open out so that 
their artillery has play on Stuart's line, and the Confeder- 
ates give way and fall back to the rear of the Rummel 
buildings. The fight ended, the Federals withdraw to their 
position, having lost in killed and wounded two hundred 
and eighty-nine men, and captured three hundred and 
thirty-five of the enemy. The Confederate loss is not 
definitely reported, but it could not have been less than that 
suffered by Gregg's brigades. Stuart's entire purpose is 
defeated, though he watches until evening for opportunity 
to act against the Federals. After nightfall, his command 
is withdrawn from brilliant battle to perform the sad and 
more arduous duty of covering the retreat of a defeated 
army and its pathetic trains of wounded braves. 

The decisive battle of the American Civil War has been 
fought to a finish — and at what a cost! Out of his army 
of 85,674 men Meade has lost 22,990 men, of whom 3,063 
are killed, 2,228 die of wounds, 12,264 ^^e wounded, and 
5,435 are missing. Lee's host of 71,675 men has been re- 



234 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

duced by the loss of 20,448 men, of whom 2,592 are killed, 
1,728 die of wounds, 10,978 wounded, and 5,150 missing. 
These figures of Confederate losses — from their incom- 
plete reports — are evidently incorrect, for, while they 
show but 5,150 men missing, the Federal reports of pris- 
oners captured from July ist to 5th give the names of 
12,227 men. Of this excess over the Confederate reports, 
missing, i. e., 7,077, there were 6,802 men wounded. 
Hence, adding this last number to the Confederate re- 
port, their loss in killed and wounded was 22,100 men, and 
their total loss, 27,525 men. The Confederate army suf- 
fered the irreparable loss of seventeen generals of ability 
and mettle such as we have seen fall in the division of 
Pickett. While the Army of the Potomac has lost twenty- 
one in rank, from brigadiers to corps commanders ; of offi- 
cers there were 339 killed and 1,042 wounded among these. 
The physical condition of the two armies, then, in number 
is: Federals, 70,510 men; Confederates, 42,475 men; 
while both are fearfully depleted of their old veteran 
officers. 

The great Battle of Gettyslnirg, the successor of Water- 
loo, is ended. When Buford opened the bloody drama on 
the morning of July ist to the west of the sleeping town un- 
til its closing scene enacted by Stuart and Gregg to its east, 
on the sunny hills and valleys the fate of a youthful nation 
of godlike destiny trembled on the steely bayonets of one 
hundred and fifty thousand men. Never before was there 
so mighty a target for millions of bullets, shot and shell, 
hurled from miles of muzzles of death. Behind these one 
hundred and fifty thousand brothers have held their lives 
as of no value save as a free offering, either for the main- 
tenance or destruction of the nation. Both armies have 
fought and bled gigantically, — one of these superb hosts for 
Progress, the other, for Retrogression. Yet both have 



BATTLE OF JULY THIRD 235 

wrestled to save the nation! for, without such monstrous 
sacrifice the nation would have died of its disease, Free- 
dom infected with Tyranny. Sacrifice is the price of free- 
dom. 



CHAPTER XV 

AFTER THE BATTLE: DEDUCTIONS AND CRITICISMS 

THE measure of greatness is the magnitude of condi- 
tions overcome and mastered. Applying this to Rob- 
ert E. Lee, his colossal stature is obtained. The point from 
which he stepped into action was beyond the objects for 
which most men strive. General Lee has passed striving 
for personal glory and fame, utterly subordinating himself 
and his masterful abilities to the Cause he served, — to duty, 
as it appeared to him. In the midst of disaster such as 
would wreck a lesser life he hastens to fasten the responsi- 
bility for it upon himself while gathering the pitiful remains 
of his shattered battalions in his masterful hands, like a 
lion to stand with them awaiting the foe. 

After Pickett's repulse, Lee, in momentary expectation 
of a counter assault, has no time in which to attempt 
a readjustment of his army, even were the troops in 
condition for any considerable movement. In fact, his 
only safety is in holding it stationary in position, for he 
thus conceals his weakness behind a bold front, which 
appears unbroken and formidable. This necessity serves 
to deceive Meade and his timid council, and it is this very 
showing that leads the Federal commander to the un- 
reasonable belief that Lee is proposing to make a general 
attack after Pickett is driven instead of having made it in 
his support. 

Wisely holding this advantage, Lee makes no with- 
drawals until night comes to his aid. But no sooner has 

236 



DEDUCTIONS AND CRITICISMS 237 

darkness fallen than Ewell withdraws his corps from the 
left, and by daylight of the 4th has it in position on the 
Cashtown road, north of the Seminary, while Longstreet 
is drawn in until his right rests at the peach orchard, ex- 
tending to the left connecting with Hill. The Confederate 
cavalry is in hand, Stuart on the left guarding with three 
brigades, Fitzhugh Lee at Cashtown with one, guarding 
the supply trains there gathered. Imboden with his bri- 
gade, with a battery and infantry, is on Longstreet's right, 
while the brigades of Jones and Robertson hold the moun- 
tain passes in the rear, over which the army must pass. 

The masterful hand of Lee has again gathered his 
strangely attenuated army; and, thus intrenched and 
guarded, Meade now needs to consider if it is yet wise to 
attack him on the 4th, after letting a far easier opportunity 
slip his hand. Yet the opportunity is inviting for the 
Federal commander to move by his left, with purpose so 
to operate against Lee's right flank and rear that his army 
shall be thrown back from the Fairfield road in order not 
only to force it onto a single line of retreat but to give the 
Army of the Potomac the short line, via Hagerstown, in 
pursuit. The Round Tops form an excellent point upon 
which to hinge such a movement, protecting, as they do, 
Meade's lines of communication to Westminster, his base 
of supplies. A deployment of the massing at Meade's cen- 
ter toward his left, would enable him to advance the pre- 
pared troops on his left on such an enterprise to envelop the 
Confederate right resting in the air at the peach orchard. 

As the morning of the 4th breaks, the Federal line is 
astir scrutinizing beyond its front; and on the distant 
ridge the Army of Northern Virginia is discerned present- 
ing its formidable aspect. Is it in order to mask a retreat, 
or to make the dreaded flank movement to the south of the 
mountains toward Washington? Meade and some of his 



238 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

generals are still infected with the belief that Lee's army 
outnumbers the Army of the Potomac, though it is diffi- 
cult to understand this error after the evidence of the three 
days of battle, and when a comprehensive view is taken of 
the entire field of war and the military operations therein. 

In view of Lee's concentration on Seminary Ridge, 
ATeade's movement of his right on the morning of July 4th 
appears strange, if not reasonless. He pushes Slocum, with 
the Twelfth Corps, out on the York road away from the 
enemy and from Howard, with the Eleventh, descending 
into Gettysburg, Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps, moves 
forward on the left to occupy a portion of the battlefield 
of the 2d. These are divergent instead of convergent 
movements, such as the conditions seem to demand ; 
neither do they serve in any manner to develop Lee's posi- 
tion or intentions, nor to harmonize with the evident 
thought of the Federal commander that Lee is about to 
retreat. That this thought is strongly in Meade's mind is 
shown by the fact that he sends his cavalry toward Wil- 
liamsport, the point of Lee's crossing of the Potomac, to. 
occupy the mountain passes in that direction. Buford is 
ordered from Westminster to march on Frederick, Md., 
there to join Merritt, and thence proceed to Williamsport. 
Kilpatrick's two brigades, with Huey's, are set in march 
for Monteray. Mcintosh is at Gettysburg, where he is 
soon joined by Gregg with anothei brigade. 

These several movements of his army indicate that 
Meade has determined that Lee is about to retreat. Why, 
then, does he not move Slocum to his left and thrust for- 
ward a strong turning column from that flank with pur- 
pose to drive back the Confederate right and cut Lee off 
from the Fairfield, if not, indeed, from the Chambersburg 
roads? For it is certain that Lee will not dare to attack 
his center with Howard at Gettysburg, on the flank of 



DEDUCTIONS AND CRITICISMS 239 

such a venture. Nor would such a powerful turning force 
as Meade can easily form with Slocum and the numerous 
troops on his left be placed in any appreciable danger by 
such a movement, while its promise is most brilliant. It 
will at least develop Lee's purpose; and, this once deter- 
mined, the reconnoissance in force would be promptly con- 
verted into a general movement forward by the left, 
wherein the entire army would engage, turning the flank 
of the enemy, to drive him from covering the Fairfield 
road, if, peradventure, Lee could succeed in saving his 
army from surrender. In fact, Meade should be informed 
of the purpose of his antagonist and prepare this move- 
ment by his left to launch at daylight of the 4th, for he is 
in a friendly country where every movement of the enemy 
is observed by many who are anxious for an opportunity 
to report the same to Meade. And, with his enterprising 
cavalry, aside from the usual scouts and spies, there should 
not be the least delay in collecting all needed informa- 
tion. 

Giving all facts and conditions due weight, it is a fair 
conclusion that he is in fatal error in failing to demon- 
strate against Lee's right, holding the Army of the Po- 
tomac in hand ready to move forward in support should it 
develop conditions to warrant an attack. This conclusion 
is further sustained by the fact that should Meade operate 
by his left against Lee's right, he is in better position to 
frustrate any flank movement of the Confederates toward 
Washington if he still has fears in that direction, as he 
will also be in advanced readiness to move against the 
enemy's columns should it be found that they are in re- 
treat. Nor would the lines of the Federal army be placed 
in jeopardy in the improbable event that Meade should be 
repulsed; for in that case his army would naturally retire 
on its base of supplies, covered by the Pipe Creek line. 



240 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Operating in this manner, it appears that all reasonable pos- 
sibilities are provided for, as well as the unreasonable fears 
regarding Lee which Meade has entertained since the re- 
pulse of Pickett, and which still seem to influence him. 

With the dispositions made, as noted, the hostile armies 
observe one another in the sweltering heat until about mid- 
day of the 4th, when Nature — as is her wont after heavy 
cannonading — pours down torrents of refreshing rain, 
cooling and laving the battle-grimed soldiery, the mad fever 
of the wounded, and the long-trenched graves of the dead. 
So mired do the roads become that Meade's army, with its 
artillery and trains, remains stationary, although a similar 
soil does not hold Lee from taking advantage of Meade's 
rain embargo and completing his arrangements for the or- 
derly and unmolested withdrawal and retreat of his army. 

When, on June 28th, General Lee was informed of the 
presence of the Federal army on the near side of the Po- 
tomac, had he ordered a speedy concentration of the Army 
of Northern Virginia on Gettysburg, his corps would have 
been assembled there by the night of the 30th, forestalling 
Meade as master of the field tli rough possession of the 
Cemetery Heights. His dispositions would have been 
such, then, as to have avoided the faulty position into 
which the battle of the ist lured him, if, indeed, Gettys- 
burg would have witnessed any conflict. In this crippling 
position, he erred first in failing to take and occupy Gulp's 
Hill and the Cemetery Heights on the afternoon of the 
1st or in the early morning of the 2d. His next error was 
in making the convergent attack with the widely separated 
wings of his army — a mistake engendered by his faulty 
position. And, conscious of this disadvantage, Lee was 
at fault in failing to closely supervise the battle, and bring 
about the " harmony of cooperation," from which he hoped, 
and from which alone he could expect, success. His frontal 



DEDUCTIONS AND CRITICISMS 241 

attack on the 3d had one chance in ten of success had it 
been of sufficient weight and properly organized. Utterly 
lacking these requisites it was foredoomed, as Longstreet 
knew. Did the impossibility noble Lee attempted to work 
overshadow his towering genius? for never before nor after 
Gettysburg was it obscured. 

The terse remarks of Colonel Henderson, the English 
military authority, are pertinent in this connection : " This 
(Gettysburg) the greatest conflict of the American war, 
was the most prolific of blunders. July 2d presented a 
picture of mismanagement that is almost without parallel. 
Longstreet, ordered to attack in the early morning, did 
not till four o'clock p. m. The attack was disorganized. 
An utter absence of accord in the movement of the several 
commands. Then a double attack with its inevitable diffi- 
culties of unison. 

" There are those who will say, that most of the co- 
operation in battles should be charged to the General rather 
than to the Staff. Lee's concentration (on the field) on 
convergent lines was bad." 

Of the battle of the 2d, Confederate General Kershaw 
says : " There was a lack of cooperation and coordination 
on the part of corps, division and brigade commanders." 
But none of these subordinates were responsible for the 
plan and general supervision of the battle, which are func- 
tions of the commander-in-chief only. 

Colonel Henderson again remarks : " If Lee's Staff 
was thoroughly inefficient at Gettysburg, it was not a few 
months before at Chancellorsville, a far more difficult field 
and maneuver." 

The gravest error committed by General Lee was his 
failure to adopt the flank movement urged by Longstreet. 
While this confined the conflict to Gettysburg, and Lee to 
his defective position, it more vitally involved the southern 



242 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

cause than did tlie battle as fought, for it offered more 
definite results with greater certainty and ease. Tt was 
Lee's simplest but most brilliant operation and such as he 
never before and never thereafter declined. 

After the close of the battle of the 2d, General Lee's 
usually correct judgment was at fault in overestimating the 
advantage of the quite insignificant lodgments made in the 
Federal line. These, apparently, were the main influence 
which led him to renew battle on the 3d, assaulting the 
formidable center of the opposing army. 

The battle of the 3d was confined, practically, to Pickett's 
charge, an undertaking which more than any throughout 
the entire battle of three days, was characterized by weak 
organization and inadequate provision. It is somewhere 
claimed that for Pickett's assault General Lee put thirty 
thousand men at the disposition of Longstreet. But, if so, 
they were nowhere in evidence as troops prepared and ready 
for that work. And Longstreet, knowing this, and con- 
vinced of the hopelessness of the attack, may have thought 
it less than murder to withhold the two unused brigades 
from the slaughter, and for after needs. 

Of this culminating event of the three days of battle, 
Colonel Henderson records his criticism as follows : 
" The attack was poorly organized and launched. The col- 
umn was too weak ; its right and left support badly placed 
and supporting; and no artillery prepared to or did follow. 
There was no continuity; no adequate support, if any, 
massed and ready. For successful attacks it is essential to 
form in three lines with considerable intervals." (Pickett 
was in two lines at close interval.) "Napoleon's maxim, 
* In a decisive attack the last man and the last horse should 
be thrown in,' was wholly disregarded." Federal General 
Doubleday remarks : " Every plan made by Lee was 
thwarted in the most unexpected manner." 



DEDUCTIONS AND CRITICISMS 243 

General Longstreet, under whose immediate orders the 
column was formed, has been blamed for the attack, tlie 
claim being made tliat, under the discretionary latitude 
which may be exercised l)y a subordinate commander, he 
would have been warranted in withholding Pickett. It is 
not to be doubted that Longstreet would have done this 
had he been at a distance from the chief commander and 
acting more on his own responsibility. On tin's point Gen- 
eral Longstreet very properly comments, saying: " When 
your chief is away you have a right to exercise discretion ; 
but if he sees everything you see, you iiave no right to 
disregard his positive and repeated orders. I never exer- 
cised discretion after discussing with General Lee the 
points of his orders, and when after discussing he had or- 
dered the execution of his policy. I had offered my ob- 
jections to Pickett's battle and had been overruled, and I 
was in the immediate presence of the commanding general 
when the order was given for Pickett to advance." Rcdect- 
ing on that day, he says further: "Gettysburg was the 
saddest day of my life. 1 foresaw what my men would 
meet and would gladly have given my position rather than 
share in the responsibility of that day. It was thus I felt 
when Pickett at the head of forty-nine hundred brave men 
marched over the crest of Seminary Ridge and began his 
descent of the slope. As he passed me he rode gracefully, 
with his jaunty cap jerked well over his right ear and his 
long auburn locks, nicely dressed, hanging almost to his 
shoulders. He seemed rather a holiday soldier than a gen- 
eral at the head of a column which was about to make one 
of the grandest, most desperate assaults recorded in the 
annals of wars. The troops advanced in well-closed ranks 
and with elastic step, their faces lighted with hope." 

Dominated by these feelings of assured disaster, which 
were piled upon his previous equally firm belief that his 



244 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

flank operation would insure brilliant victory, end the war 
and insure the establishment of the Southern Confederacy, 
it can scarcely be doubted that cool, deliberate Longstreet 
was influenced against his will, on the 2d and 3d of July, 
and, in consequence, acted with less than his usual deliber- 
ate promptness. He was, in mind and heart, absolutely 
loyal to his loved superior, even when he was called upon 
to enact momentous doings to which his best judgment was 
diametrically opposed, and in the result of which he was 
as much concerned at heart, personally, as his general. 

General Law, writing of Longstreet at Gettysburg, says : 
" As to General Longstreet's disposition and action at Get- 
tysburg, if an opinion were to be formed from his general 
account of that battle, which he published in 1887, the 
general would stand fairly charged with acting in a wrong 
spirit, if not as critically hostile of General Lee and of 
his entire plan of the battle of Gettysburg. But to form 
this judgment of General Longstreet, as being the spirit 
which did actuate him during that battle, would appear 
as being unwarranted and untrue. For, during the years 
intervening between 1863 and 1887, Longstreet had been 
subjected to bitter and evidently unfair criticism for his 
conduct at Gettysburg; and his paper, published in the lat- 
ter year, plainly indicates the effect of this course, as the 
spirit it breathes is so antipodal to that expressed in the 
letters on this subject, written directly after the Gettysburg 
Campaign. 

" It is perhaps fair to believe that unprejudiced history 
will record of General Longstreet that he was so positive in 
his opinion that the movement of the Confederate army 
to its right to interpose between the Army of the Potomac 
and Washington, not only appeared to him as being the 
only hope of success to the Confederates, but that it would 
almost certainly insure a brilliant and commanding victory ; 



DEDUCTIONS AND CRITICISMS 245 

that these convictions were so strong as to cause the com- 
mander of the First Corps to act in a half-hearted manner 
during the battle of Gettysburg; although at that time he 
was perfectly loyal to General Lee, and in his heart meant 
to hold himself subordinate to the plans and orders of his 
Chief, notwithstanding the fact that he was firmly of the 
opinion that General Lee was fatally in error." 

With the defensive character of the Federal battle and 
the compactness of its line of defense, a lesser order of 
generalship may hold its own against a more skillful offen- 
sive, and with less chance of error, once the defensive army 
is in position. It was due to these conditions, perhaps, 
that the errors made by General Meade were few, espe- 
cially as he did not venture to take the offensive from his 
stronghold. 

Previous to the battle, he had his army advancing with 
too wide a front, and from which he would have suffered 
severely had Lee followed up the defeat of Meade's left 
wing on the ist. His next error was his disregard of 
his exposed left flank, which, had it not been offset by 
a greater fault on the part of Lee, would have been fatal 
to the Federal battle on the 2d. And in applying the 
remedy, Meade so completely unmanned his right that for 
hours it was open to any fair enterprise moved to its cap- 
ture. If these were minor faults the same cannot be said 
of Meade's failure to deliver a counter-stroke immediately 
following the repulse of Pickett. Of this Longstreet 
says: "As they (Pickett's wreckage) came back I fully 
expected Meade to ride to the front and lead his forces to 
a tremendous counter-charge." General Lee on the other 
hand, rode to the front, rallying his troops to resist such 
an expected blow. Nor is Meade blameless for not having 
attacked any time thereafter during the 3d and 4th of July. 

Had the Federal commander possessed higher qualities 



246 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

of generalship, the war would have ended at Gettysburg, 
and the humble name of George G. Meade would have been 
placed high in the Order of Fame, and highest among those 
who won lasting renown in our Civil War. For he would 
have defeated the great general of that war not so much with 
the aid of superior position as by the exercise of superior 
ability. Meade may have acted wisest for himself and his 
cause, however, by contenting himself in the safe course 
of, " Well done," and " Let well enough alone." Meade 
at Gettysburg and Grant at Vicksburg gave to the nation a 
new Independence Day. Perhaps additional years of great 
slaughter and suffering were required to teach us needed 
lessons, and eliminate unsoundnesses from the foundations 
of our national life? 



CHAPTER XVI 
lee's retreat 

LEE'S supply trains, assembled at Cashtown during the 
rain of July 4th, draw out in stretching column over 
the Chambersburg pike, creaking under their loads of booty 
drawn by fat Pennsylvania stock; while great droves of 
cattle crowd wonderingly along the roads southward. 
Vehicles of every kind bear the wounded, following on the 
same road. 

Two roads are open to Lee, one to the north, by way 
of Chambersburg, the other and more direct, to the south, 
via Fairfield to Hagerstown. Over the latter the Army of 
Northern Virginia moves on the night of the 4th. Hill 
leads; then Longstreet, followed by Ewell as rear guard. 
This fighting column takes with it only its essential ammu- 
nition and supply trains. Its line of march covers the left 
flank of the column of impedimenta and wounded. The col- 
umn of impedimenta, including ten thousand animals and 
covering sixteen miles, is guarded by infantry, cavalry and 
artillery under command of General Imboden. This pitiful 
train of misery, anguish and death marches in momentary 
expectation of attack. Through the storm and darkness 
of the night, crowded into every description of con- 
veyance, the wounded jolt over the rough and mired road, 
utterly lacking of care, food or comfort. Here and there 
along the moaning column squads of anxious guards, peer- 
ing the blackness, stumble and splash, alert to every sound 
save the groans, prayers and curses of the human wreckage 

247 



248 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

they are risking tlieir lives to safeguard. When break- 
downs and jams occur in tliis train of agony, the Hving 
tumble the dead from the crowded wagons, and they are at 
last freed to rest and to release from pain scattered along 
the roadside. 

While General Lee is thus moving his army in deliberate 
order toward safety, General Meade is in conference with 
his commanders in a second council of war. to which he 
presents these cpiestions : "Must we remain at Gettys- 
burg, or, without waiting for the movement of the enemy, 
undertake to-morrow either a movement on his flank or 
make an attack against his front? If he retires, must we 
follow him directly or try to reach Williamsport in advance 
of him by way of the Emmitsburg road ? " The Federal 
commander is also engaged in a somewhat fear-colored 
telegraphic correspondence with Halleck, who, for the 
President, is urging that Lee's army shall not be permitted 
to escape across the Potomac. The council decides against 
every possible effective operation against Lee, either by 
flank movement, attack, or direct pursuit, and is of divided 
opinion on the remaining questions. Meade thereupon con- 
firms and strengthens the inefficiency of the council by de- 
ciding to do nothing for twenty- four hours ; and, then if 
Lee retreats, to follow on the long or outside line, via Em- 
metsburg, holding course along the southern base of the 
South Mountains. Meanwhile General Lee utilizes the 
precious time in placing his columns at a safe distance; and 
should have his army across the Potomac before it can, by 
any possibility, be overtaken by the Federal army, acting on 
Meade's strange decision of twenty-four hours' delay. 
Surely, under Meade's plan, the Army of the Potomac will 
not prevent the crossing of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia into its own territory. It is within Meade's power, 
however, to interpose a temporary hindrance to Lee's cross- 



LEE'S RETREAT 249 

ing of the Potomac. For, during the period of his com- 
mand of the army, Meade has held the strong division of 
French inactive and useless at l^Vederick, Md. It is but a 
short distance from Lee's bridge at Williamsport, his only 
means of crossing the Potomac at high-water; and Buford 
is moving to join French. Lee's bridge may be destroyed 
before his infantry column can arrive to interfere. But 
French is not moved, and Nature finally interferes, not to 
favor the active and bold, but the dilatory and timid — as 
though to urge the latter from delinquency — and, by a 
sudden rise of the river, destroys the bridge. 

This dire condition confronts Lee when his slightly 
harassed column reaches Williamsport on the 7th. His de- 
feated army in retreat is held on the hostile shore of an 
impassable river where he throws up hasty works across a 
bend in it, presenting a strong front to Meade when, on the 
1 2th, he has the Army of the Potomac scattered about in 
that neighborhood while councils of timidity hold it from 
the attack conditions demand. Meade's pursuit has been 
so dilatory and his inaction at Williamsport so unaccount- 
able that the patience of President Lincoln becomes almost 
exhausted, and he telegraphs his commander that now is 
the time to attack and destroy the enemy before he can re- 
gain his frontier. Quite properly Meade considers this a 
criticism and re(iuests to be relieved of the command of the 
army, when the President in his dilemma explains that 
while no criticism was intended, he again urges attack. 
Meanwhile Ilalleck, the commander-in-chief, remains in 
Washington, four hours distant, " Bent on driving Lee back, 
is full of zeal to drive his army out of Pennsylvania instead 
of intercepting and annihilating the enemy." Almost in de- 
spair. President Lincoln remarks in confidence : " Halleck 
has frittered away time, and dispersed our forces. Nor 
can I learn that he is ever apprised of the weakness of Lee 



250 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

in Meade's front, or ever suspects what is being done. It is 
the same old story of this Army of the Potomac. Imbe- 
cility, inefficiency — don't want to do. Defend the capital. 
It is terrible, terrible, this weakness, this indifference of our 
Potomac generals, with such armies of brave men." When 
asked why he did not remove Meade, he replied : " What 
can I do, with such generals as we have? Who among 
them is better than Meade? To sweep away the whole of 
them from the chief command and substitute a new man 
would cause shock, and be likely to lead to combinations and 
troubles greater than we now have. I see all the difficul- 
ties. They oppress me. The general-in-chief and the Sec- 
retary of War should know who are competent generals 
better than I." The President endured this until he finally 
placed Grant in supreme command in 1864. By the 14th 
Lee has his bridge repaired, and his unmolested army 
crosses into Virginia, to feast and rejoice on the rich loot 
Imboden has awaiting its needs within its frontier at Win- 
chester. 

Lee's invasion has been repelled, and the Gettysburg cam- 
paign, with its momentous possibilities, is finished. And, 
if among these of vast magnitude effected by Meade's vic- 
tory that commander has failed of the greatest, the de- 
struction of the Army of Northern Virginia, and to rank 
himself among the world's great commanders, it is because 
he has not acted on his first and correct impressions at vital 
junctures, — breaking free from Halleck's or other retard- 
ing influence, as he might have done with safety under the 
President's telegrams urging him to the opportunity. The 
most drastic criticism of Meade's pursuit of Lee is due to 
the fact that the latter covered the distance from Gettys- 
burg to Williamsport, with his vast train of wounded, im- 
pedimenta and booty, in three days, while Meade consumed 
six, meanwhile leaving the Confederate army unmolested 



LEE'S RETREAT 



251 



by any retarding force! Varied as are the fortunes of 
war, history scarcely records an instance where a defeated 
army escaped molestation during its retreat ; especially where 
it found its way closed by an impassable river with the vic- 
torious army closed in on it in superior numbers. 

General Meade has done well and nobly, when his lamest 
action is contrasted with that of the controlling military 
mind at Washington. For, even under the hamperings im- 
posed upon him, he has not only defeated Lee's heretofore 
victorious army, but in doing that great feat of arms he 
has also repelled the Confederate invasion and defeated all 
that its success would have accomplished, both at home and 
abroad. He has unwittingly sealed the doom of the 
Southern Confederacy, and defeated those who schemed 
and plotted against the American republic. All thanks, 
then, to General George G. Meade, who, in failing to se- 
cure the essential substance of the Gettysburg campaign, 
thereby missed the personal crown of glory more than once 
offered through the ability of the Army of the Potomac dur- 
ing its continuance. 

By the ist of August, 1863, these two old antagonists 
have maneuvered from the Potomac to the Rappahannock, 
where, in practically the same positions from which they 
entered upon the Gettysburg campaign, they engage in no 
serious enterprise until May, 1864. Meade meanwhile 
makes a fruitless incursion to Mine Run, in the autumn of 
1863, Lee enacting a like return directly thereafter, and 
equally fruitless. Then both armies settle into winter can- 
tonment and rest. 

The Gettysburg campaign, from June 3d to August ist, 
has cost the Army of the Potomac 32,043 men, and the 
Army of Northern Virginia 29,695 men. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE REFLEX 

HAVING followed tlie crest wave of our Civil War 
from its formation to its glorious breaking on 
Cemetery Hill, and trailed its quick back-run to the Rapi- 
dan, let us follow on in rapid skirmish over the fields, val- 
leys, hills and woods of Virginia, wherein were recorded 
the final struggles of the war. 

In the West, fortunately remote from Washington, there 
had grown into victorious command a man of dominant 
generalship which the demands of the war and of the 
people of the North, finally overriding political and politico- 
military ambitions and jealousies, called to the head of the 
Federal armies. The obscure but rising general, Ulysses 
S. Grant, who, as the subordinate of Halleck when he was 
in command of the Middle Department, was disgraced and 
almost driven from the army because he won a victory with- 
out seeking the approval of his superior, had since climbed 
the heights of earned fame up a causeway of unbroken 
victories until he unlocked the Mississippi and clove the 
Confederacy in twain by the capture of Vicksburg. Re- 
turning from thence, he unprisoned the army of Rosecrans 
at Chattanooga and placed W. T. Sherman in command, 
another proven general whose similar experience with Sec- 
retary of War Cameron enabled him to counsel Grant to en- 
dure Halleck and bide his time in the army. 

The Federal War was finally to have the benefit of gen- 
eralship in supreme command of its armies, under the 

252 




GKN. U. S. CKANT 



THE REFLEX 253 

President. Mr. Lincoln called Grant to Washington and 
gladly accepted the wise condition imposed by the latter as 
the one on which he would consent to assume chief com- 
mand, which was that he, Grant, should have command in 
fact, without hampering or interference from any source, 
properly submitting his plans, of course, to the President. 
The necessity for this foresighted wisdom on the part of 
Grant becomes apparent when we read in the official history 
of this time: "One of the considerations which caused 
General Grant to make his headquarters with the Army 
of the Potomac was the political and personal influences of 
various kinds and of various individuals which, centered in 
Washington, had thwarted some generals, and interfered 
with all who had commanded the Army of the Potomac 
since the beginning of the war. It was General Grant's 
duty himself to encounter these difficulties, and to with- 
stand, if he could not prevent, political interference. If 
he remained in the East this was secured ; but with the 
general in chief a thousand miles away, the Government 
might not be able to resist entreaties and threats of inter- 
ested or anxious outsiders, and the best concerted schemes 
might come to naught." 

But even with General Grant close to Washington, and 
by authority of the President, in full command of all the 
armies, the general-in-chief could not get his orders to 
Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley, correctly transmitted 
through his subordinate, Halleck, and the War Office! For 
in his Memoirs, General Grant leaves this condemning 
record against both. He says: " On the 15th of Septem- 
ber, 1864, I started to visit Sheridan in the Shenandoah 
Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive 
him out of the Valley and destroy that source of supplies for 
Lee's army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders 
through Washington to Sheridan to make a move, because 



254 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

they would be stopped there, and such orders as Halleck's 
caution, and that of the Secretary of War, would suggest 
would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contra- 
dictory to mine." 

Should we not be grateful to the noble men who, as 
commanders, subjected themselves and their reputations 
to these positive jeopardies, ceaselessly undermining, stulti- 
fying, and thwarting their orders and best-laid plans? 
They were surely inspired by a feeling more lofty than 
personal ambition, for, under these conditions, they were 
practically certain of being not only thwarted of their laud- 
able ambitions, but of losing whatever reputation they had 
previously acquired. Grant, with his iron will, was law-sent 
to our country's sore need to act against the otherwise un- 
conquerable imbecility in the military conduct of the war 
at Washington. He had already proved himself one of 
the four generals of record who had found it possible to 
hold subordinate commanders to unity and harmony of 
action, both in campaign and battle. Nor in this larger 
field of gigantic war to which he was called did he fail in 
this in any vital respect or instance, where he found it pos- 
sible to place officers of his own selection in command. 

Fixing the 4th of May, 1864, as the date on which the 
Federal armies must be prepared and simultaneously move 
against the enemy in their fronts, he concentrated the Fed- 
eral energy in two armies, that of the West under command 
of General Sherman, and the Army of the Potomac in the 
East, under General Meade, the lesser armies serving as 
auxiliaries to these. He personally directed the campaign 
against Lee and placed himself with the Army of the Po- 
tomac to generally direct its operations. 

The North, awakened into renewed hope and confidence 
by the appointment of this silent, unpretentious victor to 
command its armies, recruited them with energy. Many 



THE REFLEX 255 

of the discharged veterans, volunteers of '61, reenlisted, 
but the majority of recruits were conscripts, A swarm of 
bounty men were also sent to the armies, and, still pur- 
suing the inane policy of the early war-time, many new 
regiments often under officers of little or no experience in 
the field, augmented the Federal armies. While the numer- 
ical strength of the Army of the Potomac was thus vastly in- 
creased, its soldierly and fighting efficiency was by no means 
correspondingly augmented. The wide disparity in num- 
bers of raw and veteran material did not permit the latter 
to quickly mold and toughen the new into effective soldiers. 
Yet it is with this preponderance of raw material, good 
and bad, with which Grant must penetrate an intensely 
hostile territory against the most desperate resistance of 
the yet dominant and formidable veterans of which the 
Army of Northern Virginia is composed, and under the 
command of no less a master of war than Robert E. Lee, 
his army fighting a defensive war on its own ground, where 
every mile gained by its opponent serves to concentrate the 
Confederates and push them nearer to their supplies, while 
the army covering its lines of communication requires no 
detachments to guard them. On the contrary, the invader 
must constantly weaken his effectives by detachments to 
guard his lengthening lines through hostile territory, with a 
corresponding difficulty in supplying his advancing host. 
These last-noted conditions, alone, will diminish Grant's ef- 
fectives on the battle-front thirty per cent, within the first 
month of his proposed invasion, progressing against Lee 
over a most difficult terrain affording every natural advan- 
tage to the defense, and made impregnable against direct 
attack by rough works with which the troops of both armies, 
for the first time, learn to cover themselves against direct 
assault. 



256 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

When Grant crossed the Rapidan River he had : 

Effective combatants 97, ^7Z ^^" 

Absent from colors — details and train- 
guards 19.095 men 

Total men to supply, not including sick and 

arrests 1 16,368 men 

Guns, with 270 rounds of ammunition each 274 

IMPEDIMENTA. 

Artillery carriages, battery wagons and 

forges 657 

Horses for these 6,239 

Vehicles for transport of artillery am- 
munition 609 

Animals for these 3>72i 

Arniy's entire wagon-train, miles long if in 

one line 130 

Miles covered by army in marching order, 

column of fours 31 

Miles of impedimenta to one mile of troops 434 

This Impedimenta illustrates Napoleon's statement that 
" an army moves on its belly." 

The defense operating under average conditions, has an 
advantage of three to one over the offensive force. This 
enormous advantage, however, which should enable Lee 
to defeat Grant if the present relative strength of the re- 
spective armies can be maintained, must ultimately be over- 
come and more than ofifset by the fact that while Grant 
will be able to replenish the enormous losses which he 
must suffer, the inevitable depletion of Lee's army cannot 
be made good because the Confederacy is approaching ex- 
haustion of men and resources. Again, the concert of 
action of all his armies, effected by Grant, precludes the 
Confederate practice of the past of reinforcing one army 




[Ji;U'r.-(iKN.- WILLIAM r. shl.kmax 



aciiiK Page '2i>7 



THE REFLEX 257 

from another not seriously engaged by the Federals in its 
front. 

The enrollment in the Federal armies in April 1864, 
was 603,000 men, of which force one-fourth were non- 
effectives. The losses through the year were made good 
by recruitment. The cost of the Federal war increased 
to the sum of $2,500,000 per day. In the spring of the 
same year, the armies of the Confederacy numbered about 
350,000 men, and through the year their losses were only 
one-half replenished by recruitment. 

On May 4, 1864, the two main Federal armies, with the 
lesser armies, move simultaneously against the Confederacy ; 
that under Gen. William T. Sherman against the Confeder- 
ate army under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, at 
Chattanooga, Tennessee. Sherman drives Johnston back 
to Atlanta, Georgia, disappears into the heart of the Con- 
federacy, and reappears at Savannah, on the Atlantic sea- 
board, thus completing the first stage of perhaps the most 
daring and remarkable invasive campaign which the his- 
tory of war records. From Savannah Sherman moves 
northward, overcoming almost insurmountable obstacles na- 
ture there raised, and in presence of an ever active if not 
strong opponent hanging on his flank, Sherman's purpose 
in marching from Atlanta to Savannah is to break up the 
railways and destroy the arsenals of the Confederacy 
throughout the main zone of its army supply, then to turn 
northward and catch Lee between his army and the Army 
of the Potomac, which is pushing Lee southward. 

Cooperating with the Army of the Potomac is the Army 
of the Shenandoah, first under Sigel and later Hunter, 
operating toward Lynchburg, Virginia, and the railroad 
in the region west of Lee. The Army of the James, under 
General Butler, is to operate against Richmond from the 
south along the James River. Under command of these 



2S8 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

several generals these two auxiliary armies accomplish 
nothing of moment until General Sheridan takes command 
in the Shenandoali, and Butler's force is withdrawn to 
act directly with the Army of the Potomac in command of 
its corps chiefs under personal direction of Grant. The 
remaining auxiliary forces in the trans-Mississippi region 
and along the sea-front do little more than to hold small 
Confederate forces in their front away from concentration 
with Lee and Johnston. 

Thus, for the first time during the three years of war, 
the Federal armies are to combine in action, and over an 
area equal to continental Europe. If this vast enginery 
of war, so widely dispersed, is held to work in harmony, 
the sun of General Grant's generalship will have risen to 
its zenith, to shine upon and guide the Federal armies, 
and the result must be the defeat and collapse of the South- 
ern Confederacy. With the Confederacy overcome, will 
come the rehabilitation of the nation, the firm establish- 
ment of the great republic, finally on the safe and perma- 
nent basis of real unity generated and forged by the fierce 
metallurgy of war, wherefrom a mutually respecting, 
homogeneous people and nation shall emerge. 



CHAPTER XVIII 
as the end approached 

The Wilderness 

ON May 4, 1864, Lee's outposts along the Rapidan 
River are swept back by Grant's ponderous columns, 
as the Army of the Potomac crosses that war-demarcating 
stream with an effective strength of 99,438 men, and 274 
guns.* 

During March Meade had consolidated the Army of the 
Potomac into three corps, thereby seriously affecting the 
esprit de corps, while rendering its units too ponderous 
and unwieldy for proper handling and supervision by a 
single commander, especially in the region through which 
the Army of the Potomac is to operate. These reorgan- 
ized corps consist of the Second under its old commander, 
Hancock, the Fifth under Warren, whom we saw acting 
so wisely on Round Top at Gettysburg, and Sedgwick with 
his old Sixth Corps. The old First and Third Corps are 
scattered among these three. The Eleventh and Twelfth 
are sent west, under Hooker, to win glory with Sherman, 
and with him return to greet their old comrades of the 
Army of the Potomac. 

Immediately following his failure at Gettysburg, Lee 
regained his masterful generalship, and from then until 
the bitter end it constantly gained in grasp and brilliancy. 
During the winter of 1863, compelled to disperse widely 

* Figures of strength, &c., are from Humphreys' " Vircinia Cam- 
paign." 

359 



26o THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

his army for reasons of subsistence, he so disposed it that 
its front, near the enemy, would oppose a stout resistance 
while the distant divisions rapidly concentrated to its re- 
inforcement without impediment over their various avenues 
of approach. These provisions are complimented by the 
fact that the roads from his cantonments converge, through 
open country, on the Wilderness, a vast woods of scrub 
growth penetrated by few and diiTicult roads through which 
an enemy must pass toward his camps if essaying to give 
battle in open country where superiority of numbers will 
awiil most. It is the purpose of Grant to surprise Lee, pass 
the Wilderness and issue from its western margin to give 
battle in the open, before Lee can concentrate and hold him 
to contest in the wild tangle. To defeat this plan and give 
battle where superiority of numbers will be of least value, 
Lee advances into the Wilderness and confronts Grant's 
army with the Army of Northern Virginia, numbering (>i,- 
953 men. 

The proportion between the two armies is affected by the 
addition of Burnside's Ninth Corps of 19,331 men, which 
joins Grant on May 6th, the second day of the first battle. 
The Ninth Corps, however, is not incorporated into the 
Army of the Potomac under Meade's command, but is per- 
sonally directed by Grant. This addition, then, gives Grant 
a total strength of 118,769 men, 316 guns, against Lee 
with 61,953 men, 224 guns. This gives the defense an ad- 
vantage of one to two, instead of the established ratio of 
one defensive equalizing three acting offensively. 

Promptly at midnight of May 4th, the Army of the 
Potomac is in movement crossing the Rapidan on five 
bridges, with its artillery and ammunition trains, and is 
safely bivouacked the same day in Lee's front, having 
marched twenty miles over the few and difticult roads 
of the Wilderness. On the 5th, the army moves out with 



AS THE END APPROACHED 261 

its columns headed southwestward, hoping- to clear the Wil- 
derness, to catch Lee unprepared, and defeat his army in 
detail. That alert commander, however, has, on the 2d, 
observed the activity of his antagonist from his lofty moun- 
tain outlook, and is prepared to countermove in advance, 
to meet Grant while his army is still at a disadvantage in 
the vast scrubby woods. At 8 a. m., of the 4th, the hostile 
skirmish lines engage in the fierce and murderous battle 
of the Wilderness. In this battle campaign which in dura- 
tion, continuous and desperate fighting has, perhaps, never 
before been incident to any war of record, the Army of 
Northern Virginia places hors de combat an army of mcti 
equal to its own numerical strength at the beginning of 
the campaign. For Lee limits his operations to a strict 
defensive, seldom thrusting out even a small column in 
attack beyond his works. The battle is fought in a per- 
fect maze of scrub-growth, brush and vines so dense that 
often the hostile lines are first made aware of the presence 
of each other by a point-blank fire delivered at a low level 
by men prostrate behind rough intrenchments crowned by 
head-logs with space underneath through which to fire. 
So fierce and level is this leaden storm hurled that trees 
two feet in diameter are cut down as though felled with a 
coarse, dull saw. It is found that, during our Civil War, 
a ton of lead was flung to each man killed. This waste 
of ammunition is due to the fact that in battle men stood 
upright, as a rule, and seldom took deliberate aim; but, 
loading and firing rapidly with the old muzzle-loading arm. 
most of the pieces were discharged at a high trajectory and 
the projectile did not enter the hostile line. Not so when 
firing from a prostrate position through a low aperture, as 
delivered through this campaign, especially by the Con- 
federate defense against the necessarily exposed assaults 
by the Federals. The excessive Federal loss during this 



262 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

campaign is mainly chargeable to the level fire of the Con- 
federates from underneath head-logs, and into exposed 
assailing lines hurled against these impregnable covers. 

As the Wilderness battle progresses, here and there the 
dead brush takes fire from the gun-wads, and hundreds of 
wounded men arc burned to death, their agonized shrieks 
blending with the murderous hum and zip of the leaden 
storm racing through the holocaust to add living fuel from 
the fierce lines of combatants, which scarcely give way 
to the licking flames. The utmost care is necessary to 
prevent friendly troops from firing into each other, so dense 
is the smoke-filled thicket. And there are thousands of 
acres of it, penetrated only at wide intervals by rough 
roads and bush paths practically unconnected by crossroads. 
This often makes necessary the cutting of roads for the 
passage of troops, and for the batteries, which find scope 
only from infrequent cleared spots and road intersections. 
So vast is this Wilderness tangle that one hundred and 
eighty thousand men, with their artillery and huge supply 
trains, are swallowed from sight in its labyrinth for days, 
and make their presence known only as they render it a 
roaring inferno of death, their ghostly columns stealing 
through it by night to grapple, fight and die in its day 
gloom, and issue their mangled streams therefrom. Never 
before in the history of war, have armies fought for prin- 
ciple or for empire over such a field ! 

Grant has failed either to emerge to the west of the Wil- 
derness or to surprise Lee, while, on the contrary, Lee has 
confined his antagonist to battle emersed in this wild, where 
superiority of numbers is reduced to the minimum of ad- 
vantage, and where his readily available troops can check 
and hold the Federals while his distant columns there con- 
centrate. Safely ensconced behind their ever-extending 
works, the Confederates slaughter Grant's host while ob- 



AS THE END APPROACHED 263 

serving his brave soldiery prove them impregnable by gi- 
gantic assaults in mass, and by miles of deployed lines, 
hurled against them almost continuously for more than a 
month; until, finally, when last ordered to such an assault 
to be made the following morning, the Federal infantry 
is observed by a staff officer busy writing names and home 
addresses on bits of cloth and sewing these to their blouses, 
so deadly have they proved such work. During this bloody 
period, the Army of the Potomac, ever failing in frontal 
attack, is successively swung to its left in repeated at- 
tempts to flank the Confederates out of their trenches and 
place the Federal army between Lee and Richmond. 
But Lee discovers the purposes of his adversary, and, mov- 
ing on shorter parallel lines. Grant's advanced columns, in 
every instance, find themselves against one of these in- 
trenched lines covering strategic road centers, which, once 
in possession of the Federals, would enable that army to 
interpose between Lee and his capital and source of sup- 
plies, and force him to battle in the open. 

Grant's first objective is Lee's army, Richmond being 
secondary and necessarily incidental to the defeat of the 
Army of Northern Virginia. If, therefore, Grant can 
outflank Lee on his right and thus impinge his army be- 
tween Richmond and her army of defense, Lee will be 
forced to open battle, where there will be fair promise of 
a great Federal victory, and the end of the war. With 
such momentous possibilities in objective, those who think 
to accuse General Grant of wanton disregard for human 
life, may coincide with his wise decision to expend that 
life freely in the delivery of unremitting sledgehammer 
blows in the endeavor to effect the immediate destruction 
of Lee's army, rather than to suffer the dangers from 
Lee's possibilities, to extend over a lengthened period, dur- 
ing which the aggregate expenditure of life and treasure 



264 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

would, of necessity, be enormously augmented. Sharp, 
stupendous war is not only decisive, but it is also preemi- 
nently humane! 

From May 5th to the close of the 7th, terrible battle 
rages. But Lee establishes and maintains his front so 
forcefully that Grant is well-nigh defeated. But instead 
of retreat, he begins a series of flank or turning movements 
to his left to turn Lee's right and force him to open battle 
cut off from Richmond. 

While the Wilderness has been a field of success to the 
Army of Northern Virginia, it has proved fatal to two of 
its most able and renowned generals. Almost on the spot 
where Jackson received his death wound in the Battle of 
Chancellorsville, Longstreet is now so seriously wounded 
as to incapacitate him for duty for many months, when 
his determined skill of war is most needed. 

The following brief pen portraits were recorded by one 
present at this time : 

" After the close of the main fighting on the 7th, there 
is an interval of comparative quiet which is improved for 
rest, not alone by the troops, but by those who direct them. 
An eye-witness records this scene at headquarters : " The 
lieutenant-general, at the foot of a tree, one leg of his 
trousers slipped above his boot, his hand limp, his coat in 
confusion, his sword equipments sprawling on the ground ; 
not even the weight of sleep erases that persistent expres- 
sion of the lip which held a constant promise of something 
to be done. General Meade at the foot of another tree — 
a military hat, with the rim turned down about the ears, 
tapping a scabbard with his fingers, and gazing abstract- 
edly into the depths of the earth through eye-glasses that 
should become historic. General Humphreys — Meade's 
chief-of-staff — a spectacled, iron-gray, middle-aged officer, 
of a pleasant smile and manner, who wears his trousers in 



AS THE END APPROACHED 265 

the manner of leggings, and is in all things independent 
and serene, paces yonder, to and fro. That rather thickset 
officer, with close trimmed whiskers, and the kindest eyes, 
who never becomes harsh or impatient to any comer, is 
Adjutant-General Williams. General Hunt, chief of ar- 
tillery, a hearty- faced, frank-handed man, whose black hair 
and whiskers show the least touch of time, lounges at the 
foot of another tree, holding lazy converse with some of 
his staff. General Ingalls, chief quartermaster of the army, 
than whom no more imperturbable, efficient, or courteous 
presence is here, plays idly and smilingly with a riding 
whip, tossing a telling word or two hither and thither. 
Staff officers and orderlies and horses thickly strew the 
grove. Plans have been made and are ready to be issued 
at dusk which will put the great Federal host in secreted 
night march to the left, hoping to flank Lee. An occa- 
sional stray shell, searching the woods, scarcely disturbs 
the quiet and repose." 

Spottsylvania 

Failing to overcome Lee, Grant during the night of May 
7th slips his first turning column southward past the rear 
of his battle lines, headed for Spottsylvania Court House, 
which strategic point will give him command of the roads 
on Lee's right flank and force his army onto exterior lines, 
leaving the shorter roads to Grant. This will tend to 
force Lee into the open where he can be fought with ad- 
vantage. But Lee has not been asleep. His battalions 
are also hastening southward over more direct roads, and 
are found intrenched at Spottsylvania, ready to deliver 
their leaden compliments to the approaching Federal ad- 
vance. On the 8th, the great battle of Spottsylvania opens, 
continuing almost incessantly and with the utmost fury 
until the 19th. The desperate nature of this contest may 



266 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

be judged by the losses therein suffered. Grant's losses 
are 17,72^ men, of whom the killed and wounded number 
15722. 

Reports, which are fragmentary and incomplete, place 
the loss of the army of Northern Virginia at about 10,000 
men. 

The numerical sacrifice of human life, however, terrible 
as it is, does not equal the loss to the Federal army of one 
life which has issued from its ranks on its long furlough. 
Major-General John Sedgwick, one of its main bulwarks 
for years, the loved commander and father of the old re- 
liable Sixth Corps, is among the dead. Smiling encourage- 
ment to some of his men new to battle, whom he saw dodging 
the bullets that whizzed past, he had just remarked, jokingly : 
" Soldiers, don't dodge bullets. Why, they can't hit an 
elephant at this distance." At that instant a veteran of- 
ficer at his side heard the familiar thud of a bullet, and 
turned to remark it to Sedgwick, who at that moment gave 
him a smile and fell into his arms dead, shot through the 
head. No braver soldier than John Sedgwick ever com- 
manded soldiers. Easily competent to all demands, he 
was ever cool, reliable and safe. Where he commanded 
superior attention was unnecessary, and he had molded the 
grand old Sixth Corps into a living colossus to give and 
take the shock of battle with steady calmness. Every atom 
of his being a soldier, he lacked only personal ambition to 
carry him to supreme command over the army he loved and 
graced; for Sedgwick had the honor of declining the com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac. Perhaps, also, his 
abounding good sense and clear judgment dictated him 
wisely in this, else his keen sense of duty might have 
overstepped his modesty and sense and led him to place 
his marked generalship at the mercy of the hampering fate 
which dwarfed and bound that requisite in most of the 



AS THE END APPROACHED 267 

commanders of the army until Grant assumed command 
on conditions of freedom. A Confederate General said of 
Sedgwick: "He has two mourners, his friends and his 
foe." 

General Wright assumes command of the sad-hearted 
Sixth Corps, which never lost the impress of its revered 
father, Sedgwick. 

During the battle of Spottsylvania one of the two in- 
stances of hand-to-hand combats fought by considerable 
masses during the war was waged most desperately at times 
for days. This occurred at a great salient in Lee's line, 
which by the valorous carnage there wrought, was made 
famous as the " Bloody Angle." At this angle, massed 
divisions, one after another, charged the breastworks de- 
fended by like deployed and massed divisions. Fifty thou- 
sand Federals engaged in its assault and defense against 
the defense and assault of Rodes, Ramseur, Gordon, Mc- 
Gowan, Perrin and Harris aided by two battalions of ar- 
tillery. The line of works was taken and retaken, until 
living columns, moving to death, charged over the works 
amply graded on either side by piled dead. During this 
lengthened slaughter, the fighting lines frequently hugged 
the opposite sides of the works, over which muskets were 
thrust and discharged into the faces of the enemy ; or, 
leaping upon the intrenchments, the bayonet and clubbed 
musket supplanted the execution of hurled lead, while at 
every opportunity the waiting guns plowed and enfiladed 
the rushing masses and lines of flesh and blood ; yet these 
giants of war were the peaceful, kind hearted, laughing 
American boys of everyday home life. What potencies lie 
in wait in the average American! 



268 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Movement to the North Anna River 

While Lee is maintaining the integrity of his position at 
Spottsylvania, Grant, forced to make a movement to his 
left, attempts to outwit the Confederate commander by 
detaching the Second Corps, which he sends toward Rich- 
mond a distance of some twenty miles, as a bait which he 
hopes Lee will attempt to gather before reinforcement may 
arrive to its aid. Hancock is to be rescued by an attack 
from the remainder of the army before Lee can intrench; 
or should he fail to seek Hancock, the latter will become 
the advance of a flank or turning movement. It is thought 
that Lee cannot escape being gored on one or the other 
horn of this baited dilemma. 

Hancock, therefore, moves out on the night of May 20th, 
heading for Milford Station, on the Fredericksburg Rail- 
way, ordered to attack any hostiles he may encounter, and 
to take position on the right bank of the Mattapony River. 
During the night of the 21st, other portions of the Federal 
army are secretly set in motion following Hancock. But 
Lee gains information of this movement, and parallels it 
with a portion of his troops, to be followed by the entire 
army on the 22d. On the 23d, the Confederate army is 
concentrated about Hanover Junction, where it is rein- 
forced by some nine thousand veteran troops, including 
Pickett's famous division, now fully rehabilitated. 

But General Lee is not so eager for Hancock's Corps as 
he is to interpose between the Federal army and Rich- 
mond, at the same time covering one of the main arteries 
of Confederate supply, the Virginia Central Railroad. By 
his movement to Hanover Junction he renders Hancock's 
movement abortive and compels Grant's direct attention. 

After leaving the Wilderness country at Spottsylvania, 
the terram is open, rolling, well intersected by roads. 



AS THE END APPROACHED 269 

This enables the Federal commander to observe closely the 
Confederate movements while concealing his distant 
corps. These are put in motion with instructions to follow 
Lee's movement and bring him to battle. 

The Confederate army, meanwhile, has intrenched itself 
on the south bank of the North Anna River where, on the 
23d, it is found occupying a strong line some three miles 
in length along the cord in a bend of the river against which 
both of its flanks rest. In fact, Lee is fully, prepared and 
waiting for Grant, with infantry and artillery in position 
and well covered by works, while at all river crossings he 
is strongly fortified and in force. His position in general 
conforms to the bend of the river. This convex shape 
compels Grant to extend his front and widely separate 
the wings of his army — conditions not unlike those at 
Gettysburg, with the position of armies reversed and a 
river in front of the Federal line. The 24th is spent by 
Grant in continuing to develop the Confederate position, 
and at all points tested it is reported too strong to attack 
by the considerable columns pushed forward in these re- 
connoissances. After considering these discoveries Gen- 
eral Grant determines that Lee's position is too formidable 
for attack, and prepares for another flank movement to his 
left. But in order to confuse Lee, a division of Federal 
cavalry is sent out on the 26th, to demonstrate on the Con- 
federate left and to damage the Virginia Central Railroad, 
as though to clear the way for a Federal movement by the 
right. Lee's position is so strong, and the conditions are 
so inviting, that, observing the reluctance of Grant, the 
Confederate commander has prepared to attack the divided 
Federal army, and is only prevented by a sudden illness. 

The series of minor engagements incident to the close 
proximity of the hostile armies mark the movement to 
the North Anna with a Federal loss of some 2,100 men, 



270 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

killed, wounded and missing. If the Confederates sufifered 
in proportion, their loss must have been about one thou- 
sand men. 

Cavalry Operations 

On the 9th of May General Sheridan is ordered from 
Aldrich, on the Orange and Fredericksburg Railway, to pass 
Lee's right, destroy the Virginia Central Railway, then ad- 
venture against and if possible into the defenses of Rich- 
mond, and if necessary to push on to Haxall's Landing on 
the James River and there to take supplies and make his 
way back to the main army. In the penetration of the 
enemy's territory, Sheridan passes Lee's right, crosses the 
North Anna River out of reach of hostile infantry, and 
now encounters Stuart. Sheridan continues his advance 
while these two superb cavalry commanders maintain a 
running fight day after day, during which great damage 
is done to the Confederate railways, their locomotives and 
rolling stock, and large quantities of stores are destroyed. 

Stuart operates not only to defeat Sheridan in battle, 
but also to force him away from Richmond. With these 
purposes in view, he concentrates at Yellow Tavern, on 
the Brock pike, six miles from Richmond. Here, on the 
nth, Sheridan attacks and routs his brigades. In this 
contest severe losses are suffered on both sides, and the 
Confederates cavalry suffers the loss of its leader. General 
Stuart. General Lee said of this great cavalry leader: 
" Stuart never left me ignorant of the enemy." 

Pursuing the Confederate squadrons as they retire to- 
ward Richmond, Sheridan's troopers pass within the outer 
defenses of the Confederate capital, being the first and 
last Federal troops to perform that feat until the Army of 
Northern Virginia, its impregnable defense for four years, 
was no more. Demonstrating against Richmond, in aid of 




LIKL'T.-CKX. IMIII.M' II. SI I KK [I ).\.\ 



Facing Page 27o 



AS THE END APPROACHED 271 

a movement of the Army of the James against that city 
from the south, Sheridan arrives at Haxall's Landing, 
where he remains until the 17th, when he starts out to 
rejoin the Army of the Potomac, arriving within its lines, 
near Hanover Junction, on the 24th. 

Cooperative Movement of the Army of the James 
The Army of the James, under command of Major- 
General Ben. F. Butler, consists of two corps, the Tenth, 
under General Gillmore, and the Eighteenth, commanded 
by General Wm. F. Smith, with a cavalry division under 
General Kautz. 

This army numbers, in infantry. . . , 31,872 men. 

Guns, 82 , . 2,126 men. 

Cavalry, 6 guns 4.701 men. 

Total, 88 guns 38,699 men. 

In General Butler is found one of the most eminent ex- 
amples of the " Political General " in high command dur- 
ing the Civil War. At the outbreak of the war, as an am- 
bitious politician of the Democratic Party in Massachusetts, 
he quickly secured rank as a major-general, although he 
was a lawyer without experience or knowledge of the art of 
war. He first secured independent command in the riotous 
city of Baltimore and later at Big Bethel where, in June, 
1861, in an insignificant skirmish, he was ignominiously 
beaten, due to lack of plan or soldierly knowledge. B}; 
issuing his famous order referring to the negroes as " Con- 
traband of war," he attempted at the very outset of his 
adventure in the field of war to make our great national 
conflict serve his personal political ambitions. Later in 
the same year Butler commanded at New Orleans after the 



272 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

taking of that city by Farragut, and administered in such 
manner as to win for him the lasting hatred of its in- 
habitants and the suspiciously derisive smile of all others 
who became acquainted with the real history of his ad- 
ministration. 

We next find him in chief command of the Army of 
the James. Among his subordinates are General Gillmore, 
a West Point man, and General Wm. F. Smith, who, from 
a staff officer at Bull Run, has won his way first to the 
command of divisions in McClellan's campaigns and bat- 
tles, then to the command of a corps under Burnside at 
Fredericksburg; and w'as with Grant in the great battle 
of Missionary Ridge, at Chattanooga, acting to assist 
greatly in making possible that great Federal victory. 
Brigadier Alfred H. Teny, in command of one of But- 
ler's Tenth Corps divisions, also deserves special mention. 
A lawyer before the war, he had taken a lively interest in 
military matters. Entering the army at the outbreak of 
hostilities, during the first year he had w^on to the com- 
mand of a regiment for his action in the capture of a 
Confederate stronghold. Then as brigadier, during 1862- 
63, he served in the operations about Charleston, win- 
ning such distinction for soldierly ability and gallantry 
that he is now found in command of a division in the 
Army of the James. Later, Grant wnW select him to 
command the second, and successful expedition against 
Fort Fisher, the first having ignominiously failed under 
the personal command of Butler. Terry's brilliant victory 
at Fort Fisher wins him promotion to a brigadier's rank 
in the Regular Army. He captures Wilmington, com- 
mands a military department after the war, and becomes 
a major-general in 1886. 

Another man who became a magnificent soldier and 
won his way to high command simply by his soldierly 



AS THE END APPROACHED 273 

ability, without the material aid of politics, was John A. 
Logan. Fighting at the first Bull Run in a minor grade, 
he was promoted to a colonelcy, and won his knowledge of 
war through successive grades until, finally, Sherman found 
him competent to command the Army of the Tennessee 
during his unparalleled campaign from Atlanta to the Sea, 
and from there North. 

In the Confederate army were like spirits. John B. 
Gordon first entered the army as captain of a unique com- 
pany of wild Georgia mountaineers. Under Lee he ad- 
vanced through the various grades until, as a lieutenant- 
general, he became noted as, perhaps, the most energetic 
and daring commander in the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, Jackson and Stuart excepted. Political preferment 
succeeded his soldierly achievements. Logan forgot the 
politician in the soldier. Gordon and Terry were types 
of the non-political citizen-soldier. The three well serve 
as examples of soldierly men, laudably ambitious, but 
declining to use other than their developed ability for 
command wherewith to gain command. They were too 
honest, patriotic, and wise to seek positions which they 
were not competent to fill — and in which they would do 
great harm, both to their cause, and to themselves, by the 
certain display of their incapacity. General Sherman be- 
spoke a requisite of war in saying: "I want officers who 
know how to and will obey orders." 

In great war, our armies will ever be composed of citi- 
zen-soldiers. Hence it is not amiss that we give the points 
here introduced earnest thought in order that the experi- 
ence of the past shall guide us in the future; that it shall 
lead the people to aid their President-commander-in-chief 
in this direction, by requiring that none but educated sol- 
diers and those who have first won in the profession of 
arms shall be commissioned as generals in our armies. Let 



274 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

the citizen demand, in this respect, so fortify the Executive 
against the politician that, in future, generalship such as 
Smith's, Gillmore's and Terry's shall not be used as a step- 
ping-stone by incompetent ambition ! 

Grant had informed Butler that his objective was Rich- 
mond, and had instructed him to move the Army of the 
James on May 4th and to take and intrench City Point on 
the James River. From thence Butler is to operate on the 
south side of the James against Richmond from the south, 
cooperating with the Army of the Potomac advancing from 
the north, and is to act so aggressively that reinforcements 
from the defenses of Richmond cannot be sent to Lee. 
In doing this, he is closely to invest that city on the south, 
gaining ground to his left until his flank shall rest on the 
James above Richmond, if possible. There the Army of 
the Potomac will connect with that of the James if the 
former succeeds in throwing Lee back from his capital. If 
not successful in this, the two armies will unite to the east 
of Richmond. 

On the morning of the 6th Butler disembarks his army 
from transpoits at Bermuda Hundred, the next day ad- 
vancing some five miles and intrenching. On the 5th Gen- 
eral Kautz, with his cavalry, sets out from Suffolk, Va., 
to cut the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad and delay its 
traffic of supplies and troops to Richmond. Moving rap- 
idly, on the 6th Kautz cuts the Norfolk and Petersburg 
Railway and the telegraph line. On the 7th his troopers 
destroy a bridge on the Weldon Railway at Stony Creek, 
where he learns that three trainloads of Confederate troops 
have just passed north, and that five more trains are due 
there the same evening. Destroying another bridge over 
the Nottoway Creek, Kautz arrives at City Point on the 
loth, as his force is not adequate to contend with the Con- 
federates gathering to defend the railways. But the de- 



AS THE END APPROACHED 275 

struction of the bridges delays the arrival of reinforcements 
to Beauregard, in command of the defenses of Richmond, 
until the 12th, 

The force available to oppose Butler's 38,699 men and 
88 guns consists of 6,000 men and a few guns, more or 
less intrenched. On the 7th Kautz develops the fact that 
Beauregard is receiving reinforcements, and Butler has sent 
his cavalry on raid for the very purpose of interrupting 
their arrival. By the nth, these reinforcements have ar- 
rived to increase Beauregard's force to 19,000 men; and, 
on the 15th, it numbers 24,000 men exclusive of those held 
in the defenses of Richmond. 

Butler's landing is effected as a surprise, and, under the 
circumstances, necessarily in front of a weakly guarded 
point ; while along his near front run lines of communica- 
tion vital to the Confederates. Yet, instead of promptly 
sending out a reconnoissance in force with ready support 
to make and hold lodgment, one brigade marches out and 
back, reporting the enemy, whereupon Butler lies safe un- 
til the 9th, though it is confirmed that reinforcements are 
arriving. His opponent thus has ample time in which to 
gather an effective defense, if not to take the offensive and 
neutralize the Army of the James, for it is intrenched across 
a narrow neck in a sharp bend of the river, where a mimi- 
mum force with artillery, counter-fortified, can hold these 
much-needed tens-of-thousands useless. 

The left of Butler's intrenched line rests on the Appo- 
mattox River. Both Gillmore and Smith now urge him 
to cross that stream with sufficient force to operate to the 
south of Petersburg, to the destruction of the railways 
Kautz has damaged, thus cutting off reinforcements while 
he captures Petersburg, itself, before sufficient reinforce- 
ments can arrive to offer a successful resistance. The 
probabilities are all in favor of this operation, the vital 



2^6 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

importance of which, the possession of Petersburg, is later 
proved by a year of ceaseless siege and battle by the com- 
bined armies of the Potomac and James. But Butler, un- 
able to comprehend that Grant's instructions will be more 
effectively followed, and the enemy more effectually weak- 
ened by this larger operation, advised by Smith and Gill- 
more, on the 1 2th again moves out against the Railway, 
and by the 15th has his army facing the Confederate de- 
fense to the south of Richmond, ready to assault. But 
when thus in position, there are no troops available with 
which to make the proposed attack, for the enemy has been 
given ample time to gather a formidable force behind their 
ready outer defenses about Richmond. Butler has counted 
on the cooperation of Admiral Lee's flotilla, moving up 
the James to engage the powerful Confederate batteries on 
commanding bluffs along its course, the destruction of which 
is imperative to the safety of the right flank of the land 
force. But his plan places the army beyond help from the 
navy, mainly on account of the difference between the 
depth of the river and the draft of the vessels. 

The commander of the Army of the James now finds 
himself confronted by a force of some 24.000 infantry, 
artillery, and cavalry, protected by a formidable line of 
works which completely command the open country along 
its front. From his safe position Beauregard can safely 
issue an attack against his opponent's weak line, especially 
so on the right, a mile from the river and without strong 
ground to rest upon. And further, the Army of the James 
has become so reduced by detachments, in the main useless, 
that it is practically equaled in numbers by the Confederates 
ensconced behind their impregnable works. Butler has 
therefore succeeded in defeating himself before he has had 
a chance to fire or receive a shot, and Beauregard has only 
to overcome the dispersed resistance of an equal number of 



AS THE END APPROACHED 277 

dispirited men whose main thought is how best to extricate 
themselves from the trap their commander has finally suc- 
ceeded in setting for them. In order to understand more 
completely the position in which this unfortunate army finds 
itself, it is only necessary to examine the field to determine 
that Butler cannot assault Drury's BlufT with his right. He 
cannot turn the Confederate position, nor scarcely make 
a feint attack; while he cannot fall back to Bermuda Hun- 
dred, or any other position, without abandonment of his 
campaign against Richmond before he has fired a shot, 
even if able to withdraw his army without disaster. Butler 
has already bound and chained himself from offensive ac- 
tion. Had he moved as Smith and Gillmore urged, im- 
mediately following the intrenchment of his position at 
Bermuda Hundred, Petersburg must have fallen into his 
hands if assailed with skill and energy, six thousand men 
being the only force available for its defense at that time. 
With this strategic point in his possession, a small fraction 
of his army behind its prepared defenses could have held 
in check many times their number arriving from the south, 
even as Lee held Grant later, leaving the large portion of 
the Army of the James free to more closely invest Rich- 
mond on the south, and to extend its line to the James, 
above that city, as Grant had proposed. This done, Butler 
would have then also cut the Richmond and Danville Rail- 
way, entering Richmond from the southwest, thus com- 
pletely isolating Richmond and with it Lee's army from 
most direct communication with the south, their source of 
supplies and reinforcement. 

Observing the Army of the James in its anomalous po- 
sition, and fearful that Sheridan may return and operate 
to the north of Richmond, Beauregard makes ready to at- 
tack Butler's right on the following day, with the purpose 
of cutting his army ofif from its base at Bermuda Hundred 



278 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

and capturing it. For this purpose he has 22,000 men with 
artillery and cavalry. A bright moonlight on the night of 
the 15th facilitates the movement of the Confederates into 
position. But as day wakens a dense fog rises so blinding 
that anything like certainty of movement is impossible. 
Advancing, however, the Confederates strike Smith's ex- 
posed flank, and, after a long and stubborn resistance in 
the darkness, he retires his right, fearing that it will be 
completely turned. The fog finally lifts, and the disorgan- 
ized lines of the combatants are reorganized, when the battle 
is renewed along the entire line, continuing with varying 
success well into the afternoon. But Beauregard is not 
successful in cutting the Federals off from their base, as 
one of his divisions fails to come into action against Smith's 
right. This enables the Army of the James to maintain 
its integrity until evening, when Butler withdraws behind 
his intrenchments across the neck of Bermuda Hundred. 
Beauregard counter-fortifies, and Butler is " bottled up," 
as Grant pertinently remarks. In drawing his line close 
in, Beauregard brings on a sharp engagement the result 
of which is to completely seal the country outside of his 
" bottle " to the general commanding the Army of the 
James. 

The sum total of Butler's campaign, in benefit to the 
Federal war, is the part performed by Kautz with his 
cavalry, acting independent of other than general orders; 
for he has done much temporary damage to railways and 
destroyed large quantities of Confederate stores. As a 
priceless ofi^set to this repairable loss, the Army of the 
James is reduced by 4,200 men, killed, wounded and missing 
while the Confederates lose 2.884 rnen from the same 
causes. Besides this fatality to life, Butler's failure has 
cost his government far more than the material loss he has 
inflicted on the Confederacy. After the war Butler in Con- 



AS THE END APPROACHED 279 

gress engages to kill off some of Grant's paroled Confeder- 
ates, until notice is given by Grant that the parole given by 
him " shall be held inviolate if another war is necessary to 
uphold it." General Pickett is among those w^ho are thus 
safeguarded. Such was Ben. Butler, as a general and man. 

On the 22d, Grant learns of Butler's fiasco and thereupon 
orders him to retain sufficient troops to hold City Point, 
and to send the remainder, under Smith, to join the Army 
of the Potomac. It becomes necessary for Grant to repeat 
this order on the 25th, in which he directs that Smith em- 
bark at once and land his troops at White House on the 
Pamunkey River. Taking Brookes' division of his own 
corps, and those of Devens and Ames, of the Tenth, Smith 
embarks 16,000 men, sixteen guns, and a squadron of cav- 
alry on the 29th. Butler retains 10,000 infantry and 4,600 
cavalry. Beauregard holds 9,000 infantry and a small 
brigade of cavalry with which to hold Butler within his 
bottle, and sends the remainder of his force to Lee, Pick- 
ett's division among them. 

On the evening of May 26th, the Army of the Potomac 
begins withdrawal from Lee's front and is on march to 
cross the Pamunkey River in the vicinity of Hanover Town, 
thirty miles south, and seventeen from Richmond. The 
advance, Russell's division of the Second Corps, is cur- 
tained by Sheridan's cavalry on its forced march to Han- 
over Town. The final withdrawal of the Federal army is 
effected in the intense darkness of the night of the 27th, 
and it is hoped, without the knowledge of the enemy. At 
9 A. M. of the same day Sheridan has reported that his cav- 
alry occupies Hanover Town, with detachments along the 
road as far as Atlee's Station, on the Virginia Central Rail- 
way, ten miles from Richmond. Meeting with slight re- 
sistance, Russell reports his division across the Pamunkey. 



28o THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

This movement of the Army of the Potomac is evidently 
of vital importance for the nearness of Hanover Town to 
Richmond prevents further left flank operations by Grant 
to impinge between Lee and his capital, if this one proves 
unsuccessful. This is, then, in the nature of the final move- 
ment of the campaign, unless results of the fierce battle 
which under these conditions, must be fought here, compel 
its continuance into a second stage. The probability of a 
desperate battle being waged here lends special interest to 
the prospective field. Within its natural compass, several 
considerable streams meander through numerous swampy 
stretches. This feature gives additional importance to the 
main pikes and network of connecting roads. The prin- 
cipal pike from Lee's position on the North Anna, coursing 
to White House on the Pamunkey, intersects Hanover 
Town. The latter place either commands or threatens the 
principal roads into Richmond. H Grant can occupy and 
hold command of these roads, he finally will have accom- 
plished his purpose to outflank and throw Lee back from 
Richmond, defeat him, in all probability, and hold the Con- 
federate capital at his mercy; if, indeed, such a result does 
not close the war. That Grant will do his utmost to ac- 
complish, and Lee to defeat, this scheme is a certainty, and 
the grapple will be terrific. 

Near noon of the 28th, Wright's Sixth Corps has passed 
the Pamunkey, and is in position across the Hanover Court 
House road at Crump's Creek. Closely following, the Sec- 
ond Corps forms on the left of the Sixth, completing the 
covering of this road to Haw's Shop. The Fifth Corps 
is in position with its right on the railroad two miles in 
front of Hanover Town, and its left contiguous to the 
Totopotomoy crossing of the road from Haw's Shop to 
Old Church. At midnight the Ninth Corps crosses the 



AS THE END APPROACHED 281 

Pamunkey at Hanover Court House, Wilson's cavalry re- 
maining on its north bank until the morning of the 30th, 
to cover the crossing of the trains. 

On the morning of the 28th, Sheridan demonstrates from 
Hanover Town toward Richmond, and beyond Haw's Shop 
encounters the Confederates in force and lightly intrenched. 
A hard-fought cambat lasts until evening, when the Con- 
federates are driven back. From prisoners Sheridan learns 
that the corps of Longstreet, now commanded by Ander- 
son, and that of Ewell are four miles from Haw's Shop: 
hence Lee's army is up in force, and Grant did not quit 
Hanover Junction unobserved, as he had hoped to. 

On the morning of the 27th, Lee becomes convinced that 
the Army of the Potomac is withdrawing and in movement 
southward. He therefore sends his cavalry in the direction 
of Hanover Town to peer the enemy's movements, and 
began to move his army to Ashland, fourteen miles north 
of Richmond, an important road center. During the after- 
noon of the 28th Ewell's Corps, now under Early, has 
marched twenty-eight miles and is now in position at Hart- 
ley's Corners, at the intersection of the roads from Han- 
over Town and Richmond, his right on Beaver Dam Creek 
near Mechanicsville, his left on the Totopotomoy, four 
miles from Haw's Shop. Here Early faces the Federal 
Fifth Corps. Meanwhile, Anderson's Corps has taken po- 
sition on the right of Early between Huntley's and Walnut 
Grove Church, covering the road from White House on 
the Pamunkey, via Mechanicsville to Richmond. Hill's 
Corps, with Breckinridge, extends from Early's left across 
the railway a mile north of Atlee's Station. Lee's cavalry 
is at Haw's Shop and Hanover Court House. Lee, there- 
fore, is covering the very roads the Army of the Potomac 
is on, and Grant has again failed to outflank him. These 
masterful commanders, then, have again moved and ar- 



282 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

rayed their hosts for battle, and in positions which both 
must exhaust every means to secure. 

General Grant, never given to temporizing measures or 
to procrastination, on the morning of the 29th orders the 
commanders of the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps to re- 
connoiter their fronts, supporting with their entire forces. 
Warren, with the Fifth, pushes out on the Shady Grove 
Church road; Hancock, over the roads from Haw's Shop, 
via Atlee's Station toward Richmond, and Wright, with 
the Sixth, moves toward Hanover Court House. The 
Ninth Corps with Burnside, is in reserve near Haw's Shop. 
Sheridan, with the divisions of Torbert and Gregg, is on 
the left of the army in observation on the roads to Mechan- 
icsville, Cold Harbor and White House. The leading di- 
vision of the Fifth Corps — Russell's — meets with strong 
opposition in its advance to Hanover Court House. Bar- 
low, wounded at Gettysburg, now of Hancock's Corps, 
meets only outposts until he reaches the railway crossing 
of the Totopotomoy, where he encounters the Confederates 
in force, intrenched, and the skirmishers hotly engage. 
Birney is advanced to extend Barlow's right; while, on the 
morning of the 30th, Gibbon's division moves up on his 
left, and to the left of the Richmond road. The Second 
Corps is in front of the Confederate right, consisting of 
Anderson's Corps, the left of Early's, and Breckenridge. 
Grififin, leading Warren's advance along the Shady Grove 
Church road, encounters infantry pickets, which retire. 
Cutler's division moves up in support of Griffin. The 
Ninth Corps is held in reserve between the Fifth and Sixth. 
The reconnoissance has developed the fact that the Army 
of Northern Virginia is in Grant's front and strongly in- 
trenched, ready to contest the right of way over the roads 
along which the Army of the Potomac is moving toward 
Richmond in order to engage Lee's army, Grant's objective. 



AS THE END APPROACHED 283 

During the respite before the grapple it is enlightening of 
army Hfe to note a group of officers gathered at an im- 
promptu dinner after days of separation amidst war's 
jeopardies. They are in the shade of a bit of woods be- 
tween the hostile batteries. Growing jolly, as befitting the 
occasion, they fill the air with Federal war songs, which 
causes the Confederate gunners to send their compliments 
searching the trees above for the songsters. Nor do these 
birds cease warbling until compelled by their own artillery- 
men beyond, who are receiving most of the Confederate 
tokens of regret over not being invited. 

The Battle of Cold Harbor 

On May 30th Barlow's skirmishers open another great 
battle of the series. Grant moves his infantry close in to 
the Confederate line, and directs Wright to move up on 
Hancock's right, from Hanover Court House, and endeavor 
to place his corps across Lee's left flank. The Sixth Corps, 
in executing this order, finds itself in swampy tangles which 
hold it from arriving to do effective work on Hancock's 
right during the day. Meanwhile skirmishers of the latter 
capture the enemy's intrenched skirmish line, while bat- 
teries are being placed which silence Lee's guns. 

Burnside has a sharp skirmish while moving the Ninth 
Corps into position ; but by evening he is established across 
the Totopotomoy; his right resting on that stream near 
the Whitlock House, his left near the Shady Grove Church 
road. Warren, advancing on his road with Griffin's di- 
vision supported by Crawford and Cutler, drives the Con- 
federate skirmishers until they pass a stretch of swampy 
ground behind which Early's Corps is intrenched in the 
vicinity of Huntley's Corners, on the Old Church and Me- 
chanicsville pike. Warren's advance is in ceaseless skir- 
mish with cavalry, and from this it is reasoned that Lee's 



284 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

infantry is not in his front. But Early has moved his 
right along this same road to Bethesda Church, and is, 
this afternoon, across Warren's flank, who has but one 
brigade in support of his skirmishers. When his advance 
reaches Bethesda Church it is assailed and quickly driven 
by Rodes' division, which follows the Federals to Shady 
Grove Church. Here the fire of a Federal battery checks 
the Confederates until the remaining brigades of Crawford 
and Cutler arrive and repulse Rodes after a stubborn com- 
bat. Early's brigades then withdraw a short distance cov- 
ering the Mechanicsville road. To relieve Warren, Hancock 
advances Barlow at 7 p. m., and gallant Brooke, ever ready 
and able, attacks through the darkness with his brigade. 
His advance is over obstacles which, says Hancock, 
" would have stopped a less energetic commander," and at 
7 140 he has captured the enemy's first line of rifle-pits, 
when Meade orders the attack to cease. 

When Early advanced against Warren's left, Anderson's 
Corps assumed its vacated position at Huntley's Corners. 
Lee is thus massing heavily on his right, evidently with 
purpose to throw back Grant's left and drive him away 
from the roads to Richmond, while the purpose of the 
latter is exactly the reverse. With such disputants to 
argue, the debate must be long and heated. Anderson is 
posted with Pickett's division on his right, Field in his 
center, and Kershaw on his left. Some cavalry is also 
on this flank along the road from Old Church to Cold 
Harbor, near the crossing of the Matedequin. This cav- 
alry is attacked by Sheridan about one o'clock, p. m., and 
is driven into Cold Harbor. Torbert's division remains 
and holds the ground within one and one-half miles of 
this point. Wilson's cavalry division, from the Federal 
right, is destroying bridges and railroads. At noon of the 
30th, Smith's Corps, from Bermuda Hundred, begins to 



AS THE END APPROACHED 285 

arrive at White House, on the Pamunkey. The next day- 
he is to move up the south bank of that stream, where his 
force will be exposed to any sudden dash from the Confed- 
erate right. Sheridan, therefore, is directed to keep a sharp 
lookout toward Cold Harbor and on the Alechanicsville 
road; also to send a brigade of his cavalry to Smith on 
the morning of the 31st. Lee, however, does not learn 
of Smith's arrival until June ist, when this corps is first 
met in battle at Cold Harbor. 

On the 31st, Grant presses against the Confederate line 
as close as is possible without bringing on a battle. He 
finds Lee's position so strong naturally and so formidably 
intrenched and manned, that an assault is not attempted, 
but his skirmishers are held close up, and an attack is 
threatened. Sheridan, finding Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry di- 
vision at Cold Harbor preparing to attack, anticipates him 
with Torbert's troopers, who possess themselves of that 
place, where they are reinforced by Gregg's division. 
Near dark Lee returns with Hoke's infantry division in 
support, and Sheridan orders his cavalry to withdraw be- 
cause of lack of ammunition. But Meade directs him to 
hold the position at all hazards ; and Sheridan remains, 
strengthening his works during the night. General Lee is 
beginning to press forward with his right, pursuing his 
purpose to drive the Federal left away from Richmond 
by gaining possession of the roads vital to Grant's plan of 
operations to his left. On this same day, Wilson, on the 
Federal right, gains possession of Hanover Court House, 
and Sheridan's brigade, sent to White House, returns, re- 
porting that Smith was still disembarking, and that no 
enemy was found in that direction. 

Meanwhile Lee continues secreted preparation on his 
right. Early's Second Corps is shifted somewhat toward 
the left, and Anderson's, on Early's right, extends the Con- 



286 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

federate line still farther in that direction. Hoke's divi- 
sion is on the extreme right, near Cold Harbor, fronting 
Sheridan, as seen. Kershaw is one mile north, at Beu- 
lah Church. Pickett on the left reaches to Walnut Grove 
Church road, while Field's division holds the left of the 
First Corps on the Mechanicsville pike. This line is 
partly intrenched; and from behind it the intention is to 
launch a movement in force from Anderson's right toward 
Cold Harbor and Beulah Church, to be made by Hoke and 
Kershaw on the morning of June ist. 

While Grant knows, through Sheridan, that Hoke is 
near Cold Harbor, he is not aware that Kershaw is near 
him, nor that Anderson's Corps has been shifted to Early's 
right, and in position between Cold Harbor and Beulah 
Church. The demonstrated strength of Lee's line in front 
of Hancock compels Grant to seek a vulnerable point; 
and, being in conformity with the direction of his course 
and plan, he determines to send two corps to Cold Har- 
bor, and from that point attack the enemy before the latter 
has time to discover the movement and intrench. Wright, 
therefore, is ordered from the Federal right to Cold Harbor 
on the left, fifteen miles distant, and is directed to hasten his 
march during the night of the 31st, in order to arrive to 
Sheridan's aid at daylight of June ist. It is assumed tliat 
at that time Lee's cavalry and Hoke's infantry will attack 
him. The route of the Sixth Corps is through a strange 
country with intricate roads, which so delay its march that 
the entire corps is not in position in the vicinity of Cold 
Harbor until 2 p. m., June ist. 

General Smith lands his Eighteenth Corps of 12,500 
men and sixteen guns at White House by 3 p. m. of the 
31st; and, leaving Ames with 2,500 men to guard that land- 
ing, he is at Bassett's, near Old Church, with 10,000 men 
and all his artillery, by ten o'clock the same night. The 



AS THE END APPROACHED 287 

next morning he receives an erroneous order from Grant's 
headquarters which takes him to New Castle Ferry, instead 
of to Cold Harbor, as is meant, and where he is expected 
to take position between the Fifth and Sixth Corps. This 
mistake causes him to lose five hours, besides subjecting 
his already weary troops to many miles of extra and rushed 
marching; and as yet the Eighteenth Corps is not tough- 
ened to the pace of the Army of the Potomac. 

In the meantime Wright is still distant from Sheridan, 
who is left alone to hold Cold Harbor against an over- 
powering force. On the morning of June ist, Hoke, who 
is in contact with Sheridan, does not attack, but Kershaw, 
coming later to this work with two brigades, is repulsed 
by the rapid fire from the new repeating carbines of Sheri- 
dan's troopers and from his artillery. This gives Sheridan 
a respite until nine o'clock, when Wright's Corps be- 
gins to arrive. He then moves off toward the Chicka- 
hominy River to cover the Federal left. Sheridan has 
made a fine display of the unique use of American cavalry, 
intrenched and holding ground against infantry and ar- 
tillery. Observing Wright's heavy columns in their front, 
Kershaw, Pickett and Field close in to their right on 
Hoke, with Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry beyond Hoke on the 
extreme right. Warren, seeing this movement of Ander- 
son's troops in his left-front and beyond, deploys two di- 
visions, with orders from Meade to attack. But these 
troops are delayed by swampy ground, Anderson's move- 
ment is completed with his brigades behind formidable in- 
trenchments before Warren arrives to assault, and it is 
abandoned. 

At 2 p. M. the Sixth Corps is all up and in position cov- 
ering the roads to Cold Harbor from Bethesda Church, 
New Bridge and Despatch Station, near the Chickahominy, 
on the York River Railway. At six o'clock Smith is also 



288 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

in position on the right of the Sixth Corps, and has orders 
to cooperate with Wright in his proposed attack. Grant is 
thus estabHshed at the strategic point, Cold Harbor, which 
would have easily been in Lee's possession had Hoke, sup- 
ported by Kershaw, attacked Sheridan with promptness 
and vigor early in the morning. 

After nearly four days spent in observing, fencing, 
skirmishing and adjustment, the foot-weary hostiles have 
ceased marching and are in readiness to grapple in fierce 
battle. The full-manned lines are but fourteen hundred 
yards apart, with open ground between. The Confeder- 
ate skirmish line is in a strip of wood some three hundred 
and fifty yards in advance of their main line, which crosses 
the road from Cold Harbor to the Richmond road. Hoke's 
division, the Confederate right, has its left resting near 
this road, Kershaw on his left, then Pickett and Field. 
Opposed to these divisions of Anderson's Corps, the Sixth 
Federal is arrayed — Ricketts' division on the road from 
Cold Harbor to the Richmond pike, defended by Hoke. 
Russell is to the left of Ricketts, then Getty's division — 
Neill commanding — with Neill's brigade on the extreme 
left, and refused. Smith, with the Eighteenth Corps, con- 
nects with the right of the Sixth in the order of Brookes, 
Devens. and Martindale, the last division refused and hold- 
ing the road from Bethesda Church toward Mechanicsville. 
At 6 p. M. Wright and Smith advance against a heavy 
musketry and artillery fire, and Ricketts penetrates the 
Confederate line through a slight gap left between Hoke 
and Kershaw-. He carries the main line of intrenchments, 
compelling Anderson to send aid, when a new line is 
formed in rear to cover the breach. Russell and Xeill 
maintain alignment with Ricketts, Russell's right brigade^ 
entering the breach with Ricketts' men: but Neill's left 
does not become heavily engaged. The Eighteenth Corps 



AS THE END APPROACHED 289 

at the same time crosses the open ground under a heavy 
fire, captures the enemy's advanced line in the wood, and 
charges up close to the main works. Finding these too 
strong to carry, the assailants retire and hold the line in 
the wood, which they immediately strengthen. Smith's 
right, across the Beulah Church road near the church, has 
its skirmishers and artillery ceaselessly engaged during 
the remainder of the ist. 

This initial advantage to the Federals, however, has cost 
them heavily : the Sixth Corps, in killed and wounded, 
1,200 men; the Eighteenth, 1,000. In the afternoon, Han- 
cock is ordered to march during the early night in order 
to reinforce Wright's left in the morning, when it is pro- 
posed to make a general attack along the entire front of 
the army. Wright and Smith are to act in conjunction; 
Warren will attack supported by Burnside. But Smith is 
out of ammunition; and his troops, unaccustomed to long 
marches and quick succeeding battle, are exhausted from 
their exaggerated march from White House and their 
splendid fighting. In consequence, the attack is postponed 
till 5 A. M. on the 2d. 

Sheridan, relieved by Wright at Cold Harbor, takes 
position farther to the left, guarding that flank of the 
army. Wilson, on the right, has had a sharp engagement 
with a large force of Confederate cavalry under General 
Wade Hampton, now commander-in-chief of Lee's cavalry 
in place of Stuart. Hampton is wounded, but drives Wil- 
son, who leaves behind two railway bridges and consider- 
able track destroyed. 

During the night bonfires and cheering break out along a 
section of the Confederate line, when Grant learning the 
cause, remarks to Ingalls, "Why can't we light up too?" 
Soon corresponding fires blaze along the Federal front help- 
ing Pickett's men celebrate the birth of an heir to their 



2go THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

loved commander. In due time a silver service goes through 
the lines marked, George E. Pickett, Jr., from U. S. Grant, 
Ingalls and others. 

On the morning of the 2d, Warren extends his left to 
connect with Smith, and contracts his right until it rests 
near Bethesda Church, doing this in such manner as to 
leave one-half of his corps available for attack. His posi- 
tion has a development of about three miles, by using ar- 
tillery to form his left and by utilizing the numerous 
swamps of the Matedequin. Burnside withdraws and 
masses the Ninth Corps in Warren's right-rear. Wilson 
covers the right of the Federal line, operating from Be- 
thesda Church to the Pamunkey against the main body of 
Lee's cavalry. Sheridan has in his front on the left Fitz- 
hugh Lee's division. Hancock's night march has been de- 
layed by intricate roads, heat and dust, to such an extent 
that his columns arrive at Cold Harbor at about 6 130 on 
the morning of the 2d. At 7.30 a. m., after a brief rest 
and breakfast, they are in line, having formed under a 
brisk skirmish fire. Gibbon is across the road from Cold 
Harbor to Despatch Station, Barlow on his left. Birney's 
Division is left with Smith. A slight shifting of divisions 
is made in the Sixth and Eighteenth Corps, all of which 
goes on under a lively fire of skirmishers. 

Grant has thus shifted his army somewhat to his left 
and has it in position ready to attack. But a month of 
ceaseless fighting by day followed by night marches be- 
gins to affect his troops who are operating in the increas- 
ing heat. The attack proposed for 5 a. m. on the 2d is 
therefore postponed to 4.30 a. m. on the 3d. the corps 
commanders meanwhile making every preparation to be 
ready. 

Nor has General Lee been idle, for, observing the Fed- 
eral movement to the left, he has also extended and massed 



AS THE END APPROACHED 291 

heavily on his right. Beginning on the morning of the 2d, 
Breckenridge moves into position on high ground to the 
right of Hoke; while Wilcox and Mahone, of Anderson's 
Corps, extend the line beyond Breckinridge. Fitz. Lee 
crosses the Chickahominy, guarding toward the James 
River. Kershaw, on Hoke's left, is supported by the 
brigades of Law and Gregg, of Field's division. This re- 
adjustment leaves Early with his corps and Heth's divi- 
sion on the left of the army. The position is intrenched 
during the day under a heavy skirmish and artillery fire. 

General Lee now attempts an offensive plan of his own. 
He orders Early to fall upon the Federal right flank while 
it is in motion, then to drive southward in front of the 
Confederate line, sweeping the Federals before him. The 
division of Rodes is accordingly moved out on the Shady 
Grove Church road, Heth following to take position on 
his left, while Gordon swings round to his right, keeping 
pace with Rodes. This operation finds Burnside still in 
movement under cover of his skirmishers yet occupying the 
corps intrenchments. These are driven and many cap- 
tured by Rodes, who also gains the rear of the Fifth Corps, 
where he takes many prisoners. 

The Fifth Corps has thinly manned its line in order to 
form its column of attack, as already mentioned. This 
has left Cutler and Crawford to cover the corps front of 
three miles from Bethesda Church to Smith's right. Grif- 
fin's division, however, is massed at the Church ; and, 
quickly deploying, he attacks and forces Rodes back along 
the road of his advance. In this sharp encounter, Rodes 
loses one of his most valued brigadiers, General Doles. 
Heth is held in check by Chittenden's division, aided by 
Potter and Wilcox, all of the Ninth Corps. 

Lee's flank attack is thus foiled, and Early's troops in- 
trench on the Shady Grove Church road, Ramseur's divi- 



292 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

sion holding the intrenchments as far as Anderson's left. 

After a night's rest, and all in readiness, the entire 
Federal army, excepting Sheridan's cavalry, is ordered to 
advance and attack Lee's position at 4.30 on the morning 
of the 3d. Wilson, on the right, has been reinforced by 
tv^o thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, just 
up from Port Royal. But this addition to his force is 
reduced to an effective of one thousand of each arm by 
the exhaustion of a continuous march of twenty-eight 
hours. Wilson is to move from Hanover Court House and 
assail Lee's left and rear. 

In not distant proximity the Army of Northern Virginia 
is ready behind its intrenchments. Hancock's Corps is 
formed with front of two divisions in double line; Bar- 
low on the left. Gibbon on the right, with Birney in sup- 
port. Barlow deploys his division with the brigades of 
Miles and Brooke in the first line, with Byrnes and McDou- 
gall in the second. Gibbon's first line consists of the bri- 
gades of Tyler and Smith, deployed; while McKean and 
Owens form the second line in close columns of regiments. 
This gives the Second Corps column of attack a develop- 
ment of four brigades front in double line, with a division 
in reserve serving as the third line. The Sixth Corps is 
formed with a front of three divisions; Russell on the 
left, Ricketts in the center, and Neill on the right. These 
formations are not for attack to be made by a single col- 
umn over a long distance, as was Pickett's at Gettysburg 
but for general assault along an army front. In front 
of these two Federal corps, where Lee expects to receive 
the heaviest blows, he has massed many of his most famed 
brigades and divisions to oppose their like. 

At 4.30 A. M., June 3d, Hancock, Wright and Smith 
move forward to the assault, and quickly capture the ad- 
vanced rifle-pits of the Confederates under a heavy fire 



AS THE END APPROACHED 293 

from infantry and artillery. From thence the gallant lines 
charge close up to the main intrenchments through a mur- 
derous fire, the Confederate guns plowing their ranks with 
a crossfire along the entire front of the three corps. But 
this determined line is unable to carry the Confederate in- 
trenchments, and, this decided, the assailants quickly throw 
up cover and maintain their position within from thirty to 
fifty yards of the hostile works. 

Barlow's advance carries his division against the Con- 
federate salient along the road from Despatch Station, 
which, after severe fighting, is captured, with three guns. 
These are turned against the retreating Confederates, who 
are followed into their main works by Miles and Brooke. 
But the second line, under less experienced commanders, 
has advanced less rapidly, and now is out of supporting dis- 
tance at the critical moment, as was Pickett's at Gettys- 
burg. The intrepid first line is not strong enough to hold 
and widen the breach under the storm of musketry and en- 
filading gun fire poured into its ranks, followed by an at- 
tack by Breckenridge, reinforced by Anderson. Forced 
from the intrenchments, these cool, determined com- 
manders withdraw their brigades and intrench on a strong 
eminence fifty yards to their rear. This fine division loses 
heavily ; Brooke is seriously wounded and two colonels are 
killed. 

Gibbon orders his second line, formed in columns of regi- 
ments, to closely follow the first, pass the breach to be made, 
and then deploy. His column becomes divided by a swamp, 
thus losing its solidity of impulse. But his troops push on 
under a fierce fire, each half column gaining a lodgment 
in the assaulted works. Again the support fails : for, in- 
stead of pushing through the first line and then deploying, 
as ordered, Owens halts to first deploy ; and in consequence. 



294 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Gibbon is driven clear of the hostile works, but intrenches 
in the near distance. In his division Brigadier Tyler is 
wounded, McLean killed, and Haskell, who succeeds the 
latter, is mortally wounded. 

The gallant Second Corps has failed to dislodge Lee's 
right, and its dauntless commander reports that it will 
be unwise to attempt another assault. The Sixth and 
Eighteenth Corps have met with a similar experience and 
result, all losing heavily, especially from the enfilading fire 
of the Confederate artillery. The Federals have gained in- 
trenched position within some fifty yards of Lee's works ; 
but with Hancock all the corps commanders report that 
further direct assault will be useless. At i 130 p. m. Grant 
orders a suspension of open attack, and that the advance 
toward the Confederate works be made by means of regular 
covered approaches. This work is taken up and progresses 
under the most trying conditions of heat, exhaustion and 
sickness; and under a ceaseless fire of artillery and musketry 
from the confederate lines, in close contact, until June 12th, 
when it is abandoned. 

This last general assault on Lee's line cost the three as- 
sailing corps 4,000 men, killed and wounded, and the five 
corps 5,600 men, within the space of less than one hour. 
Among the Confederate ofBcers wounded are Generals 
Kirkland, Lane, Finegan and Law. 

The total casualties suffered by both armies in this cam- 
paign from May 5th to June 12th are as follows: 

Army of the Potomac 

Killed and wounded 41.165 men 

Missing 7,440 men 



Total 48,605 men 



AS THE END APPROACHED 295 

Army of Northern Virginia 

Killed and wounded 20,000 men 

Missing 3,300 men 

Total . . . ., 23,300 men 

Butler's Campaign 

Federal. . ., 4,200 men 

Confederate 2,884 rnen 

Total . ., 7,084 men 

Totals 

Army of the Potomac 48,605 

Army of Northern Virginia 23,300 

Butler's Campaign 7,084 

Total losses in thirty- four days, not in- 
cluding sick 78,989 * 

What such losses mean to armies will be best understood 
by looking into a detail or two. General Gibbon reporting 
of his division, Second Corps, states that " On the 3d of 

May my command numbered. ., 6,799 ^^" 

Recruited to July ist by 4^263 men 

11,062 men 

Losses to July 31, officers killed yj 

Enlisted men 971 

Wounded, officers 202 

Men 3,825 

Total loss , 5>o75 men 

* Humphreys — who is followed in the above table — remarks that 
the figures are short of the actual losses, as reports are not complete, 
either Federal or Confederate. 



296 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Of officers lost 40 are regimental commanders. Four bri- 
gades have had 17 different commanders; thus depriving my 
division of the large majority of its experienced veteran 
officers, while reinforcements were raw recruits lacking drill 
and discipline, many never having fired a gun ; the vast ma- 
jority of these men much inferior in character to my old 
troops, though in many instances these constituted the 
major parts of regiments and even brigades." 

Confederate reports do not afford such details; but Gen- 
eral Early states that " From May 5th to June 12th he lost 
Johnson and his entire division ; that of his brigadiers only 
one remains, four killed, four wounded, two captured, two 
promoted. Constant exposure, limited provisions, and serv- 
ice in the swamps having left his divisions not stronger 
than brigades, and his brigades with the strength of regi- 
ments." 

Appropriately great-hearted Hancock, alone in his tent, 
sobs like a great father amidst the 10,000 men remaining 
of his 40,000, while by his order the corps band dirges the 
miserere to their memory. 

It tells much of veteran officers in relation to their men 
to observe two of these — dependable friends — race across 
a zone of death, where they would not send subordinates, to 
notify an advanced regiment of the near withdrawal of the 
army and order it to come in to safety after dark to take its 
place in the next move of Grant. 

While the armies are in observation and digging ap- 
proaches, it will be of interest to notice some facts which 
their colossal contest during the past fierce weeks have em- 
phasized, — first, the strategy and tactics of the opposing 
commanders. Grant, once his plan is determined, holds to 
it, giving little regard to that of his antagonist. Approach- 
ing him he does not delay to feel out with small detachments, 
but, moving up within close striking distance, the enemy's 



AS THE END APPROACHED 297 

position is developed by heavy columns with ready support, 
to push home any advantage or purpose with massive as- 
saults, aided by powerful threats at remote points. These 
not usual methods failing, then a general assault is made 
along his entire front by heavy columns with ample reserves 
in close support. A ponderous war, like a fate in persist- 
ency. Nor does Grant change his methods after amply 
proving them fatal against the now fully developed field 
works the troops have become expert in hastily throwing 
up as cover. Defeated against these, he immediately ad- 
vances to his unalterable purpose by wide swings or flank- 
ing movements, in which great skill and considerable craft 
are displayed. It is difficult to conceive of Grant fighting 
defensively. 

General Lee, while equally fixed in his purpose, is most 
alert and sensitive to his antagonists — of his movements, 
character, disposition, and to what is proper for him to do 
under conditions and circumstances; operating to counter- 
act, forestall, and overcome, with the positive nimbleness of 
an athlete. By exercise of these qualities in utilizing the 
advantage of shorter lines, — which this has enabled him 
to maintain, — Lee has thus far defeated Grant's purpose 
and forced him to some other course if he will attain it. 

In the operations of these battle weeks certain officers 
with their commands have been doing specific work to 
which they appear to be specially adapted, — Hancock 
with his Second Corps, speedy and certain, leading out 
in flank movements and in battle more than others, and 
engaged in the most desperate and gallant assaults; Sedg- 
wick's Sixth Corps, like its father, its old and almost 
revered commander, steady and dependable under all con- 
ditions; Sheridan's troopers partaking of his sturdy im- 
petuosity and invincibility. In the Confederate army: the 
impress of Jackson so much a part of his old troops, and 



298 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Stuart of his troopers, that they continue as formidable and 
unique. Longstreet's men are found where hard, stubborn 
work is to be done; while the Army of Northern Virginia is 
the personification of its loved and revered commander. 
Troops long under an officer take on his qualities. 

On the 1 2th of June, Grant inaugurates practically a new 
campaign against Lee and Richmond by swinging his army 
round to the east of that city, to the James River and Peters- 
burg, to the south of the Confederate capital; and, in fact, 
the only true line of operations against hostiles operating 
within the Virginia salient north of the James. Grant has 
finally proved the " Overland " Line of operations impos- 
sible, even as it displayed itself from the time the building of 
the Virginian terrain and its surroundings were completed. 

General Lee, therefore, has outmaneuvered Grant in the 
most bloody and desperate, if not the most skillful cam- 
paign of the Civil War; but at what a terrible cost the 
summary of casualties shows. 



CHAPTER XIX 

PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 

AFTER the determination of the Battle of Cold Har- 
bor, on June 12th, General Lee boldly takes advan- 
tage of the brief interval in which his antagonist is settling 
down to some new plan of operations by detaching Breckin- 
ridge westward toward the head of the Shenandoah Valley 
to the aid of Confederate forces in that region operating 
against General Hunter. This detachment is made im- 
perative by the fact that Grant also orders Sheridan, with 
his cavalry, to make a junction wnth Hunter, and work to- 
gether in general and widespread destruction of Confeder- 
ate railways. Shortly after the departure of Breckinridge, 
General Early, with his corps, is also detached, incidentally 
to aid Breckinridge, but mainly to make a raid down the 
Shenandoah Valley to threaten Washington, with the idea 
that this will have the efifect of drawing Grant away from 
Richmond to the defense of the Federal capital. Early 
is left to make his diversion as far north as to appear 
before the defenses of Baltimore and Washington, cap- 
turing a Federal Paymaster's train east of Baltimore. At 
the needed time, however, the Sixth Corps and a division 
from the Army of the Potomac arrive in Washington, 
Early retires southward, and the Federal army remains 
at the south of Petersburg, defending the Federal capital 
by holding Lee's main force busy defending its own. 
On June 9th Grant's engineers are instructed to intrench 

299 



300 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

a line in the rear of Cold Harbor to be held while the army 
is being withdrawn. The withdrawal is begun by Warren, 
who, on the nth, secretly moves his tw^o reserve divisions 
in march to Moody's, four miles from Bottom Bridge, on 
the Chickahominy, and on the night of the 12th follows 
with the remainder of his corps. Warren is to cross the 
Chickahominy and demonstrate along the several roads, 
well out toward Richmond, in order, if possible, to deceive 
Lee into believing that the Fifth Corps is the advance of 
the Army of the Potomac moving against Richmond from 
the east; while, in fact, Warren is the curtain behind 
which the Federal army with its immense trains is moving 
to cross the James River at Wilcox's Landing, and from 
thence move on Petersburg. 

This great flank movement, covering a swing of fifty 
miles, the cord of which, twenty-five miles, is Lee's line, is 
effected in perfect order and without delay or interruption 
from start to finish. Nor is it a retreat, like that made by 
McClellan, in 1862, over a part of the same ground. 
Grant's more difficult feat, of swinging around Vicksburg, 
has given him rare practice in this kind of operations. So 
skillfully is the withdrawal of the army from the Confeder- 
ate front made and its movement concealed that it is lost 
to Lee for several days. 

With the exception of Smith's Eighteenth Corps, the 
army moves overland, Hancock pushing ahead immedi- 
ately after Warren with the right of way, in order to make 
special crossing of the James and join Smith, coming by 
transports from White House to the vicinity of Bermuda 
Hundred. The speedy transit of these two corps is or- 
dered by Grant for the sole purpose of taking Petersburg 
before it can be reinforced, and thus secure the key to the 
defenses of Richmond on its south, and w^ith it, possession 
of the Confederate railways of supply to that city and to 



PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 301 

Lee's army. In order to insure the early arrival of these 
two corps, Smith is given the right of way to White House 
and Hancock is hastened by special ferrying across the 
James before the pontoons can be laid. In this manner 
his corps with its artillery is across the James on the 15th, 
where Hancock finds Smith arriving. Butler at once 
strengthens Smith's command to 16,000 men, including 
cavalry and artillery, and starts him off with orders to 
capture Petersburg, as Grant has directed. After some 
hours of delay waiting for rations, Meade, at about 10 a. m., 
gives Hancock orders to proceed towards Petersburg 
and take position where the City Point Railway crosses 
Harrison's Creek, with his corps strengthened to 20,000 
men with artillery. 

Grant has thus, on June 15th, some 48,000 men with ar- 
tillery, within striking distance of Petersburg — including 
Butler's force at Bermuda Hundred. At this time Beaure- 
gard has but 5,000 men — infantry and cavalry — aside 
from the considerable artillery in works, with which to 
make defense. Yet Smith, alone, has orders to attack and 
capture this railway center and southern door to Rich- 
mond. At this vital juncture in the enterprise confusion 
and failure ensue, due to lack of orders! For it appears 
that Smith is not informed that Hancock will move directly 
to his support, nor is Hancock advised that it is the plan 
that he shall do so, and act directly with Smith against 
Petersburg for its speedy capture, though he has been has- 
tened for this very purpose. 

Smith, under Butler's order, starts at daylight of the 
15th, with his Eighteenth Corps, and in due time arrives 
before the strong works guarding Petersburg. He is met 
by an artillery fire so heavy and sustained that he believes 
it to be well supported by infantry; and, being alone, he 
deploys his columns and approaches with caution, but sue- 



302 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

ceeds in capturing the works in his front, though suffering 
heavy loss from artillery fire, so well do the Confederates 
cover the field with their guns. The only force available 
to the defense of Petersburg is that opposing Smith. This 
consists of 3,400 infantry under General Wise, Deering's 
cavalry, and some militia, aside from the artillery. Nor, 
excepting Hoke's division, does aid arrive during the day ; 
for General Lee disagrees with General Beauregard and 
still believes General Grant is preparing to attack Richmond 
from the east. 

In the mean time, Hancock leaves the river at 10 a. m., 
on the 15th, under Meade's order to "Proceed to Peters- 
burg by the most direct route and take position where the 
City Point Railway crosses Harrison's Creek." Either 
because of an error in his map, or from misunderstanding, 
this order leads Hancock, not to Petersburg, but in search 
of a non-existent point some miles away from that city 
and from Smith. This error is not corrected until 5.30 
p. M., when Hancock receives a dispatch from Grant direct- 
ing him to " Make all haste to the assistance of Smith, suc- 
cessfully attacking Petersburg." Directly following receipt 
of this order from Grant comes an aid from Smith with a 
message to Hancock, saying : " A despatch received from 
Grant states that you are moving to my support on the 
road from Windmill Point. Please hasten to my aid." 
The Second Corps at this time is near Old Court House, 
some four miles from Smith's left. By nine o'clock, two 
of his divisions arrive and relieve the tired troops of Gen- 
eral Smith. 

These dispatches give documentary evidence that neither 
Smith nor Hancock had been ordered to unite their forces 
and act together in an assault on Petersburg. General 
Grant, himself, remained silent in regard to this entire mat- 
ter, except to state in his Memoirs that " Had my orders 



PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 303 

been carried out, Petersburg would have fallen." In view 
of these facts, it is reasonably probable, if not morally cer- 
tain, that General Grant had intended to issue specific orders 
to that effect if he did not believe he had really done so. 
At midnight of the 15th orders are received to defer at- 
tack, and on the i6th the entire army is about Petersburg. 
It has already been published that this miscarriage, which 
cost the siege of Petersburg, was due to the same cause 
which afflicted Hooker at Chancellorsville. 

At 2 p. M., on the i6th, General Lee receives a dispatch 
from Beauregard telling him of the presence of the Federal 
army at Petersburg. Anderson's and Hill's corps are then 
in the vicinity of Malvern Hill, on the north bank of the 
James. 

At 3 p. M., Lee telegraphs Beauregard that he is not 
informed that Grant has crossed the James, while all 
save the Sixth Corps and Wilson's cavalry are across. 
From the i6th to the i8th Beauregard holds five miles of 
fortified line with 14,000 troops in presence of the Army 
of the Potomac in full force, meanwhile losing but a few of 
his advanced works, though vigorously assailed by the Sec- 
ond, Fifth, Ninth and Eighteenth Corps. At 3 :30 p. m., 
the 17th, General Lee telegraphs his cavalry commander at 
Malvern Hill, to push out and ascertain what has become 
of Grant's army. By the afternoon of the i8th the corps 
of Anderson and Hill's have arrived at Petersburg; and, 
after various attempts to dislodge Lee, the opposing armies 
settle down to engage in a protracted siege. 

It may be a matter for wonderment that Beauregard, 
with a force of but 14,000 men, was able to maintain hold 
of Petersburg for two days against the combined efforts of 
four corps of the Federal army. But it must be borne in 
mind that Petersburg had previously been skillfully fortified, 



304 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

and that these works were well equipped with artillery. 
These guns, served with great vigor and destructive effect, 
led to the belief that they were supported by a considerable 
force of infantry, and that the Confederate works could 
not be rushed and overrun without great loss of life. Con- 
sequently, Beauregard's line required to be first well recon- 
noitered in order that it might be assailed at advantageous 
points. Before this could be done and the Federal army 
moved into position to deliver a general attack, Lee was 
up with the corps of Hill and Anderson to man the ready 
fortified line. Meanwhile, Beauregard performed wonders 
in moving and massing his small force at the most threat- 
ened points, there to desperately resist powerful assaults, 
in which he lost sections of his line, only to quickly span 
the gaps with a new line in its rear. But the fatalities best 
tell the story. 

From the 15th of June to the i8th of June, the Fed- 
eral army loses, in killed, 1,298 men, 7,474 wounded, miss- 
ing, 1,814 — a total of 10,586 men. This grave is the 
monument erected to the skill of Beauregard and to the 
valor of his 14,000. 

A small determined force, well fortified and ably com- 
manded, can withstand many times its number, often for 
long periods, as the famous sieges of historic record show, 
and which Lee will again illustrate with the dwindling Army 
of Northern Virginia at Petersburg. Besides, the troops 
of Beauregard are fresh; while the Army of the Potomac 
has, but a few days since, finished a most bloody, protracted 
and exhausting campaign of thirty-four days of almost 
ceaseless battle by day and night marches, closing this with 
several days of intrenchment work at Cold Harbor in the 
heat and in a swampy country, which greatly impaired the 
health and spirit of the army. Then, to cap the climax, it 
at once engaged in forced marches of extreme length in 



PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 305 

order to place itself safely across the James before Lee could 
operate to attack it while in movement. 

Thus for forty days has the Army of the Potomac been 
unremittingly engaged in enacting an unprecedented cam- 
paign. Is it, therefore, a matter for surprise if it finds it- 
self in front of Petersburg on June i6th, marched and 
fought almost to a standstill? Nor is its condition worse 
than that of the Army of Northern Virginia, for, while 
the latter has moved over shorter lines, it has not been 
full rationed. 

Meade's chief-of-staff relates of this campaign : " The 
Army of the Potomac arrived in front of Petersburg 
with the larger part of its officers — who had literally 
led their troops — either killed or wounded ; and a large 
number of the men absent who filled the ranks at the 
beginning of the campaign." Again, "Its antagonist must 
have been in a similar condition, except that it had not 
suffered from attacking intrenchments, nor from as much 
night marching." 

The vast recruitment which poured into the Army of the 
Potomac to make up for losses suffered was composed 
largely of raw levies, which were incorporated in regiments 
newly organized of men who had served their three years' 
term of enlistment, and were called on by the President to 
reenlist for another period of two years or throughout the 
war. The response was prompt and massive from these 
men upon whom a short term of peace at home had begun to 
pall. The experience of one regiment of which one-half 
consisted of raw recruits will serve to illustrate that of 
many. Leaving its State camp eleven hundred strong, un- 
der a veteran colonel and line officers, this regiment immedi- 
ately joined the Army of the Potomac and engaged in the 
battle of the Wilderness, and in two weeks there were left 
four hundred men answering to roll-call. 



3o6 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

As an illustration of the physical and moral condition of 
the troops in its effect on their spirit, it is related of some 
Federal troops with a splendid record, that at a time when 
the siege was well advanced, becoming hotly engaged at 
an important point, they offered but a weak resistance for 
a few minutes, and then flocked off out of fire, refusing to 
reenter, and returned to their camp. The superb personnel 
and morale of the old Army of the Potomac became greatly 
reduced during the siege by the heavy influx of conscripts 
and bounty men. Yet, so mightily had the Volunteers 
builded during their four years of great war, that mere 
absorption into the structure they had erected served to trans- 
form much poor material into good soldiers, so that the 
proud, all-enduring Army of the Potomac emerged from 
the war with its fair fame little tarnished and still invinci- 
ble. Haloed in enduring glory with its superb antagonist, 
the Army of Northern Virginia, each made immortal by 
the other. 

It is unnecessary here to follow the detailed progress of 
the Siege of Petersburg, as these are graphically given by 
General Humphreys, in his " Virginia Campaign of 
1864-5," ^^^ by other military historians of the war. 
Hence the general scope and data of the siege will suffice. 

The strength of the respective armies, as they engage in 
the Siege of Petersburg on July 20, 1864, is as follows: 

Army of the Potomac 

Effectives, Infantry 37>984 men 

Effectives, Cavalry 10,280 men 

Army of the James 

Effectives, Infantry 24,009 men 

Effectives, Cavalry 1 1,188 men 



Total, not including Artillery 73,461 men 



PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 307 

Army of Northern Virginia 

Effectives, Infantry 39,295 men 

Effectives, Cavalry 8,436 men 

Total, not including Artillery 47»73i men 

On December 20, the remaining divisions of the Second 
Corps and Kershaw's division joined Lee, giving him on 
that date a force of 53,764 men. Grant is also strength- 
ened by the return of the Sixth corps and the division sent 
to Washington against Early's incursion. 

Until the late winter of 1864 closed active operations of 
the armies at Petersburg, almost ceaseless battle was waged 
along the established line of works to breach and carry them, 
and both lines of fortifications were constantly extended 
westward in Grant's endeavors to gain control of the Con- 
federate railroads and to turn Lee's right flank, and in the 
efforts of the latter to defeat these purposes. In the spring 
of 1865 these works had become so extended that Lee's 
fortified line covered a distance of forty-one miles from 
Bermuda Hundred southwestward : and Grant's, offsetting, 
were of equal development. The Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, reduced to 35,000 men, defended this line with less 
than 1,000 men to the mile. 

At this time the Confederate Congress assured itself that 
there was not sufficient meat in the Confederacy to supply 
the armies, that its armies were deficient in transportation, 
and that the bread supply for Lee's army was in jeopardy. 

On March 31, 1865, the effective forces of the contending 
Armies at Petersburg were: 

Army of the Potomac 

Infantry . 72,020 men 

Field Artillery 5,862 men 

Guns 263 



3o8 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Army of the James 

Infantry 19,267 men 

Field Artillery 3,077 men 

Guns 126 

Sheridan's Cavalry 13,820 men 

Total, not including Artillery 74J53 ^nen 

Army of Northern Virginia 

Infantry ....,.., 46,000 men 

Field Artillery , 5,000 men 

Cavalry , 6,000 men 



Total 57,000 men 

These figures do not include Lee's heavy artillery, local 
troops, or the naval force, participating in the siege. 

General Lee is thus maintaining his numerical advantage 
of I to 2. But this is being constantly weakened by ex- 
haustion of recruitment, as also by increasing lack of food, 
transportation, and equipment for his army. But these fa- 
talities could be measurably overcome, and Lee's war con- 
tinued, by withdrawing from Petersburg and moving his 
army around Grant's left toward the more impregnable 
country in the heart of the Confederacy, and his supply 
region; there absorbing the other scattered armies and 
forces and, ultimately, if necessary, retire into the moun- 
tain section, where, by battle and strategy, he could prolong 
his war indefinitely in that region. And it is these two 
last contingencies that Grant makes it his purpose to frus- 
trate finally. 

Indeed, General Lee had urged upon his government the 
advisability of abandoning Richmond, and moving his army 
into the interior, instead of engaging it in the siege of 



PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 309 

Petersburg, directly after the siege was begun, realizing, as 
his superiors did not, that Richmond had ceased to hold 
strategic value, and that its political worth was naught as 
compared with his army; or, concisely, that the Confederacy 
could be sustained only upon the bayonets of the Army of 
Northern Virginia. 

Wrestling like giants in a death grapple, for nearly a 
year, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern 
Virginia sweat the life blood of many thousands, until, 
finally, on the morning of April 2, 1865, General Lee sends 
a dispatch to President Davis that during the following 
night he would be compelled to abandon his lines, and would 
attempt to move his army to Danville, Virginia. Thus, 
after making one of the most skillful defenses of record, 
at 8 p. M. of the 2d of April, 1865, the Army of Northern 
Virginia draws out of its defenses and begins its last march. 
Lee's purpose is to reach Danville, where, covering the rail- 
way to the south fortuitous events may transpire. 

But Grant divines Lee's purpose and, on the morning of 
the 3d, sets his army in strenuous pursuit over roads along 
Lee's left flank and rear. These flank columns deflect the 
course of the pursued army northward to an extent sufficient 
to throw Lee away from Danville, when he makes the effort 
to reach Lynchburg. That point gained, he will have 
reached a railway and also the entrance of the mountain 
country, where his army can be maintained and reinforced, 
. and continue the war in this impregnable region. Grant, 
therefore, undertakes the task of preventing such a calam- 
ity. It is not necessary to urge either commanders or their 
troops to exert themselves to the utmost, for all see the end 
of the war in the capture of Lee and his long invincible war- 
riors. Discomforts and lack of rest incident to forced 
marches disappear in the exhilarating excitement of the 
pursuit. Federal cavalry appears to multiply and spring 



3IO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

alert and daring on every left-flank road along Lee's ad- 
vance, and Grant's infantry becomes wing-footed. 

With this host thrusting its flank and rear, the crip- 
pled and starving, unyielding remnant of the proud Army 
of Northern Virginia turns upon its hunters, like a wounded 
lion pestered on its way to the jungle, giving blow for blow 
while sternly holding its course. 

After more than four years of herculean effort made by 
the Army of the Potomac in campaigns and great battles, 
in the endeavor to reach Richmond, — but some sixty miles 
in direct line from Washington, — against the defense made 
by the Army of Northern Virginia, on the 3d of April, 
1865, that city surrenders to General Godfrey Weitzel, com- 
manding the Twenty-fifth Corps. — And President Lincoln, 
threading the dangers alone, seeks out the home of Gen. 
Pickett, — whom as a boy he had sent to West Point, and 
loved, — knocks at the door, introduces Abraham Lincoln, 
takes little George from the mother, kisses him and says : 
" For your sake, little fellow, I guess I shall have to forgive 
your father." 

The retreating army pushes steadily westward, subsist- 
ing on the scanty wayside gatherings, but still fending with 
its famed valor and dash, especially the rear guard, Stone- 
wall Jackson's old Corps, under command of Lieutenant- 
General John B. Gordon, risen on merit from the rank of 
captain of a company of wild Georgia mountaineers. Mar- 
shal Ney with his French veterans, covering the retreat of 
Napoleon from Russia, was not more bold and determined 
than is fiery, fearless Gordon in covering the retreat of 
the dwindling remnant of this " Grand Army," from Peters- 
burg to Appomattox. Thousands of the less hardy Confed- 
erates, exhausted, disheartened, and literally starving, either 
scatter through the country and find their way to their 
homes, or surrender, to procure food. But the uncon- 



PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 311 

querable nucleus of this noble army march and fight on 
until its day of doom, and then, with wondering surprise 
and indignation, press about their idolized commander, and, 
with undiminished confidence in him, and in themselves, beg 
that he shall lead them to cut their way through the sur- 
rounding host. Nor will thousands of these heroic souls 
surrender; but, learning that this is to be their fate, they 
throw down their arms, scatter, and find their way home- 
ward to face bravely the wreck and ruin they find there, — 
there to work out their salvation and that of the South, un- 
der imposed conditions so humiliating and apparently hope- 
less as would have palled the hearts of less valor — or sent 
them afield again in an interminable partizan conflict. 

As a dying campfire sparks and flashes up here and there 
with leaping brilliancy before expiring, so does the uncon- 
querable valor of the veteran antagonists scintillate and 
flame before its final disappearance from the field of war to 
merge in and energize the elements of peace. Devens, of 
the Federal cavalry, makes, according to the assertion of his 
superior, " The finest cavalry charge of the war, his troopers 
actually riding with him over the Confederate intrench- 
ments and capturing their defenders." Also General Reed 
with eighty cavalry and five hundred infantry, suddenly 
surrounded by the Confederates, rather than surrender 
fights two divisions of cavalry until he, all his cavalry of- 
ficers and Colonel Washburn, commanding the infantry 
are killed, when their troops surrender. And, on a larger 
scale : General Ewell, his corps reduced to 3,600 men, and 
Anderson with the remnant of his corps, 6,300 men, finding 
themselves hemmed in by the Sixth Corps and Sheridan's 
cavalry, fight until their 11,000 men are reduced to 4,000, by 
death, wounds, and capture, Generals Ewell, Kershaw, and 
others being among the captured. 

Finally, surrounded near Appomattox Court House, Vir- 



312 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

ginia, on the 9th day of April, 1865, General Lee accepts 
General Grant's letter demanding the surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, this being done, however, only 
after a sad council with his leading commanders, in which 
indomitable Gordon, holding the advance, declares: " My 
old corps is reduced to a frazzle, and unless I am heavily 
supported by Longstreet, 1 do not think we can do any 
more.'' To continue the hopeless struggle longer would be 
only a waste of life. General Lee, the noblest representa- 
tive of Aristocracy, surrenders to General Grant, the hu- 
mane representative of Democracy. 

On the 9th of April, 1865, the material remains of the 
Army of Northern Virginia cease to exist as an army. It 
surrendered to physical exhaustion before it laid down its 
arms to men. Its proud and unique fame will not cease. 
With that of its great antagonist, the Army of the Po- 
tomac, their blended fame is immortal, while the men who 
raised it merge into peace, disappear, and become forgot- 
ten, — their ever living selves strengthened and ennobled 
by their mortal deeds. 

There remained of the Army of Northern Virginia to 
surrender: 

General Lee and his Staff 15 men 

Longstreet's Corps 14.833 men 

Gordon's Corps 7,200 men 

Ewell's Corps 287 men 

Cavalry Corps 1,786 men 

Artillery Corps 2,586 men 

Detachments 1,649 n^^n 

Total, 28,356 men 

The Federal losses of the Petersburg Campaign and Siege, 



PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 313 

covering the perio'd from June 15, 1864, to April 9, 1865, 
were: 

Killed ,. .,.••-. 5790 nien 

Wounded ,...., 19,797 "^^^ 

Missing 10,476 men 



Total i. . 36,063 men 

Confederate data is lacking. But it is fair to estimate 
their losses in killed and wounded as at least one-half of 
the proportionate losses of the Federals, as they made 
several desperate sallies, and often fought in the open in 
resisting Grant's flank extensions. 

On April 25, 1865, General Joseph E. Johnston surren- 
dered his Army to General Sherman, soon followed by that 
of the remaining Confederate forces, — the Army of North- 
ern Virginia being gone. 



CHAPTER XX 

PEACE AND UNITY 

OUR great American Civil War, which for a moment 
of eternity set in turmoil a spot on the infinite tide of 
Life, ended at Appomattox. Its crest wave which broke on 
Cemetery Hill had ebbed to dash and thunder on the rocks 
of war and finally level in the ocean of peace. We should 
know of its elements. 

During the war the total enlistments in the Federal 

forces, army and navy, were about 2,750,000 men 

In the Confederate armies about 1,000,000 men 

The Federal forces were composed of nationalities as fol- 
lows : 

American, per-cent 75- 

German, per-cent 7- 

Irish, per-cent i. 9- 

Mixed Foreign, per-cent 9. 

The war cost the Federal Government. . . $6,500,000,000 

The cost of the war to the Confederacy must be rep- 
resented by zero, as it became bankrupt. But the entire 
population of the Confederacy was utterly and pitifully 
impoverished thereby. 

The casualties of the Civil War were: 

Federals, killed in battle 61,363 men 

Died of wounds received in battle 34.773 ^^^ 

Died of disease 183,287 men 

Died of accident 3^6 men 

314 



PEACE AND UiNITY 315 

Executed 7 men 



Total Deaths — of which 29,038 were 

Colored — 279,735 men 

Only fragmentary data is obtainable of Confederate 
losses. But, assuming the same percentage as appears 
in Federal reports, Confederate dead would be, from 
all causes, about 100,000 men. 

Of the Federal Forces there were: 

Discharged for disability 224,306 men 

Dishonorably discharged 2,693 ^^^^ 

Dismissed the Service, officers 2,423 men 

Cashiered, " , 274 men 

Resigned, " .. . 22,281 men 

Deserted, Officers, 216. Enlisted men, 198,- 

829 199,045 men 

Yet the great heart of President Lincoln saved all but 
seven of them from the penalty of death that they had 
earned. He said that they were not mercenaries, but just 
our ordinary American boys away from home for a time 
soldiering. 

At the close of the war the Federal army 

numbered , 1,000,000 men 

During the last three years of the war the 

Confederate army numbered about . . 450,000 men 

The Civil War was the last considerable conflict waged 
with smooth bore, short range, muzzle loading arms, per- 
mitting of massed or close order battle. The long range, 
rifled, breech loading and magazine guns, small and large, 
which have compelled open order battle, were practically 
unknown in the Civil War. In it the telegraph and rail- 



3i6 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

way were first employed in warlike operations of moment. 

The general Campaign of 1864-65, naturally brought to 
fruition the fruit of the years of war's growth in general- 
ship — most completely ripened in Lee, Grant and Sher- 
man. Due to their more commanding positions, the two 
first named became more conspicuous and wider famed 
than Sherman, but it may not be questioned that, had the 
superior command of either Lee or Grant fallen to Sher- 
man, he would have won to hold the superior meed as 
worthily. The three began the campaign of 1864 simul- 
taneously: Grant and Lee from the banks of the Rapidan, 
in Virginia, Sherman, from Chattanooga, Tennessee; all 
starting on May 5, 1864, under Grant's initiative as the 
dominant force. From that day on, while the movements 
of the three were inter-affecting, they were focalized more 
in final results, for from then on, Grant and Lee were paired 
in opposition in the East, while Sherman, in the West, 
operated against several Confederate commanders to the 
same end as Grant, and under his general direction. 

Sherman, starting out from Chattanooga with an army 
of 100,000 men, opposed by General Joseph E. Johnston — 
second only to Lee in the Confederate Armies for general- 
ship — with an army of 70,000 men, continued a campaign 
to Atlanta, Georgia, one hundred miles south, through a 
most difficult mountainous country, sparsely settled, pene- 
trated by a few indifferent roads, while one or more con- 
siderable rivers had to be crossed. The line of operations 
was along a single track railway through this country, open 
to easy raids, compelling heavy detachments to its defense 
every mile advanced until the enemy accused him of carry- 
ing ready-made railway bridges for his often broken track. 
Over this railway all supplies of every kind were brought 
to Sherman's army from his base four hundred miles in 
his rear. Previous to and during the campaign, Johnston 




LTKL'T.-l.KN. luSKfll K. lOllNS'i'ON 



Facing Page 016 



PEACE AND UNITY 317 

prepared strong natural positions with extensive fortifica- 
tions in addition to the formidable difficulties of the country 
itself. So strong and skillful were Johnston's prepared 
places for battle that in no case could they be taken by 
direct assault, thus compelling Sherman to wide turning 
movements — sometimes entirely away from his railway 
through country where he was forced to make his roads. 
Under these extreme conditions of opposition, and against 
an army equal to his own — equalized by its defensive war 
and by hostile nature — and most skillfully commanded, 
Sherman fought his way to Atlanta in a period of four 
months, and captured Atlanta, a veritable stronghold, by 
a series of brilliant turning operations. The losses in this 
campaign were. Federals, 31,687 men: Confederates, 
34,979. The Confederacy, in Atlanta, also lost its main 
arsenal and manufactures of war. 

It may be noted that, from the outstart, Sherman met 
with the famed field trenches which we have seen baffling 
Grant's massive assaults in Virginia. After once testing 
these Sherman ceased to assault them, but held his op- 
ponent to their shelter with heavy skirmish lines, thus free- 
ing his main force to turning movements, whereby he 
compelled Johnston to abandon every one of his fortified 
positions without undue loss of men. 

Atlanta captured, in the heart of the Confederacy, Sher- 
man's new opponent. Hood — whom we observed at Get- 
tysburg — attempted to spoil Sherman's campaign by 
forcing him back into Tennessee to protect his railway and 
his base at Nashville. But Sherman placed General George 
H. Thomas — the " Rock of Chickamauga " — in command 
of that section and city, the key of Tennessee, and left 
Hood to destroy himself and the Confederate war in the 
West by his eccentric operation into Tennessee, where his 
army was disastrously beaten and dispersed by Thomas. 



3i8 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Sherman, meanwhile, set out from Atlanta, to isolate 
himself with an army of 60,000 picked troops, and marched 
three hundred miles east to Savannah, on the Atlantic coast, 
through the remaining supply section of the Confederacy, 
destroying its arsenals and railways. From Savannah Sher- 
man headed north and made way to Goldsboro, North Caro- 
lina, through four hundred and twenty-five miles of hostile 
country, crossing overflowed rivers and swamps, which made 
bridge and corduroy roadbuilding necessary for hundreds 
of these miles. With his army at Goldsboro, he was in 
position not only to destroy the considerable army which 
Johnston had collected against him, but he was in the true 
rear of Lee, held at Petersburg by Grant. Sherman thus 
brought the army of the West, by a march unparalleled in 
the history of war, to the support of the army of the East, 
the original idea of this undertaking and the details of its 
execution being his own ; to which Grant, at first with hesi- 
tation, finally gave his approval. It is militar}^ opinion 
that had this unique feat of war been undertaken by a lesser 
master of the art of war it would have been crowned by 
disaster. 

Meanwhile Grant was engaged in the campaign against 
Lee, in Virginia, over terrain not difficult after the Wil- 
derness was passed, and made formidable only by the pres- 
ence of Lee's army behind intrenchments such as we have 
seen Sherman turning. His announced objective was that 
army first, with Richmond secondary. Grant was at the 
head of an Army of effectives of 118,769, men, engaged 
offensively against Lee with 61,953 men, defending their 
own soil and homes. And Grant's base was always within 
a day's wagon-haul of his army, hence his lines were not 
dangerously open to incursion. From May 5th to June 
1 2th he fought his way over sixty miles, from the Rapidan 
to Cold Harbor, with a loss to his army of 48,605 men, and 




MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS 



Facing Pa<?e 31S 



PEACE AND UNITY 319 

depleted his opponent's by 23,300 men. Grant, in doing 
this, continuously assaulted Lee's impregnable field-works 
with massive columns, frequently hurling his entire army 
against these along its entire front; and, fatally unsuccess- 
ful, he then attempted to flank his wiley antagonist by great 
turning movements, but with equal unsuccess,' 

Lee's defensive war, utilized to the last point by his con- 
summate skill, defeated Grant's first campaign, as the latter 
neither subdued the Army of Northern Virginia, nor cap- 
tured Richmond. And to any general who had before 
commanded the Army of the Potomac, this defeat of his 
purpose would have meant close of campaign and with- 
drawal from continuance of aggressive operations for a 
time. Grant, not being thus constituted, immediately con- 
tinued his campaign by swinging around Richmond by the 
east to Petersburg, and laid siege to that key to the south- 
em defense of the Confederate capital. Here a year later 
the Great Confederate, with the frazzled remnant of his 
superb Army of Northern Virginia, was compelled to sur- 
render. 

Grant, a great fighting general who was never once 
whipped from first to last, in the Virginia Campaign was 
fairly outgeneraled by the faultless strategy and tactics of 
General Lee ; while in comparison with Sherman, the award 
of superior generalship cannot be given to Grant. But his 
grand strategy, which combined and moved all the Federal 
armies over a field equal in area to the continent of Europe, 
on one Objective, and in one year subdued 800,000 square 
miles of territory defended by 400,000 men, demonstrated 
and insured his greatness above all other commanders in 
the American Civil War. 

Considering Grant's genius for wide and harmonious com- 
bination, one can but wonder whether he, in command of 
the Confederate Forces in 1864-65, would not have asserted 



320 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

himself above his modesty for the sake of the cause, and, 
drawing in Hood from his wild enterprise into Tennessee, 
unite his 60,000 men with Johnston on the flank of the 
Army of the Potomac at Petersburg, unlocking the Army 
of Northern Virginia to join with these, and, with this 
most of all powerful army which the Confederacy assem- 
bled, take position between Sherman and the Army of the 
Potomac and launch out at either; or, failing in such en- 
terprise, then, with the concentrated military resources of 
the Confederacy, withdraw into its center or heart of im- 
pregnable mountains. Would the North have sustained 
further war against such a formidable stand ? Perhaps Gen- 
eral Lee had something of this nature in mind when he 
urged upon his government the advisability of moving his 
army into the interior and abandoning Richmond, instead 
of engaging in the fatal siege of Petersburg. At that time 
General Lee held the power to overrule the adverse decision 
of President Davis. And it may be questioned whether 
duty should not have overcome General Lee's modesty and 
sense of loyalty to his erring superior; for Richmond, as 
the Confederate capital, had ceased to hold essential politi- 
cal value upon which its strategic worth depended. 

Grant's method of war, — to hammer and keep hammer- 
ing, — has been severely criticised as productive of useless 
slaughter, whereas it was not only effective of results of 
victory but was also merciful of life. The virtue of ham- 
mering to speedy victory is reinforced by the fact developed 
in our war that for every man lost in action, there were 
three put out of service by disease, discharge and desertion. 
From May, 1864, when Grant began battle in the Wilder- 
ness, until Appomattox, April 9, 1865, he lost 124,390 men 
in killed, wounded and missing. The Army of the Poto- 
mac from April 5, 1862, to May 4, 1864, lost 139,751 men, 
and had gained but thirty miles in advance of Bull Run, 



PEACE AND UNITY 321 

where the first hattle of the two years' series of contests 
was fought. 

The two great commanders developed in our Civil War, 
Grant and Lee, as they met at Appomattox, were, in per- 
son, character and development, most fitting representatives 
of the genius and people of their respective sections, the 
North and the South, as they w'ere also of the respective 
causes for w'hich the peoples of these sections fought. 

Broadly and truly democratic was the great Northerner, 
in contrast wath the great Southern aristocrat. Lee personi- 
fied the passing aristocratic order ; Grant, the more universal 
Democratic order, come to master all sections of these 
United States, and finally mold them into one homogeneous, 
free and progressive nation, by war mightily advanced to- 
ward its destiny in spite of all opposing powers which had 
conspired to its destruction. 

One phase of the surrender is most aptly presented by 
an historian, who writes : ** Grant represented the principle 
of equality and human brotherhood that makes the United 
States what it is. Lee was the type of a departed era, 
destined henceforth to take its place with the expiring tra- 
ditions of royalty and aristocratic pretension. But no Bay- 
ard of romance could have borne himself wath more knightly 
consideration for a fallen foe than did the plain man — 
Grant — whose action, not his dress, so well became him 
on an occasion giving him such opportunity for the dis- 
play of the littleness and self-assertion of a small mind, 
or the greatness and self-forgetfulness of a noble soul." 

Grant and Lee at Appomattox represented epochal con- 
ditions identical with those which w^ere embodied in the 
opposing generals of the Republic of Rome, Caesar and 
Pompeius, at Parsalus, 48 B. C. Pompeius, the spirit of 
the past outrun to disintegration; Cccsar, the spirit of the 
future; and whose victory over his antagonist marked the 



322 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

moment when humanity could once more start hopefully 
on new lines of progress. 

A duty to ourselves would l>e left undone, and we could 
be justly accused of either personal cowardice or a lamenta- 
ble lack of confidence in common good sense, should we 
fail to review two special phases of our war, both of which 
caused, at that time, perhaps more personal bitterness of 
feeling than the main conflict itself. These were the de- 
struction of private property by invading armies and the 
treatment of prisoners of war. 

First, let us realize that in practice war is the exact re- 
verse of peace. No man ever enunciated a plainer trutii 
more concisely than did General Sherman when he said : 
" War is hell." In war, whatever is necessary to its aid 
and success, within broad and long-established bounds, is 
not only proper, but is absolutely demanded. 

If Sherman had disregarded this rule of war, his cam- 
paign from Atlanta to the sea could not have been made, 
and in consequence the war would have dragged it's devas- 
tating length through additional years during which not 
only many millions in value of material would have been 
destroyed in excess of that consumed by Sherman's army, 
but many additional tens of thousands of brave men would 
have been slaughtered. Which, then, was the most hu- 
mane? The same question is put to the thousands of North- 
ern citizens who suffered precisely the same personal losses 
and hardships from Lee's army during its Gettysburg cam- 
paign, even to the extent of burning Chambersburg as a 
companion-piece to similar Federal army acts. Both were 
war on sections which, as entireties, were hostiles engaged 
in war against the respective armies of invasion ; hence, 
enemies; and, as such, properly subject to the rules of war, 
and under which they had placed themselves equally with 
their armed sons in the field. 



PEACE AND UNITY 323 

In regard to prisoners of war, any human being deprived 
of his personal liberty quickly becomes dissatisfied and un- 
reasonably critical of his conditions in every detail, espe- 
cially so of his food and treatment. He naturally becomes 
mentally ill, and this mental condition together with physical 
inaction usually results in ill health. And, adding to these 
the previous hardships of war, permanent decrepitude may 
ensue. These conditions and reasons furnish the true rea- 
son for the vast majority of mutual complaints and cruel 
accusations regarding the treatment of Confederate and Fed- 
eral prisoners of war during our civil conflict. It is true, 
nevertheless, that in isolated cases these prisoners were in 
the keeping of human monsters, cruel, vindictive and fiend- 
ish such as are every day met with amidst the pursuits of 
peace. How much more, then, will such flock to war's 
service of captivity, where their natures find freer and 
larger play? Such was infamous Wirz of Andersonville. 
Then two other facts of our war-time must be considered — 
the scarcity of subsistence in the South, and the quite nat- 
ural bitterness of the people under invasion. These two 
influences were not active in the North amidst its plenty, 
and unsubjected as it was to the rigors of invasion. And 
while, here and there, the Confederate prisoners were sub- 
jected to real hardships and cruelties at the hands of in- 
human keepers, public sentiment did not permit any marked 
continued case of general prison starvation and cruelty. 

Viewed as a material contest, it is not away from the 
truth to conclude that the South should have emerged from 
our Civil War victorious. This opinion is reinforced by 
history. The Welsh have never been conquered, though 
vastly outnumbered and not to be compared with their 
assailants in resources. The Swiss, likewise, in the midst 
of hostile Europe have successfully defended their free- 
dom. The weak, separatCj and not overfriendly British 



324 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

Colonies in America, loosely confederated, insurrected 
against mighty England and established the United States 
of America. For half the life of a generation the 
Cubans, sustained only by the indomitable spirit of the peo- 
ple, maintained war with Spain while denied all resources 
of war and barred from organization and arming for other 
than guerilla warfare by a foe so numerous and overpower- 
ing that the native habitants were billeted by the oppressors, 
and were held to bear the expense of their attempted sub- 
jugation. The Cubans would have succeeded without aid^ 
or have died in attempting freedom. 

Why, then, did our competent and valorous Americans 
of the South fail, abounding in all abilities as compared with 
the successes enumerated, and reinforced by the selfish in- 
terests and jealousies of Europe? Among the apparent 
contributive factors is this : the undertaking was hampered 
by the inabilities of Mr. Davis for so large an enterprise. 
The Confederate Government acted an effective part in the 
defeat of Secession. A tangible and certain reason is seen 
in our Southland to-day where its superb valor and hero- 
ism of war have been ameliorated to peace working wonders 
in its rich fields of upbuilding and prosperity, which were 
not possible while the incubus remained which overshadowed 
that fair land to bind its free people more than slavery 
shackled the bondman. 

Invaluable as are these accrued benefits from the failure 
of secession, they are pecuniary and local. Surely there 
must have been interests of a higher and broader nature 
behind these lesser ones which acted to overcome so able and 
superb an effort. Because secession failed the American 
people are a Union and not separated into two hostile States. 
Its supreme effort at Gettysburg failed because the life of 
our nation, the Union, was at stake; because a principle as 
old as time, Freedom, the Cause of Man, was the w^ager. 



PEACE AND UNITY 325 

By reason of its failure the American people, in their 
hearts, are imbued with the true spirit of life ; they are free, 
united Americans, and proud of a citizenship which has 
been so splendidly won. Because we were not disrupted 
by secession but became united in freedom, we were fitted 
to stand on the frontier of human life formidable against 
error and inhumanity, ready to lead out as one people in 
the sacred cause of Humanity with selfless might, win won- 
drous victory over monstrous selfishness and tyrannies, per- 
forming the mission of the American nation! and enabled 
to take place in lead of the nations as the one moral Power 
among the Powers of the world. Setting example to our- 
selves and to the nations, we gave proof that only by pur- 
suing the royal course of selfless, fearless endeavor can evil 
be overcome and peace, good-will among men, be estab- 
lished. 

These discernible causes for the failure of secession may 
well make us thankful for the fierce heat of war, for the 
sweet and noble memories which have smoothed and bound 
us in unity, and for the noble and inspiring lessons of that 
prime endeavor and its defeat. 

Surely there is a higher Genius than man's, which su- 
pervises his every affair, and directs to diviner ends than 
his farthest vision may perceive at the time. We may con- 
fidently look for its action in so great an event as our Civil 
War and view with favor these larger facts in considering 
its results, — mightily potent to futurity. Let us thank- 
fully reconcile our hearts to the lesser regards of sectional 
or personal successes or failures as being merely incidental 
to these mightier purposes. 

The reflex from the crest wave of our American Civil 
War leveled and settled at Appomattox into the great ocean 
of peace forever. But the superbly energized spirit thereof 
did not die; nor did it cease to act when the armies of its 



326 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

embodiment melted and blended into civil life. For had 
it ceased to act on our new field, in our new national life, 
our vast expenditure of life and treasure would indeed have 
been wasted. The American national spirit was first awak- 
ened into full and robust being by that war, and it is this 
same spirit which, acting in the ways of peace, has wrought 
so wonderfully in our common life. It is this same spirit, 
acting through our national unity, which has, within the 
minute period of one hundred and forty-three years, enabled 
us to outdo the ages in material progress and development. 
It is this same spirit which inspired our humanity and 
forced us to step boldly into the world's arena as man's 
mailed champion against tyrannies. And in executing this 
championship commission of heaven, we found ourselves in 
moral leadership of the nations! 

In the eternal war between Class and Mass, between Aris- 
tocracy and Democracy, in this latest submission of the 
ceaseless question to the arbitrament of armed hosts. De- 
mocracy was crowned with the wreath of laurel. But the 
spirit of neither was ignoble. Both fought for freedom, 
while each exactly represented its class or cause. The one 
waged for the right to govern itself, and to do its pleasure 
with the Mass : the other, to rule as pleases the Mass, — 
neither right; but the high principle, the right to freedom, 
was held superior to the mere right to property, and to the 
more ignoble right to gain, in our civil dispute. 

From the war-wed spirits of the old North and South a 
new national spirit has arisen. And from a living memory 
Lincoln and Lee step forth alive, one an inspiration to noble 
being, the other showing the ways of kindly wisdom ; hand 
in hand, to restore and inspire our mired patriotism ; and 
again lead us. that the tyranny of greed with its attendant 
furies, — the tyrannies that seek to bind and limit the best 
in men, — shall be utterly cast down and forever banished 



PEACE AND UNITY 327 

from our fair land, from this the most imperial domain ever 
entrusted to man, sealed to us by the dear blood of our 
fathers and their fathers' fathers, and by heaven's powers 
as the heritage and last hope of humanity. 

For the American people there are valors of peace which, 
if performed, will resound through the ages when the heroics 
of war shall have ceased to echo. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Artillery is indexed as Batteries, fol- 
lowed by names of commanders, except- 
ing that of the Confederates under 
Gen. Alexander. 
After Battle, 182 
Alexander, Brig.-Gen. E. P., 152, 163, 

et seq., 169, 200, 209, 217, 222, et 

seq., 226. 
Ames, Brig.-Gen. A., 180. 
Ames, Brig.-Gen., 279, 286. 
Americanism, 18, 19, 23, 325, et seq. 
American People, 327. 
American Civil War, unique features, 

22> 35. 36, 37. 183. 314. et seq., 319 

321, 334, et seq. 
Anderson, Maj.-Gen. R. H., 141, 164, 

172, 174, 17 s, 188, Com. Longstreet's 

Corps, 281, 284, et seq., 293, 303, et 

seq. 
Anderson, Brig.-Gen. G. T., 161, 223, 

226. 
Appomattox, 309, et seq., 313, 324. 
Archer, Brig.-Gen., no, in, 114, 209, 

216. 
Aristocracy, 221, 312, 321, 326. 
Armies, Federal, Confederate, nature 

of, 18; formation, recruitment, 50 to 

S3; in movement, 70, 73, 133, et 

seq., at Gettysburg, streng^th, 102; 

condition, 103; positions, 105 to no, 

144; engaged, in, 123, 127, et seq., 

133 to 151; battle, 152. 
Armistead, Maj.-Gen. L. A., 201, 209, 

213, et seq., 221. 
Army of the James, 257, 27s, et seq., 

279. 
Army of Northern Virginia, 60 to 67, 

94, 143, 187, 192, et seq., 226, 229, 

237, 247; Gettysburg Campaign, 250, 

25s; Final Campaigns, 259; strength, 

260, 261; the Wilderness, 262, et seq.. 



Army of — continued. 

Spottsylvania, 265, 266; movement to 
Cold Harbor, 279 to 282; battle, 282 
to 294; Lee's influence on, 297, 304, 
et seq., condition, 307 ; et seq., sur- 
render, 312, 318; et seq., 321. 

Army of the Potomac, formation, 
strength, 62, 63, 67, 70, 8i, 85; 
usage of, 89, 92, 115, 192, 195; 
Gettysburg Campaign, losses, 251; 
under Grant, 254, 255; strength, im- 
pedimenta, 256; final campaigns, 
259; the Wilderness, 262, 263; 
Spottsylvania, 260, 279 to 282; 
battle, 282 to 294; et seq., losses, 
299; et seq., condition, 306; et seq., 
309; et seq., 312, 320. 

Army of the Shenandoah, 257. 

A Soldier, 113; incidents, 295. 

Artillery Battle, 206, et seq. 

Avery, Col. C. M., 180. 

Ayres, Brig.-Gen. R. B., 158, 168, et 
seq. 

Baltimore Pike, 107, 170, 175, 177, 178, 
ig6, 230, 2JI. 

Barnes, Brig.-Gen. Jas., 156, 162. 

Barksdale, Brig.-Gen. Wm., 163, 164, 
169, 175- 

Barlow, Brig.-Gen. F. C, 115, 123, 282, 
et seq., 284, 292, et seq. 

Bartlett, Brig.-Gen. J. J., 171, 203, 228. 

Batteries, Arnold's, 204; Bigelow's, 156, 
160, 168; Cowan's, 208; Cushing's, 
204, 215, 221; Qark's, 156, 160; 
Fitzhugh's, 208; Hazlett's, 157, 159, 
168; Hazzard's, 204; et seq., 210; et 
seq., McGilvery's, 170, 171, 176, 
203; et seq., 210, 213, 225; Os- 
borne's, 204, 205; Parson's, 208; 
Perrin's, 204; Rittenhouse's, 204, 



331 



332 



INDEX 



Batteries — continued. 

20S, 210; Rorty's, 204; Smith's, 

155. 156. IS9. 160; Winslow's, 160. 

Gen. Alexander's are indexed under 

his name. 
Baxter, Brig.-Gen. H., 120. 
Battle of the Wilderness, 259 to 264. 
Beauregard, Maj.-Gen., 27s, 276; attack 

by Butler, 278; bottles, Butler, 279, 

301, 304. 
Benning, Brig.-Gen. H. L., 155, 203, 

227. 
Berdan, Col. H., 140. 
Bermuda Hundred, 274, 277; et. seq., 

297, 300; et seq. 307. 
Biddle, Col. G. H., 123. 
Birney, Maj.-Gen., D. B., 136, 156, 

161, 166, 167, 225, 282, 290, 292. 
Blair, Sec, 96. 

Bloody Angle, 267, 293. 
Bounty Jumpers, 51, 255. 
Brainerd, Col. Wesley, 87, 88. 
Breckinridge, Gen., 281, 291, 299. 
Brewster, Col. W. R., 203. 
Brinkerhoff Ridge, 203, 230. 
Brockenborough, Col. J. M., 114, 125, 

209, 216. 
Brooke, Col. John R., 161, 167, 284, 

292, et seq. 
Brookes, Brig.-Gen., 279, 288. 
Bucktails, 1 14. 
Buford, Brig.-Gen. John, 101, 105, 

no; et seq., 115, 132, 138, 206, 234, 

238. 
Burbank, Col. S., 168, 203. 
Burling, Col. G. C, 136, is6. 
Burnside, Maj.-Gen. A., 89, 260, 283, 

289, 291. 
Butterfield, Maj.-Gen. Dan., 97. 
Butler, Maj.-Gen. B. F., 257; described, 

271, 27s; et seq., bottled, 278; in con- 
gress, 279, 301. 
Byrnes, 292. 

Cjesar, 321. 

Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. J. C, 136, 160, 

162, et seq. 

Campaign of Gettysburg, 58, 59, 70, 

78. 87, 97, 98. 
Candy, Col. C, 162, 171. 



Carr, Gen. J. B., 214- 

Carroll, Col. S. S., 181. 

Cashtown, 99, loi, 247. 

Cause of Man, 324. 

Cavalry, American, 56; et seq., 71, 80, 

98, 137, 206, 229, 270; against other 

arms, 287, 309, 311. 
Cemetery Hill and Ridge, 104, 108, 

117, 129, 131, 175, 181, 200. 
Cemetery Hill, 314. 
Chambersburg, loi, 322. 
Chambersburg pike, 105, 247. 
Chamberlain, Col. J. L., 161, 168, 169, 

174. 
Chambliss, Col. J. R., 230. 
Chancellorsville, 85, 86, 116, 150. 
Chase, Sec., 83. 
Chittenden, Col., 291. 
Citizen Soldiers, 38; et seq., 44, 46, 56; 

Terry, 272; Logan, 273; Gordon, 273. 
Cold Harbor, battle of, 283, 286, 288; 

losses, 294, 299; et seq., 304, 318. 
Condition of Armies, 99; et seq.. Con- 
federate advantages, 102, 103, 146, 

et seq. 
Conditions, North and South, 35; et 

seq., 44; et seq., 49, 54, 55. 77. 
Confederacy, 39; et seq., 54, 307; et 

seq., 317; should have succeeded, 323. 
Confederate Armies, strength, 314. 
Confederate Officers, 44, 45, 52. 
Conscripts, 255. 

Contrast and Parity, Federal and Con- 
federate soldiers, 37; et seq., 45, 56. 
Convergent and Divergent Movements, 

119, 149, 202, 238. 
Crawford, Brig.-Gen. A. W., 169, 284, 

291. 
Crest Wave, The, 220, 325. 
Cross, Col. E. E., 161, et seq. 
Cumberland Valley, 145. 
Culp's Hill, 106, 138, 16s, 176. 
Custer, Brig.-Gen. Geo. A., 230, et 

seq. 
Cutler, Brig.-Gen. L., 125, 284, 291. 



Daniel, Brig.-Gen. J., 121. 
Davis, President Jefferson, 44, 46, 309, 
320, 334- 



INDEX 



333 



Davis, Brig.-Gen. J. R., no, 114, 209, 

216. 
Day, Col. H., 168, 203. 
Democracy, 221, 312, 321, 326. 
De Trobriand, Col. P. R., 136, 154, 160. 
Detachments, 92, et seq. 
Devin, Col. T. C., 118, 127. 
Devil's Den, 105, 106, 152, 160, 194. 
Devens, Brig.-Gen., 279, 288, 311. 
Doubleday, Maj.-Gen. Abner, 112; in 

command First Corps, 113, 114, 117, 

123, 127; Generalship, 128, 171, 211, 

225, 242. 
Doles, Brig.-Gen. G., 133, 291. 

Early, Lieut-Gen. Jubal, loi, 129, 141, 

177. 179; promoted, 281; find with 

Ewell's Corps. 
Eleventh Corps, 112, 115, 117, 123, 124, 

127, 178, 238, 259. 
Emmitsburg Pike, 105, 148, 164, 169. 

200, 213, 222. 
Eustice, Col. H. L., 174, 211. 
Ewell, Lieut.-Gen. R. E., 60, 64, 75, 80, 

118, 129, 141, 152, 163, 165, 172, 176, 

179. 181, 311. 
Ewell's Second Corps, 164, 172, 178; 
Early commanding, 281, 283; et seq., 

285, 291; losses, 29s, 299, 307, 311. 

Farnsworth, Brig.-Gen. E. J., 204, 224. 

Fayetteville, 102. 

Federjil Officers, 44, 46, 53. 

Federal Enlistments, nationality, per- 
centages, casualties, discharged, de- 
serted, 311. 

Fifth Corps (Sykes), 136, 141, 157, 
162, 167, 171; under Warren, 259, 
280, 282, 291, 300, 303. 

First Corps (Reynolds, Doubleday), 
114, 116, 123; et seq., 127, et seq. 

Field, Maj.-Gen. C. W., 284, 286, 291. 

Field Intrenchments, 255, 261, 262, 317, 
et seq. 

Finegan, Brig.-Gen. J., 294. 

Fisher, Col. J. W., 174, 203. 

Flank Movement to the James River, 
299. 

French, Gen., 249. 

Gamble, Col. W., 114, 127. 



Garnett, Brig.-Gen. R. B., 201, 209, 213. 

Girrard, Col. K., 203. 

Geary, Brig.-Gen. J. W., 136, 162, 196, 

198. 
Gettysburg, 99, 117. 
Gettysburg Field, 105 to no, 117, 142. 
Gibbon, Maj.-Gen. John, 136, 213, 214, 

282, 290, 292; et seq., losses, 294, et 

seq. 
Gillmore, Gen., 272, 275. 
Gordon, Brig.-Gen. J. B., 123, 181; 

Lieut.-Gen., 273, 291, 310, 312. 
Graham, Brig.-Gen. C. K., 126, 156, 

163. 
Grand Army, 310. 
Grant, Gen., U. S., 48, 49, 90, 94, 95, 

131, 246; Commander-in-Chief, 252, 
253. 258; Final Campaigns, 259, 260; 
The Wilderness, 262, 263; described, 
264; Spottsylvania, 265; North Anna, 
268 to 270; of parole, 279; order to 
Butler,. 279; Movement to Cold Har- 
bor, 279 to 282; Battle, 282 to 294; 
incident, 289; after Cold Harbor, 296, 
299; Flanking, 300; et seq., 307; et 
seq.. Victory, 312; et seq., General- 
ship, 316; et seq., 319; his method, 
320, et seq. 

Grant, Col. L. A,, 203, 224. 

Green, Brig.-Gen. G. L., 162, 177, 178. 

Gregg, Brig.-Gen. McM., 137, 205, 230; 

et seq., 234, 282, 285. 
Gregg, Col. J. I., 230. 
Griffin, Brig.-Gen. C, 282, 284, 291. 

Hall, Col. N. J., 211. 

Halleck, Maj.-Gen. H. M., 48, 49; his 

generalship and strategy, 68, 69, 73; 

et seq., 78, 79, 82, 83, 89, 90, 92, 94; 

idle army of detachments, 92, 93, 

Sec. Welles on, 95, 98, 249, 253. 
Hampton, Brig.-Gen. Wade, 230, 332, 

289. 
Hancock, Maj.-Gen. W. S., 62, 91, 130, 

132, 167, 170, 181, 214, 225, 227, 
259, 268, 282; of Brooke, 284, 289; 
et seq., 292, 294; mourning, 297, 
300, et seq. 

Harper's Ferry, 92. 
Haskell, Col., 294. 



334 



INDEX 



Hays, Brig.Gen. H. S., i8o, i8i. 
Hayes, Brig.-Gen. Alexander, 123, 211, 

216. 
Harrow, Brig.-Gen. VV., 211, 214. 
Heth, Maj.-Gen. H., 99, 114. M'. 291. 
Heidlersburg, loi. 
Hill, Lieut.-Gen. A. P., 60, 105, 115. 

122, 163, 164, 172, 201, 212, 303, et 

seq. 
Hill's Third Corps, 164, 165, 172, 175, 

182, 223, 281. 
Hoke, Brig.-Gen. R. T., 123, 285, 287, 

et seq., 291. 
Hood, Maj.-Gen. J. B., 141, iS4i 160, 

317, 320. 
Hooker, Maj.-Gen. Joseph, 62, 69, 71. 

76, 78, 79, 82; resigns, 83; his fail- 
ing, 8s, 88, 89, 92, 96, 259. 
Howard, Maj.-Gen. O. O., 62, 112, 116, 

118, 123; et seq., 127, 132. 
Huey, Col. P., 137, 238. 
Humphreys, Brig.-Gen. A. A., 136, 138, 

156, 165, 166, 172, 225; appearance, 

264, 306. 
Humphreys, Col. B. G., 221. 
Hunt., Brig.-Gen. H. J., 62, 64, 170, 

204, 206, 208; appearance, 265. 
Hunter, Maj.-Gen., 257, 299. 

Imboden, Brig.-Gen. J. D., 206, 247. 
Ingalls, Brig.-Gen. kufus, 265. 
Iverson, Brig.-Gen. A., 120. 

Jackson, Lieut. -Gen. T. A. (Stonewall), 

63; et seq., 66, 73, 100, 130, 151, 264, 

297, 310. 
Jeff Davis Legion, 233. 
Jenkins, Brig.-Gen. A. G., 206, 230, 

231. 
Johnston, Lieut.-Gen. J. E., 257, 313; 

generalship, 316; et seq., 320. 
Johnson, Maj.-Gen. E., loi, 141, 165, 

176, 178, 197. 198. 
Jones, Brig.-Gen. J. M., 178, 179. i97- 
Jones, Brig.-Gen. W. E., 206. 

Kane, Brig.-Gen. T. L., 162, 179, 197. 
Kautz, Brig.-Gen. A. V., 274; et seq., 

278. 
Kemper, Brig.-Gen. J. L., 201, 209, 213, 

216. 



Kershaw, Brig.-Gen. J. B., 156, i6i, 
:66, 228, 241, 284, 288, 307, 311. 

Kelly, Col. P., 94. 

Keys, Maj.-Gen., 166. 

Kilpatrick, Brig.-Gen. J., loi, 192, 205, 
224, 228, 238. 

Kirkland, Brig.-Gen., 294. 

Lane, Brig.-Gen., 125, 172, 177, 180, 

181, 201, 202, 209, 216, 294. 
Law, Brig.-Gen. E. M., 142, 152, 153, 
161, 167, 168, 189, 191, 224, 226; 
comment, 244, 291, 294. 

Lee, Gen. Robert E., 40, 60, 63; et 
seq., declines Federal command, 89; 
generalship, 72; et seq., 78; et seq., 
80, 82, 94, 98; et seq., 112, 130; at 
Gettysburg, 135, 144; flank move- 
ment, 146, 147; order of battle, 148; 
et seq., 152, 163, 167; 165, 172, 17s, 
176; comments, 186 to 191, 195; et 
seq., third day, 200; et seq., 222, 227, 
229; after battle, 236, 257; com- 
ments, 240 to 24s; retreat, 247, 250; 
campaign losses, 251; final cam- 
paigns, 259; et seq., the Wilderness, 
262; Spottsylvania, 265; North Anna, 
268 to 270; movement to Cold Har- 
bor, 279 to 282; battle, 282 to 294; 
after Cold Harbor, 296; et seq., 303; 
et seq., 307; et seq., surrender, 312; 
generalship, 316; et seq., 319; et 
seq., inspirer, 326. 

Lee, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh, 230, 231, 285, 
287, 291. 

Lincoln, President Abraham, 40; et 
seq., 48; interference with armies, 
49. 75. 78, 90, 91. 249, 250, 253, 306; 
incident, 310; inspirer, 326. 

Lines of Operation, etc., 70, 72, 78, 81, 
98, ISO, 170. 194. 200, 237, 247. 

Lockwood, Brig.-Gen. H. H., 171, 174, 
197. 

Logan, Maj.-Gen. J. A., 273. 

Longstreet, Lieut.-Gen. James, 60, 64, 
1 05; his flank movement, 144; et seq., 
attack, IS2, 171, 17s, 176, 189; com- 
ments, 190, 191, 199; July Third, 
206, 210, 221, 224; comments, 243, 
244, 264, 297, et seq. 



INDEX 



335 



Longstreet's First Corps, 141, 142, 148, 
ISO. 153. 162, 164, 187, 223; Ander- 
son in command, 281, et seq. 

Lutheran Seminary, 188. 

Mahone, Brig.-Gen. W., 171, 172, 201, 
291. 

Martindale, Co., 288. 

Marshall, Col. J. K., 209, 216. 

Maxims of War, 123, 150, 227. 

McCandless, Col. W., 169, 173, 203, 
227, 228. 

McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Geo. B., 46, 47, 
89; on Halleck, 95, 300. 

McDougall, Col., 292. 

McDowell, Maj.-Gen. I., 96. 

Mcintosh, Col. J. B., 230, et seq. 

McKean, Col., 292. 

McLaws, Maj.-Gen. L., 141, 152, 155, 
163, 167; et seq., 174, 226. 

McLean, Col., 294. 

Meade, Maj.-Gen. George G., 83, 92, 
97, 100, 113, IIS, 129, 131; at Gettys- 
burg, 13s, 199, 202, 204, 225; et seq., 
after battle, 236; comments, 237 to 
240, 24s, 246; in pursuit, 248; et 
seq., campaign loss, 251; under 
Grant, 234; appearance, 264, 268, 
301, et seq. 

Meade, Col., 138. 

Meade's ready column of attack, 225. 

Meager's Irish Brigade, i6i, 162. 

Merritt, Brig.-Gen. W., 137, 204, 224. 

Meredith, Brig.-Gen. S., 123, 126. 

Milroy, Brigt-Gen., 75, 76, 93, 96. 

Newton, Maj.-Gen. J., 135, 171, 174, 

225. 
Neel, Brig.-Gen. T. H., 202, 288, 292. 
Nevin, Col. D. L., 174, 203, 228. 
Ney, Marshal, 310. 

Nichols, Brig.-Gen. F. T., 178, 179, 197. 
Ninth Corps (Burnside), 260, 280, 282; 

et seq., 303. 
North Anna Position, 268 to 270, 290. 

O'Neal. Brig.-Gen. E. A., 120. 
O'Rourke, Col. P. H., 158, 159. 
Overland Line, 94, 297. 
Owens, Brig.-Gen. J. T., 292, et seq. 



Paul, Brig.-Gen. G. R., 122. 

Peach Orchard, 136, 163, 166. 

Pendleton, Brig.-Gen. W. N., 62, 65. 

Pender, Maj.-Gen. W. D., 119, 123, 
141, 172. 

Perrin, Col. A., 125, 222. 

Perry, Brig.-Gen. E. A., 164, 165, 201, 
202, 209. 

Pettigrew, Brig.-Gen. I. J., 99, 114, 
201, 202, 209; et seq. 216. 

Pickett, Maj.-Gen. George E., 140, 150, 
190, 201, 208, 209; his charge, 211; 
et seq., 216, 217; described, 218 to 
221; personally, 243, 268; saved from 
Butler, 279, 284, 286; et seq., in- 
cident, 289, 310. 

Pipe Creek Line, 100, 102, 115, 117, 
239- 

Pleasanton, Brig.-Gen. A., 62, 65, 72. 

Plum Run, 138, 161, 162, 166, 169, 170, 
173. 199. 215. 

Political Generals, 44; Butler, 271. 

Political Factors, 44, 77, 83, 91, 97. 

Pompeius, 321. 

Petersburg, 275, 277, 297, 300; et seq., 
310; losses, 312, et seq. 

Pope, Maj.-Gen. John, 89, 101. 

Posey, Brig.-Gen. C, 171, 172, 201. 

Potter, Brig.-Gen. R. B., 291. 

Prisoners of War, 323. 

Private Property, 322. 



Ramseur, Brig.-Gen. S. D., 120, 181, 

291. 
Reed, Col., 311. 

Results of the War, 27, et seq. 
Reynolds, Maj.-Gen. J. F., 62, 82, 91, 

loi, 104, 110, 112, 113, IIS, 132. 
Rice, Col. J. C, 161, 203. 
Richmond, 94, 263, 270, 274; et seq., 

280, 297, 300, 308, 320. 
Ricketts, Brig.-Gen. R. B., 288, 292. 
Rock Creek, 106, 107, 197. 
Robertson, Brig.-Gen. J. B., 154, 199. 
Robertson, Brig.-Gen. B. H., 206. 
Robinson, Brig.-Gen. J. C, 114, 124, 

127, 178, 225. 
Rodes, Maj.-Gen. R. E., loi, 118, 120, 

123, 141, 177, 179; et seq., 284, 291. 



336 



INDEX 



Round Tops, los, io6, 139, 142, 148, 

153. «S4. 158, 161, 167, 169, 174, 184, 

185, 191, 194, 199, 203. 
Rowley, Brig.-Gen. T. A., 114, 211. 
Ruger, Brig.-Gen. T. H., 196, et seq. 
Russell, Brig.-Gen. D. A., 203, 224, 279, 

282, 288, 292. 
Scales, Brig.-Gen. A. M., 125, 201, 202, 

209, 216. 

Schimmelpfennig, Brig.-Gen. A., 118, 

123. 
Scott, Gen. Winfield, 89. 
Second Corps (Hancock), 136, 156, 162, 

170, 171, 259, 268, 279; et seq., 282, 

290, 292, 294, 297, 300, et seq. 
Sedgrwick, Maj.-Gen. John, 62, 91, 174, 

196, 197; killed, 266, 297. 
Seminary Ridge, 104, 200, 229, 238. 
Semmes, Brig.-Gen. P. J., 156, 166, 203. 
Shaler, Brig.-Gen. A., 197, 202, 211. 
Shenandoah Valley, 299. 
Sherman, Lieut.-Gen. W. T., 88, 90, 

2S2, 254, 257, 273, 313; generalship, 

316 to 322. 
Sheridan, Lieut.-Gen. P. H., 58, 253, 

258, 270, 271, 279, 281; et seq., 284; 

et seq., 286, 289, 297, 299, 311. 
Schurz, Maj.-Gen. C, 115, 117, 179. 
Sickles, Maj.-Gen. Dan., 62, 117, 138; 

his salient, 139, '40, 142, 149, 155, 

163; et seq., 167, i6g, 174, 176; 

comments, 183, et seq. 
Sigel, Maj.-Gen. F., 257. 
Sixth Corps (Sedgwick), 136, 162, 171, 

238, 259, 266, 280, 282; et seq., 290, 

292, 294, 297, 299, 303, 307, 311. 
Slocum, Maj.-Gen. H. W., 62, 82, 138, 

141, 177, 196, 228. 
Smith, Maj.-Gen. W. F., com. Eight- 
eenth Corps, 27s; et seq., 284; et 

seq., 290; et seq., 300, 303. 
Southern Confederacy, 258. 
South Mountains, 99, 102, 144, 248. 
Spangler's Spring, 177, 178, 194, 196. 
Spottsylvania, Battle of, 265 to 268. 
Stanton, Sec, 90, 96, 254. 
Stannard, Brig.-Gen. G. J., 203, 211, 

214, 215. 
Steinwcbr, Brig.-Gen. A. Von, 115, 127. 



Stuart, Lieut.-Gen. J. E. B., 56, 62, 64, 

6s, 98, loi, 142, 149, 192, 229, 230; 

et seq., killed, 270, 297. 
Steuart, Brig.-Gen. G. H., 178, 197. 
Stone, Col. Roy, 128, 211. 
Strategy, 67, 72, 73, 76, 80; et seq., 

94, 98, 99; et seq., 189, 190, 265, 

280, 288, 299, 319, et seq. 
Sumner, Senator, 78. 
Sweitzer, Col. J. B., 157. 
Sykes, Maj.-Gen. G., 62, 136, 156, 161. 

I 
Tactics, 119, 120, 144, 319. 
Terry, Brig.-Gen. A. H., 272. 
Third Corps (Sickles), 117, 136, 138, 

152, 162, 167, 169, 171, 184, 185, 259. 
Thomas, Maj.-Gen. Geo. H., 88, 317. 
Tilton, Col. W. S., 157, 166, 203. 
Torbert, Brig-Gen. A. T. A., 282, 284, 

et seq. 
Trimble, Maj.-Gen. J. R., 201, 209, 216. 
Twelfth Corps (Slocum), 136, 162, 171, 

198, 238, 2S9- 
Tyler, Brig.-Gen. R. O., 292, et seq. 

Vicksburg, 300. 

Vincent, Col. S., 157; et seq., 169. 
Virginia Salient, 32; et seq., 297. 
Volunteers, 58, 92, 306. 

Wadsworth, Brig.-Gen. J. S., 112, 178, 

179. 
Walker, Brig.-Gen. J. A., 178, 197. 
Walton, Col. J. B., 200. 
War, Causes of, 20; et seq., field of, 30, 

et seq. 
Ward, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H., 136, 152, 

154, 168. 
Warren, Maj.-Gen. G. K., 143, 153, 157, 

282, 287; et seq., 290, 300. 
Washburn, Col., 311. 
Washington, 144, 299. 
Washington, Defense of, 72, 74, 76; et 

seq., 81; covering policy, 91, 92. 
Water Line, Federal, 94. 
Webb, Brig.-Gen. A. S., 175, 211, 214. 
Weed, Brig.-Gen. S. H., 158, 161, 168. 
Welles, Sec. Navy; Diary notes, 87, 

95; et seq., 249, 252. 



INDEX 



337 



Weitzel, Maj.-Gen- G., com. Twenty- 
fifth Corps, 310. 

Wertz, of Andersonville, 323. 

Wheaton, Brig.-Gen. F., 228. 

Wilcox, Brig.-Gen. C. M., 153, 164; et 
seq., 176, 201, 202, 209, 212, 215, 
221, 291. 

Wilcox, Brig.-Gen. O. B., 291. 

Wilcox's Landing, 300. 

Wilderness, The, 260; et seq., 264, 305, 
318. 

Willard, Col. G. L., 170, 173, 211. 

Williams, Brig.-Gen. A. S., 162, 171, 
174, 196. 

Williams Brig.-Gen. Seth, 265. 

Williamsport, 238, 249. 



Wilson, Brig.-Gen. J. H., 281, 284; et 

seq., 289, 292, 303. 
Wise, Brig.-Gen., 302. 
Woodruff, Brig.-Gen. W. T., 204, 211, 

213. 
Wofford, Brig.-Gen. W. T., 163, 164, 

166, 169, 201. 
Wright, Brig.-Gen. A. R., 164, 165, 17s, 

188, 201, 202, 210, 215, 222. 
Wright, Maj.-Gen. H. G., com. Sixth 

Corps after Sedgwick, 267, 282; et 

seq., 288; et seq., 292. 

Ziegler's Grove, 135, 136, 171, 172, 199, 

205, 210. 
Zook, Brig.-Gen. D. K., 161. 167. 



